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Abstract 
In this thesis the concept of social representations is made relevant to the study of the 
‘public sphere’ according to scientists. This is elaborated by the re-examination of the 
notion of a ‘consensual’ and a ‘reified universe’ substantiating a more socio-
psychological approach in the study of relevant phenomena. Two processes generate 
social representations of the public: anchoring and objectification. The empirical 
study investigates the scientists’ views of the public sphere, in relation to public 
perceptions, media coverage and the regulation of cloning technology. Elite media 
coverage of the stem cell debate and conversations with stem cell scientists are 
systematically analysed with multiple methods. Findings are based on 461 news 
articles that appeared in Nature and Science between 1997 and 2005 and on 
interviews with 18 U.K based stem cell researchers conducted between February and 
October 2005. The analysis compares the debate before and after the ‘stem cell war’ 
of 2002, and typifies a high tension in representing the public sphere, elaborated in 
metaphors and prevailing arguments. Central elements of the representation assume a 
strong disassociation of science from the public sphere; peripheral elements operate 
with a degree of blurring of those same boundaries, which recognises a common 
project. This representation, while being expressive of its context of production, 
constitutes a functional response to it.  
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Introduction 
What is this driving force behind the development of one’s thesis? What are the 
complex circumstances that lead to its birth? Where is one to situate it and which 
theoretical, methodological and empirical tradition inspires to enrich? These 
pertaining questions constitute the essence of every piece of work and definite and 
absolute answers are hard and difficult to reach. They presuppose a certain degree of 
reflection; a distancing from one’s conscious and unconscious drives and at the same 
time a certain extent of expertise, a deep and yet panoramic understanding of different 
but nevertheless interrelated fields of knowledge and research. It would be unrealistic 
to claim that during the development of this thesis I have acquired the mastery of 
silencing subjectivity while realising full intellectual competence. However, I can 
claim with certainty that I have struggled to trace or build bridges between previously 
unrelated conceptual fields, to relate theory to method, to see, listen, and read not only 
what is given in plain site but also what remains aloof, as well as to combine logic 
with the creativity and life imagination has to offer. While doing so, I also 
experienced the efforts of the people I set out to investigate, interview and analyse; to 
claim objectivity and universality while remaining close to both those people and the 
text, and of course, above all humane. If I could capture the purpose of the present 
thesis in one little sentence that would be the way experts in one field of 
biotechnological research represent and experience the perception, representation and 
regulation of their work by non-experts. Thus, focus is placed on the perceived 
relationship between the scientific and the non-scientific as theories, selves and the 
world are also illuminated. Moscovici’s theory on social representations constitutes 
the backbone of this attempt, for it manages to offer a fruitful and holistic perspective 
of the plasticity and complexity of human thought in interaction and communication 
with the collective, the strange, the threatening, overall the other.  
 However, one of Moscovici’s initial purposes was to offer a way with which 
to study the relationship between the scientific and the non-scientific. His attempt to 
map the different ways a scientific theory, that of psychoanalysis, was received, 
perceived and transformed by different segments of French society in the 1950s is 
paradigmatic of such an effort (Moscovici, 1961/1976). In some of his writings social 
representations per se are equated to a specific type of knowledge, that of science 
made common. This perspective seems to be further fuelled by his discussion of the 
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‘consensual’ and the ‘reified’. Thus, if taken literally, it suggests that the consensual is 
the world of social representations (common sense) while the reified the world of 
science. The purpose of the individual social psychologist then is to account and 
document perceptions, identities, shifts and changes in the former. The latter is out of 
reach, probably left in the hands of philosophers to understand and explain it. In my 
opinion such a reading does not do justice to social representations as a theory of 
knowledge nor to Moscovici’s intention to enrich the scope of social psychology, nor 
does it enhance common sense and science in any way. If this is indeed the case, then 
creativity and imagination are excluded from the scientific. Social psychology is 
restricted to common sense while the role of the non-expert is limited to the 
consumption of what the expert produces. This is a rather mundane picture where 
demarcation between different forms of knowledge dictates the grasp of reality. Is the 
world really divided into two? Well, in a way it is. Scientific facts are produced in the 
confines of laboratories through the elaboration of highly technical knowledge, tools 
and practices. This is a truly universal knowledge, in the sense that facts can be 
reproduced and replicated unrelated to their context of production. This authoritative 
knowledge then makes its way out of the laboratory offering advice and credentials, 
explaining the world and planning projects of action as it also provides solutions, 
treatments and ways of protection from diseases, economic and natural disasters, to 
name but a few. Thus, weather reports define holiday plans and destinations, 
electricity promotes everyday life while sustaining communication and drugs provide 
relief from pain. Progressively, the non-scientist comes to view and act in the world 
through these skilled pieces of information. Old prejudices and myths give way to 
more rational and logical understandings. It is not a daemon that has possessed the 
individual but a chemical imbalance in her/his brain. It is not that Zeus is having a 
fight with the other gods that thunder is produced but it is the sound of lightning, an 
electrical discharge in the skies. What is being performed here is the infusion of 
scientific knowledge into other forms of knowledge. One could term this process as 
the ‘scientification’ of common sense. Then Moscovici is right to bring our attention 
to the multiple ways in which the scientific enters and changes the common-sensical. 
Indeed, large-scale studies like that of the Eurobarometer (Gaskell and Bauer, 2001; 
Bauer and Gaskell, 2002) reveal and compare how different cultural contexts 
encounter and appropriate scientific knowledge.  
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 Is this, however, just a one-way communication process, like the ‘reified’ and 
the ‘consensual’ might have us believe? Increasingly laboratory research is invaded 
by private and public agendas. The industry, the government, the army have all 
contributed in one way or another in determining not only the availability of material 
resources but also the direction of specific scientific projects and subsequent 
applications. Scientific facts not only penetrate other forms of knowledge but 
progressively challenge taken for granted conceptions of nature, the body, life itself. 
The significance of these challenges has ceased to assume a local character and are 
becoming more and more global; affecting a multitude of cultures, countries and 
individuals (Tenner, 1997). As a consequence, concerns are raised both regarding the 
risks as well as the ethics of scientific conduct. People become skeptical to the idea of 
science as progress (Tourraine, 1995). Consumers are organised to oversee what they 
eat and drink; religious and pro-life groups are formed to safeguard the embryo and its 
potential to human life; environmental organisations are set up drawing strategies and 
building rhetoric on nature and its form of exploitation. Scandals like that of the 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or the Foot and Mouth Disease reveal the 
inadequacy of expert advice to deal with current threats. At the same time that trust in 
science loses its magnitude, there is also a kind of political crisis. People no longer 
believe nor rely on the motives and decisions of the policy makers to safeguard their 
constitutional rights (Gaskell et al., 2001b). Instead, they demand to know where their 
money is going, what they consume, how to protect themselves from an increasingly 
troubled environment and how to preserve individual beliefs and values relevant to 
their culture, ethnicity and religion. As a response to that, contemporary science 
policy is undergoing important alterations. Especially for the U.K, where decision 
making used to follow a less participatory more internalised pattern, this is a novel 
phenomenon. We have come a long way from the 1985 Royal Society document 
‘Public Understanding of Science’ to the more recent report by the House of Lords 
‘Science and Society’. While the former promoted educative efforts to ‘scientise’ the 
British public, the latter puts forward a more dialogical perspective calling for the 
integration and participation of public voices in the policy of science. At the same 
time, and in an effort to build a degree of public opinion management into their 
products, large companies like the Geron Corporation began incorporating the ethical 
concerns of the public over embryo research into their research plans, promoting a 
utilitarian image of human embryonic stem cell technology and cloning (Franklin, 
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2003). Another question then arises: how is the ‘consensual’ and the ‘reified’ to 
account for such a ‘politicization’ of science? 
The present research stands at this crossroad. On the one hand, there is a 
demarcation between the scientific and the non-scientific, highly exemplified by the 
form of institutionalisation of science. On the other hand though, there is a 
progressive transcendence of those same boundaries. As social research strives to 
document, as well as, promote public understanding of science and scientific 
understanding of the public, the need to account for the way the scientific community 
experiences this reality is more topical than ever. The present thesis aspires to explore 
this phenomenon by focusing on one specific biotechnological type of research, that 
of human cloning or somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) and its experts’ 
representations of the public sphere, that is, public perceptions, media coverage and 
regulation of their work. The choice of human SCNT has been mainly dictated by the 
intense and large-scale public debate that occurred after the announcement of the birth 
of Dolly the sheep. Overcoming national barriers it is a vivid example of the 
controversial nature of current research and the progressive penetration of ethics in 
discussions about contemporary science. More specifically, the thesis attempts to 
provide a final typification of the various meanings of the public sphere, as they are 
imbedded in representational contents (anchors and objectifications); their 
interrelationships and possible functions. Relevant questions include ‘how do UK 
stem cell scientists conceptualise the public perceptions, media coverage and 
regulation of their work?’, ‘what types of communication and interaction between 
science and the public sphere do these meanings prioritise?’, ‘what are the possible 
functions of these meanings?’. In debates about science and the public sphere, words 
are the vehicles of persuasion, dialogue, exchange of ideas and perspectives, in one 
word, meanings. Rhetoric assumes a central stage. As such, two important rhetorical 
devices are investigated: metaphor and argumentation. Meaning however is not 
reached in the seclusion of the individual mind but through constant communication 
and exchange with the collective. Thus, different types of data and methods of 
analysis are triangulated, maximising the interpretative power of the present study.  
Overall, the thesis comprises three sections consisting of two theoretical, two 
methodological, and three chapters devoted to empirical analysis and the subsequent 
interpretation of the data. Chapter One re-examines Moscovici’s discussion of the 
‘reified’ and the ‘consensual’ through a consideration of their different proposed 
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readings and their respective ramifications on social representations both as a theory 
of knowledge and a phenomenon under investigation. Taking into account the 
conceptual pluralism with which the concept of social representations has been 
applied in relevant scholarship, either as science made common or as common sense, 
ideologies, values, so on and so forth, such a clarification was thought pivotal. More 
specifically and largely drawing from latest developments in relevant socio-
psychological research (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999; Duveen and Lloyd, 1990; Foster, 
2003; Jovchelovitch, 2007; Moscovici, 1993), in the context of the present thesis 
social representations are applied both as a theory of knowledge and a phenomenon 
under investigation. As a theory of knowledge, they highlight the constituted and 
constitutive nature of knowledge inviting the researcher to approach her phenomenon 
of study in a disinterested attitude (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999). As a phenomenon, they 
call for a consideration of the multiplicity of resources and processes engaged in 
knowledge making while illuminating the subjective, intersubjective and objective 
elements of representing (Jovchelovitch, 2007). By implication, and in response to 
recent criticism regarding the relevant tradition’s lack of operationalisation of the 
processes generating social representations, an attempt is made to further link 
anchoring and objectification with discursive contexts of communication. More 
specifically, anchoring is connected to metaphoricity while objectification to 
argumentation. While I cannot claim originality over this conception, for Liakopoulos 
(2000) has already proposed a similar connection, I set to further develop his original 
ideas, mainly extending them by including Billig and his perspective on 
argumentation and rhetoric. I propose that metaphors and arguments are not only 
ways of expressing and persuading but they also reveal symbolic resources and 
projections of ideas, casting light on anchors and objectifications.  
Chapter Two aspires to offer a brief yet exhaustive overview of relevant 
empirical research. Focus is placed on two related bodies of literature, that of 
sociology of science and the public understanding of science tradition. The purpose is 
threefold. At a first level, relevant research might help in the identification of possible 
empirical and methodological lacunae. At a second level, similar studies provide an 
important resource in further enhancing the understanding of the phenomenon of 
research. Lastly, they identify possible bodies of knowledge to which the present 
research might contribute.  
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The next two chapters are more methodological in nature. Thus, Chapter 
Three discusses human SCNT and the related public debate as it occurred after the 
birth of Dolly in the UK. In the first part of the chapter the reader is introduced to the 
technicalities and background of SCNT research. Adopting Bauer and Gaskell’s 
(2002) proposed framework for researching the relationship between science and the 
public, the human SCNT debate is approached as a movement. The model has 
informed the design of the present research by enabling the identification of different 
actors and the demarcation between different interest groups while offering a clear 
and manageable operational definition of the public sphere. Public perceptions, media 
coverage and regulation are defined as the constitutive arenas of the public sphere. 
Considering the plurality of terms with which to refer to the non-scientific, such as 
‘common sense’, ‘society’, ‘everyday knowledge’, ‘lay’, the definition is of great 
analytical value for the researcher. It is with such a connotation that all relevant terms 
are used in the context of the present thesis.  
Chapter Four takes us to the heart of the research design. It discusses the 
specific methods used for the collection of the data and their subsequent analysis. 
Thus, articles from two scientific journals Nature and Science discussing public 
perceptions, media coverage and regulation of Cell Nuclear Replacement (CNR) 
technology from 1997 to 2005 are triangulated with material from individual 
interviews with UK scientists, conducted over a period of nine months, from February 
to October 2005. This is performed in an attempt to further enlighten both 
sociogenetic and ontogenetic aspects of social representations. Moreover, content 
analysis of the scientific media is combined with metaphor and argumentation 
analysis uncovering trends and patterns of coverage while accounting for the 
construction of social representations in formal settings of communication. Analysis 
of metaphors and arguments used by experts to refer to public developments of SCNT 
research while talking privately is also performed. In each case, reasons are offered 
grounding the choice of different types of data and methods of analysis. Examples are 
also given (mainly in the appendices section) further explaining the logic and mode of 
conduct.  
The following three chapters are dedicated to the presentation of findings. 
Thus, Chapter Five discusses the results of the analysis of the scientific journals. 
What types of public events are discussed in the scientific press? Which ‘public 
spheres’ mostly preoccupy interest? Which voices are represented? What kind of 
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metaphors and arguments are used? Are there any shifts across the years investigated? 
Chapter Six brings forth the ontogenetic element of social representations while 
allowing for comparisons with the data derived from the analysis of the journals. 
Again, what types of metaphors and arguments are employed in private? Are there 
any differences between individual accounts? And what about the self? Chapter Seven 
concludes the present work by offering a more synthetic view. Thus, a discussion of 
the social representations of the public sphere as indicated in the representational field 
analysed is offered. Meanings and contents are linked to structure and functions of 
representing while accounting for the overall context of their production. The chapter 
ends in a reflective tone by providing some preliminary propositions for future social 
representations studies.  
Despite its limited focus the thesis manages to produce a set of rich and 
fruitful data, enhancing our understanding not only of social representations but of 
being and living in a highly complex and complicated world. Thus, it provides access 
to the experience of encountering different knowledge, competing views and opinions 
whilst operating in a highly debated field of research. As boundaries and 
demarcations are drawn protecting professional ideologies and ideals, at the same 
time they are mixed and blurred, sustaining future choices and practices. Such a 
hybridity is not only reflective of the world but also a functional response to it. Being 
in itself becomes hybrid, as the following pages will reveal. Overall, the present work 
extends both social representations tradition and relevant socio-psychological study of 
expert forms of knowledge. At the same time, it also makes developments in the study 
of rhetoric, sociology of science, public understanding of science and political 
sciences. Considering recent attempts to redefine and refine the relationship between 
the scientific and the public sphere, such an account is considered highly topical.  
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Chapter 1 
Revisiting the ‘reified’ and the ‘consensual’ in the context of 
communication  
 
The choice of a theoretical framework in the study of a given phenomenon is always 
expressive, among other things, of the researcher’s conceptual stance in relation to 
current paradigms of research in her/his respective field of study. Thus, it is my 
personal contention that Moscovici’s seminal theory expanded the discipline of Social 
Psychology both on theoretical and methodological levels by raising the attention of 
the researcher to the study of human thought and action as a dynamic and interactive 
process. By rupturing prior demarcations between the internal and the external, 
Moscovici revitalised the field with references to communication, rationality, 
diversity, the social and the individual, to name but a few. He has managed to offer a 
conceptual and methodological model flexible enough to account for the study of 
polyphony experienced in present conditions of living. However, when accepting a 
theory, one can also find oneself engaged in a dialogue about those aspects of it that 
are currently the object of further development. In such an instance, one can either 
work towards its expansion or on second thought dismiss it as lacking any 
explanatory power.  
 Over the past forty years or so an intense and fruitful debate has developed 
around the theoretical and methodological contributions of social representations 
theory in Social Psychology. In this vein, Farr (1993) recognizes the potential of the 
theory to enlarge the scope of the discipline by reinstating the importance of myth and 
magic, language, religion and customs while giving new significance to old methods 
of research. Overall, a vast corpus of authoritative work has been produced, pondering 
on the origins of Moscovici’s work, on the nature and functions of social 
representations, on their operationalisation in research and so on, with a view to 
further extend his original ideas (e.g. Duveen & Moscovici, 2000; Deaux & 
Philogene, 2001; Wagner, & Hayes, 2005; Jovchelovitch, 2007). For others, however, 
inconsistency and vagueness lie at the heart of the theory calling it ‘a pot-pourri of 
contradictory ideas, seasoned with some pieces of speculative cognitive psychology’ 
(McKinley & Potter, 1987, p.484). By and large, in a review of the relevant literature 
Voelklein and Howarth (2005) identify four basic lines of criticism leveling 
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reservations against social representations accounts, regarding what is seen as a) 
theoretical ambiguity, b) social determinism, c) cognitive reductionism, and d) lack of 
a critical agenda in the proposed relationship between scientific and commonsensical 
knowledge. It is not within my intentions to extensively discuss all relevant accounts, 
but rather to focus on two particular aspects of Moscovici’s theory, which received 
much attention. That is Moscovici’s treatment of the relationship between the 
scientific and the public realm, verbalized in the names of the ‘reified’ and the 
‘consensual’, and his propositions regarding the contents of social representations, 
namely anchors and objectifications.  
Relating to the former, I set to further expand some earlier points made by Foster 
(2003), as to the different proposed readings of the reified and the consensual, the 
different interpretations of social representations that each of them entails and to the 
wider implications they hold for the socio-psychological study of different kinds of 
representations. While documenting this polyphony, the present thesis will be situated 
in line with some recent propositions offered by social representations researchers 
(Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Duveen, & Lloyd, 1990; Foster, 2003; Jovchelovitch, 2007; 
Moscovici, 1993) that corroborate a more holistic understanding of representation as 
an over-arching phenomenon found at the basis of all knowledge systems, more or 
less expert. These propositions not only offer a clearer and more elaborate definition 
of social representations, both as a potential theory of knowledge and as a 
phenomenon to be studied, but they also put forward a well-articulated framework for 
performing relevant studies, and in so doing tightening the links between theory and 
research.  
At a second level, and motivated by current on-going discussions about the lack of 
operationalisation in the study of the contents of social representations an attempt will 
be made to further elaborate on some earlier efforts by Liakopoulos (2000) to relate 
the study of rhetoric with that of anchors and objectifications. More specifically, 
anchors will be connected to metaphors and objectifications to arguments. While 
positivism asserts the neutrality of methods of research with respect to theory, I would 
agree with Farr (1993) that one should always consider the methods of research in 
relation to the theoretical framework adopted, for there should be a match.  
The present chapter intends to clearly manifest and explain the rationale in which 
social representations are employed throughout this thesis, both conceptually and 
empirically. It is believed that such an understanding further expands Moscovici’s 
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initial ideas to promote and substantiate a more socio-psychological approach in the 
study of the relationship between different types of knowledge and their holders 
(Moscovici, 1987; 1993).  
That stated, it is propounded that the choice of Moscovici’s social representations 
theory should also be linked to the context of the Institute of Social Psychology at the 
LSE, which hosted the development of the present thesis in an atmosphere of on-
going discussions about the contextual and polyphasic nature of human thought. It is 
these kinds of ideas and debates that have nurtured and cultured my understanding of 
Social Psychology as a discipline for the study of social phenomena, that is, 
phenomena situated in the world we live and create in.  
 
1.1 Social representations: from the ‘naïve’ to the ‘amateur’ scientist 
The concept of representation, as the making present of what is actually absent 
through the use of symbols has been central in social science’s studies of the human 
mind, language, self, societies, and cultures; in one word, of human life. While it is 
not within the intentions of the present thesis to fully account for this rich and 
polychromous tradition
1
, it suffices to say that various scholars have long pondered on 
the centrality of representation in the development of the human infant, in the 
construction of language and acquisition of speech, in the establishment of social 
order, and in the formation and transformation of different cultures, to name but a 
few. However, it is representation’s epistemic function, that is, its ability to produce 
knowledge about the world that has been the subject of intense debate through the 
centuries. Questions such as, ‘how does the human mind acquire access to the 
‘outside world’? or ‘how valid can this representation be?’ have preoccupied the 
minds and writings of a plethora of social researchers (Jovchelovitch, 2007).  
In the context of Social Psychology and for the first half of the preceding century, 
a highly mentalistic perspective dominated the study of representation, both 
conceptually and empirically (Duveen, 2000). Drawing from Descartes’ cogito ergo 
sum representations were studied as individual cognitive processes deprived of their 
contextual or symbolic nature. As a corollary, representations were treated as mere 
reproductions of an external reality, existing somewhere in the distant ‘out there’.  
Confined within laboratory walls, social psychologists strived to document human 
                                                 
1
 For a more comprehensive account of work on representation see Jovchelovitch (2007) 
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mind’s information-processing procedures as analogous to that of a lifeless computer. 
In this vein, any observed discrepancies between external reality and internal 
cognition were accounted for as biases and errors. Soon, the idea of the individual 
person as naïve prevailed. 
It is against this mundane and degraded image of the human mind that 
Moscovici’s innovative contribution can be fully appreciated. Retracing his steps, 
Moscovici (2000; Moscovici & Markovà, 2000) reports how his understanding of 
such diverse works as that of Durkheim, Freud, Heider, Lévy-Bruhl, Piaget and 
Vygotsky provided the main intellectual background for his battle against social 
psychology’s behaviouristic, individualistic and positivistic dominance. With his 
original work on the way psychoanalysis was received and consequently appropriated 
by different milieus in the French public sphere of the 20
th
 century, he set to restore 
the concept of representation by recuperating the links between the social and the 
cognitive (Moscovici, 1961/1976). By connecting knowledge to its social and 
historical conditions of production he reinstated the rationality of the individual 
person, not as a neutral observer of the world but as an active subject in the process of 
constructing it. Knowledge of something is always knowledge of someone in a 
specific place and time. At the same moment, knowledge is contested, communicated, 
discussed and transformed. As such, knowledge is never fixed or static and its plural 
and changing nature needs to be appreciated. It does not merely reflect certain 
representations and attitudes about the world but also situates people in the world, 
debunking social and psychological identities. As Jovchelovitch (2007) astutely points 
out, Moscovici set about to establish that: 
 
 (a) there is no such thing as ‘free’ knowledge, produced by a subject ‘free’ of 
others, history and belonging; (b) that ordinary people can hold knowledge and 
know what they are talking about; (c) that history and structures do not exist 
independently of the subjects that produce them in the first place. (p.44) 
 
However, at the same time this was also a study of the relationship between 
different forms of knowledge, both scientific and common sense. The centrality for 
social psychologists that Moscovici (1987) affirms to such an endeavor has made him 
proclaim that: 
Any science devoted to the study of thoughts and beliefs in the society of 
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our times must come to terms with an obvious epistemological problem: the 
relationship between scientific and non-scientific thought, or what one refers 
to as popular thought, common sense, the thinking  of lay men and women, 
ideological thought e.t.c. (p.513). 
 
Indeed for Wells (1987) Moscovici’s social representations could be seen not only 
as a theory of understanding knowledge, its conditions of genesis and functions but 
also as a meta-theory offering explanations of the relationship between science and 
common sense. This latter point, calls for a consideration of what Moscovici has 
described as ‘consensual’ and ‘reified’ universes. The different possible readings of 
this proposed dichotomy hold profound ramifications not only for the definition and 
consequent empirical uses of social representations theory both in general and in 
relation to the present thesis, but also for the potential role of social psychology in the 
study of different types of knowledge and their inter-relations.  
 
1.2 The ‘reified’ and the ‘consensual’ revisited 
According to Foster (2003) Moscovici’s discussion of the consensual and the reified 
offers the possibility of a number of different readings postulating in this way 
different understandings of the relationship between science and common sense as 
well as different definitions of social representations as theoretical concepts, 
inevitably leading to distinct empirical routes.  
 A first rather strict and literal meaning of the ‘reified’ and the ‘consensual’ 
seems to suggest a clear demarcation between science and common sense, splitting 
reality into two distinct and incompatible worlds. Hence, in some parts of Moscovici’s 
work (1981; 1984; 1987) the reified universe is discussed as the mode of knowledge 
corresponding to science. Its purpose is to construct a map of the forces, objects and 
events that exist ‘out there’, independent of human interaction. Thus, as he proclaims, 
things here become the measure of man. In contrast, the consensual universe 
corresponds to social representations: 
 
‘a set of concepts, statements and explanations originating in daily life in the course 
of inter-individual communication. They are the equivalent, in our society, of the 
myths and belief systems in traditional societies; they might even be said to be the 
contemporary version of common sense’ (Moscovici, 1981, p. 181).  
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While the purpose of science is to turn something familiar into something unfamiliar, 
the purpose of social representations, and thus common sense, follows the opposite 
direction, making present and concrete what had remained absent and aloof. Here man 
is the measure of things. By implication, social psychology is to become a science of 
this consensual universe.  
Such a reading seems to hold immense ramifications for the understanding and 
study of scientific and common-sense knowledge by social psychologists. Thus, seen 
in this light, science emerges once again as an amnesic, ahistorical, ahuman, almost 
mythical endeavour (Bangerter, 1995; McKinley & Potter, 1987; Purkhardt, 1993). 
Descartes’ cogito ergo sum resurfaces in the form of what Jovchelovitch (2007) terms 
‘the psychology of the pure object’ proclaiming the purity of a world that is seen as 
detached of any human input. However, the ethnographic study of scientific 
laboratories, with the work of Latour and his colleagues (1999; Latour & Woolgar, 
1986), as being more paradigmatic, has indicated how reification, that is, what we 
come to acknowledge as a scientific fact, as a true depiction of our world, is not an a 
priori condition of science but rather the ex-post facto of a long process that in its 
making includes a number of different resources, more or less esoteric to science. 
More specifically, the reification of a scientific fact is as much the product of hybrid 
processes that include personal motives and aspirations, scientific instruments, 
expeditions and sites, interrelations among like-minded peers, between different 
scientific groups, and between holders of different types of knowledge, more or less 
expert (such as activists, politicians, the public, the media and so on and so forth), as 
of purified processes, like the distanciation between: self and the world, humans and 
non-humans, science and common sense (Bachelard, 1938; Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 
1983; Latour, 1987; Latour, 1993; Latour & Woolgar, 1986). That is, reified scientific 
knowledge as ahistoric, objective, ahuman, and context-free is only but the outcome 
of historic, subjective, human and contextual procedures. This realisation, however, 
should not be taken as a relativistic understanding of reified representations, but as a 
realistic assumption that what we understand the world to be is a product of human 
thought, action and inter-action. Even scientists’ purposeful attempts to discard their 
own subjectivity so as to acquire an objective understanding of the world is both the 
constituted product of more or less consensually reached norms (Kuhn, 1970), as well 
as constitutive of scientific communities, identities and ideologies (Bangerter, 1995; 
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Jovchelovitch, 2007). And while to a non-scientist, scientific theories and studies may 
turn something familiar into the unfamiliar, for a scientist familiarity, concretisation 
and explanation lie at the heart of science’s modus operandi and scopes. Since social 
psychology’s establishment per se has been based on the making sense of such 
complex and live phenomena, why should we exclude them from its study? Is it, 
perhaps, because it lacks analogous rich explanatory potential? It is my personal 
conviction not to rush to such a conclusion lightly. Moscovici’s theory of social 
representation has the ability to form the basis of such an endeavour. However, before 
further elaborating on this point, one should finish what one set out to accomplish. 
Therefore, it is time to return once more to the reified-consensual dichotomy and 
ponder on the consequences of this first and rather literal reading on common sense. 
The allocation of common sense in a universe operating in the exact opposite way 
to that of science runs the risk of neutralising one of Moscovici’s great intentions, that 
is, the restoration of the rationality of common sense. If reification, in other words, the 
production of objective knowledge about the world, is only part of the game of 
science, then how is one to assess the ontological power of other forms of knowledge? 
Hence once again, Descarte’s dichotomy between subject and object returns to 
institute what Jovchelovitch (2007) calls the ‘psychology of the pure subject’. The 
human mind once again finds its route back to the seclusion of its private thoughts, 
biases and errors. The underlying hierarchy between different types of knowledge that 
such an understanding of the reified and the consensual suggests, takes social 
psychology back to its positivistic past (Foster, 2003). As it has been argued so far, 
this is not what Moscovici aspired to achieve nor is it in line with relevant socio-
psychological findings (some examples include Gervais, 1997; Gervais & 
Jovchelovitch, 1998; Jodelet, 1991; Moscovici, 1961/1976). Indeed, to an observer 
certain representations may seem to be irrational, unfounded or stereotypical but they 
still remain, for those who hold them, the product of historic, social and contextual 
processes while performing a series of functions, such as, producing theories about 
the world, providing identity, assisting communication, resisting; in a word, situating 
oneself in the world while taking a stance towards it (Moscovici, 1988).  
Another reading of Moscovici’s discussion of the two universes focuses on the 
proposed relationship between science and common sense. On some occasions, it 
seems that Moscovici (Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983) proposes a uni-directional 
mode of rapport between the consensual and the reified. Postulating a transition from 
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first to second hand knowledge as the phenomenon of our times, he appears to suggest 
an alteration in the flow between scientific and common sense knowledge. Thus, 
while in the past science was born out of common sense, the revolution of 
communication has neutralised this process. Now, the flow of information has been 
reversed with the diffusion of scientific facts into common sense and the birth of 
social representations. Social representations per se are equated to a particular type of 
knowledge, that of ‘science made common’, a modern version of common sense. As a 
corollary, social representations research comes to occupy a middle space between 
science and society, studying the transformations of scientific knowledge as it enters 
the world of the non-scientist. In his terms, “from its inception, the notion of social 
representations was conceived in order to study how the game of science becomes 
part of the game of common sense” (Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983, pg. 101). As such, 
the idea of a ‘true common sense psychology’ is promoted while the theory of social 
representations becomes anchored in the tradition of Public Understanding of Science 
studies as a form of interpretationist research (Michael, 2002). Such a treatment of 
social representations as ‘science made common’ seems to be problematic on the 
basis of two premises. On the one hand, it appears to favour a particular type of 
research, thus restricting the scope of the theory to empirically account only for the 
transformations scientific concepts undergo once they enter the consensual realm. As 
Foster (2003) also points out, such an account does not seem to reflect the reality of 
relevant research. Thus, a number of social representations studies have expanded 
Moscovici’s theory by examining representations not necessarily originating from 
science but from common sense understanding, like Jodelet’s (1991) scholarly work 
on the representations of madness in a French community or Philogene’s (1994) study 
on the representations of ‘Black’ and ‘African American’. On the other hand, this 
proposition seems to deprive public understanding of science from having any 
significance in the reification of scientific knowledge (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Bauer 
& Gaskell, 2002; Foster, 2003). However, as has been argued so far, this assumption 
falls short. Moreover, although rationality is reinstated in the world of common sense, 
a canonical account of science communication is sustained. As a result, a 
unidirectional view of the communication process prevails with science remaining the 
sole original point of departure, while transformation processes are located in the later 
stages of scientific construction (Bucchi, 1998). Such a treatment seems to be out of 
step with current science communication research and its subsequent identification of 
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more complex ways in which science and non-science interact (Hargreaves & 
Ferguson, 2000; Lewenstein, 1995). 
Another reading of Moscovici’s discussion on the consensual and the reified has 
been proposed by Duveen & Lloyd (1990). They report that Moscovici’s real 
intention was to draw attention to the differentiation between scientific and common-
sense understanding as a phenomenon of our times, and not to propose a particular 
philosophy of science. Such a reading invites the idea that Moscovici was in fact 
trying to reflect the way contemporary Western societies, in representing different 
forms of knowledge, create distinctions and assign different degrees of status. Again, 
Foster (2003) brings to discussion a series of references in Moscovici’s writings that 
seem to entertain this perspective, neutralising the centrality of the ‘consensual’ and 
the ‘reified’ in the theory of social representations. She reports how on certain 
occasions Moscovici talks about the two universes as ‘categories’ and ‘contexts’ 
(Moscovici, 1984; 1988). Moscovici (1993) himself propounds on how the separation 
between common sense and science as incompatible and the subsequent hierarchical 
treatment of knowledge, could be seen as a co-product of the dominant social 
psychology of his time where the distanciation of knowledge from its social and 
historical context of production led to the degradation of common sense as prone to 
errors, biases and stereotypes, and to the elevation of scientific knowledge as 
objective and reified. Yet, a close examination of the reification of science, like that 
proposed by Latour and his colleagues (Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983; Latour, 1987; 
Latour, 1993; Latour & Woolgar, 1986), as the product of a long contextual, historic, 
social, in one word, human process, brings forth a number of questions, still under-
examined by social psychologists, like: 1) Under what conditions and by what 
processes does a certain group of experts produce a certain representation about and 
of the world? 2) How is this representation received and appropriated by the rest of 
the scientific community? 3) How is this representation received and appropriated by 
other groups more or less expert (like the general public, politicians, the media or 
interest groups)? 4) What kinds of roles (if any) do these groups play in the reification 
(or non-) of such a representation? 5) What are the processes of communication and 
persuasion connected to these conditions?  
One could go on with such questions since each one of them represents but a 
whole tree of other interrelated questions, like for example, ‘what kind (if any) of 
human and non-human resources are mobilised in the formulation of a scientific 
 28 
representation? (Latour, 1999)’; ‘under what conditions do scientists share and 
discuss knowledge? (Moscovici, 1993)’; ‘what kinds of transformations does a 
scientific representation undergo by non-experts? (Moscovici, 1961/1976; Gaskell & 
Bauer, 2001)?’; ‘what kind of transformations do scientific representations undergo 
by scientists themselves so as to render them suitable for propagation within 
differentiated publics? (Bucchi, 1998, p.7)’; ‘what kinds of representations of the 
relationship between science and non-science are enacted in this process?’ The 
present thesis makes a more socio-psychological contribution to this last question, 
also investigated by other social scientists, as will be discussed more closely in the 
next chapter. However, before proceeding any further, the question still remains: If 
such complex phenomena are indeed the case then how can Social Psychology 
contribute to their study? It is my assertion that once again one should return to the 
concept of representation and its subsequent treatment.  
If reification is but the mixed product of different types of representations held by 
different types of representations holders, then representations are what there is to 
begin with (Jovchelovitch, 2007). The tradition of decontextualising representations 
from the people who hold them, from the historical conditions in which they are 
created, and from the possible symbolic functions they could potentially play, has 
resulted in splitting the world into two: one world in which rationality reigns and 
another where irrationality is the norm. From its inception, Moscovici’s theory of 
social representations has been a forceful polemic to such an idea. It is to this, now 
almost 50-year long tradition of social psychological research that one could turn in 
order to base a more symmetrical treatment of all representations, originating either 
from expert or less expert contexts. Moscovici’s (1993) assertion that all 
representations, including scientific, are social, that is, they are constituted by and 
constitutive of the communities of people who produce and share them in a specific 
place and time, opens the way to such an endeavour. A number of social 
representations researchers over the years have come to cultivate, promote, and 
expand such an understanding and employment of Moscovici’s original theory. It is in 
the context of such an understanding that Moscovici’s social representations are 
likewise employed in the present thesis.  
Recently Jovchelovitch (2007) argues for a socio-psychological approach to 
knowledge: 
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 ‘[T]hat can retrieve its connection to the personal, interpersonal and sociocultural 
worlds in which it is produced. Representation is at the basis of all knowledge 
systems and understanding its genesis, development and realisation in social life 
provides the key to understanding the relationship that ties knowledge to persons, 
communities and life words’ (ibid, p.2). 
Thus, while representation forms the basis of all knowledge systems, every 
representation comes as the symbolic outcome of the interrelations between self, 
other, and the object world. More specifically, as Bauer and Gaskell (1999) argue, to 
represent, that is, to produce symbols that provide meaning, involves a minimal 
triadic system comprised of two people and one object. Meaning is not produced 
magically in the mind of the individual but always in relation to another, implied or 
imagined (work by scholars like Piaget (1962) and Winnicott (1967; 1985) 
corroborates such an understanding). To this basic triangle ‘a time dimension, both 
past and future, is added to denote the implied or espoused project (P) linking the two 
subjects and the object’ (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999, p.170). Thus, knowledge of 
something is always knowledge by someone in relation to other subjects, their 
interrelations and communication as taking place in a specific context and within a 
time horizon. It is these intersubjective and interobjective relations that define the 
symbolic shape of objects in the social world and ultimately, the set of a shared 
system of symbolic codes that determine what is to be accounted for as real or not in a 
given context and time (Jovchelovitch, 2007).  
In this light, Moscovici’s social representations come both as: (1) a theory of 
knowledge, seen as constituted by and constitutive of its contexts of production; and 
(2) a phenomenon, a set of empirical regularities comprising the ideas and practices of 
a specific group of people towards a specific object to be studied in close connection 
to the social and communicative processes that produce and reproduce them. 
Moscovici’s (1961/1977) initial attempt to study the way psychoanalysis was received 
and perceived in different French milieus of the 20
th
 century, pointed to a possible 
way in which to study relevant socio-representational phenomena. Work in this 
tradition has both expanded and crystallised Moscovici’s intentions, by offering a 
paradigm of how to approach social representations as phenomena of research (Bauer 
& Gaskell, 1999; Duveen & Lloyd, 1990; Flick, 1992a; 1992b; Farr, 1993; Gervais et 
al., 1999; Jovchelovitch, 2007 and Sotirakopoulou & Breakwell, 1992). Although a 
fuller account of the way this work has informed the empirical elaboration of the 
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present study is given in subsequent chapters (see Chapters 2 & 4), one needs to 
return to the wider ramifications that the theory of social representations holds for the 
socio-psychological study of knowledge.  
 
1.3 Researching social representations 
If representation, seen as the symbolic outcome of subjective, intersubjective, and 
objective processes, is the basis of all types of knowledge, then, the illumination of 
these processes forms an essential part of the work of social psychologists. 
Jovchelovitch’s (2007) discussion of these processes as the ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘how’, 
‘why’ and ‘what for’ of representation offers a clear and comprehensive framework 
for relevant studies. Thus, if one is to account for social representations as a theory of 
knowledge, then the purpose of relevant research should be to proceed by taking into 
account whose knowledge it is set to investigate, the content of this knowledge, and 
its links to the conditions of its genesis and multiple functions.  
The ‘Who’ of representation. It is in social milieus, that is, groups of people bound 
together by a common project that social representations are born and circulate, 
embodied in behaviours, individual cognitions, informal and formal settings of 
communication (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). Hence, representations are always 
constructed by someone in relation to someone else (Jodelet, 1991; Moscovici, 1984). 
The illumination of who is representing, that is, the specification of appropriate social 
segments for the study of social representations can constitute an a priori condition 
for the elaboration of one’s study or its ex-post facto outcome. In some cases, it is the 
object of representation that becomes a self-referential point for the formation and 
organisation of more or less clearly defined and identified social milieus to be 
investigated (for example, self-referential groups, like environmental or religious 
ones). In other cases, however, it is the outcome of a study that makes this 
segmentation possible, as was the case in Moscovici’s original work on the 
introduction of psychoanalysis in the French public sphere of the 20
th
 century that 
resulted in the differentiation among three distinct social milieus toward 
psychoanalysis, the urban-liberal, the Catholic and the communist milieus (Bauer & 
Gaskell, 1999). Whatever the case may be, the illumination of who is representing 
calls for a consideration of the identity (individual or social) and the history linking 
this group of people together. And while for some groups knowledge of something 
also seeks to represent the people who carry it, for others it is the bracketing out of the 
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identity of the knower that may well be at the forefront of representational processes, 
the clearest example being science (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Therefore, the position of a 
group vis-à-vis an object and the mode of engaging in representational processes offer 
the possibility for comparisons among different social milieus, holding different types 
of representations (Bangerter, 1995; Gaskell & Bauer, 2001; Gervais, 1997; 
Moscovici, 1961/1976).  
The ‘What’ of representation. The ‘what’ of the representation relates to the 
construction of the object, that is, the ideas, themes and significations that are ascribed 
to it; in one word the content of the representation (Jovchelovitch, 2007). According 
to Moscovici (1981; 1984; Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983) it is through transformative 
processes, namely by anchoring and objectifying, that the symbolic construction of an 
object is performed. As such, the illumination of the content calls for the mapping out 
of all possible anchors and objectifications of a given object in a given group of 
people at a given time. This is what Bauer & Aarts (2000) call a process of 
typification. Therefore, either through the study of words and/or visual images, and/or 
bodily movement, and/or non-linguistic sounds, the purpose of the individual social 
representations researcher is to map out the content of representation; the making 
known of previously unknown attributes (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). Such an 
illumination of the content of the representation could then open the way to further 
conceptual developments, like for example: a) the identification of core and peripheral 
elements, that is, of the structure of the representation in a given group at a given time 
(Abric, 1993); or b) the comparative analysis of contents of representations among 
different groups of people in a specific time-frame; or c) the investigation of the 
transformations the representations of a given object undergo in the history of a group 
of people. At the same time, it is through the study of the content of the representation 
that the analysis of its ‘how’, ‘why’ and ‘what for’ is further substantiated.  
The ‘How’ of representation. It is through social interaction and communication that 
representations are formed and transformed. It is the consideration of such processes 
that involve the study of the ‘how’ of representation in close affinity with its content. 
More specifically, the content of a representation may reveal the possible 
communicative style adopted by a social milieu in relation to others. Does the content 
of a representation entail the recognition of other perspectives or is it indicative of 
how one voice is imposed over another? (Jovchelovitch, 2007).  
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The ‘why’ and the ‘what for’ of representation. The ‘why’ of the representation 
denotes not only its cognitive function to create knowledge about the world but also 
its symbolic function to express motives, intentions, and emotions. As such, the 
investigation of the content of the representation sheds light not only on a group’s 
worldview but also on personal and emotional logic. Added to that, one finds the 
functions of the representation, that is, its ‘what for’ elements, closely connected. And 
while a lively discussion on the demarcation of social representations from other types 
of knowledge, such as myths, ideology or attitudes, to name but a few, has flourished 
over the years (Flick, 1998; Gaskell & Fraser, 1990; Jahoda, 1988), social 
representations research has re-directed relevant questions by showing them to be part 
of the numerous functions of representing. Thus, social representations may serve, at 
one and the same time, different functions for a social group be they ideological, 
mythical, familiarising, providing identities, sustaining conformity, enabling 
resistance, assigning attitudes, or planning and scripting intentional activities (Bauer 
& Gaskell, 1999; Gervais & Jovchelovitch, 1998; Herzlich, 1973; Jodelet, 1991; 
Jovchelovitch, 1995; Liakopoulos, 2000; Moscovici, 1961/1977, Philogene, 1994). 
Future research may enrich and further substantiate such a long list.  
Thus far, an overview of the various readings of Moscovici’s discussion 
regarding the ‘reified’ and the ‘consensual’ has been offered. It has been argued that a 
rather literal understanding of the ‘reified’, as the world of science, and the 
‘consensual’, as the world of common sense, hence, social representations, runs the 
risk of treating old hierarchies between different types of knowledge as an a priori to 
their study. Such an understanding not only threatens the rationality of non-expert 
knowledge, but also has the potential to reduce the scope of Social Psychology to a 
positivist approach of knowledge. A second reading of the ‘reified’ and the 
‘consensual’ resulted in restricting social representations to a specific type of 
knowledge, that of science made common, while promoting a, so far ungrounded, uni-
directional understanding of the relationship between science and common sense. In 
light of recent developments in the social representations tradition of research and the 
social study of science, an alternative understanding of the ‘reified’ and the 
‘consensual’ has been offered; one that suggests Moscovici’s intention was to 
highlight such a dichotomy more as a phenomenon of our times. This alternative 
reading offers the opportunity for the re-direction of relevant research questions of the 
relationship between science and common sense, as well as a different 
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conceptualisation of Moscovici’s social representations per se, both as a theory of 
knowledge and an empirical phenomenon to be studied. At the core of such an 
interpretation, lies the assumption that representation is at the heart of every type of 
knowledge, be it more or less expert. Representation, however, is not treated as the 
amnesic, asocial creature of an individual mind but as the symbolic outcome of 
communicative interrelations among subjects over an object at a specific place and 
time with the potential for the individual to produce knowledge about the world while 
situating itself in it. Nevertheless, reconnecting knowledge with the people who hold 
it and their conditions of living and interacting at a specific time should not be treated 
as a way to trivialize it as subjective or biased. Indeed, to argue for the objectivity of 
the world as socially constructed does not make it less objective (Jovchelovitch, 
2007). As it has been argued, objectivity is but the product of contextual, historic, 
individual and social processes. It is its pre-existence as a fait-accompli that such a 
treatment of representation, and consequently, knowledge seeks to renounce. Indeed, 
if there are consensual and reified categories of knowledge they should be the subject 
of empirical verification of relevant social psychological research, not a blindly 
accepted presupposition. Moscovici’s social representations as a theory of knowledge 
have the ability to fill such a lacuna.  
At the same time, the above discussion offers a clear understanding of the way 
social representations are conceptualised and employed in the present thesis, both as a 
theory of knowledge and as a phenomenon under investigation. As a theory of 
knowledge, social representations highlight the constituted and constitutive nature of 
knowledge inviting the researcher to approach her phenomenon of study in close 
connection to the conditions of its genesis in a disinterested attitude (Bauer & Gaskell, 
1999). Indeed, to an observer certain representations may seem irrational or biased, 
however, one may well account for their functionality when taking into account their 
social and historical dimensions. As a phenomenon, social representations invites the 
researcher to consider and further highlight the subjective, intersubjective, and 
objective elements of representation, that is, the ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘how’, ‘why’ and 
‘what for’ of the representation (Jovchelovitch, 2007). A complete overview of the 
design of research and relevant questions will be further clarified in subsequent 
chapters (Chapter 2 & 4). Following, another highly debated topic of Moscovici’s 
theory will be explored, which relates to the operationalisation of the transformative 
processes that generate social representations, in other words, anchoring and 
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objectifying. Since the typification of anchors and objectifications, hence, the content 
of representation, forms an important pre-requisite in the investigation of its 
communicative and functional features, one should strive to further establish such an 
attempt. It is in this view that the discussion turns to some earlier efforts by 
Liakopoulos (2000) to relate the study of rhetoric with that of anchoring and 
objectifying. 
 
1.4 More on transformative processes: anchoring and objectification 
Moscovici (Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983) argues for representation as a prerequisite 
to learning. One cannot know without having engaged in the act of representation. 
Representation, however, is not to be treated as the product of a mechanistic mind 
operating in solitude as some sort of information processor, but rather as a 
transformative and highly creative process of a plastic, historic, in one word, 
interactive mind. Thus, the representation of an object is but an amalgam of ideas, 
themes, and significations that are at one and the same time constituted by and 
constitutive of their conditions of genesis. To further clarify such a point Moscovici 
discusses representations as anchors and objectifications, consequently establishing 
the historical and ontological correlates of knowledge (Gervais, 2002). 
 There is no spontaneous parthenogenesis of knowledge. That is, there is no 
knowledge of something without consideration of the past. Rather, every 
representation is to be seen in continuation of a previously established set of contents 
to which it is connected through processes of anchoring. Moscovici (1981; 1984; 
Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983) argues for anchoring as an inner-directed process, 
which through naming and classifying, attaches the object of representation to a 
recognizable reference point. Rosch’s ideas on prototypes and basic level categories, 
as discussed by Moscovici (1981), are evidence of her influence as a source of 
inspiration for his conceptualisation of anchoring. More specifically, and in a first 
step, anchoring, per Moscovici, involves the assignment of a name to the object 
represented. Such a naming permits the incorporation of the object of the 
representation into a group of people’s pre-established network of categories, that is a 
set of ideas, words, mental images; in one, word, already existing meanings. At a later 
stage, this process of classification involves a comparison of the object of the 
representation with what is considered the typical member of the category in which it 
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has been classified. Anchoring, hence, is a process of categorisation. In Moscovici’s 
(1981) terms:  
‘categorising someone or something is tantamount to choosing a prototype among all 
those embedded in our memory and establishing a positive or negative relationship 
with it’ (p. 195).  
As soon as something is anchored, it can then be described, with certain 
qualities or intentions imputed to it; it can be distinguished from other objects, while 
becoming subject to a convention between those who use it and share the same 
convention (Moscovici, 1981; 1984).  
However, Moscovici (1961/ 1977; 1981; 1984) observes how some of those 
ideas, words,  mental images, that is, meanings assigned to an object, do not merely 
serve as a way of classifying it into a pre-established stock of knowledge but 
progressively become the object per se. This process has been identified by 
Moscovici as a procedure of objectifying, in other words, assigning ontological 
features to a previously mental construction. More specifically, Moscovici discusses 
objectifications as ‘figurative nuclei’ that is, as a set of words and images that do not 
merely symbolize the world but are the world in itself. In his study of psychoanalysis 
(1961/1977), he monitors the elaboration of such a metamorphosis of mental images 
and words into physical objects by the different milieus of the French 20
th
 century 
public sphere. He observes how in some cases the psychoanalytic term ‘complex’ 
loses its previously mental and highly abstract matter to become a real, living and 
concrete object that manifests its existence through actual behaviours. Thus, 
objectifying is an other-directed process aiming at defining the world as it is. 
Objectifications are but a set of concrete ideas and images of the world, as perceived 
in its actuality, by a group of people at a specific time and place. At the same time 
however, the objectification of something or someone is also evident and expressive 
of this same group; in Moscovici’s (1984) own words, ‘don’t we objectify precisely 
so as to forget that a creation, a material construct is the product of our own activity, 
that something is someone?’(p.41).  
For Moscovici (1981; 1984) both anchoring and objectifying serve to 
familiarize us with the unfamiliar: anchors are instances of transferring something or 
someone into our own frame of reference, whereas objectifications are instances of 
reproducing this same something or someone in the manner we perceive it to be in our 
thoughts, words and actions. Consequently, Moscovici invites us to treat the content 
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of each representation as expressive of the memory and the reality of the people who 
hold it. Hence, the individual researcher is to approach knowledge in connection to 
the history of the people who share it and by implication, to not to regard it as a mere 
epiphenomenon, but rather as a constitutive of those same people and their world. 
Moscovici’s discussion of anchoring and objectification invited criticism 
mainly by discourse analysts along two relevant lines. The first line of criticism is 
related to a wider debate regarding the ‘paradox’ of the universal and particular 
aspects of social representations as a theory of knowledge (Gervais, 1997). Can the 
theory be employed to account for knowledge production in the particular conditions 
of modernity or can it be used to account universally for phenomena across time and 
cultures? Billig’s (1988) proposed solution to the debate was to discuss anchoring as a 
universal feature of all knowledge systems, and objectification as particular to modern 
society. He propounds for theological theorising as a set of beliefs functioning 
contrary to objectification, and as a consequence, rendering something material 
abstract. In this way, he suggests a division between a society with objectified social 
representations and a religious society, thus limiting objectification to the conditions 
of less traditional settings. I would argue that what Moscovici set out to emphasise 
when talking about objectification is the capacity of the thinker not merely to produce 
ideas and explanations about the world but to actively participate in the construction 
of reality. People do not just theorise, they also create. Even abstract notions like 
‘God, or ‘spirit’ not only represent a certain, mental manner of pondering on the 
world, but also define it, and as such, human thought and action. Gervais (1997) has 
also argued extensively on the matter by bringing forth a quantity of empirical 
evidence confirming examples of objectification in traditional as well as modern 
societies. More recently, Jovchelovitch (2007) hypothesizes over reflexivity as a 
possible way of differentiating between more and less traditional settings of 
knowledge formation. Overall, I would agree with Duveen and Lloyd (1990) that 
although at an analytical level and for the purposes of research anchoring and 
objectification can be distinguished; they are, nevertheless, interrelated. In their own 
words “[Objectification and anchoring] are interdependent, in the sense that a 
representation can become securely anchored to the extent that it is also objectified, 
and vice versa, that objectification would be impossible unless a representation were 
anchored” (ibid, p. 2).  
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The second line of criticism leveled at anchoring and objectifying relates to 
social representations as a phenomenon, that is, as a set of empirical regularities 
comprising the ideas of a group of people vis-à-vis an object to be investigated, and 
their mode of study. More specifically, certain discourse analysts have pointed to the 
possibility of reducing the investigation of social representations to the cognitive level 
(Jahoda, 1988; Parker, 1987; Potter & Litton, 1985; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Potter 
& Edwards, 1999; Semin, 1985). Since related criticism has been extensively 
discussed elsewhere (Voelklein & Howarth, 2005), the present account is of a more 
epigrammatic nature. Overall, critics have drawn the attention of social 
representations scholars to the dangers of limiting their focus to what happens in a 
person’s head and thus excluding any consideration of wider social, ideological and 
cultural conditions. In this context, and in contrast to Moscovici’s intention for a more 
anthropological approach, social psychologists run the risk of confining the study of 
social representations, as a phenomenon of research, in laboratory-experimentation 
settings. To remedy such an approach, Potter and Litton (1985) suggest an 
understanding of social representations as linguistic phenomena. They assert that such 
an attempt will rectify certain theoretical ambiguities, with regard to the nature of 
social representations and their formation, and will contribute to empirical 
expediency. By studying social representations as linguistic repertoires, attention is 
redirected to language and its use in relation to its context of production. Billig (1988, 
1993; Potter & Billig, 1992) makes a similar point, warning social representations 
theorists not only against treating anchoring and objectifying as purely cognitive 
processes but also undermining the human capacity to think, argue and negate by 
overemphasising consensual agreement. As a corollary, he invites social 
representations scholars to a more dialogical consideration of the human mind and 
calls for an empirical examination of argument and conflict as they take place among 
social actors.   
Accounting for the above, Voelklein and Howarth (2005) discuss a number of 
social representations studies emphasising the cognitive as well as the social, cultural 
and ideological nature of anchoring and objectifying. In relation to Potter & Litton’s 
proposition, they identify the danger of reducing social representations to the study of 
language as a methodological absence in the study of knowledge. In this vein, they 
point to a series of empirical findings suggesting that social representations are not 
only evident in linguistics but also apparent in artifacts, like drawings and pictures, 
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and in actions. Indeed, both Jodelet’s (1991) study of the representations of madness 
and Howarth’s (2006) research on racism indicated how at times social 
representations are only visible through action. This is in line with Moscovici’s 
(1985) thesis that although any representation may pass into discourse, the study of 
discourse can never reflect all possible representations. Complementing Billig’s view 
over the static and consensual nature of social representations, Markovà (2000; 2003) 
discusses the dialectical nature of social representations as reflected by Moscovici’s 
triangular semiotic triangle Ego-Alter-Object. She astutely demonstrates how 
Moscovici’s conception of knowledge-making, taking place in triads, corroborates the 
idea that knowledge of something by someone is always developed within the context 
of communication processes, where people seek to negate, change, transform, and 
argue about the world while being in it. More to the point Rose et al. (1995), provide 
evidence of the dynamic character of representing as demonstrated by relevant 
research. Yet, time and time again social representations scholars have welcomed 
Billig’s argumentative account of social thinking as a source for potential contribution 
in the study of representations (Duveen, 2000; Moscovici, 2000; Augoustinos, 2001). 
Voelklein and Howarth (2005) invite social representations researchers to 
methodologically account for the dynamic and dialectical aspects of knowledge. 
Recently, Moscovici (1998) himself restated the importance of language in the 
representational process calling for a further exploration of the discursive aspects of 
representing.  
It is to the above discussions that the present thesis seeks to contribute by 
studying anchoring and objectifying in the context of discursive interaction and 
communication. In light of recent criticisms over the lack of operationalisation in the 
study of the contents of representations, the current account seems topical (McKinley 
& Potter, 1987). As such, an effort will be made to further pursue an earlier attempt 
by Liakopoulos (2000). In his study of the social representations of biotechnology in 
Britain, he set to establish a conceptual and methodological bridge between anchors 
and metaphors, and objectifications and arguments. While following in his steps, the 
present thesis strives to further expand his account by bringing Billig’s discussion of 
arguments to the foreground. Such a choice has also been dictated by the phenomenon 
of research, a point fully developed towards the end of the present chapter. As a 
corollary, when studying the way experts discuss about the public sphere in formal 
and informal settings of communication, one is obliged to account for the rhetorical 
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and argumentative aspects of their discourse. For, the human cloning debate is not 
only a debate about the natural and the unnatural, the ethical and the immoral, but it 
also entails a wider discussion on the relationship between scientific and common 
sense knowledge, science and society, what is and is not true and false.  
That stated, I do not mean to suggest that what is being proposed here is an 
exemplary model for the operationalisation of anchors and objectifications but rather 
a form of casting light on the possible contents of the representation of the public 
sphere by a group of experts within a discursive context. Anchors and objectifications 
can also be found in actions, images and drawings, among others. Nor do I seek to 
further establish social representations as linguistic repertoires, as per Potter and 
Litton (1985), for I agree with Moscovici that discourse is just one place where 
knowledge is created and manifested. Rather, I wish to underline the importance of 
rhetoric when studying social representations as a phenomenon and put forward a 
possible way for its integration in relevant research.  
 
1.5 On metaphors and anchoring 
Aristotle was among the first to provide a definition of metaphor. In his Poetics he 
defines metaphor as consisting of giving something a name that belongs to something 
else (Ortony, 1993). His definition inaugurated a fruitful discussion over what is to be 
counted as metaphorical, and although is still topical, it is not universally accepted 
(Cohen, 1979). Metaphor is a linguistic trope used to mean something other than what 
is literally said. For example, to call somebody ‘a pig when he eats’ is an instance of a 
common metaphor used to define something in a non-literal manner, since humans are 
not pigs. Although the distinction between literal and non-literal types of speech is not 
straightforward, as it is dictated by individual characteristics and social norms, the 
identification of metaphor follows the simple procedure of focusing on the figurative 
properties of speech (Liakopoulos, 2000). 
 Over the centuries, metaphor has been the focus of study in rhetoric, 
linguistics, philosophy, and the social sciences. Liakopoulos’ (2000) authoritative 
review of the relevant literature exempts me from providing an exhaustive account. 
That stated one could argue, however, that the different conceptualisations and 
proposed treatments of metaphors relate back to Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, and to 
the fundamental question of the relationship between the mind and the world. For 
some, the answer is to be found in the idea of an ‘outside world’ existing 
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independently of human interaction. The idea that objects have the perceived 
properties they have based on their inherent characteristics and independently of 
anyone who experiences them, calls for the demarcation of well-articulated and 
appropriate tools for their study. Literal language, for its precise, unambiguous and 
testable nature, has often been thought of as the most paradigmatic tool with which to 
provide objective representations of the world (Ortony, 1993). In this vein, any other 
use of language is to be treated as meaningless. Metaphors, thus, are but an example 
of violations of linguistics rules, a series of parasitic devices left in the hands of 
politicians and poets. Though, for others there is no objective representation of the 
world without a simultaneous consideration of the holder of the representation. That 
is, knowledge of an object, namely the perception of its inherent characteristics, does 
not arrive spontaneously but through a highly interactive process between the object 
and the person who is representing, his previous knowledge and the context in which 
this has been acquired. Such a conceptualisation of the relationship between the mind 
and the world proposes a more holistic understanding of language, debunking its 
lively and creative nature. In this light, any demarcation between literal and non-
literal figures of speech is to serve more quantitative rather than qualitative purposes 
(Ibid, 1993). Based on this view, metaphor is not just a rhetorical, meaningless device 
used by poets and politicians but it is pervasive in language as well as ordinary 
thought. Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) theory of metaphor is the most paradigmatic of 
such treatment. Though not as novel as they initially proclaimed, for their theory 
seems to echo the ideas of a number of influential and pioneering 19
th
 century 
philosophers (Nerlich & Clarke, 2001), their work provides a clear and well-
elaborated understanding of the manner in which metaphor forms part of representing, 
that is, of making sense of the world.  
 For Lakoff and Johnson (1980), there is no such thing as an external and 
objective reality, independent of how human beings conceptualise the world. On the 
contrary, people actively construct the world they live in and categorisation plays a 
crucial role in this process. Rosch’s ideas on the centrality of categorisation in 
representing have once again, as per Moscovici, proved a solid basis for the 
elaboration of their theory of metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987). 
More specifically, and drawing from Rosch’s conceptualisation of prototypes and 
basic-level categories, they proclaim that: 
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‘Because so many of the concepts that are important to us are either abstract or not 
clearly delineated in our experience (the emotions, ideas, time etc.), we need to get a 
grasp on them by means of other concepts that we understand in clearer terms (spatial 
orientation, objects etc.)’, (Lakoff & Johnson, p.115).  
 
Categorisation is a way of identifying one thing or experience in terms of 
another. Categories are defined by prototypes as well as family resemblances to 
prototypes and are adjustable in context, given various purposes. A choice of a certain 
category highlights particular properties of the categorized object, while downplaying 
others. Since most human understanding involves conceptualising one kind of entity 
in terms of another, then most of our thinking is metaphorically based, for the essence 
of metaphor is to make sense and experience one thing in terms of another
2
. As such, 
and in contrast to classical theories, Lakoff (1993) situates metaphor not in the context 
of language but in that of thought. Metaphors function as mappings across conceptual 
domains. Thus, metaphor is conceived as a mapping from a source domain to a target 
domain. Entities in the source domain correspond to entities in the target domain. 
More on this point, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest a strategy called ‘mnemonics’ 
to further illustrate the correspondences involved in a conceptual mapping. Thus, to 
say that a relationship has hit a dead-end street, is to conceptualise one domain 
(‘love’) in terms of another (‘journey’). This entails a number of correspondences like 
(Lakoff, 1993, p. 207):  
 
LOVE IS A JOURNEY 
The lovers correspond to travelers. 
The love relationship corresponds to the vehicle. 
The lovers’ common goals correspond to their common destinations on the  
journey. 
Difficulties in the relationship correspond to impediments in travel.  
 
A common feature of mappings is that they refer to superordinate categories. 
For example, in the LOVE IS A JOURNEY mapping, a love relationship corresponds 
                                                 
2
 Again this idea of metaphors creating similarities rather than pointing out pre-existing, objective 
similarities is not as novel as Lakoff & Johnson proclaimed but has also been elaborated by scholars 
like Richards and Black (Nerlich & Clarke, 2001) 
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to a vehicle, that is, the vehicle is the superordinate category that includes other basic 
level categories, like car, train, boat and plane. Moreover, metaphorical mappings can 
be seen as being in close connection to each other, revealing lower-order and higher-
order mappings. Thus, the conception of love as a journey entails a higher-order 
mapping, that of ‘life is a journey’. The conceptualisation of life as a journey relates 
to a purposeful and goal-oriented conception of life. Purposes are destinations and the 
means one chooses to undertake them are paths. As a corollary, the LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY metaphor inherits the structure of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. 
Lovers are travellers and their love relationship is a journey. The rest of the mapping 
is a consequence of THE LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. 
According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), the choice of a certain metaphor is 
not idiosyncratic. Rather, each metaphor has an experiential basis. That stated, 
however, they claim that ‘it is hard to distinguish the physical from the cultural basis 
of a metaphor, since the choice of one physical basis from among many possible ones 
has to do with cultural coherence’ (1980, p.19). For example, to talk about value as 
‘more is better’ is an exemplar of much of the Western way of thinking and living. 
However, since each culture is comprised of different subcultures and individuals, this 
does not necessarily entail that such a metaphor would be universally shared. As such, 
the choice of a particular metaphor not only points to the experiential basis of 
knowledge but also to its context of production.  
Following from the above, it is evident that metaphor cannot simply be 
reduced to a meaningless linguistic trope but rather it can provide data as to the wider 
categorisation processes that take place during the understanding of an object, namely 
during its representation. In the tradition of social representations, metaphors have, in 
one way or another, always been part of research (Gervais, 1997; Jodelet; 1991, 
Jovchelovitch; 1995). Moscovici himself has commented on their potential role in the 
creation of knowledge, stating that “it appears that metaphors play an important role 
in the creation of social representations, precisely because they slot ideas and images 
which are little familiar into others which are already familiar” (2001, p.20). In 
studying the representation of sperm and ovum in conception, Wagner and his 
colleagues (Wagner et al., 1995), discuss Lakoff and Johnson’s account of metaphors 
in relation to objectification. More specifically, they argue for the ability of metaphors 
to provide a mental image to a previously abstract concept, theory, or phenomenon as 
indicative of objectification processes while, based on their findings, they conclude on 
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the way ‘the social is often the point of reference for a group’s system of knowledge, 
be it about ‘natural’ or other phenomena’ (ibid, p.285). However, Moscovici’s 
discussion of objectification relates not to the assignment of a mental image to a 
previously unfamiliar object as a reference point - this is more indicative of the work 
of anchoring - but to the way specific mental images and ideas progressively lose their 
symbolic properties to become the object in themselves. In his terms, objectification 
takes place ‘when the words we use to give an abstract form to complex substances or 
phenomena become the substance or the phenomenon’ (Moscovici, 1984, p.43). 
Indeed, there is no evidence in Wagner’s et al. (1995) investigation of such a use by 
their ‘subjects’ of the images created by the metaphors employed in their study. In 
contrast, the use of the metaphors by the researchers per se, as a list of pre-determined 
‘variables’ (ibid, 679), ‘comparisons’ (ibid, 684) or ‘points of reference’ (ibid, 685), 
from which their subjects could draw and potentially discuss about conception is more 
akin to the mechanism of anchoring than that of objectification. I would, therefore, 
argue that metaphors and their analysis are more a way of identifying and typifying 
the kinds of pre-existing symbolic resources (mental ideas and images as source 
domains) employed by an individual or a group of people to name and to categorise a 
given thing, person or object (possible target domains). This is in order to describe it, 
distinguish it from other things, persons or objects and provide a common point of 
reference, thus, sustaining inter-subjective communication. One cannot dismiss the 
similarity with which Lakoff and Johnson talk about metaphor as a way of 
experiencing one thing in terms of another through categorisation in order to make 
sense of it, and Moscovici’s discussion of anchoring as the employment of pre-
existing stock of meanings, ideas, and mental images as reference points from which 
to draw in the process of naming and categorising and, and in so doing make sense of 
another thing. I, hence, concur with Liakopoulos on the study of metaphors as a way 
of illuminating the process of anchoring. Moreover, the treatment of the human mind 
and knowledge as at one and the same time historic, social, subjective, objective and 
inter-subjective designates another point of convergence between the two theories.  
That stated, two points call for further clarification. Firstly, metaphor is not the 
only linguistic trope of categorising function. Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) discuss 
simile as serving related purposes. That is, to say that someone is ‘like a lion in 
conversations’ also categorises an object in terms of something else implying 
metaphoricity. As such, it could be stated that, although anchoring does not always 
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include metaphor, metaphoricity seems to play an integral part when anchoring. 
Secondly, the above discussion should not be perceived as an attempt to treat 
metaphors exclusively as part of anchoring processes. The study of metaphors may 
offer a way of researching anchoring as it takes place in discursive interaction, 
illuminating cultural and contextual resources employed in conversational settings to 
classify the object of representation. However, one cannot dismiss the possibility of 
certain metaphors being objectified. In a recent study of the employment of the 
biological metaphor of ‘neocortical warfare’ in Serbian conspiracy literature, Byford 
(2002) demonstrates a rather interesting phenomenon. He describes an initial phase in 
which the ‘neocortical war’ metaphor by Serbian conspiracy theorists was used 
preserving its non-literal meaning to anchor practices of information warfare in 
biological terms. Progressively though, the metaphor was dissociated from its non-
literal features and was transformed to refer to actual brain manipulation. Byford 
(2002) discusses such a literalisation as an instance of objectification. Thus, it is 
suggested that although certain metaphors may play a significant role in the 
familiarisation of a given object of representation by classifying it into already 
existing categories, some metaphors may progressively assume a more ontological 
status, becoming the thing itself. In this vein, one could argue that although the study 
of metaphors may illuminate wider categorisation processes, some metaphors may 
well present instances of objectification processes. Indeed, if this is the case, then it is 
more a point of empirical verification than of conceptual certainty. Therefore, I would 
argue that it is the phenomenon of study that explains itself and calls for the attention 
of the researcher to fully account for its complexity. It is with such an approach that I 
set to investigate the use of metaphors in the human somatic cell nuclear transfer 
debate by experts when discussing its public dimensions. 
 
1.6 Argumentation and objectification  
The first theory of argumentation was formulated in the fifth century B.C. by Corax 
and Tisias as a tool for assisting in the elaboration of the debates emerging in the 
context of the Greek polis (Liakopoulos, 2000). Progressively, the art of rhetoric 
developed as a philosophical branch of its own, with Sophists representing its 
specialists. Since argumentation for the Sophists served the purpose of persuasion, 
they set about establishing a number of strategies, teaching prominent Athenians the 
way to successful rhetoric. Their equation of argumentation to success in persuasion 
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induced an intense debate whose repercussions are still traceable in contemporary 
treatments of arguments. Thus, Aristotle was among the first to raise the importance 
of logic and validity in the study of arguments. He distinguished between inductive 
reasoning, where the premises support a general conclusion by naming specific cases, 
and deductive reasoning, where the conclusion necessarily follows from the preceding 
propositions. It was in the context of deductive reasoning that he situated the study of 
argumentation and devised a set of rules to measure its validity. Emphasis was given 
to the microstructure of arguments, that is, in the examination of the logical form of 
the argument and its internal structure, and in the identification of common fallacies 
(Freeman, 1991). A successful, and thus, valid argument is one in which the 
conclusion follows logically from its premises. Aristotle’s deductive logic dominated 
the study of arguments until the nineteenth century, when studies of argumentation 
asserted the inability of formal logic to account for the analysis of arguments in 
ordinary life (Antaki, 1994). A new approach developed termed ‘informal logic’. 
Although general parity exists amongst scholars regarding the definition of argument 
as a more or less complicated set of premises supporting a conclusion, they part 
company on their respective approaches. Thus, in the North American tradition of 
argumentation study focus was given to the argument as a set of premises of a single 
coherent piece of reasoning, as exemplified in the works of Thomas and the like 
(Antaki, 1994). On the other side of the Atlantic, the European tradition has tended to 
emphasise arguments more as a dialectical process, pointing to the context of 
argumentation, its audience, and language. Two are the most influential works in this 
approach, those of Perelman and Olbrechts - Tyteca (1969) and that of Toulmin 
(1958; Toulmin et al., 1979). They both approach argumentation within the context of 
a debate in which two or more interlocutors try to persuade each other and their 
audiences over the validity of their respective claims. Toulmin’s account, however, 
goes a step further by identifying the constitutive parts and in so doing leading to a 
more functional approach in the study of arguments. It was on the basis of Toulmin’s 
approach that Liakopoulos (2000) aimed to establish a link between argumentation 
and objectification. While presenting his account, an attempt will be made to further 
elaborate on his original ideas by bringing into the discussion Billig’s ideas on 
argumentation on the study of social phenomena.  
For Toulmin (Toulmin et al., 1979), argumentation is “the whole activity of 
making claims, challenging them, backing them up by producing reasons, criticising 
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those reasons, rebutting those criticisms and so on” (p.13). Every argument can be 
conceived as both a process and a product. The idea of the argument as a process 
reflects the internal structure of each argument and its constitutive parts, whereas the 
argument as a product refers to the wider activity of discourse and debate of which the 
argument forms a part. According to Toulmin, in order to understand the structure of 
arguments as products, one first needs to account for the functional roles statements 
may play in argument as process. In this vein, he offers a diagrammatic presentation 
of the argument as constituting certain premises and conclusions. Thus, the basic 
structure of any given argument can be conceived as including a claim, the conclusion 
of the argument; of data, a set of preceded facts establishing the conclusion; a 
warrant, that is, premises asserting the legitimacy of the data to support the claim; and 
backing, a set of universal statements or facts that support the authoritative status of 
the warrant. In some cases, the force of the process from data to claim in virtue of a 
warrant is expressed by using qualifiers, such as, ‘necessarily’, ‘probably’ and so on. 
Close to qualifiers are rebuttals, statements that express the conditions under which 
the warrant does not have an authority. Figure 1.1 presents Toulmin’s schematic 
representation of the argument structure as a process. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The structure of the argument as a process 
 
 
 
Toulmin distinguishes between analytical and substantial arguments. While in 
analytical arguments the claim necessarily follows from its premises, like in 
So, ‘Qualifier’, ‘Claim’ 
Unless 
     
‘Rebuttal’ 
         Since 
      ‘Warrant’ 
On account of 
    ‘Backing’ 
‘Data’ 
 47 
arguments found in logic or mathematics, in substantial arguments this is not the case, 
for they are produced in the more fluid and abstract context of ordinary life. Though 
deductive logic can account for analytical types of arguments by applying the rules of 
formal validity, it cannot assess substantial argumentation. To account for such 
arguments one needs to specifically address the context of their production. That is, 
the content and the form of the argument are depended on its conditions of 
production. Elaborating further on this idea, he introduces the notion of ‘argument 
fields’, propounding that some aspects of the argument are basically the same 
regardless of the context, while others are context specific. Examples of fields include 
politics, law, art and others. Each field has its own standards for developing and 
understanding arguments, thus, universal criteria over the validity of all possible 
arguments are simply irrelevant. Up until now, no consensus has been reached over 
the field-invariant and field-dependent elements of arguments, nor the number of 
possible fields (Liakopoulos, 2000). However, Toulmin’s theory has been used in the 
study of argumentation emerging in different contexts, like in politics (Ball, 1994), in 
the media (Chambliss and Garner, 1996), and in local settings (Putnam and Geist, 
1985), to name but a few.  
According to Liakopoulos (ibid), argumentation constitutes an integral part of 
public debate over a given object. Since, argumentation, per Toulmin, involves a 
series of statements structured around certain manifest and concrete contents with the 
aim of persuading a particular audience in the context of a larger debate, then the 
individual researcher’s purpose, when studying relevant phenomena, is to further 
illuminate those contents. In Liakopoulos’s terms, since language is one way in which 
social representations are created and communicated in the context of a public debate, 
then the study of argumentation is pivotal, for it enables the elaboration of thought in 
a way that is easily understood by everyone. If argumentation is the elaboration of 
thought, and thought consists of dominant representations, then the argument is 
treated as a highly visible vehicle for the process of objectification. Thus, in the study 
of a public debate, arguments become the locus in which the objectified meanings 
assigned to an object are clearly reproduced for the various purposes of 
communication. 
I concur with Liakopoulos that when people argue over some idea, project or 
action, for instance, argument becomes the place where ideas and meanings are 
reproduced in a highly structured and elaborate manner, in the way Moscovici 
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discusses objectification. However, as Billig astutely points out, there is more to an 
argument than just that.  
Drawing from the Sophists’ philosophy on rhetoric, Billig has written extensively 
on the rhetorical and psychological implications of their maxims for social 
psychology’s conceptual and methodological treatment of various social phenomena 
(Billig, 1985; 1988; 1989; 1993; 1994a; 1994b; 1996; 1997; Billig & Cochrane, 1979; 
Potter & Billig, 1992). At the same time, he also demonstrates the implications of the 
rhetorical account of argumentation for cognitive psychology. Based on Isocrates’ 
claim that the same arguments people use when speaking to an interlocutor, also 
inhabit their internal thinking, he postulates that argumentation is not only confined to 
language but also to thought. More specifically, Billig argues that thought is not static 
and monologic but rather that it is a natural dialectical process, since private thinking 
is modelled on public argument. As a corollary, he invites social psychologists, and 
especially social representations researchers, to study the thinking society by focusing 
on the argumentative aspects of communication. Such an invitation seems to be in line 
with Moscovici’s assertion of the dialogical nature of the human mind, a point also 
discussed earlier. In Moscovici’s own words (Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983): 
 
‘When people uphold some view about a person or group, and explain their view, 
we can be sure that they are not simply giving an interpretation of the observed 
facts. They are at the same time comparing this interpretation with some others 
made by a real or imaginative partner…All representations are then triangular -  
subject, object and third person. But the third person may vary and the ‘audience’  
for a representation may change, in which case different forms of language will be  
used to verbalize the ideas (p. 117). 
 
In line with Moscovici’s assertion, Billig states that to hold a point of view is to 
take a stance in a matter of controversy, that is, to argue, to give a response to a 
continuing dialogue. In contrast to the tradition of deductive logic where primacy was 
given to the form of the argument, Billig insists on its content. Following Protagoras’ 
maxim that there are two sides to every issue, he propounds that each argument is not 
only reflective of ideas or attitudes towards the object of a debate but also of the 
people who hold it and their interlocutors at a specific place and time. More 
specifically, to understand an argument and its content one should ask the question 
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‘what is this attacking, what is the counter argument?’ In this vein, the choice of a 
certain argument is not merely expressive of the arguer’s positioning towards an 
object of the debate but also reflective of what the arguer believes her/his counter-
position to be. That is, when people argue about something as a way of criticising the 
counter-position, they also reproduce the way they actually understand and believe 
this counter-position to be, that is, their objectifications of their interlocutors. 
The above discussion has certain important ramifications for the present research 
phenomenon and its study. As it has been aforementioned, the reification of a 
scientific representation is but the product of a long process of negotiation and 
argumentation between different types of knowledge and their holders (interlocutors).  
Somatic cell nuclear transfer research has been at the focus of an intense debate not 
only regarding its technicalities but also its wider social, ethical, economic and 
political aspects (see chapter 3). As different actors elaborate and assemble with a 
view to settle its future as a reified fact, a parallel debate takes place regarding ‘who’ 
is entitled to participate in this process. Thus, arguments and counter-arguments are 
put forward contesting, defending, scrutinising, and questioning public ideas on 
human cloning, individual and media representations, and regulatory developments. 
The purpose of the present research is to account for the way scientists conceptualise 
the public sphere and its role in these debates. That stated, it seems pivotal to take into 
account the structure and content of the arguments employed by scientists to discuss 
the public sphere. However, and in addition to Liakopoulos’ (2000) claims, arguments 
are not only a way of elaborating and concretising individual thoughts but also, as 
Billig suggests, a way of taking a stance in relation to counter views. In this vein, 
when people argue about something as a way of criticising the counter-position, they 
also express what that counter-position is. Thus, when scientists employ certain 
arguments to talk, for example, about the media coverage of SCNT research by a 
newspaper, they also reveal, in their choice of argument, their positioning of the 
media as interlocutors in the wider debate over the reification of scientific 
representations. That is, they reproduce the way they actually understand and believe 
the media to be. Hence, the choice of words, ideas and meanings with which to argue 
reveals the thing in itself. As a corollary, an argument is at the same time a 
worldview, a counter-position, the past, the future, the visible or invisible interlocutor; 
in a sense, it is a way of typifying objectifications. In studying arguments one is 
invited to account for the choice of a specific argument as expressive of the discursive 
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context, in this case the wider debate over human SCNT research, the interlocutors 
and counter-positions; that is, the various actors and their various positions in the 
debate. In the context of the present thesis, a point also discussed in chapter 4, 
Toulmin’s identification of argumentation structure will be retained as it offers a clear 
and elaborate technique with which to typify the various objectifications.  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
Moscovici’s seminal theory of social representations has undoubtedly contributed to a 
revival of old debates in social psychology, while introducing novel propositions for 
the study of knowledge. Certain dichotomies of the past, like those between subject 
and object, opinion and truth, individual and collective have been revisited with a 
view to promoting a contextual and more dynamic perspective of human thought and 
knowledge. The idea of communication has been central to Moscovici’s conception of 
social representations, overcoming the notion of the person as a neutral observer or 
even worse as a prejudiced thinker. People think and talk in relation to each other with 
a view to discussing and debating, to preserving and to changing. It is this dynamic 
and pluralistic view of the world that drew my attention to the theory of social 
representations and, partly, prompted my curiosity over the relationship between more 
or less expert forms of knowledge and their holders. Indeed, the relationship between 
the scientific and the non-scientific has been at the heart of Moscovici’s theory ever 
since its first conceptualisation and elaboration in his study of the reception of 
psychoanalysis by different French milieus. His discussion of the consensual and the 
reified and their different possible readings hold important ramifications not only as to 
Moscovici’s treatment of science and non-science but also as to the overall standing 
of his theory in relation to knowledge and its study. By implication, it also proved a 
troubling issue for the elaboration of the present study; an issue calling for further 
clarification. 
 It has been suggested that certain readings of this proposed dichotomy confine 
social representations both as a theory of knowledge and a phenomenon under 
investigation. Thus, a literal reading of the reified and the consensual proposes the 
splitting of knowledge, and hence reality, into two worlds, an objective, namely that 
of science, and a subjective, namely that of common sense. As such, social 
representations become a theory of common sense knowledge confined to the study of 
relevant phenomena. A second proposed reading equates social representations with a 
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particular type of knowledge, which is that of science made common, while relevant 
research is restricted to the investigation of the diffusion of scientific concepts in the 
public realm. It is thought that both readings run the risk of oversimplifying the 
relationship between science and common sense, as well as reducing the scope of 
Social Psychology to a positivist approach of knowledge. Instead, the different 
understanding of the consensual and the reified that has been proposed, invites for a 
redirection of the questions on the relationship between science and non-science, 
which consequently calls for a more holistic account of all types of knowledge.  
In this vein, reification is not the a priori condition of certain types of 
knowledge, but the ex-post-facto of a highly historic, human, and contextual process 
of interaction between different types of representations and their holders. Here, the 
importance is not to explain how science or common sense work as separate units of a 
common sphere, but how they manage to co-exist as one body of a continuous flow of 
information and knowledge (Latour, 1999). Knowledge emerges as the triangular 
architecture of subject-object-subject. The study of its production, circulation, and 
transformation across different milieus becomes central to such an endeavour. It is 
believed that Moscovici’s social representations and his conceptualisation of the 
constituted and constitutive nature of knowledge offers a rich and well-elaborated 
framework for the study of all types of knowledge, be it more or less expert. It is 
through such an understanding of Moscovici’s social representations that the present 
thesis has been cultivated, conceptualised, and elaborated. 
Hence, in this study social representations are employed both as a theory of 
knowledge and a phenomenon under investigation. As a theoretical framework, they 
point to the constituted and constitutive character of all types of knowledge. 
Knowledge of something is always knowledge by someone in a specific place and 
time. This, however, is not to be taken as a revival of relativism but rather as an 
assertion of construction as the basis of objectivity. As a corollary, knowledge is not 
to be treated hierarchically but with respect; in relation to those who hold and 
preserve it, their history, past, present and future. It is with such a disinterested 
attitude that the present phenomenon of research is approached. 
As a phenomenon, social representations of the public sphere among experts 
in SCNT research, are not to be treated as a way of illuminating ‘common sense’ 
notions of ‘common sense’ or ‘amateur transformations of expertise knowledge’ 
about ‘common sense’; it should be treated as a set of empirical regularities 
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comprising the ideas and meanings of a specific group of people towards a specific 
object (the public sphere), to be studied in close connection to the social and 
communicative processes that produce and reproduce them. In this light, research is to 
fully account for the objective, subjective, and intersubjective elements of knowledge. 
More specifically, the purpose of the study is to provide a typification of the possible 
meanings of the public sphere among experts, that is, the content of representation, 
and by that to further elucidate their historical and contextual origins, and their 
possible structures and functions. In light of recent criticism regarding shortcomings 
in the operationalisation of the study of the contents of representations, namely 
anchors and objectifications, an attempt was made to promote a previous analogous 
effort by Liakopoulos (2000) in the study of words and rhetoric. As such, Moscovici’s 
anchoring has been connected to Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptualisation of metaphor, 
while objectification has been connected to Toulmin’s and Billig’s accounts of 
arguments. It has been argued that the use of metaphors in language, either in the 
context of a text or in a discursive situation, can cast light on anchoring, while 
argumentation can enlighten the process of objectification. An argument may 
implicitly contain a metaphor in the same mode as a metaphor may contain an 
argument (Liakopoulos, 2000). In such a vein, the distinction proposed is more of an 
analytic rather than of a conceptual nature, for the two processes are part and parcel of 
the same continuum.  
Having presented the main theoretical backbone of the present study, it is time 
to assume interest in the relevant research undertaken thus far to account for scientists 
and the way they conceptualise lay publics, media coverage of science, and science 
policy. Though the contribution of social representations research has concerned 
mainly the way different publics represent scientific developments, literature in other 
fields of research, like in the sociology of science and the public understanding of 
science tradition, have recently turned their attention to the study of scientists and 
their respective representations of the public.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The public according to scientists: reviewing the literature 
 
The relation between science and the public, and consequently between scientific and 
common sense knowledge, has been an issue of intense debates ever since Plato and 
Aristotle provided some first definitions on the different forms and functions of 
knowledge. Initially focusing on issues of demarcation, that is, what counts as 
scientific and what not, scholars have moved to the conceptualisation of different 
theoretical models accounting for the nature and functions of communication between 
the scientific and the public realm. However, and more to the point of the present 
study, how are scientists themselves conceptualising this relation? Empirical work 
relevant to this research topic has been identified in the context of two related bodies 
of literature, that of the Sociology of Science and the Public Understanding of Science 
tradition, which will be presented respectively. The purpose for doing so does not 
stem from an attempt to define the phenomenon of research beforehand. Rather, it is 
performed mainly to demonstrate the kind of research that has informed the present 
work, assisting in the design of its conduct while casting light on the existence of 
possible conceptual, methodological and empirical lacunae. Furthermore, relevant 
studies provide a fruitful resource for a better understanding of the phenomenon of 
research. Lastly, they aid in drawing links with possible areas of knowledge to which 
the present thesis may contribute both theoretically and empirically. The dual 
distinction of the literature in Sociology of Science and Public Understanding of 
Science is performed mostly to suit the practical needs relevant to the clear and 
manageable presentation of related work and not to reflect any conceptual 
demarcation on my behalf.  
 
2.1 Studies in the Sociology of Science 
In parallel to efforts to treat the demarcation of science from other intellectual 
activities as a philosophical problem per se, some scholars in the sociology of science 
have approached it as a practical issue in itself for scientists. The most paradigmatic 
work in this context originates from the writings of Gieryn (1983, 1985, 1995). 
Gieryn tackles the problem of demarcation not as an inherent characteristic of science 
but rather as part of the ideological efforts of scientists to define their work and its 
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products in an attempt to distinguish them from non-scientific intellectual activities. 
He examines the rhetorical style adopted by scientists in a series of debates regarding 
the relation between science and religion and mechanics, in the struggle for the 
scientific legitimation of phrenology, and in the relations between science and public 
policy. In public debates the rhetorical styles adopted by the scientists are seen by 
Gieryn as instances of boundary work, that is, occasions in which the presentation of 
science to the general public and the political authorities is performed in such a way 
so as to simultaneously defend their professional autonomy while enlarging their 
material and symbolic resources. This strategic play between being ‘close but not too 
close’ to the public, in the words of Gieryn, is highly exemplified in a study of the 
rhetorical style adopted by a National Academy of Sciences report, in the context of a 
public debate in the United States concerning the circulation of scientific knowledge 
to enemies of the State and national security. Scientists were found to construct a 
boundary between the production of scientific knowledge and its consumption, 
distinguishing between the insiders of knowledge production, represented by 
themselves, and the outsiders, represented by the exploiters of such knowledge and 
the governmental efforts to control it. According to Gieryn this demarcation served so 
as to take the blame for undesirable consequences away from basic scientific research 
and thus limiting political interventions in its conduct, while preserving public support 
by reminding legislators of the contributions of science to technological progress. In 
the same line, research by Jasanoff (1987) illuminates analogous boundary practices 
in the discourses of U.S scientists involved in carcinogen regulation. Another 
influential work of the interface between scientific and non-scientific knowledge is 
Wynne’s widely celebrated case study on the interactions between government 
scientists and Cumbrian hill farmers in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, 
which demonstrated the validity and complexity of local knowledge (Wynne, 1991, 
1992a, 1996).   
Further extending similar scholarship, Mike Michael and his colleagues 
(Michael & Birke, 1994a; 1994b; Michael & Brown, 2000; Brown & Michael, 2001) 
undertook analysis of the discourse employed by scientists in the context of two 
important disputes, the animal experimentation controversy and the case of 
xenotransplantation. In the former, the main aim of the study was to measure the 
impact of the 1986 Animal Act on relevant scientific research. The purpose of the 
study was the examination of the scientists’ views on British legislation. A qualitative 
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approach was assumed, which involved interviewing 43 scientists of diverse 
professional status and in different institutions, all engaged in animal experimentation 
procedures. The analysis stressed the employment of two different sets of discourses 
each serving complementary purposes. The first set of discourses reflected an 
overwhelmingly positive attitude of the scientists towards the then recent legislative 
measures. Legislation was seen as further promoting an already ethically-sound 
established scientific endeavor while enhancing the reflexivity of the experts upon 
their doings. In Michael’s and Birke’s terms (1994a) “before the act we were good; 
after the act we are no more or less good but we think about it more now” (p.195). 
The second set of discourses represented the efforts of scientists to demarcate their 
practices from those of a variety of ‘others’ involved in the debate. As such, explicit 
references were made to specific groups of actors, like foreign scientists, the 
cosmetics industry, agriculture and abattoir representatives and pet lovers in an 
attempt to contrast themselves as morally superior. On a more implicit level, the 
general public was derogated as ignorant, morally compromised, and hypocritical, 
even strategically regretful. Animal activists were seen as manipulators of public 
emotionality, thus rendering them as inauthentic or pathological. All in all, non-
experts were doomed as ethically and epistemologically flawed. Commenting on the 
functions of such rhetorical means, Michael and Birke (1994a, 1994b) demonstrate 
their utility in the presentation of animal experimentation in a relatively positive 
ethical light. Furthermore, scientific discourse was discussed in the context of 
Gieryn’s findings on boundary work and Collins’ (1981) propositions on the scientific 
core set. As such, scientists were seen as engaged in an enveloping activity in which 
the various criteria for a legitimate contribution to the debate were defined. Scientists 
presented themselves as willing to discuss with the public and other interested groups 
within the context of a rational, non-violent and authentically emotional debate. 
However, while the content of the debate remained open, these same criteria served 
the double role of including and excluding relevant interlocutors, thus controlling who 
is and who is not to contribute to the debate. Further on this study, Michael and 
Brown (2000) have pondered on what they call ‘lay political science’. Accordingly, 
lay political science refers to the idea that scientific discourse not only reflects 
specific versions of nature, scientific facts and procedures but also versions of publics 
and proposed models of communication between science and non-science. The 
analysis of the scientific discourses in the animal experimentation case suggests, 
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according to Michael and Brown, a specific form of dialogue committed to a specific 
version of democracy, that of competitive elitist democracy. Thus, by defining a set of 
characteristics necessary for one to enter the debate, the scientists were proposing a 
competitive elitist model of communication in which decision is performed by a 
highly selected group of skilled people in the name of a largely ill-informed public.  
The later study regarded the analysis of the British press coverage of the 
activities of two biotechnology companies involved in xenotransplantation research 
over the period 1992-1995 (Brown & Michael, 2001). The analysis focused on the 
way scientists and medical practitioners defended the selection of the pig as the best 
species from which to ‘harvest’ transplant tissues in the future. While in the case of 
animal experimentation the scientists interviewed were found to contrast themselves 
to the public, in this case research portrayed them engaged in a process of 
dedifferentiation. Discussing the technicalities dictating the choice of the pig as the 
best donor species, scientists adopted a more internal set of discourse restricted to 
specialist arguments over the naturalness of the procedure. Drawing from their 
expertise scientists were portrayed as the sole people capable of making relevant 
judgments, leaving the public out of such matters. When moral and cultural criteria 
entered the discussion, Brown and Michael observed a switch in scientific discourse 
employing a ‘non-expert-popular’ rhetoric and in that way identifying themselves as 
members of the public. Thus, by proclaiming the superiority of their expertise while 
aligning themselves with the public, the borders between science and the public were 
played out in such a way so as to allow the scientists to define the debate exclusively 
in their terms. By setting themselves as representatives of the public, scientists 
seemed to favour another form of democracy, that of protective democracy. 
According to Michael and Brown (2000), this model of democracy suggests that 
sovereignty lies with the people but is to be found in their representatives who act 
based on the general good. Again, scientists were portrayed as acting for the general 
good while the public was not even invited to contribute to the debate, for they were 
rendered as technically incompetent.  
 
2.2 Studies in the ‘Public Understanding of Science’ tradition 
According to Bauer (2003) the term ‘Public Understanding of Science’ or PUS 
presents a dual nature, encompassing on the one hand the activities of those interested 
in promoting lay understanding and communication of science, and on the other a 
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growing field of empirical social research intended to measure the public’s 
apprehension of science, its modus operandi and its products. Over the past 25 years, 
research in the public understanding of science has mobilised interest in a variety of 
academic fields like sociology, psychology, history of science and other related areas 
of work. One could say that it has become a field in itself with the publication of two 
peer-reviewed journals, Public Understanding of Science and Science 
Communication, and a growing number of graduate and postgraduate programs in 
science communication and its research (Gregory & Miller, 1998).  
 In a review of European studies in the Public Understanding of Science 
tradition Bauer (2003) identifies three successive paradigms of research, each more or 
less distinct from the other both chronologically and conceptually. In each paradigm 
the relationship of science and the public realm is configured in a different light, 
contributing a deficit either to the public or to science itself. In each case different 
research questions, methodologies and intervention strategies are proposed for the 
betterment of the scientific future.  
In the post-war period (1960s-1980s) relevant research unfolded in the context 
of the ‘scientific literacy’ idea, which identified a deficit in the scientific knowledge 
of the public on the basis of either ignorance or illiteracy and proposed analogous 
ways for its enhancement, mostly in the form of educational programs. In this vein, 
the measurement of knowledge by quiz-like items was prioritised. Focus was 
sustained on psychometrics and the operationalisation of the factual and 
methodological aspects of science. However, criticism was soon expressed pointing 
both to the definition as well as to the measurement of ‘scientific literacy’. The 
condemnation of such an approach led to a second wave of theoretical and empirical 
work that dominated the field over a span of almost 10 years (1980s-1990s) under the 
title Public Understanding of Science (PUS), sometimes with an added T for 
technology (PUST).   
 In the U.K this transition was marked by the Royal Society’s publication in 
1985 of a report entitled ‘The Public Understanding of Science’, also known as the 
Bodmer report. Overall, the report reflected an alarming concern amongst the 
scientific establishment over the political vulnerability of research funding due to 
what was seen as an esoteric ethos of scientific practices vis-à-vis the public (Miller, 
2001). As Bauer (2003) astutely demonstrates, the new model shared certain 
conceptual commonalities with the previous one, for it too stressed a public deficit. 
 58 
However, in this case it is less a knowledge gap and more the issues surrounding 
public attitudes towards scientific developments that preoccupied relevant research. 
The rationale of this paradigm unravels around the idea that scientific literacy would 
in fact increase support for science, or widely known as ‘the more they know the more 
they love it’. As a corollary, while the practices of those promoting PUS were 
orchestrated around efforts to increase the popularisation of science (some exemplars 
of which include the setting up of the ‘Coalition on the Public Understanding of 
Science’ or CoPUS, a tripartite organisation whose main objective was to promote 
public understanding of science through the engagement of the scientific community 
per se, and the establishment of science communication grants and annual prizes for 
the best popular science books and so on), social researchers focused their attention 
on the study of public attitudes towards science and technology, tackling both 
theoretical and methodological issues of significance. Large-scale public opinion 
surveys were coupled with the analysis of media coverage further extending the range 
of concepts, methods and data considered relevant (Bauer, 2003). An intense, yet 
unfortunate, debate also occurred between quantitative and qualitative research over 
the determination of the sole legitimate ‘scientific study of PUS’. While the 
correlation between knowledge and attitude remained inconclusive, criticism started 
verbally attacking both the methodological as well as the theoretical assumptions 
implied in the paradigm. Thus, a fruitful discussion emerged regarding the 
employment of large-scale literacy surveys. Furthermore, studies on the ‘lay local’ by 
such workers as Wynne (1991, 1992a, 1996) and, although to a lesser extent visible in 
the debate, on social representations by Gervais (1997) pointed to the contextual and 
sophisticated nature of lay knowledge. Overall, criticism re-examined the definitions 
of the ‘public’, ‘understanding’ and  ‘science’ as they were implied in research under 
the PUS paradigm (for an elaborated discussion see Gregory and Miller (1998), Irwin 
and Michael (2003), Irwin and Wynne (1996), Levy-Leblond (1992), Sturgis and 
Allum (2004) and Wynne (1992a, 1992b, 1995)). At the core of the criticism lay what 
was seen as a disparity between a degrading portrayal of public and media opinion 
and a caressing of scientific authority and legitimacy. All in all, soon the finger of 
guilt was pointed at the deficit model of public understanding and calls were made for 
a more reflexive approach in the PUS research tradition (Miller, 2001). In the context 
of this critique a new paradigm of research emerged leading to new questions. This 
time the apportionment of deficit fell on the opposite camp, that of science and 
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scientific experts, due to their lack of trust in the public. Politically, the transition was 
once again marked by the publication of a House of Lords report entitled ‘Science and 
Society’ in 2000. In contrast to Bodmer’s references to public ignorance and media 
inconsistencies, this report gave priority to what Miller (2001) terms the 3-Ds, that is, 
dialogue, discussion and debate. PUS research is currently operating under the new 
Science and Society paradigm. As scholars are widely debating whether it is truly an 
instance of genuine reflexivity or yet another disguise of the more traditional PUS 
paradigms (for instance Michael, 2002), research is experiencing a broadening of its 
scopes and questions. As such, while the measurement of public opinion, knowledge 
and attitudes dominated the field for years, new investigations, this time of the 
understanding of the public by the experts, come to light. It is this work that is of 
great informative value to the present study.  
 When the present thesis was first conceptualised, almost 6 years back, the 
review of the relevant PUS literature before 2000 revealed a small number of works 
under this subject. Most of PUS research, as has been mentioned so far, was 
preoccupied with the study of public understanding and media coverage of scientific 
developments. Little attention was given to the other end of the spectrum, that of 
scientists and the way they conceptualised issues of public opinion and science policy. 
An exception to this was the work by Rabino (1994), an American biologist. 
Prompted by an intense public interest in biotechnology and genetic engineering, as 
reflected in publicity and regulatory developments at that time, Rabino set to 
investigate the attitudes of his colleagues involved in genetic engineering research on 
both North American and European ground. His interest was focused on the 
measurement of the perceived possible impact of public attention, political advocacy 
and regulatory developments on biologists’ works. Thus two surveys were conducted; 
one involving a sample of 430 US recombinant DNA scientists and the other 400 
scientists associated with the European biotechnological community. A comparative 
analysis indicated that although both US and European researchers agreed with the 
relative impact of public attention on their work, there were certain attitudinal 
differences. Overall, European researchers were found to hold more negative 
attitudes, considering public attention as harmful. Subsequent analysis revealed that 
this difference correlated well with the relative severity of regulations, explaining 
variations both between US and European scientists as well as among European 
researchers. Negative attitudes were reported with regard to the perceived influence of 
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public opinion and pressure groups over what was seen as unjustifiably strict 
regulatory controls. Although not against the idea of regulation per se, negativity was 
reported mainly amongst those European researchers with the most stringent 
regulatory controls, such as the Germans and Swiss. Overall, the analysis revealed the 
tendency of US and European researchers to prefer a more exclusive pattern of 
decision making, involving only experts in the field. A perceived gap between the 
public understanding of science and research was also reported by the respondents, 
with the majority of their recommendations reflecting rectifying and educational 
intentions.  
 As has been aforementioned, the publication of the ‘Science and Society’ 
report by the House of Lords, constituted a clear point in PUS research in Britain, 
prompting the investigation of scientific attitudes and notions of public opinion and 
science policy. In the context of the new proposed communication model between 
science and non-science, the Wellcome Trust commissioned a UK large-scale survey 
by MORI with the intention to further contribute to the development of a “national 
strategy which moves beyond the Public Understanding of Science towards genuine 
public dialogue” (MORI, 2000, p. 3). The survey, which was termed ‘The role of 
scientists in public debate’, focused on the investigation of scientists’ attitudes 
towards communicating science issues. The survey was organised along five research 
objectives all centred on the exploration of the preferred model of communication by 
scientists, the identification of individual differences amongst scientists, as well as 
perceived barriers towards more effective communicational practices. The study was 
conducted over a four-months period, from December 1999 to March 2000, and 
questioned scientists in both biomedical and non-biomedical fields of research 
receiving funding from a multitude of resources. Results indicated an overall positive 
attitude towards communication with the public. Science communication was 
portrayed by the participants as a matter of duty for scientists for the betterment of 
public decision making and the restoration of the relationship between scientists and 
the public, seen as experiencing a period of crisis and public mistrust. Results also 
indicated a distrust of most popular media by the scientists. Discussing variations 
amongst scientists, the study revealed a tension between biomedical researchers’ 
sense of duty to communicate with the public, which was found to be stronger 
compared to non-biomedical researchers, and their limited reported activity in science 
communication. The concluding part of the paper, entitled ‘Building a new dialogue: 
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discussion’, is indicative of the remedial nature of the study. Thus, MORI included a 
number of recommendations to the institutions and funding authorities engaged in 
scientific research for the encouragement of a ‘legitimate culture of dialogue’ (MORI, 
2000, p 71). These can be grouped roughly in seven different categories and embraced 
recommendations for 1) the promotion of the understanding of science 
communication in the scientific community, 2) the promotion of scientists’ 
communication skills, 3) the promotion of communicational services, 4) the 
promotion of collaborative activities between funders and institutions, 5) the 
promotion of collaborative activities between scientists and journalists, 6) the 
promotion of communication language, and 7) the stimulation of participation in 
science communication activities of the least involved groups of researchers. 
 Further extending this prescriptive tradition of social research into PUS and 
science communication, Waterton et al. (2001) conducted a qualitative study 
involving interviews with 52 scientists working in the domains of ecological 
protection, climate change, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and genetic 
engineering (GM) between 1998 and 1999. The project was part of a series of other 
research and practical policy initiatives, like the British Council’s programme 
‘Towards a Democratic Science’ and the activities of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Society. The research aims intended to explore the way 
different scientists reflected on their doings in relation to science policy and the 
discursive repertoire adopted while discussing these subjects. This last point drew 
heavily from the observations by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) of the employment by 
scientists of two different rhetorical repertoires in formal and informal settings of 
communication. In formal situations scientists were found to exert an empiricist 
representation of science. Thus, scientists and scientific knowledge are presented as 
objective, rational and value-free, in absolute separation from the social fabric. In 
informal situations though, scientists were more reflective on their activities, 
portraying them as contingent, that is, influenced by personal and social 
circumstances.  
Interview results indicated a tension experienced by scientists between the 
preservation of their professional identity and the demands and needs of a variety of 
funders, be they the public or the private sector. As a community, scientists appeared 
fragmented and weak, united only in instances of public mistrust like the BSE and the 
GM food controversies. Overall, scientists were found to regularly switch between the 
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‘empiricist’ and the ‘contingent’ repertoire, with those working in less controversial 
areas using the contingent repertoire to a greater extent than those whose research 
experienced periods of public scrutiny. Based on this finding, the study concludes 
with suggestions on further encouraging a public, more ‘contingent’, self-
representation by scientists on the assumption of further promoting the general 
public’s sense of comfort with modern science and thus enhancing the emergent 
public-dialogue mood (Waterton et al., 2001).  
An Internet survey by Burchell (2003) was also conducted amongst UK 
biotechnologists and geneticists working in the public sector. The study took place in 
2001 and can be seen as a further extension of Waterton and his colleagues (2001) 
research. While interested in investigating scientific attitudes towards science and 
scientific knowledge, the Likert-style questionnaire distributed, contained items 
intended to measure attitudes towards the general public and media coverage as well. 
Overall, the study reported what was termed as a poor view of the public and the 
media. Scientists portrayed the public as irrational and were found to view the media 
as a conduit between the producers of scientific knowledge and the people. With 
regard to political decision-making, a primacy of expertise was also evident, though 
coupled with a conviction to the usefulness of holding public views accountable. 
Variations were also observed with female scientists, less senior researchers and 
environmentalists holding what were called ‘less classical scientific perspectives’. 
Based on these differences the author drew some optimistic predictions regarding the 
possibility of a change in scientists’ understanding and attitude towards the public, 
while inviting social research for a future ‘group work with both scientists and 
members of the public’ (Burchell, 2003, p. 16).  
A qualitative analysis involving GM scientists was also conducted by Cook 
and his colleagues (2004), comprising interviews with 18 GM experts within one 
academic institution. The study focused largely on the communicational language 
adopted by the researchers as well as their perceptions of non-experts and anti-GM 
opposition. One of the intentions of the study was to assess the actual effect of the 
communicational style adopted upon non-experts. Thus, it also included the analysis 
of 15 ‘non-experts’ within the university under study (comprised of administrative 
and technical staff, and students) as well as 10 ‘outside advisers’ holding a 
professional interest in GM food from a variety of areas. The conclusions of the study 
focused mainly on the interview data with the scientists, using the data from 
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interviews with the other two groups as reference points. Findings indicated a three- 
dimensional categorisation of the participants in the GM debate by the scientists, as 
involving ‘scientists’, ‘the public’ and ‘the opponents of GM’. The communication 
style preferred by the interviewees varied according to the group targeted. ‘Scientists’ 
as a category was thought of as a homogenous, unproblematic grouping, standing in a 
binary opposition to the ‘public’. Public disquiet over GM food was characterised as 
irrational and emotional, to be overcome by the dissemination of more scientific facts. 
There was little room for reflection on the wider economic, political and ethical 
concerns explicitly addressed in the responses of both ‘non-experts’ and ‘scientific 
advisers’, mirroring the need of scientists to limit discussions over GM technology to 
a technical context and thus excluding other participants from entering in the debate. 
Anti-GM non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the media, classified by the 
interviewees in the opposition category, were also seen in a hostile vein, driven by 
their own professional and ideological agendas and motives. Overall, scientists were 
reported as advancing communication in the frame of ‘empirical objectivity’ with the 
purpose of transforming expertise language into more simplified versions, easily 
digestible for the non-experts. Cook et al. (2004) commented on the inability of 
scientists to take notice of other dimensions of the debate as a failure to appreciate 
simultaneously the opportunities as well as the challenges offered by crop genetic 
modification. Moreover, the interviewers report what they view as an ironic paradox 
between scientists’ criticisms over the emotionality and irrationality of the public and 
their own use of highly emotive language and selective examples.  
Still within the context of the ‘GM crisis’ Burchell (2007) reports the results 
of data derived from the analysis of 18 semi-structured interviews with scientists 
involved in crop genetics research, conducted in 2003. The aims of the study were in 
line with his previous internet-based survey (Burchell 2003) exploring mainly 
scientists’ views on the status of scientific knowledge, the status of public knowledge 
and their relation and the role of science policy, media coverage and NGOs. The 
findings present certain analogies to previous studies as to the degrading view 
scientists hold about the public understanding of GM and its media coverage. Again, 
scientists were bound up in an empiricist repertoire, distinguishing their knowledge, 
activities and relevant motives as legitimate, objective and straightforward. This was 
in direct contrast to the way they talked about the practices of four ‘others’, the 
public, the media, environmental NGOs and other unspecified scientists, all rendered 
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‘contingent’ and thus illegitimate, based on a number of reasons respectively. In this 
instance, Burchell’s conclusions were less optimistic identifying what he views as a 
discouraging finding in the context of the promotion of the science-non-science 
dialogue towards the amelioration of public controversy surrounding technological 
developments.  
Two additional recent studies come to extend relevant scholarship in the U.K 
by focusing exclusively on industry and its representatives. Burngingham and 
colleagues (2007) report the results of a qualitative study that took place amongst 
representatives of the area of chemicals industry. The research formed part of a larger 
project set to investigate the way lay environmental knowledge was conceptualised, 
accessed and used within the UK chemicals industry. The study was prompted both 
by the general switch in PUS research and practices towards more participatory 
models of science communication and also by new policy changes specifically 
addressing the chemicals industry in the context of EU regulations. In order to detect 
possible variations, interviewees were selected from 4 different companies reflecting 
differences in size (small versus multinational) and orientation (business-to business 
versus business-to-consumer). On the whole 34 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with senior executives in the areas of chemicals/cleaning products. The 
interviews addressed questions of definitions of the public/s, characterisation of 
public environmental concern and knowledge, communication with publics and 
policies of corporate social responsibility and sustainability. Interviewees drew 
distinctions between the general public as citizens and more specific publics like 
‘consumers’ and ‘neighbours’. While ‘consumers’ were at times referred to as parts of 
the larger public, the ‘neighbours’, identified as the local communities residing in the 
neighbouring surroundings to those of the companies’, were rarely discussed in such 
terms. It was these two groups that tended to be seen as the actual publics of relevance 
to the participants. When it came to the evaluation of public, consumer or local 
knowledge, they were mentioned less as holders of knowledge, though invalid in both 
extent and quality, and more as advocates of concerns and complaints. Thus, the 
general public’s worries were seen as irrational and media driven, the consumers’ 
reservations as lacking ‘hard’ scientific knowledge, and the neighbours’ objections as 
relying on the senses rather than on logic. The results also indicated two variations of 
the deficit model employed in the discourses of the interviewees. Thus, when 
discussing the public understanding of industry, respondents reflected on extending 
 65 
communication with the public in the view of restoring both understanding and a 
perceived lack of trust. However, when the issue was the public understanding of 
chemical products, the perceived deficit of knowledge was conceived as reasonable 
and in no need of any rectifying intervention. With the exception of the executives 
representing the multinational business-to-consumer company, there was little 
reflection amongst the interviewees over the value of an extensive public dialogue 
around the assumptions and the general visions underpinning industry activities. This 
was also manifested in the communication practices of the companies, which were 
mostly prompted by substantive motivations to address risks, impacts and preferences.  
 Researching the electricity supply industry, the Devine-Wrights (2005) further 
contribute to the field by studying the representations of domestic electricity 
consumers amongst UK electricity industry stakeholders. The study was qualitative in 
nature, comprising 18 semi-structured interviews with relevant representatives and 
was conducted in the light of recent developments in renewable energy technologies. 
The main aim of the interviews was to explore the way industry representatives 
thought about demand-side management in the U.K. Interviewees’ discussions were 
found to be negatively worded and developed mainly around the electricity 
consumers’ or customers’ lack of socio-cognitive skills, socio-economic resources 
and socio-morals necessary for the participation in demand or supply activities. 
Pondering on their results, the Divine-Wrights bring to the attention of the policy-
makers the need to change the ‘deficit beliefs’ reinforced by current UK government 
schemes, for, together with the existing industry regulations, they were conceived as 
an impermeable barrier for the development of a more participatory, decentralised 
system of energy production.  
 Concluding the review of PUS studies relevant to the present research topic, is 
a study conducted in Canada. Focusing on another controversial scientific field, that 
of aquaculture (the commercial growing of fish and shellfish in nets or other semi-
contained areas in fresh and marine waters), Young and Matthews (2007), report the 
results of an Internet survey of the views of 300 aquaculture experts on the role of lay 
contributions in scientific and political debates over this controversial industry. 
Questionnaire items were designed to reflect respondents’ views on the participation 
of potential stakeholders in relevant policy and regulation, on the role of the media in 
the debate and on their assessment of the knowledge and values of ‘general public 
opinion’. Findings indicate a correlation between the respondents’ general stance to 
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aquaculture and their attitudes towards incorporating local and native knowledge in 
formal scientific practices. This means that those experts more sceptical to the idea of 
aquaculture tended to be more willing to integrate other forms of knowledge. 
Responses to open-ended questions however, indicated that this incorporation was 
mostly conceptualised as a way to further increase the legitimacy of expert opinion, 
that is, as complementary to scientific views, rather than as a form of knowledge of 
potentially contributing value. A similar correlation was reported regarding the 
measurement of experts’ views on the role of media coverage. However, an 
overwhelmingly poor assessment of the media contribution to relative debates was 
measured based mostly on accusations of the institutional ethos of the media as driven 
by capitalist values. Negative opinions were also measured on items and open-ended 
questions referring to the ‘lay’ general public. The public was seen as making poor 
decisions due to either cognitive limitation or to partial media reporting, albeit not 
purposely. Commenting on their findings, Young and Matthews (2007) suggest that a 
certain paradox is identified. On the one hand, scientists deny public opinion by 
referring to biases in media representations and lay interpretations of science, while 
on the other hand they claim it by incorporating stakeholders’ opinions in the view of 
legitimising their own doings. The authors reconfigure this tension as a struggle for 
control over claims and knowledge. Certain conclusions need to be drawn from this 
study. Firstly, under conditions of scientific controversy scientists assign different 
degrees of legitimacy to different types of knowledge. Secondly, media and public 
understanding of science is downplayed for it is performed outside the experts’ 
control. Thirdly, public and stakeholder participation is invited only in the ‘post- 
production’ period of scientific knowledge, complementing scientific knowledge and 
thus keeping the control over knowledge in scientific hands.  
 
2.3 Reviewing the literature: the path ahead 
Prior knowledge always forms part, in one way or another, of present and future 
thoughts, ideas and actions. The present study and its investigation of the way experts 
in one area of knowledge conceptualise the public sphere, bares no exception. Hence, 
there is a need for a certain degree of reflexivity in identifying the way prior research 
on the relationship between science and the public as perceived by scientists 
themselves, has informed the present study. Although a fuller account of its rationale 
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and design will be offered in subsequent sections (see Chapter 4), some epigrammatic 
ideas shall now be addressed.  
Thus, the aforementioned studies present an interesting amalgam of a variety 
of theoretical, methodological, empirical and motivational resources from which to 
draw and approach relevant phenomena. Indeed, by assuming a disinterested attitude 
towards the phenomenon under their investigation, works like that by Gieryn (1983; 
1985; 1995) and Michael and his colleagues (Michael & Birke, 1994a; 1994b; 
Michael & Brown, 2000; Brown & Michael, 2001) contribute to the present study by 
providing a specific portrait of the scientists investigated as a distinct group of experts 
bound together either under a common ideology or a set of similar interests. In each 
instance, scientists are depicted as a highly active assembly, who in their attempt to 
protect their autonomy while securing wider public support, negotiate the boundaries 
between: science and the public, expertise and culture, insiders and outsiders, in a 
strategical and sophisticated manner. However rich and informative they may be, the 
above studies run the risk of undermining the relationship between language and 
thought and consequently the subjective (who I am), objective (how the world is) and 
intersubjective (who the other is) elements of knowledge. Discussions on their 
findings suggest a tendency to regard scientific discourses about the public as 
instances of linguistic repertoires. By accounting for variations in scientists’ 
discussions solely in connection to their conversational context, these studies seem to 
undermine the importance of representation in the making sense of, thinking about, 
talking in, in one word, living in the world. Is the purpose of a shift in a person’s 
rhetorical style solely to be accounted for on the basis of persuasion? Yet, what point 
does persuasion have if, at the same time: who is talking; her/his relation to other like-
minded individuals; their common project; any possible shared history; their possible 
representations of the world; and the potential structure and functions of these 
representations in, for instance, forming, sustaining or resisting communication with 
others, is not taken into consideration? Though at times implied, the above studies fail 
to explicitly make such links. By taking a more socio-psychological approach, it is 
thought that the present research addresses such a lacuna. 
Studies like those by Burchell (2003; 2007), Burngingham (2007), MORI 
(2000), Rabino, (1994), Waterton et. al, (2001) and Young & Matthews (2007) 
provide a more heterogeneous picture of the scientific community, with opinions and 
views about publics, public opinion or science-policy varying according to 
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nationality, seniority, gender, institution as well as, the general technical and more 
social conditions affecting each field of research. These are all points for a priori 
consideration in the elaboration of one’s research. Nevertheless, most of the above 
accounts provide a more attitudinal perspective, overshadowing the investigation of 
possible links between knowledge and those who hold it at a particular place and 
time. Concurrently, their sustained focus in large-scale settings and interview 
situations, attempting either to draw vast generalisations or less widespread but richer 
information, has no analogous counterpart in the form of endeavours to assess more 
formal channels in which knowledge is produced, transformed and communicated. 
However, as is fully discussed in chapter 4, research on social representations has, 
time and time again, pointed to the conceptual and empirical necessity of 
investigating different settings of representations.   
 One final comment, and more to the point of the PUS studies presented so far, 
regards the why recent PUS activities expanded their focus to include the study of 
experts and the significance of this on relevant social research, including the present 
study. Bauer (2003) points scholars’ attention to the recent blurring of the borders that 
has taken place between social research and intervention. Thus, there is a sense that in 
the context of the new Science and Society paradigm, what has been termed as a 
‘crisis of confidence’ has as much to do with public distrust of scientific 
developments as to experts’ distrust of the public. Therefore, as the argument follows, 
views by scientific experts of the public, the media and the democratic process (and 
so on and so forth) come under scrutiny with the intention of detecting and rectifying 
them in order to re-gain the public’s hearts and minds. As Bauer points out, this might 
well be an instance of a reverse PUS deficit. In his terms “this agenda, academically 
grounded as it may be, is in affinity with political and business consultancy with 
whom it shares a decidedly pragmatic outlook. Much of this activity takes the form 
of practical advice sold in a market place” (2003, p.11).  
In some cases more explicit than others, this remedial agenda was found to 
affect relevant empirical work in three main ways. Thus, it seems to have prioritised 
research focus on some ‘hot’ topics for science policy, like the GM and the BSE 
disputes. This view has also been reflected in such research items and questions, set 
to measure scientists’ knowledge of public opinion formation, attitudes towards a 
series of channels and modes of communication as well as to assess possible hurdles 
impeding the realisation of a more ‘public dialogue’. Lastly, traces of it can also be 
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identified in the form of prescriptive recommendations made to the relative 
authorities in order to tackle communicational barriers or ‘deficits’, as well as, in the 
form of predictions about the future of the science-non-science relationship.  
It would be a lapse to ignore the influence of the current zeitgeist in PUS 
research on the present study. Much of the interest in studying the social 
representations of the public sphere among experts in SCNT research was born in the 
context of these wider conversations upon the relationships between science and 
society. Thus, the present work could be seen as constituting a further contribution to 
these recent discussions. However, the present thesis has no socio-therapeutic 
aspiration in the sense of identifying ‘biases’ and drawing strategies for their 
omission. This is reflected in the choice of social representations, both as a theory 
and phenomenon (as discussed in the previous chapter), and in its overall execution, 
allowing the scientists interviewed to bring into the discussion those aspects of the 
public sphere that are of interest to them rather than those belonging to a pre-
determined consultancy-based list of themes (covered in chapters 4, 5 and 6).  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The relationship between science and non-science as viewed by scientific experts has 
been mainly addressed by studies in the Sociology of Science and the Public 
Understanding of Science traditions. Both, successfully depict the numerous ways, 
rhetorical devices, opinions and attitudes, scientists hold over issues of much 
philosophical interest, as are the demarcation of science or its distribution. Some draw 
on a desire to practically tackle hurdles in the public communication of science, 
whereas others stand out as being more academically oriented towards the interface 
and border-construction between different forms of knowledge. As a corollary, some 
studies point to ‘deficits’ in expertise knowledge about the processes involved in the 
formation of ‘lay’ knowledge and public opinion, in the conduct of media coverage, 
and the development and application of regulatory frameworks. In this vein, 
prescriptions are drawn with a view to further promote public trust in science and 
democratic decision-making. Other studies point to the mastery with which scientists 
define and redefine notions, such as ‘science’, ‘society’, the ‘lay’ and specific 
‘publics’ in their efforts to sustain control over the production of knowledge and the 
definition of their professional identities. Whatever the case may be, all studies 
constituted rich and informative sources of great conceptual, methodological and 
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empirical value to the present research. At the same time, they all, in one way or 
another, point to certain lacunae that underlie the importance for a more socio-
psychological approach to the study of relevant phenomena, as a way of illuminating 
the objective, subjective and intersubjective elements of scientists’ representations of 
the public sphere, in different settings of communication and in relation to their 
historical and geographical contexts, in other words, their time and place. The present 
research is expected to address such a lacuna. 
At this point, the presentation of the theoretical underpinnings of the present 
thesis is concluded. In the following section light will be shed on the meaning and the 
technicalities involving SCNT research, while looking into the UK public debate that 
arose following the announcement of the birth of Dolly the sheep, as a movement. 
This will be followed by a presentation and subsequent discussion on the rationale, 
design and conduct of this study prior to reporting its findings. 
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Chapter 3 
The Human Cloning Debate in the UK 
 
The aim of the present chapter is to provide the reader with background information 
on somatic cell nuclear transfer, both as a scientific procedure and as a subject of 
intense public debate in the UK. More specifically, the chapter starts by briefly 
discussing the technology of somatic cell nuclear transfer, its history and applications, 
to move on to the presentation and conceptualisation of the UK human cloning 
debate, based on the framework developed by Bauer and Gaskell (2002) for the study 
of the relation between biotechnology and European publics. In so doing, the debate is 
approached as a movement calling for the identification of actors, publics and the 
dynamic relations between among them. In this way, it is thought that the reader will 
become better acquainted with the technical, historical, and geographical context of 
the phenomenon of research, that is, addressing the when and where of the social 
representations of the public sphere among experts in this study. The debate is 
approached in a manner flexible enough to capture the complexity of the phenomenon 
yet simple enough to allow, at a later stage, a comprehensive analysis of the relation 
between science and the public as viewed by scientists themselves. It is presented, as 
it unfolded up until the completion of the present research, covering relevant UK 
developments from 1997 until 2005.  
 
3.1 Which ‘cloning’? 
Much confusion is generated when one encounters the word cloning (McGee, 2000). 
Etymologically the word originates from the ancient Greek for ‘twig’. In biology 
literature the words clone, clones, cloning and cloned have been used for years to 
denote a variety of different procedures, from the cultivation of groups of cells and 
DNA molecules to more complex techniques such as the production of whole 
organisms (for a more elaborated description see Appendix 1). In contrast to the 
multifaceted polysemy encountered in the scientific vocabulary, in the public domain 
words like cloning and its synonyms have been equated with the use of the nuclear 
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transfer technique on animals and humans for a plethora of applications
3
. It is this 
technique, involved in the creation of Dolly the sheep, along with its experts that 
constitute the focus of the present research.  
Nuclear transfer (or Somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) or Cell Nuclear 
Replacement, CNR) involves an unfertilized egg, whose nucleus is removed and 
replaced by another nucleus with the full number of chromosomes, which is 
stimulated through an electrical pulse4 to start developing as an embryo. The 
transferred nucleus can originate either from an embryonic, a foetal or an adult cell, 
thus resulting in different success rates. This is because cells taken in different 
developmental stages are more or less specialised or differentiated. Differentiation 
refers to the progressive restriction in possible cell fates, until only one cell fate is left 
(Gurdon & Byrne, 2002). Early embryonic cells (the blastomeres) are totipotent cells, 
meaning, they are not differentiated cells, and have the potential to generate an entire 
organism. As the embryo develops, its cells become more specialised or 
‘differentiated’, losing their potential to generate all the different tissues of the body, 
and becoming restricted to only those they are destined for (Sureau, 2002). Therefore, 
when the transferred nucleus is taken from an early embryo, the success rate of the 
procedure is greater than when a nucleus from a foetal or adult cell is used. For 
example, Dolly the sheep, which was created by using the nucleus of an adult cell, 
was the only lamb born out of 277 attempts (McLaren, 2002a). It is this potential of 
the technique to replicate an entire adult organism that resulted in an intense debate 
after the announcement of Dolly’s creation. For the first time cloning of an adult 
organism became less of a fictional scenario and more of a feasible reality.  
Some initial attempts in the development of the nuclear transfer technique date 
back to the beginning of the twentieth century (Gurdon & Byrne, 2002). Spemann, in 
                                                 
3
   In the present thesis the term ‘human cloning’ is used to refer to overall somatic 
cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) or cell nuclear replacement (CNR) research and its 
various applications on humans, reproductive as well as therapeutic 
4
   This is the technique Campbell and Wilmut followed for the creation of Dolly, 
relying heavily on Willadsen’s practice of electrofusion in order to trigger embryonic 
development. However, this is not the only route, as was demonstrated by Hawaiian 
scientists, who cloned dozens of mice in 1998 through nuclear microinjection (Wakayama et. 
al., 1998) 
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1914, was the first to experiment with amphibian cloning. He managed to conduct 
nuclear transfer with early newt embryonic nuclei. He continued in 1938 with the 
publication of his book ‘Embryonic Development and Induction’ proposing for the 
first time a ‘fantastical experiment’ involving the cloning of an adult animal. After 
Spemann, various other experiments were performed, albeit always on amphibians. 
 The first attempt to perform nuclear transfer on mammals was made in 1975 
by Bromhall. Yet, most of the potential of mammalian cloning required the use of 
differentiated or adult donor cell nuclei (Gordon & Byrne, 2002). This problem 
remained unresolved until 1996 when Ian Wilmut and Keith Campbell announced the 
birth of Megan and Morag (for more on the history of nuclear transfer on vertebrates 
see Appendix 2).  
PPL Therapeutics was founded in 1987 as the commercial branch of the 
government funded institution Animal Breeding Research Organisation, now known 
as the Roslin Institute in Scotland. The purpose of PPL was to commercialise the 
production of proteins using transgenic technology in animals. The main goal of the 
Megan and Morag experiment was to ‘produce animals from an embryo derived cell 
line that had differentiated in culture’ (Klotzko, 2003, p.11). The purpose of the 
research was to establish a routine technique for the genetic modification in animals 
for transmission through the germ line. The two sheep were cloned by inserting 
identical nuclei from an embryo-derived cell into enucleated eggs, that is, eggs whose 
own nucleus had been removed.  
As an extension to a series of nuclear transfusion experiments that involved 
nuclear donors from embryo, foetal and adult cells, the Roslin Institute announced in 
1997 the birth of Dolly. Dolly was created by cells taken from the udder of a six-year 
old Fin Dorsett ewe (that is, adult and thus even more differentiated cells). 277 of 
those cells were fused with 277 unfertilized eggs, resulting in 29 viable reconstructed 
eggs that were implanted in Blackface ewes. One of them led to the birth of Dolly 
(Wilmut et al., 1997).  
The creation of Dolly managed to successfully solve one of the greatest mysteries 
in the study of cell development, namely that of differentiation and the possibility of 
turning a cell back to its early stages of development. After this experiment, the 
scientific world flourished with announcements of similar attempts. Thus, PPL 
announced the creation of a transgenic lamb, Polly, which carried a human gene in 
every cell of her body, and was created by nuclear transfer from cells that had been 
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grown in culture and had been genetically modified. There were also announcements 
of cloned mice (Wakayama et al., 1998), cows (Kato et al., 1998), goats (Baguisi, et 
al., 1999) and pigs (Polejaeva et al., 2000). 
 
 
3.2 Prospects of Nuclear Transfer Technology 
The technique of nuclear transfer can be applied for the pursuit of a variety of 
different goals, involving the cloning of both animals and humans.  
Some of the most notable applications of the procedure on animals involve a)low 
cost biopharmaceuticals and the generation of human proteins in transgenic animals; 
b)nutraceuticals relating to the modification of animal milk for the improvement of its 
nutritional value; c)xenotransplantation to overcome problems of animal organ 
rejection by the human body; d)disease models, for the production of disease models 
in animals that share physiological commonalities with humans; and generally, 
e)transgenics technology where the nuclear transfer procedure offers the possibility of 
the direct genetic modification of cells in culture for the creation of transgenic 
animals (Campbell, 2002). In addition to the above applications, nuclear transfer has 
been proposed as a secure way for the preservation of animal species that are 
currently threatened with extinction. It is also argued that animal cloning research 
could enhance scientific understanding regarding cell reprogramming techniques, cell 
regulation, and differentiation. 
Two are the most prominent potential applications of cell nuclear replacement 
on humans, both involving the creation of a human embryo resulting either in the 
birth of a child or in its use for a number of medical and therapeutic purposes. The 
first application is usually called human reproductive cloning, while the latter human 
therapeutic cloning (for the purposes of the present research, and in order to sustain 
clarification, this distinction will be retained, although this terminology is accepted by 
neither the whole of the scientific community nor by other actors relevant to the 
technology). 
Human reproductive cloning involves the application of nuclear transfer 
technology in order to produce an offspring that would be genetically identical to 
another human being. In 2001, Severino Antinori a Rome-based obstetrician, 
Panayiotis Zavos a fertility researcher from Kentucky, and Avi Ben-Abraham an 
Israeli physician, were the first to announce their intentions to produce the first human 
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clone of an adult organism. Their experiment was set to take place in an unnamed 
Mediterranean country; however, to date there has not been any evidence or 
publicized data confirming the successful result of such an attempt. In the same year, 
a religious cult called the Raelians that believe that all life on Earth was created by 
alien scientists and that cloning is the key to the future, were about to sue the US 
government for not permitting them to continue their research into cloning human 
beings. Soon after, they announced the birth of the first human clone; however, they 
have omitted to provide any scientific data of the proclaimed event.  
The term therapeutic cloning is considered ambiguous, as it has been taken by 
some to embrace reproductive cloning as a therapy for infertile couples (Royal 
Society, 2000). In the context of the present thesis, it is employed to refer to 
applications of cloning that include the creation of an embryo but do not result in the 
birth of genetically identical individuals. The term therapeutic cloning has been 
widely equated with the application of the nucleus replacement technique for the 
creation of an embryo, in order to extract pluripotent embryonic stem cells 
(Appendices 3 and 4).   
Stem cells are able to produce at least one type of highly specialised 
descendant, while almost all types of stem cells have the capacity for prolonged self-
renewal (Holland et al., 2001). Stem cells can be found in adult organisms, foetuses or 
early embryos and can be classified into four basic categories, on the basis of their 
malleability (Royal Society, 2000; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2000): Totipotent 
stem cells, pluripotent stem cells (embryonic stem cells and embryonic germ cells), 
multipotent cells, and stem cells with more restricted potency (for more on stem cells 
see Appendices 3 & 4).  
Pluripotent embryonic stem cells (ES cells) have been the focus of intense 
scientific interest ever since the first successful derivation of human ES cells by 
researchers at the University of Wisconsin in 1998 (Thompson, et al., 1998). 
Embryonic stem cells could be cultured in vitro, and unlike foetal or adult stem cells, 
they can result in the production of all cells and tissues in the human body. 
Embryonic stem cells can be extracted from blastocysts (early embryos) 
created either by in vitro fertilisation (IVF) or by cell nuclear replacement. The 
application of cloning techniques for the extraction of stem cells offers a considerable 
advantage compared to ES cells derived from embryos created by IVF. Although both 
cell types can give rise to all the cells and tissues in the human body, therapeutic 
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cloning guarantees genetic compatibility with the person being treated (HGAC & 
HFEA, 1998b). As a result, this procedure could provide immunologically compatible 
tissues for the treatment of degenerative diseases or repair damage to skin or bone. In 
this way, risk of tissue rejection would be avoided while there would be no treatment 
of the patient with immunosuppressive drugs, which in many cases can lead to cancer.  
In the U.K the first license to create human embryos for research purposes by 
cell nuclear replacement was issued in June 2004 to scientists at Newcastle 
University, setting the beginning of a new era in the treatment of diabetes. There is 
still a variety of questions to be answered with regard to cell differentiation and the 
successful manipulation of ES cells in order to result in the desired tissue. In the long 
run, scientists believe that by perfecting the use of nuclear replacement technique, 
knowledge and understanding of cell differentiation will be enhanced, obviating the 
need to create embryos as a source of stem cells.  
 
 
3.3 The human cloning debate as a movement 
In their comparative study on the reception of biotechnology across different 
European countries, Bauer and Gaskell (2002) propose a framework for the social 
scientific analysis of the changing relations between science, technology, and the 
public. Based on the writings of such a variety of scholars as Giddens, Habermas, 
Latour, Moscovici and Piaget, to name but a few, this framework has been the 
backbone for the conceptualisation of the human SCNT debate as a movement, while 
assisting in the design of the present research, mainly in three ways. First, and in line 
with social representations research as discussed in Chapter 1, it offers a clear 
specification of appropriate social segments, that is, milieus, groups of people bound 
together towards a techno-scientific development, mostly defined in terms of self-
referential assemblages (for example, activists, religious, scientific experts). It also 
manages to put forward a clear operationalisation of the term ‘public sphere’ for the 
purposes of empirical work, at the same time as it invites the researcher to promote 
the understanding of the polymorphous relations among those involved in the debate, 
while enhancing it further.  
 More specifically, the conceptualisation of human SCNT research as a 
movement, permits a straightforward identification of the structure of the human 
cloning debate in terms of actors and the public. Three different groups of actors are 
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identified: a) the scientific-industrial complex, situated at the heart of the human 
cloning movement and comprised of individuals involved in the making, promotion 
and exploitation of CNR research; b) those who see a benefit in this research; and c) 
those who resist it. The public sphere assumes a triangular hypostasis, comprising the 
arenas of the mass media, regulation and public perceptions. The operationalisation of 
the public sphere, as three different arenas, permits the identification of the various 
relations between regulation, media coverage and public perceptions, while bringing 
the attention of the researcher to the complexity of those links. In the words of Bauer 
and Gaskell (2002) “each arena must be understood in the context of the other two, 
and in the context of the activities of the biotechnology movement” (p.363). Table 3.1 
gives a schematic depiction of the way the three arenas have been presented by the 
two scholars in terms of their modus operandi, achievements, and functions (ibid, 
2002, p.18).  
Secondly, the framework offers a clear understanding of the dynamics among 
actors and the public, discussing relations, functions, and actions in terms of challenge 
and counter-challenge, frames of discourse, and changing representations in the 
context of a competitive, almost Machiavellian course.  
As such, the model enables the researcher to ponder on the changing relations 
between science and the public in a simple yet flexible manner, while promoting and 
assisting the study of issues that are still underdeveloped, as is the relation between 
science and the public from the scientific viewpoint.  
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Table 3.1 The operating principles of the three arenas 
 
Public arenas  
 
Public conversations and 
perception 
 
Mass media coverage 
 
Regulation  
Modus operandi 
 
Medium cycles 
Some consistency 
Memory 
 
 
 
‘media logic’ 
Short cycles 
News values 
Imperative of novelty 
Little consistency 
Hardly any memory 
Framing 
 
Long cycles 
Bias against novelty 
Consistency 
Long memory 
 
Achievements 
Opinion,  
Attitude 
Stereotype 
Schemata 
Awareness 
Skills 
Dissemination 
Propagation 
Propaganda 
Advertising 
Education and training 
Agenda setting 
 
Regulatory regimes 
Functions 
 
Being able to act on it; 
Communicating with other 
people; 
 
Information; 
Entertainment; 
Linking domains of 
societal action; 
Allocation of 
responsibility; 
Assimilation and 
accommodating public 
opinion; 
Enabling technology; 
 
 
 
3.4 Contextualising the UK human cloning debate 
Before visiting the debate around human SCNT research as it unfolded in the UK 
after the birth of Dolly and within the 9-years time frame specified, it is pivotal to 
account for prior scientific and social developments, as they seem to have provided 
the background by having already shaped patterns of argumentation, as well as, 
forming interlocutors.  
Thus, the 1960s and 1970s have been characterised as periods of great 
transformation both in terms of scientific discoveries and social change. These were 
times of radical advancements with regard to assisted reproductive technologies and 
birth control. Developments in artificial insemination in animals were followed by the 
first successful attempt to produce a baby through IVF that resulted in the birth of 
 79 
Louise Brown, in July 1978. Other babies soon followed; whereas just over a decade 
later, in 1989, a total of around five thousand egg donations were estimated to have 
occurred in the United States alone (Maienschein, 2003). The advancements in 
assisted reproductive technology brought into discussion a plethora of issues.  
In contrast to the promises raised by IVF for many infertile couples, the 
conservative press, the Church and some ethicists argued against the ‘unnaturalness’  
of a procedure that brought into question the values of the traditional family, while at 
the same time increasing the risks of serious health problems for future generations. 
Worries were also expressed about designer babies, invoking images of a ‘Brave New 
World’. Furthermore, important legal problems arose, such as, who is entitled to an 
egg; who owns a fertilised egg or a frozen embryo; how extra fertilised eggs are to be 
treated; and how should research involving human embryos be regulated. Questions 
were also raised about the cost of these procedures and its potential inclusion in 
existing health care systems.  
This was also a period of great social changes where primacy was given to 
individual civil rights and personal autonomy. The reproductive freedom of women 
and the right to have an abortion was also one of the most debated issues of that 
period, while discussions over the status of the human embryo and its right to life are 
still ongoing amongst ethicists. While feminist organisations were demonstrating for 
the right to abortion and controlled pregnancies, the Church and a strong anti-abortion 
movement were declaring against abortion as an act of murder, initiating discussions 
about the return of eugenics.  
The human SCNT debate in the UK is to be conceptualised as a continuation 
of the above debates. There is relevance both in terms of the arguments put forward 
but also in terms of central actors mobilised. Thus, the discussion on the ethics of 
human SCNT research has re-initiated debates on what is natural and what is not; 
health risks involved; and discussions about the status of the human embryo, points 
that will be further addressed in the following part of the present chapter. In terms of 
actors, as it will be latter shown, the same forces have once again mobilised, 
reestablishing existence in the context of a novel biomedical development.  
Despite the great similarities with past debates, the ethical debate over human 
SCNT research has also been informed by some important changes since the 1970s. 
These changes embrace mainly three important areas, namely, the current status of 
bioethics, the right to reproduction and the patients’ movement (Callahan, 2003). 
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Bioethics was established as a discipline in the 1960s in the midst of social 
turmoil in the United States, where a general suspicion of technology was articulated 
by many intellectuals. Although there is no consensus over the degree of 
technological acceptability by bioethicists, some argue that current bioethicists are 
more likely to support a scientific development (Callahan, 2003), while others argue 
for the contrary (Caplan, 2003), developments in genetic engineering and human 
genome research have undoubtedly matured the discipline giving way to more holistic 
and informed moral discussions. As such, bioethics has come to contribute greatly to 
the way a novel biomedical development is received by the public and the regulatory 
authorities. 
Secondly, the right to procreate has been given primacy ever since the first 
discussions about artificial insemination, IVF and surrogate motherhood took place in 
the 1970s and 1980s. According to Callahan (2003) the right to become a parent in 
any way possible has become almost a moral absolute, in contrast to the early 1970s 
when the reproductive rights movement was just being formed.  
Lastly, recent years have experienced the mobilisation of a powerful patients’ 
movement that has lobbied regulatory authorities intensively achieving great increases 
in government support of biomedical research while advocating for the right to relief 
from infertility and from serious diseases. 
 
3.5 The UK human cloning debate 
In scientific terms, research on somatic cell nuclear replacement has a long past with 
the first experiments dating as far back as 1914. However, it was the media 
announcement of the birth of Dolly the sheep on February 1997 that commenced the 
first public discussion of the ramifications of this technology, in ethical, economic, 
social, and political terms. While the debate initially focused on the meanings of 
human reproductive cloning and the prospects of duplicating oneself, the first 
successful isolation and culture of pluripotent stem cells from human blastocysts in 
1998, raised additional issues concerning the therapeutic applications of the technique 
and the potential moral and social impact of creating and using human embryos for 
stem cell research (Nippert, 2002). The UK debate on SCNT research has been 
mainly a dispute regarding the use of this technique in the creation of human embryos 
as sources of human embryonic stem cells that could eventually lead to therapeutic 
applications. As such, it can be approached as an amalgamation of opinions and 
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discussions relevant to human embryo research, stem cell technology, and human 
reproduction issues. Overall, it reflects what Giddens (1994) has identified as the 
double-nature of science and technology, offering beneficent promises, as well as, 
new dangers and risks for humankind. Generally in the U.K, as well as in other 
countries, there is a parallel in both the issues of discussion and of the actors 
mobilised. It is the developments in the public sphere though, especially in terms of 
the regulation of this technology that distinguishes the U.K worldwide. As pointed out 
above, the presentation of the debate covers the period from 1997 until the end of 
2005 matching the time frame of the study. More intense in the first years after the 
creation of Dolly, the public debate seems to have followed developments in the 
regulation of human cloning and stem cell research, and gradually lost its severity. At 
the time of the study, SCNT was discussed mainly in the context of embryonic stem 
cell research.  
The UK debate is presented in an epigrammatic yet sufficiently exhaustive 
manner, allowing the reader to better contextualise the present study. At a first level, a 
presentation of the various actors and their arguments will be made, concluding in the 
distinction of two focal standings, mainly concerning the human therapeutic 
applications of SCNT research: the pro-therapeutic and the anti-therapeutic cloning 
argumentation. At a second level, human SCNT research will be discussed in terms of 
its public reception, as indicated by relevant studies on its perception by different 
members of the UK public, its media coverage, and finally its regulation in the British 
context.  
 
3.5.1 Actors in the UK debate: arguments and counter-arguments 
Following Bauer and Gaskell’s (2002) suggested framework for the analysis of the 
relations between science, technology and society, three main distinctions regarding 
groups of actors can be made in relation to human SCNT research and its prospects.  
Firstly, there are those with an interest in the creation and exploitation of cell 
nuclear replacement research and applications, also known as the scientific–industrial 
complex. These include research institutions, scientific societies, bankers, managers, 
marketing executives, stockholders, communicators, patent lawyers and a series of 
other actors. The scientific voice was expressed mainly through published reports and 
press releases, as well as by the numerous UK science-based organisations (like for 
example the Nuffield Council of Bioethics, the Royal Society, the Medical Research 
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Council, the British Medical Association, the Association of Medical Research 
Charities) and by the official representatives of the various public institutions where 
most of the UK’s research activity takes place (Parry, 2003). While the reproductive 
applications of the technology were largely rejected, with the exception of some 
individual voices, it is the therapeutic potential of its application that took centre stage 
in their activities.  
Secondly, there are those who saw opportunities in cell nuclear replacement 
research. Again, there has been little support for the use of cloning in human 
reproduction, albeit some individual ethicists and infertile couples. The majority of 
activities focused on the promotion of the therapeutic prospects of the technique in 
stem cell applications. Thus, with the support of some ethicists and the medical world, 
the major proponent of the technology was a strong patients’ movement that vastly 
dominated the public debate in the form of clear-cut organisations. Some 
paradigmatic examples include the Alzheimer’s Society, the British Heart Foundation, 
the Cancer Research Campaign, Diabetes UK, Huntington Disease Association and 
the Parkinson’s Disease Society.  
Thirdly, there are those who voiced concerns about both the therapeutic and 
reproductive applications of cell nuclear replacement. Albeit some individual cases, as 
per certain scientists and ethicists, this last type of actors was mostly represented in 
terms of self-referential groups like the Church, pro-life organisations (for example 
The Pro-Life Alliance, Life) and anti-abortion campaigners (like the Society for the 
Protection of the Unborn Child). 
Taken together, the first two actors (scientific-industrial complex and patient 
groups) constituted the basic pro-therapeutic cloning front. While identifying a range 
of moral, deontological, as well as, practical difficulties raised by reproductive 
cloning, speakers advocating the creation of embryos through SCNT as a source of 
stem cells used seven main points of argumentation to promote such uses of the 
technology (Parry, 2003). Largely confined to scientific reasoning and drawing from 
prior debates on human embryo research, proponents of SCNT advocated for its 
nature as a mere continuation of prior research, already accepted and well-regulated in 
the British context. According to this line of argument, the creation of human 
embryos through SCNT held no new ethical dilemmas, for it followed long-
established human embryo research practices, while essentially serving therapeutic 
goals. Indeed, and converging with moral and religious arguments, human therapeutic 
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cloning advocates went on to articulate a more scientific conceptualisation of 
conception and concurrently of the human embryo per se. As such, the importance of 
conception in the creation of human life was undermined. Rather, conception was 
seen as one out of many conditions that contribute to the potentiality of a human 
embryo becoming a person. These include status provisions that are external to the 
embryo, such as the successful placement of the embryo into the womb, implantation, 
and a healthy pregnancy. Based on this perspective, all of these steps are sufficient 
conditions that should be met in order for an embryo to successfully develop into a 
human baby (Schroten, 2002). Coupled with this type of argumentation, a more 
utilitarian conceptualisation of the human, artificially created, embryo was proposed. 
Thus, a human embryo created by natural conception or in some cases by assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART) bears a different status than the embryo created by 
cell nuclear replacement for therapeutic purposes (or supernumerary embryos 
resulting through ART). In the former case, the anticipated result is gestation, leading 
to the birth of a new human being, while in the latter the goal is to treat an otherwise 
incurable condition, and in so doing save the life of a human being. This was taken as 
a sufficient reason to allow therapeutic cloning, as perceived alignment both with 
God’s desire to heal the world and with issues of human dignity (Peters & Bennett, 
2003; Kahn, 2002). Indeed, this last point was further substantiated by the 
identification of certain ‘desperate’ groups of ill people, advancing the naturalisation 
of stem cell cloning through embedding it within life’s narrative sequence (Parry, 
2003). Such reasoning provided grounds for pro-therapeutic cloning speakers to 
position themselves as both ethically and scientifically sound. As a result, the social 
and ethical cost associated with this type of research not being carried out and 
consequently depriving those suffering from particular diseases from the therapeutic 
prospects of SCNT, was seen as incommensurable. By implication, any delay in this 
type of research would account for a considerable delay in the overall fight against a 
number of degenerative diseases.  
The above four lines of argumentation can be seen as a continuation of prior 
debates regarding the status of the human embryo and the role of scientific research in 
providing therapies and consequently in responding to already existing social 
demands (Parry, 2003). The following three points of reasoning, as advocated by 
those in favour of SCNT research for therapeutic purposes, present as being more 
inherent to this particular type of research issue. Hence, and once more, embedded in 
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scientific reasoning, proponents of human SCNT promoted its therapeutic uses as 
bearing no alternative to other similar projects. Although acknowledging the 
importance of encouraging other analogous research, like that offered by adult stem 
cells or the exploitation of embryos left over from IVF treatments, supporters of 
therapeutic cloning highlighted organ compatibility as an advantage offered uniquely 
by CNR research. This was coupled with the argument as to the potential contribution 
of human cell nuclear replacement as a scientific technique in the further 
advancement of the understanding of the regulation and differentiation of cells. In the 
long run, they claimed, this knowledge could well make therapeutic cloning obsolete, 
since scientists would eventually possess the know-how to turn any cell in the human 
body into one sharing the same properties with embryonic stem cells (Maienschein, 
2003). Accounting for the advancement in relevant research internationally, pro-
therapeutic cloning arguments also developed within economic and political frames, 
emphasising the potential for the research to ameliorate the health care system and the 
financial growth of the UK, while further establishing the country’s status as a 
potential leader in the worldwide medical field (Nippert, 2002; Parry 2003).  
At the other end of the spectrum, polemicists of SCNT and its applications on 
humans, developed their rhetoric by combining religious, moral and scientific 
reasoning. In terms of the reproductive uses of this type of technology, a certain 
degree of parity can be traced between religious, pro-life and abortion organisations’ 
rhetoric and their scientific and patient groups’ counterviews both agreeing on the 
potential moral and safety risks offered by such an endeavour. However, it was their 
antithetical positioning, in terms of the therapeutic uses of CNR that epitomised the 
UK human cloning debate, forming challenges and counter-challenges. As a result, 
this last group of actors presents the anti-therapeutic cloning position. At the heart of 
their argumentation, one traces the archonic philosophical thesis, which assumes that 
the real nature of a thing is to be found in its beginning (Peters & Bennett, 2003). In 
accordance with this viewpoint, human life begins at conception, and as such, the 
right of the embryo to human dignity is unlimited. This type of argumentation was 
unfolded by the polemics of therapeutic cloning in two main forms.  
The first form of argumentation emphasised matters of potentiality. In this line 
of argumentation, the embryo is treated as a potential human being, a person that 
comes into being and a call is made for the obligation to protect it. The second form 
of argumentation was an amalgamation of philosophical/theological positions and 
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scientific facts. Personhood was defined as the outcome of the sperm, the egg and the 
soul. In this context, the act of conception is seen as resulting in the creation of a 
genuinely new human individual, subject to the right for life. By identifying the 
human embryo as a potential person, or as a person, both positions raised issues 
relevant to Kant and his dictum on human rights and dignity, which proposes that a 
person is to be treated as an end and not merely as a means, and deplores the 
instrumentalisation of human life (Peters & Bennett, 2003). As Parry (2003) observes 
these types of reservations against embryonic SCNT echo similar patterns of 
argumentation in prior debates about the status of the human embryo, while forming 
the base for the counter-challenge towards the pro-therapeutic cloning advocates. 
However, and further advancing their reasoning, polemicists of this type of research 
also have made use of scientific rhetoric and evidence that is more integral to SCNT.  
Hence, opponents of therapeutic cloning gave evidence of relevant scientific 
studies pointing to the potentiality of adult stem cells to providing treatments for 
degenerative diseases. Indeed, research thus far had demonstrated, time and time 
again, the in-vivo malleability of these types of cells, such as umbilical cords and 
bone marrow, and their health-care benefits for many conditions. Further 
substantiating this claim, fears of a slippery slope towards reproductive cloning were 
also expressed based on the assumption that permission for therapeutic cloning 
studies would result in the perfection of the technique. In contrast, opponents pointed 
to a lack of appropriate scientific evidence over the ability of human embryonic stem 
cells to offer therapeutic breakthroughs at all (Parry, 2003). In such a vein, primacy 
should be given to policies that would improve the existing health care system rather 
than prioritise industrial capital and the pursuit of unknown therapies (Sexton, 2001).  
The above actors and their respective argumentation and attitudes towards 
human SCNT research assisted in progressively focusing the UK public debate on the 
therapeutic potentiality of this type of research, while framing it in a complex 
scientific, ethical, economic and political reasoning. To conclude the presentation of 
main actors and their differing points of views, some additional studies regarding the 
communication style adopted by several representatives of the scientific community 
will be discussed for their perceived relevance to the present research. 
As such, comparing the first UK reports of Dolly’s birth to the story’s 
coverage in the US press, Wilkie & Graham (2003) reveal a tendency for UK 
scientists to largely confine themselves to a discussion that is closely connected to the 
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scientific context in which they were authority figures, dismissing the cultural 
meanings of cloning as addressed by the journalists. According to both scholars, most 
paradigmatic of this tendency was the management of the public announcement of 
Dolly’s creation by the Roslin Institute, which, with the exception of a public 
relations company, failed to exhaust other possible channels of communication. 
Hence, Dolly was treated as a matter esoteric to science, i.e. by publishing the results 
in a credited journal and hiring a PR company to communicate with the media. Even 
the House of Commons Select Committee, which had visited the Roslin Institute two 
years earlier as part of its investigations into human genetics, was unaware of the 
experiments that were about to take place. Thus, when Dolly was made known and 
the public demanded scientists to account for social concerns, UK science found itself 
isolated, with few institutional allies (Wilkie & Graham, 2003). This exclusion of 
non-scientists is also evident in a media study by Einsiedel et al. (2002), where 
science is portrayed as being cut off from its social responsibilities. However, 
according to Wilkie and Graham (2003), this isolation should also be coupled with the 
tendency of the British press to provide partial scientific reporting. Such an absence 
has been mainly attributed to the limited number of science journalists in Britain. It 
has been estimated that there are more science journalists in the New York Times than 
in all the British broadsheet newspapers put together (ibid, 2003). Although this 
stands as a sufficient reason for the journalists to rely more heavily on scientific 
quotes, paradoxically, in the U.K the opposite prevails. Thus, scientists rarely feature 
as a source of information for science stories. With regard to the coverage of Dolly, 
only the scientists who participated in the project were cited, while information from 
other scientists was reported five days after the initial announcement. 
In relation to the public representatives of scientists, after a two-year (1997-
1998) analysis of British newspaper, television and Internet coverage of human 
reproductive cloning, Nerlich et al. (1999), identified four different scientific voices 
that contributed to the way the technology was largely framed. 
First is the voice of reason, mainly represented by scientists who participated 
in the creation of Dolly. In an attempt to address public worries over the prospect of 
human reproductive cloning, these scientists assumed a comforting role, reassuring 
the public that scientists had no intention of using the technology to any such end. 
Moral standards and evidence on the usefulness of the application provided the 
backing to their arguments.  
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Next are discourses of fantasy intended to stimulate popular imagination by 
pairing cloning technology with mythical figures and cinematic characters. Dr Lee 
Silver, a molecular biologist at Princeton University, represented such type of 
argumentation. 
Voices of doom, were also expressed by scientists such as Dr Dixon, a lecturer 
on gene technology at the University of Cambridge, who treated the possibility of 
using the technology for human reproduction as a fait accompli.  
Lastly there is the voice of hubris, represented by scientists who, disregarding 
the overwhelming distaste of the public towards any use of cloning technology to 
produce a human being, expressed their intention to clone a human. The first of those 
who publicly verbalised such plans was Dr Richard Seed, an American physicist, who 
proposed to open the first cloning clinic in the United States. Following in his steps, 
other scientists like Dr Severino Antinori and Dr Panos Zavos also came forward. 
Indeed, and in the context of a wider project to assess the effects of media events in 
the public understanding of genetics (Nerlich et al., 2003; Nerlich & Clarke 2003), 
Nerlich & Clarke (ibid) report the profound implications of a 2001 press conference 
by Antinori and Zavos on the media, public and parliamentary receptions of SCNT 
research in Britain. More specifically, the two scientists announced their plans to 
clone humans at a press conference organised as part of an international workshop on 
human therapeutic cloning, taking place on March the 9
th
, 2001 in Rome. Nerlich & 
Clarke (ibid) report on how Antinori and Zavos’ blurring of the boundaries between 
the different applications of human SCNT research (reproductive cloning was 
portrayed as ‘therapeutic’ in the context of addressing human infertility problems) and 
coupling this with the then recent announcement by the House of Lords to permit 
SCNT research in producing human embryonic stem cell lines, further heated up the 
British debate. Thus, the flourish of metaphors (like, ‘clones are products’ or ‘clones 
are copies’), characters from literature (e.g. ‘Frankenstein’), mythical themes and 
clichés (such as, ‘scientists playing God’ or ‘going down a slippery slope’) 
documented in the media reports following their announcement accentuated public 
fears and moral dilemmas, while additionally clouding the public’s understanding of 
the differences between the various uses of SCNT technology. Nerlich & Clarke 
(2003) also demonstrate the ramifications of this announcement on the British 
government in its urgency to further clarify the legal status of both therapeutic and 
reproductive cloning and to produce a final regulatory framework for relevant 
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research that addressed public fears, while making full use of the technology’s 
therapeutic and economic potential. 
  
 
3.5.2 Debating human cloning in the UK public sphere 
The public debate on human CNR technology is presented based on a triangular 
image of the public sphere as comprised of three distinct yet related arenas. Thus, 
different modes and mediums of representation are considered: human cloning as 
covered by the mass media, as perceived and discussed in the context of large surveys 
and semi-structured interviews with representatives of the UK public (public 
perceptions), and in regulation. According to Bauer and Gaskell (2002), each arena 
serves different functions, with media and public perceptions constituting public 
opinion of human cloning, while regulation being its governance. It is at these three 
arenas that the activities of both advocates and opponents of human SCNT research 
and applications have been aimed, in an attempt to seal the future of this type of 
technology.  
 
Media coverage of cloning  
According to Einsiedel et al. (2002), the media coverage of Dolly the sheep 
constitutes the first real global and simultaneous news story on biotechnology. The 
first reports about Dolly emerged in the British press on Sunday, 23
rd
 February 1997, 
when the Observer published news of a cloned sheep, lifting the embargo of Nature’s 
exclusivity for having put out the story. Even though the coverage had begun by 
reporting the scientific announcement as a triumph for British science, it was 
sustained further by an emerging political and ethical controversy, involving mainly 
politicians, religious figures and scientists (Holliman, 2004). Thus, discussions were 
gradually moved from the application of the technique on animal breeding, to the first 
concerns about its prospects on humans, generating the conditions for the political and 
ethical controversy that displaced the scientific announcement. The coverage of Dolly 
moved from the news pages to commentary and opinion sections, exhausting 
metaphorical thinking with discussions about humans ‘playing God’, ‘Brave New 
World’, ‘Frankenstein’ and ‘Boys from Brazil’ scenarios (Einsiedel et. al, 2002). In 
the months that followed, British newspaper coverage continued to reflect mainly on 
economic and political developments, like the invitations by Jacques Chirac, the then 
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French president, and Jacques Santer, the then president of the European Commission, 
for a thorough examination of the developments by the respective ethics committees. 
Again, most media coverage was dominated by long discussions on human 
reproductive cloning that were further kindled by the first announcements of people 
willing to be cloned (Wilkie & Graham, 2003). When the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) gave evidence to the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee in March 1997, the first considerations of the potentially 
therapeutic applications of the technique emerged.  
 In the ensuing years cloning, as with other medical biotechnological 
applications, lost its news value as developments in GM food dominated public 
debates (Gaskell et al., 2001a). Following the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE) crisis, media coverage shifted from the ethical issues raised by SCNT research 
to a broad discussion about the risks of genetically modified organisms for humans 
and the environment. One of the latest studies on the media coverage of this type of 
technology reveals a steady but moderate interest by the British press, television and 
radio news (Hargreaves et al., 2002). Human CNR research was mainly discussed 
within the context of stem cell research, though not engaging wide discussion or high 
publicity. As was the case in the early reporting of cloning, a bifurcation in reporting 
was evident, with stories of great promise being outnumbered by stories of concern. 
The press was found to be less successful in explaining the scientific rationale behind 
SCNT and stem cell research, while TV and radio programmes were more likely to 
present the medical applications of the technology. Overall, however, television 
coverage was considerably low. For example, when the House of Lords Select 
Committee for Stem Cell Research announced its decision to permit the cloning of 
human embryos for research purposes (28
th
 of February 2002), the story was given 
primacy on both ITV and BBC’s early evening news broadcast which, however, was 
not sustained over the next six months, where only sporadic references to the 
technology were featured.  
  In comparison to the first reactions to Dolly by newspapers in other EU 
countries, the British press stands out mainly for the primacy it gave to discussions 
about the health and economic repercussions of the technique, contextualised in a 
general feeling of national pride (Einsiedel et al., 2002). In the years succeeding 
Dolly’s creation and in relation to the U.S, relevant research reveals a distinctive 
tendency for British reporting of human SCNT to follow what is printed in the US 
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press, mainly in terms of the intense political debate taking place on that side of the 
Atlantic (Wilkie & Graham, 2003).  
 
Public perceptions of cloning 
A considerable number of studies focusing on the conceptualisation of cloning among 
members of the UK public were conducted in the first most intense years of the 
human SCNT debate. It is these studies that will inform our discussion on the public 
perception of the technology, and which have probably also informed scientists’ 
representations of public opinion. Thus, the findings of Eurobarometer surveys, which 
took place from 1996 to 2000, suggested that British people were not averse to the 
idea of CNR per se. Rather, it was the uses and the different applications of the 
technology that determined the reactions towards it (Gaskell, et al., 2001a). The same 
conclusion was also drawn by the Wellcome Trust’s study and the Human Genetics 
Advisory Commission (HGAC) and HFEA’s report, which were all conducted within 
the context of a public consultation exercise in 1998. 
Hence, animal cloning for medical purposes was the focus of moral worries 
and concerns regarding health risks and the conditions of experimental practices 
undertaken on animals. The prospect of applying cell nuclear replacement on humans 
reflected a bifurcation already observed in the media coverage of the technology. 
Thus, reproductive cloning was paralleled to eugenic practices and associated with 
images of automated production-line facilities and fictional characters (Gaskell, et al, 
2001a; Wellcome Trust, 1998). Concerns were frequently expressed with regard to 
the diminishing role of men in reproduction, the psychological status of the human 
clone and the dangers of cloning to personal identity. By and large, all relevant studies 
revealed the unwillingness of the public to support practices leading to reproductive 
cloning. 
The first attempts to study the public perception of human therapeutic cloning 
suggested that people were apprehensive about the purposes served by the technology. 
This was reflected in the findings of the HGAC and HFEA’s reports (1998b), which 
concluded that although people seemed supportive of the technology being applied to 
humans for medical purposes, they were also concerned with matters relating to its 
financial management and the degree of its accessibility by members of the public.  
Subsequent studies revealed a steady increase in public support for research 
involving cloned human embryos. Thus, the findings of the Eurobarometer survey 
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suggested that people in the UK were more willing to encourage the medical uses of 
cloning on the basis of its potential therapeutic benefits (Gaskell et. al, 2001a; 
Hargreaves et al., 2002). However, a study undertaken by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) in 2002, revealed a low public understanding of the science 
involved. Two surveys were conducted in April and October of 2002 in order to 
assess public knowledge, opinion, and understanding of science-related issues as 
reported in the media, with a focus on developments in climate change research, the 
MMR controversy and cloning/genetic medical research (Hargreaves et al., 2002). Of 
these, cloning and genetic medical research were found to be the most esoterically 
conceptualised by the UK public; meaning that people were less interested in the 
coverage of these stories, while at the same time they were more likely to admit that 
they were not very well informed about SCNT. The surveys also revealed that, by and 
large, people were not informed about issues relating to the regulation of the 
technology, with only 25 per cent being aware that the cloning of human embryos for 
research purposes was permitted in the U.K. The studies suggested that despite an 
awareness of the benefits of therapeutic cloning, issues relevant to regulatory 
practices and ethics arouse public anxiety (ibid, 2002). According to the researchers, 
this was highly relevant to the dichotomous type of media coverage human SCNT 
research had received, where reports focusing on the medical benefits of cloning had 
been outnumbered by alarming stories.  
To further illuminate the parameters that determined public anxiety on issues 
of human SCNT policy, there is a need to situate the discussion within the context of 
public attitudes towards science policy in general. Public attitudes towards science 
regulation seem to stem from three important factors: the established model of 
decision-making in the UK; events demonstrating the aptitude of government to 
handle scientific crises; and the public image of scientists. 
It is only recently that the UK model of decision-making has been extended to 
include the voices of the public, mainly in the form of public consultation exercises 
and public discussion forums. Thus, there was a sense that public opinion was 
excluded from regulatory discussions of scientific developments and that decision 
making was taking place behind closed doors (Wellcome Trust, 1998). These 
concerns were further reinforced in the way the BSE crisis was handled by the UK 
government. As a result, people felt that important negative information with regard 
to CNR technology was being withheld from them. They also expressed worries 
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regarding the implementation and enforcement of the law, exemplified by ‘conspiracy 
theories’ of the government secretly conducting human reproductive cloning 
experiments (Wellcome Trust, 1998). Trust in the UK government after the BSE 
crisis, declined relative to independent bodies, such as consumer organisations and 
environmental groups; overall trust in science also suffered after the same event 
(Gaskell et al., 2001a; Hargreaves et al., 2002). In general, the scientific community 
was perceived as esoteric and rigid. Though scientists were regarded as competent in 
their relative fields of interest, they were seen as lacking in social skills. They were 
perceived as driven by personal vanity and commercial motives and thus unwilling to 
address the social worries relevant to human SCNT research (Wellcome Trust, 1998). 
However, people seemed to differentiate between types of scientists, relying more on 
information given by university researchers, while finding scientists working in 
private business to be less trustworthy (Hargreaves et al., 2002).   
The findings of studies on UK public perception of SCNT seem to be in 
agreement with results from other EU countries. Thus, overall approval of the use of 
cloning technology for medical purposes across Europe was reported, while animal 
cloning received very little support. With regard to issues of trust in science policy, it 
seems that in countries such as the UK, Ireland, Greece and Italy, where the political 
system is oriented towards a pattern of conflicting political parties, people reported 
some of the lowest levels of trust in government, in contrast to democracies, such as 
those of Finland, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, where a more consensus-
oriented political system has resulted in greater confidence in the decision makers 
(Gaskell et. al, 2001b). In general, it was again actors independent of government 
bodies, such as, consumer groups, environmental organisations and medical doctors, 
which the European public found most trustworthy. 
 
Regulation of cloning  
The news of Dolly and the alarming public reaction and media coverage alike, over 
the prospect of using the technique to assist human reproduction resulted in an acute 
response by the regulators. Although surprised at first, the regulatory wheel seems to 
have gradually moved at a great pace, even faster than scientific experimentation 
(Tardu, 2002).  
 The UK was a pioneer in the regulation of human cloning, outlawing 
reproductive cloning while permitting the use of cell nuclear replacement for research 
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purposes. The political governance of human CNR was largely influenced by the then 
existing regulation on human embryo research, both in terms of the themes discussed 
and the actors involved. As a novel scientific advancement, it was treated in the 
context of the case-by-case approach implemented in the U.K over the regulation of 
all biotechnology developments, in contrast to past activities, however, it was handled 
with an unusual transparency. This is mainly due to the reformation of the regulatory 
framework of biotechnology in 1998, and the establishment of the Human Genetics 
Commission that further promoted public engagement in the regulation of 
biotechnology in general (Gaskell et. al, 2001a). 
The creation of Dolly by using cell nuclear replacement presented a challenge 
to the HFE Act, passed in 1990, which explicitly prohibited any research involving 
the replacement of a nucleus of a human embryo with a nucleus taken from a cell of 
any person, embryo or subsequent development of an embryo. However, the then 
existing definition of the human embryo (section 1 (1) a) raised the possibility that 
embryos created by cell nuclear replacement fell outside the scope of the Act (Morgan 
& Ford, 2003). With the legal status of the technology being unclear, the HFEA and 
the HGAC joined together as a working group to clarify whether the language of the 
Act needed to be amended to explicitly prohibit reproductive cloning (Bonnicksen, 
2002). Thus, a consultation document was produced, which was distributed to 
members of the public from January to April 1998. The document drew a sharp 
distinction between reproductive and therapeutic cloning, presenting in depth the 
possible and diverse applications of CNR technology (HGAC & HFEA, 1998a). The 
final report was also enriched by a qualitative study conducted by the Wellcome Trust 
in the spring of 1998 (Wellcome Trust, 1998). In December of the same year the 
HFEA and the HGAC produced another joint report (Cloning Issues in Human 
Reproduction), arguing in favour of a purposive rather than a literal interpretation of 
section 1 (1) a. However, due to the implications of the technology, it was suggested 
that further action had to be taken in the form of an explicit ban (HGAC & HFEA, 
1998b).  
Soon after, The Science and Technology Committee of the House of Commons 
argued in favour of a law prohibiting reproductive CNR, which was followed by a 
similar recommendation by the Royal Society that denounced reproductive cloning on 
the basis of morality (Royal Society, 2002). Despite the recommendations to amend 
the HFE Act to specifically outlaw human reproductive cloning, the government 
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chose, until mid-2001, to not apply any legal prohibition explicitly addressing the 
technology.  
Alongside the political developments on reproductive cloning went policy issues 
associated with the therapeutic uses of CNR. The HFE Act, which addressed research 
involving human embryos, allowed experimentation for the enhancement of 
knowledge on infertility, miscarriage, contraception, congenital disorders and 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis. The developments in CNR technology and the 
isolation of the first human embryonic stem cell lines in 1998 raised another matter, 
that of the legal treatment of therapeutic cloning. It was in 1999 that an expert group 
(Expert Advisory Group on Therapeutic Cloning) chaired by the Chief Medical 
Officer, Liam Donaldson, was appointed by the government to consider whether the 
HFE Act should be expanded to allow the creation of human embryos for research 
involving CNR and embryonic stem cells technology. At the same time, a report was 
issued by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics favouring an amendment of the Act to 
allow therapeutic cloning and embryonic stem cells research to proceed (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2000). The report was delivered to the expert group, which also 
received a scientific advisory document from the Royal Society, and in mid-2000 
issued its recommendations (UK Department of Health, 2000). The Expert Advisory 
Group on Therapeutic Cloning invited the government to expand the HFE Act so as to 
permit research on embryos less than 14 days old for medical purposes, the use of 
CNR to produce embryonic stem cells, and egg cell nuclear transfer to address 
mitochondrial diseases. Endorsing the expert group’s recommendations in August 
2000, the government requested Parliament to amend the HFE Act so as to permit 
research on human embryos, expanding knowledge on human embryo development 
and on serious diseases, as well as enabling any such knowledge to be used for the 
treatment of serious diseases (Bonnicksen, 2002).  
On 19
th
 December 2000, the House of Commons, and after a free vote, accepted 
the recommendations, further establishing the legal status of therapeutic cloning 
research. Along the same lines, following an intense debate involving representatives 
of the Church, anti-abortion groups, pro-life organisations and representatives of 
scientific societies and patient groups, the House of Lords voted on January 22 2001, 
in favour of the amendment. In response to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and as a 
means to further strengthen the changes, the House of Lords set up a review 
committee, The House of Lords Select Committee for Stem Cell Research. In 
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February 2002, the committee issued its report supporting embryonic stem cell 
research and therapeutic cloning after a consideration of the medical benefits of the 
technologies. Additionally, the committee reiterated its total opposition to any attempt 
towards reproductive cloning (House of Lords Select Committee, 2002).  
 In the meantime, further research on therapeutic cloning and embryonic stem 
cells was put on hold after ProLife Alliance, a group opposing both abortion and 
cloning, appealed to the court arguing for a literal interpretation of the HFE Act. 
According to the group, the HFE Act referred only to embryos created by fertilisation 
of an egg by a spermatozoon and not embryos created through CNR (Bonnicksen, 
2002). In November 2001, the High Court of Justice judged in favour of ProLife 
Alliance, while the government rushed to endorse a bill specifically outlawing 
reproductive cloning (December 2001). In January 2002, the Court of Appeal 
overturned the decision, thus, ending a long and heated political debate. On 1st March 
2002, the first licenses on human embryonic stem cell research were granted to the 
University of Edinburgh and Guy’s Hospital in London. Although the initial research 
involved the use of human embryos left over from IVF treatments, in the longer term 
scientists could make use of CNR technology as a means of producing human 
embryonic stem cells. In September 2002, The Medical Research Council established 
the UK Stem Cell Bank, the first of its kind in the world, while in December 2002 the 
government announced the provision of 40 million pounds to support stem cell 
research as part of that year’s spending review. The money was issued via a new 
Cross-Council Coordinating Committee of the five major research councils.  
 The UK was the first member of the EU to provide a clear and comprehensive 
regulatory framework on human reproductive and therapeutic cloning and the first 
country in the world to permit cell nuclear replacement research for therapeutic 
purposes. Although criticised by many for its permissive regulation of therapeutic 
cloning, current law is thought to present but an amalgam of ethical, social, economic 
and political reasoning, history and tradition. Hence, in a more reflective tone, various 
scholars have pondered on the regulation of human SCNT research as being but the 
mixed product of: the overall moral-philosophical standing in the UK; the prior 
relevant scientific developments and their policy; and the more recent advances, such 
as, the GM food or the BSE crises, and the public debates that ensued. Thus, scholars 
like Hauskeller (2004), Kahn (2002), and Sexton (2000) discuss the utilitarian and 
pragmatic ethical reasoning as paradigmatic of Britain’s tendency to prioritise issues 
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regarding individual rights, autonomy and choice over more intrinsical or 
deontological concepts. More specifically, by equating human rights with individual 
rights, as an issue of individual rather than governmentally imposed choices, 
importance is directed to the use of science in further promoting and substantiating 
personal health and relief issues. It was such an ethical reasoning that also framed 
prior relevant research, resulting in a continuum between human embryo and human 
reproduction research with human SCNT and stem cell scientific developments. Such 
a continuation, though, is not only reflected in the themes and actors mobilised, but 
also in the various already established institutions and their traditional practices. As a 
result, a web of institutions existing in the UK during the last 30 years, like the 
Human Genetics Commission, the Nuffield Foundation, the Wellcome Trust or the 
HFEA, provide procedures of ethical approval and commentary which allow for 
relatively quick judgments of any particular subject in the field of embryonic research 
(Hauskeller, 2004). At the same time, more recent biotechnological developments, 
such as, GM food with its intense UK public debate, and instances of scientific crisis, 
like the BSE, developing alongside human SCNT research, demonstrated the need for 
tacit public acceptance of relevant techno-scientific accomplishments (Sexton, 2000).  
 Scholars further point to the ramifications of the above considerations in 
UK parliamentary discussions and actions. As a result, narratives on the potential 
benefits of the technology in terms of both social and economic matters, 
overshadowed reflections on the wider commercial considerations and the intersection 
between commercial and ethical issues, which were largely omitted from regulatory 
debates (Sexton, 2000; Parry, 2003). Indeed it was in the UK where most of the major 
scientific breakthroughs, pre-conditional for SCNT and stem cell research, have taken 
place, resulting in the country’s overall pro-scientific attitude (Hauskeller, 2004). And 
while specific regulatory actions reflected the primacy of confining relevant 
discussions to representatives of the scientific and medical expertise (for example, 
Sexton (2000) comments on the composition of Liam Donaldson’s Expert Advisory 
Group on Therapeutic Cloning as over-representing scientists), a consideration of 
other voices in the debate were also regarded (such as, consultation of the public or 
taking account of anti-reproductive cloning lines of argumentation).  
 A consideration of relevant comparative studies with regard to the 
regulation of human SCNT research in countries outside the UK, reveals similar 
patterns of social, ethical, historical, political and economic intersections. Thus, the 
 97 
disparity between federal and private legislation of human SCNT research in the US, 
reflects similar points of convergence with prior science policy traditions and a 
utilitarian treatment of scientific developments, as that experienced in related UK 
policy. In contrast, where specific uses of science have resulted in the trauma of 
national narratives and memories, as for example, in Germany during the Second 
World War, the prospects of human SCNT research have been outlawed, revealing an 
emphasis on the perceived social function of the state in respecting and protecting 
issues of human dignity, life and death (Gottweis, 2002). And while the Nazis’ 
eugenics have also been a significant point of reference in the formation of national, 
cultural and religious identities in Israel, stem cell research and human cloning have 
not been met with analogous ethical or moral reservations on either religious or 
political grounds (Prainsack, 2006). Overall, UK regulation of human SCNT research 
offers one of the most permissive environments for conducting human embryonic 
stem cell research, while being in line with most international developments in 
outlawing reproductive cloning.  
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In tracing the history of CNR research, the creation of Dolly the sheep can be seen as 
a scientific breakthrough in a series of experiments for the understanding and 
exploitation of cell development and differentiation. However, it was the potential 
applications of the technology on humans that caught the attention of different actors, 
the regulators and public opinion in the UK, as well as in other countries. The 
subsequent debate covered the ethical, social, economic and political repercussions of 
SCNT research within the context of prior scientific developments, such as, human 
embryo research, new scientific advances, like the derivation of the first human 
embryonic stem cell line, as well as scientific crises, like the BSE and GM food. 
Initially treated by the UK representatives of research as a matter esoteric to science, 
cell nuclear replacement immediately surpassed the confined environment of the 
laboratory having a profound cultural resonance.  
 The conception of human cloning technology as a movement comprised of 
different actors, publics, challenges and counterchallenges is expressed in the context 
of a more elaborate discussion over the relationship between science and the public 
sphere. It is this last point that motivated the present study to be conducted. Although 
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a considerable amount of research has attempted to address this point through studies 
in the public sphere, only recently has there been an interest in the scientific point of 
view. Society and its relationship to science as perceived by scientists themselves 
forms the background of this study, the rationale of which is discussed in the pages 
that follow.  
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Chapter 4 
Designing the research: corpus construction and analysis 
 
The present chapter deals with the description of the research design adopted and the 
presentation of the methodological route followed for the elicitation and subsequent 
analysis of the data. To begin with, the rationale behind the design of the study is 
discussed and emphasis is given to the concept of triangulation, its importance when 
studying social representations, and the way it is employed in this context. This is 
followed by a description of the data collected and the methods of analysis used. In 
each case, deliberation is given to the reasons guiding the choice of particular types of 
data and methods of analysis. At the same time, the chapter should also be treated as 
an extension of the discussions in preceding parts of the thesis. Thus, Moscovici’s 
social representations as both a theory of knowledge and a phenomenon to be 
investigated formed the basis for the conceptualisation of research questions and their 
investigation around the assumption of knowledge as a representation process 
expressing, at one and the same time, subjective, intersubjective, and objective worlds 
(Chapter 1). Research conducted so far on the way different scientific experts 
conceptualise a variety of non-scientists and its relevant findings, provided a useful 
resource enhancing the understanding of the phenomenon currently studied, as well 
as, pointing to possible conceptual, methodological, and empirical lacunae (Chapter 
2). Lastly, the presentation of the human SCNT research and the debate it ensued in 
the UK from 1997-2005 as a movement, informed the present study, not only on the 
main issues of concern but also on the different actors and interlocutors mobilised and 
their positioning in the debate, offering a clear identification of appropriate social 
segments for the study of relevant social representations (Chapter 3).  
 
4.1 Social representations as a phenomenon under investigation: the rationale of  
triangulation 
Contrary to the idea of knowledge as a cognitive mental construction which people 
achieve by detaching themselves from emotional, social or historical links, Moscovici 
(1984) calls the attention of the researcher to the tripartite architecture of the 
representations that produce it. Thus, every representation of something is always a 
representation by someone at a specific place and time. Moreover, and in opposition 
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to those who treat knowledge in a hierarchic way, elevating the status of certain types 
of knowledge while downplaying the importance of others, as well as, to relativistic 
approaches that treat knowledge as a mere epiphenomenon, Moscovici’s discussion of 
social representation re-directs relevant research questions in identifying the logic and 
the function behind meanings and ideas, linking cognitive and social processes. As a 
result, to select information, to categorise or to render the invisible visible are taken as 
intrinsically linked to the formation, preservation and transformation of group 
identities, selves and worldviews (Gervais et al., 1999). Significations, themes, 
meanings, in one word, contents of representations are linked to their conditions of 
genesis and multiple functions. In such a vein, empathy in documenting, listening or 
observing phenomena under investigation is a necessity.  
 Thus, researching social representations becomes a quest of typifying 
contents, that is, anchors and objectifications, as they are embedded in different 
modes and mediums, while linking them back to those who hold them, debunking 
their possible structures and functions (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). Instead of studying 
phenomena in the confining conditions of a laboratory environment, forming a-priori 
hypotheses and testing them in relation to a control group, social exploration expands 
its quest in more naturalistic settings, making analytical induction an issue of the data 
per se. More specifically, it is by staring the data in the face, so to speak, and 
identifying what is there that forms the basis of empirical interpretation. However, 
soon one is faced with a problem: ‘does unidentified necessarily mean absent?’ 
(Gervais, et al., 1999). Indeed, time and time again, social representations research 
has shown the importance of accounting for presences, as well as, absences in the data 
investigated. For example, work by Jodelet (1991) on the social representations of 
madness in a family colony in rural France, where local inhabitants acted as foster 
parents to some psychiatric patients, revealed how absences of knowledge of the 
‘mad’ in the interview narratives with the locals, fully made their presence in their 
habitual practices and every-day interactions with the patients. Thus, empirically 
unidentified does not always mean non-existent. With this in mind, how, then, is one 
to design the study of a priori unknown phenomena?  
 To tackle such an issue, social representations researchers have, over the 
years, prioritised and incorporated triangulation as an integral pre-requisite in their 
studies (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Duveen & Lloyd, 1990; Flick, 1992a; 1992b; Farr, 
1993; Gervais et al., 1999; Sotirakopoulou & Breakwell, 1992). The history of 
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triangulation dates back to more than thirty years, originating in navigation and 
military strategies that use multiple reference points to locate an object’s exact 
position (Flick, 1992a). Initially, the idea was adopted as a methodological principle 
in social research, in order to address non-reactive measurement. Soon, it was 
introduced by Denzin (1978) in the realm of qualitative research as a means of 
securing the high validity of the results of a piece of study. Denzin (1978) drew a 
distinction between data triangulation: the combination of different sources of data; 
investigator triangulation: the employment of different researchers; theory 
triangulation: the implementation of different theoretical perspectives; and 
methodological triangulation: the combination of different methodological 
approaches in the investigation of a phenomenon. 
 As has been argued, the idea of triangulation has lately assumed a central role 
in the design of studies on social representations, for it is the complexity of the 
phenomenon that calls for a combination of sensitive methods of research, of sources 
of data, of theories, and even of researchers. However, triangulation is not 
implemented as a way to enhance the validity of the results but rather as a means of 
helping the researcher in providing a fuller interpretative account of the phenomenon 
under study. According to Gervais and her colleagues (1999), triangulation is more 
productive when it combines methods that tap into different aspects of 
representations, namely sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and microgenesis (Duveen & 
Lloyd, 1990). In brief, sociogenesis is the process through which social 
representations are generated at the collective level. Ontogenesis is the process 
through which the representations of a community are re-constructed by the 
individual, resulting in the development of social identity. Lastly, microgenesis takes 
place in social interaction where representations are ex-changed, negotiated and re-
constructed. Triangulation, then, is a form of comparative analysis that explores 
similarities and differences between different milieus, over time, or between different 
modes and mediums of communication through the mix of methods of data collection 
and analysis. At the same time, and in an exploration for clear guidance for the design 
of research on social representations, triangulation has become the building block of 
the present study. It is to its rationale that we now turn our attention.  
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4.2 The public sphere according to UK experts in SCNT research: a 
triangulation of formal and informal settings of communication 
From its inception the present study has been preoccupied with the relation between 
different forms of knowledge and their holders, that is, the scientific and non-
scientific, scientists and non scientists. And while the epistemic relationship between 
science and non-science has always been a subject of intense philosophical debates 
through the centuries, the question here arises for an empirical investigation in the 
exploration of relevant representations by a specific group of scientific experts. 
Current debates over the public’s understanding of science and scientist’s 
understanding of the public and their interrelationship, render such an investigation 
topical. This is, indeed, a highly underdeveloped area, with the exception of a number 
of limited studies, explored in Chapter 2. However, the vast majority of such studies 
have, either, treated scientists’ conceptualisation of the public as mere linguistic 
repertoires, undermining the links between meanings and their possible social 
functions, or approached the phenomenon of interest from a remedial agenda, 
identifying certain fallacies and rectifying them, further promoting political and 
business consultancy logics. The present study comes from a more socio-
psychological framework arguing for the constituted and constitutive nature of 
representing, at the same time as approaching it in a disinterested attitude (Bauer & 
Gaskell, 1999). Moscovici’s theory of social representations, as discussed in chapter 
1, provided a solid basis for such an endeavour.  
It is in social milieus, that is, groups of people bound together in a common 
project where social representations are formed and transformed. Bauer and Gaskell’s 
(2002) proposed model for the study of the relationship between science and non-
science, as discussed in Chapter 3, forms a useful resource in identifying appropriate 
segments for the elaboration of analogous studies. Thus, the purpose of the present 
study is the exploration of social representations of the public sphere, that is, public 
perceptions, media coverage and regulation, by UK experts in SCNT research. More 
specifically, an attempt is made to provide a final typification of meanings, their 
interrelationship and their possible functions. Relevant questions include: ‘How do 
UK stem cell scientists anchor and objectify the public sphere?’ (or the ‘what’ of 
representation as per Jovchelovitch, 2007), ‘what types of communication and 
interaction between science and the public sphere do these meanings prioritise? (the 
‘how’ of the representation), ‘what are the possible functions of these meanings?’ (the 
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‘why’ and ‘what for’ of the representation). At the same time, the meanings are linked 
to the people who hold them, in relation to their standing, in a specific debate, 
regarding not only the status of SCNT research but the overall relationship between 
science and non-science. Indeed, knowledge of something by someone is constructed 
through the employment of different symbolic processes. However, knowledge of 
something by someone, and in our case knowledge of the public sphere, is a resource 
in debates about the legitimation and reification of certain scientific developments. 
Moreover, and more to the point of public opinion studies, much theorising takes 
place, either at the macro-structural level (e.g. models documenting the relationship 
between mass opinion, mass communication, and policy making) or at the micro-
individual level (e.g. experimentation in political cognition). The adopted operational 
definition of the public sphere mediates between these two levels by pointing to the 
way the voices studied conceptualise how public perceptions relate to public policy 
and media coverage or how media coverage relates to public perceptions and policy, 
and finally, how policy is related to media coverage and public perceptions (Herbst, 
1998; Bauer & Gaskell, 2002). In a nutshell, the research illuminates, at one and the 
same time, objective (how the world is), as well as, subjective (who am I), and 
intersubjective (who the other is) elements of representing.  
 In an attempt to maximise its interpretative power, as per social 
representations research tradition, the present study employs triangulation in a 
threefold manner: in terms of theory, types of data documented, and methods of 
analysis.  
Triangulation of theoretical backgrounds. The choice of a certain theoretical 
framework holds grave importance for the conceptualisation of the phenomenon 
under study, highlighting some aspects of it while ignoring others (Gervais et al., 
1999). Social representations theory offers an alternative to more individualistic 
approaches that have dominated social psychological research for years (Farr, 1993; 
1996). Suffice it to say that the theory surpasses the notion of the ‘unthinking mind’, 
linking object with subject, the social with the individual, the past with the present 
and the future. Social representations are always representations of something by 
someone at a specific place and time. Concurrently, they provide the symbolic 
material for the elaboration of a variety of functions, either mythical or ideological, 
forming identities or enabling resistance (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). To further enrich 
the main theoretical framework, while assisting in the operationalisation of the 
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processes generating social representations, namely anchoring and objectifying, 
metaphor theory, as per Lakoff and Johnson (1980), and argumentation theory, as per 
Toulmin (1958) and Billig (1996), were also employed. Liakopoulos’ (2000) research 
on the social representations of biotechnology in Britain constituted the point of 
departure, with the intention of further extending this perspective (see Chapter 1). The 
relationship between theory and method has always been an important topic of debate, 
exemplified mostly with the distinction between the rationalists and the empiricists. 
However, I tend to agree with Farr (1993) that theory can help guide the design of a 
research so as to better account for the phenomenon under study.  
Triangulation of different types of data. Social representations tradition identifies a 
series of modes and mediums in which meanings and significations over a particular 
object are to be located. In an effort to provide a paradigm for relevant research, 
Bauer and Gaskell (1999) identify habitual behaviour, individual cognition, formal 
and informal settings of communication, as the four modes of representations, while 
bodily movement, words, visual images or non-linguistic sounds as the four mediums 
of representations. Metaphors and arguments, that is, words, regarding the public 
perceptions, media coverage and regulation of SCNT research constitute the medium 
under focus in the exploration of the social representations of the public sphere among 
UK stem cell researchers. However, other crucial questions arise: in which types of 
modes are those mediums to be explored? And how is one to select such modes so as 
to minimise the possibility of empirical absences as a consequence of methodological 
shortcomings? (Gervais et al., 1999). In order to tackle these issues, the present 
research employs triangulation of data from formal (elite media) and informal 
(individual, semi-structured interviews with scientists working in areas relevant to 
SCNT research) settings of communication that make reference to the public sphere, 
linking in this way, media and individual (individual cognition) representations. On 
the whole, it is sociogenetic and ontogenetic aspects of representations that are 
comparatively analysed. 
More specifically, there have been a variety of approaches in the study of media 
material, each illuminating specific aspects of media coverage. Thus, news items can 
be seen as an individual product reflecting the values and aspirations of a particular 
journalist, as an organisational product shaped by the modus operandi of a particular 
profession, as an activity aiming at influencing and shaping public opinion, or as a 
canvas where larger societal problems and values are portrayed (Einsiedel & 
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Coughlan, 1993). The adoption of each approach separately or in combination raises 
different questions that need to be tackled.  
From the social representations perspective, analysis of media coverage is based 
on the assumption that one needs to account for the ‘environment’ or ‘culture’ in 
association with cognition and individual opinions (Farr, 1993). Numerous studies, 
among which Moscovici’s (1961/1976) seminal work on the social representations of 
psychoanalysis in French society, Gaskell and Bauer’s (2001) work on the social 
representations of biotechnology across EU countries, and Gervais’ (1997) thesis on 
the representations of nature in Shetland, have employed the analysis of printed press 
material. However, even though Moscovici’s initial work was born out of a 
‘diffusionist’ or ‘agenda-setting’ conviction of the power of the press as a producer 
and disseminator of social representations prior to them being part of individual 
representations, recent work has moved in a different direction (Gervais, 1997). Thus, 
informed by current developments in media analysis, most notably constructivist 
accounts that stress the complex relationship between media stories and different 
social groups, and consequently the dynamics of the different denotational and 
connotational meanings of a social object, current social representations research 
seeks to illuminate the dynamics of the interaction between media and individual 
representations (Bauer, 2000). As Gamson and Modigliani (1989, p. 2) assert “media 
discourse is part of the process by which individuals construct meaning, and public 
opinion is part of the process by which journalists and other cultural entrepreneurs 
develop and crystallise meaning in public discourse.”  
 That stated, a specific type of media coverage is at the focus of the present 
research that of highly specialised scientific journals. It is the characteristics of the 
empirical problem at stake that guided the selection of scientific journals as sources of 
data. Firstly, scientific journals constitute an integral component in human SCNT 
research as a science in the making. They are a source of legitimation and credibility 
of both scientific ideas and scientific research groups that construct these ideas 
(Latour & Woolgar, 1986). They play a crucial role in the dissemination of scientific 
developments overcoming spatial constraints and giving a sense of belonging to a 
global scientific community. Secondly, they are a forum of discussion and 
communication among researchers of the main technical and public issues regarding a 
given scientific development. Thus, scientific journals are a means of exchanging 
technical information with regard to the latest advances in scientific research, and, 
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depending on the journal, following major developments in public perceptions, media 
coverage and regulation of science and technology. Lastly, an overview of the 
relevant literature pointed to a lack of empirical consideration of this type of media by 
prior research, further influencing such a choice.  
 The analysis of material from scientific journals is thought to provide access to 
the sociogenetic process of social representations. The design adopts a longitudinal 
approach and incorporates the analysis of the scientific coverage of the debate from 
1997 to 2005, for it is at a time of controversy that social representations are best 
explored (Moscovici, 1984). Therefore, the study of scientific journals will illuminate 
the historical aspects of the representations of the public sphere assisting in the 
identification of possible changes in their structure and functions across the years 
(Duveen and Lloyd, 1990; Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). Moreover, the non-reactive nature 
of these data helps to ensure that the social representations which emerge from the 
analysis, do not change by virtue of being investigated (Farr, 1993). The accumulation 
of data from scientific journals is thought to further assist in the next stage of the 
research, that of selecting interviewees and of forming the interview topic guide, by 
providing information about the main actors and issues discussed at a collective level. 
More importantly though, their analysis is thought to further enrich the interpretative 
power of the present research by offering an alternative for comparison to the data 
that emerges from individual interviews. Is there parity with regard to metaphors and 
arguments about the public sphere in relation to human SCNT research in both formal 
and informal settings of communication or are specific presences and absences 
reported? If the latter is the case, how are those differences to be accounted for? Are 
they understandable in terms of time or spatial constraints or both? That is, are 
specific meanings and themes prioritised in specific years or countries? Such 
considerations are mostly topical in the study of social representations, where one 
cannot anticipate a priori what is to be found. Overall, no causal relationship is 
adopted, rather, representations in scientific journals are seen as being engaged in 
dialogue with individual representations, the one feeding the other (Gervais, 1997). 
The following table provides a schematic presentation of the operating principles 
in terms of modus operandi, main achievements and functions of scientific journals.  
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Table 4.1 The operating principles of scientific journals 
 
 
Modus operandi 
Agenda: driven by an ethos of contribution to 
scientific progress 
Process: rigid, peer-review process 
People: highly expert and well-connected 
personnel 
 
Achievements 
Dissemination 
Education 
Mobilisation 
Agenda setting 
 
Functions 
Legitimation 
Credibility 
Communication 
Information 
Sense of membership 
Linking different domains of scientific action 
 
 
An extensive discussion on the use and interpretation of interview data has, 
over the years, been taking place. Some of the most frequently debated issues are 1) 
the relation between interviewees’ accounts and the world they describe, and 2) the 
relation between interviewee and interviewer (Silverman, 1993). Both issues have 
important ramifications, not only on interview procedure but also on the interpretation 
of data derived. Thus, from a positivistic point of view, interview data are treated as 
‘facts’ about the world. The belief in a reality ‘out there’ calls for unbiased and 
structured methods in an attempt to objectively bring out information about this 
reality. The social representations perspective takes a more constructivist stand. Here, 
the task of the analyst is to be aware of her/his dual role as both an observer and a 
participant and to treat interview data not as facts about the world but rather as 
socially constructed versions of reality (Farr, 1993). As a result, there is a preference 
for less structured interviews in an attempt to avoid imposing the researcher’s own 
representations on the persons being interviewed. The interviewer is allowed to 
explore from a list of predetermined themes, at the same time as, the interviewee 
enjoys the freedom of raising important issues not contained in the schedule 
(Silverman, 1993). While Herzlich (1973, p. 13) argued for open interviews as the 
 108 
‘only technique suitable for the collection of data’, social representations researchers 
often couple the method with other less reactive methodological approaches, as does 
the present study. 
Individual interviews with UK stem cell scientists are considered to provide 
access to the ontogenetic process of social representations, and more specifically, to 
how they become psychologically active for individuals (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990). 
These kind of data, however, are not to be treated as a way of individualising social 
representations, depriving them of their social nature, for knowledge at all levels is, 
first and foremost, social and historical (Gervais, 1997).  
That stated, social sciences textbooks are by and large preoccupied with 
extending the logic of representative sampling, where the researcher is interested in 
the description of the distribution of already known attributes in social space. 
However, the rationale of qualitative research, and indeed research on social 
representations, goes along different lines, where the task is to provide a typification 
of unknown attributes in the phenomenon of study (Bauer & Aarts, 2000). It is this 
difference that renders the use of the representative sampling rationale as 
inappropriate in the present and other research situations. Identifying this 
inconsistency, Bauer and Aarts (2000) have retrieved the idea of ‘corpus construction’ 
from the field of linguistics, offering an interesting alternative for qualitative research. 
Although the term is not as yet widely used in social sciences methodology, it was 
found to be a useful tool guiding the selection of data in the present study.  
 Thus, the sources of investigation were selected in such a way so as to 
maximise the varieties of the phenomenon under study. In each case, the 
characterisation of formal and informal contexts of communication and their varieties 
preceded any other activity. However, I tried to keep an open mind by considering 
other sources of data not accounted for initially. This will be made explicit in the next 
section. Overall, a stepwise procedure was followed: selecting preliminary data, 
analysing the variety and extending the corpus of data until no additional variety 
could be detected (Bauer and Aarts, 2000). 
Although no attempt was made to systematically account for possible 
microgenetic aspects of social representations, it needs to be stated that in the course 
of the study, I had the opportunity to attend several public meetings held in London, 
between 2003 and 2005. These were events organised by the scientific community 
(mainly the Science Museum and the British Association for the Advancement of 
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Science) whose purpose was to provide a setting where members of the public could 
directly discuss and debate with experts (such as biologists, geneticists, ethicists, 
science journalists) the ethical, economic, and scientific ramifications of research 
developments, either generally in biotechnology or more specifically in human 
embryology. In some cases, these events granted me access to interviewees, while 
overall, they served as a useful place where I myself, could discuss and exchange 
information about important developments in the human SCNT debate. However, 
since the events were not systematically explored, mainly due to time and budget 
constraints, any observations made are left in the background and will not be 
accounted for.  
Triangulation of different types of methods. The overall design of analysis follows a 
‘typification’ logic, so far as it tries to reduce the phenomenon under study to a 
manageable set of data. Thus, classical content analysis is employed so as to analyse 
those data from the elite media that highlight important dimensions of the public 
debate relating to its salience as a topic for discussion, and structure. Metaphor and 
argumentation analyses are used for the study of data derived from formal and 
informal settings of communication and cognition. They both follow a typification 
rationale, identifying different types and qualities of metaphors and arguments used to 
talk about the public sphere in the scientific journals and in the individual interviews. 
Analysis is further assisted by the application of two software packages: SPSS and 
Atlas/ti.  
Table 4.2 gives an overview of the rationale of triangulation. In the 
investigation of the public sphere among SCNT experts, data referencing the public 
sphere are analysed in such a way so as to provide a final typification of anchoring 
and objectification processes at both the collective and the individual level. At a later 
stage, results are merged together in order to identify the social representations of the 
public sphere among UK stem cell researchers, in terms of their contents, possible 
structures and functions (see also Chapter 1).  
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Table 4.2 Investigating the public sphere among experts 
 Formal Communication Informal Communication 
Data Scientific articles Individual interviews 
Methods of analysis Content analysis 
Metaphor analysis 
Argumentation analysis 
Metaphor analysis 
Argumentation analysis 
Rationale Typification of contents at 
the collective level 
 
Sociogenetic aspects of 
representation 
 
Comparison and final 
integration with data from 
informal communication 
 
Typification of contents at the 
individual level 
 
Ontogenetic aspects of 
representation 
 
Comparison and final 
integration with data from 
formal communication  
 
 
4.3 Selection of scientific journals 
Social representations are not the product of an individual mind, isolated in its own 
privacy, but rather the cumulative outcome of a constant process of communication, 
exchange, and interaction between members of a certain community and among 
different milieus. As a result, the analysis of metaphors and arguments about the 
public perceptions, media coverage and regulation of SCNT research in scientific 
articles constitutes an important counterpart to the data derived from individual 
interviews with scientists, further adding to the overall interpretative power of the 
present study. Thus, their consideration assists in the identification and typification of 
main anchors and objectifications of the public sphere existing at the collective level, 
at the same time as it offers a safe comparison with data from informal settings of 
communication, accounting for any possible discrepancies or similarities. At a second 
level, and while linking contents to people who share them, they further contribute to 
the identification of different interlocutors and their various positioning vis-à-vis other 
interlocutors illuminating the reasons guiding the choice of certain metaphors and 
arguments, thus linking meanings to their functions. Lastly, they provide an 
indispensable resource in the clarification of the historic aspects of representations, by 
assisting in the identification of possible shifts across years and countries.  
 However, where is one to look for what is yet unknown? Indeed, in an 
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exploration for relevant symbolic spaces, a long list of scientific journals was 
produced. Some of them preserved a unique focus on SCNT and associated research 
(like for example ‘Cloning and Stem Cells’ or ‘Stem cells and Development’ or 
‘Tissue Engineering’), while others had a more paramount interest in that they 
covered developments in specific scientific fields (like for example ‘Cell’ or ‘Journal 
of Cell Biology’) or across domains (like for example, ‘Nature’ or ‘Science’). Bauer 
and Aarts’ (2000) idea of ‘corpus construction’ constituted a useful resource guiding 
relevant choices. Thus, selection was made in such a way so as to be both specific and 
general; that is, technical enough for the purposes of the present study (elite media), 
yet exhaustive enough so as to maximise the possible varieties of the phenomenon 
under study in terms of meanings, as well as, voices reported.  
Two scientific journals constitute the focus of the present analysis, Nature and 
Science. Nature is a UK based journal, published by the Nature Publishing Group 
since 1869. It comes out every Thursday with the exception of the last Thursday in 
December. It is a journal of international status publishing papers from any area of 
research with great impact potential. While implementing the idea of triangulating 
relevant data from both formal and informal settings of communication, the choice of 
a non-UK publication was also considered vital. Hence, although the scope of the 
present research limits its focus to the UK context, as exemplified also by the 
selection of UK-based interviewees, science meets no temporal or geographical 
constraints. As a result one should keep in mind that scientists are likely to receive 
information from a number of resources far exceeding their geographical location. 
Thus, Science, a US based journal established in 1880 by Thomas A. Edison and 
currently published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
was chosen. It, also, is published weekly, every Friday, and as is the case with Nature, 
has an interest in research from any scientific discipline whose importance extends 
well beyond the confines of its specialised field.  
 The choice of Nature and Science as representatives of a long list of scientific 
journals was dictated by several reasons. 
Firstly, both are considered as the most prestigious multidisciplinary science 
journals. Their importance stems from their circulation figures and the calculation of 
their impact factor. The impact factor is a statistical formula that indicates a journal’s 
relative importance compared to other journals in the field, by calculating the 
frequency with which the 'average article' in a journal has been cited in a particular 
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year. Thus, the most recent research conducted in 2002 by BPA Worldwide indicated 
that the average circulation of Nature was 64,361, comprising 13,246 institutional and 
49,676 personal subscribers (Nature, 2003). The overall worldwide receivership of the 
journal for that year, along with the number of Internet users having visited Nature’s 
website came to a total of 683,516. In the same year, the average circulation of 
Science was reported by BPA Worldwide as 143,569 including 127,132 individual 
subscribers and 15,524 institutional subscribers (Science, 2003). Tables 4.3 and 4.4 
present some additional information with regard to Nature and Science readers’ 
profiles. As it is shown, life scientists (including molecular biologists, cell biologists 
and biotechnologists) constitute an important part of the overall readership of both 
journals. In terms of the impact factor, it was found that for 2002 Nature recorded its 
highest ever impact of 30.4 points, placing it ahead of Science by almost 4 points. 
The second reason that prompted the choice of these two journals is related to 
their structure. Both journals contain news, commentary, correspondence and editorial 
sections providing a forum for discussion of technical issues, as well as, issues 
pertinent to the public sphere. The similarity in structure affords a safe condition for 
any relevant comparisons between the two journals.  
Thirdly, they have both played an important role in the human SCNT debate, 
for it was through their pages that news about the birth of Dolly in 1997 (published in 
Nature, Wilmut et al., 1997), and the first isolation of human embryonic stem cells in 
1998 (published in Science, Thomson et al., 1998), reached specialist audiences and 
media reports.   
Overall, both journals constitute appropriate symbolic spaces from which to 
draw comparative data to the study interviews. While being highly popular among life 
scientists, they are also relevant enough to SCNT and associated research, yet 
sufficiently general, offering the possibility to maximise the varieties of the 
phenomenon under study in terms of voices reported and their corresponding 
positioning regarding the relationship between science and the public sphere. In this 
way, the criteria of ‘corpus construction’ of qualitative research, as specified by Bauer 
and Aarts (2000), is thought to be met.  
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Table 4.3 Nature’s worldwide reader profile for 2002 
Frequency % Reader area of research 
6% Agriculture 
4% Astronomy 
30% Biochemistry/biophysics 
15% Bioinformatics 
23% Biotechnology 
17% Cancer/oncology 
28% Cell biology/development 
13% Chemistry 
10% Clinical medicine 
12% Computer science 
10% Earth science 
13% Ecology/evolutionary biology 
16% Education 
12% Environmental science 
24% Genetics 
14% Immunology 
4% Legal and financial 
6% Materials science 
7% Mathematics 
13% Microbiology/Virology/Infectious disease 
38% Molecular biology 
17% Neuroscience 
6% Oceanography 
4% Other biology 
10% Pharmacology 
11% Physics 
5% Plant science 
13% Other 
(Source, Nature, 2003, the percentage total is more than 100% due to multiple 
choices) 
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Table 4.4 Science circulation figures for 2002 
Frequency (%) Reader’s profile 
88% Individual subscribers 
80% U.S. subscribers 
58% Individual paid life science subscribers 
49% Research/research & development subscribers 
20% Non-U.S. subscribers 
15% Baccalaureate and Master’s degree subscribers 
11% Library and institutional subscribers 
4% Postdoctoral subscribers 
(Based on Science, 2003, the percentages’ total is more than 100% due to multiple 
choices) 
 
 
4.3.1 Material selection by keywords 
The search of articles was conducted on-line by making use of the relevant archive 
search services available on each journal’s webpage. The search words and phrases 
were: cloning, clone, clones, cloned, cell nuclear replacement, somatic cell nuclear 
transfer, stem cells. The focus of the search was placed on articles published in the 
sections of ‘Editorial’, ‘News’, ‘News in brief’,  ‘News features’, ‘Correspondence’, 
‘Commentary’, ‘Words’ and ‘Books and Arts’ for Nature; and ‘Editorial’, ‘News of 
the Week’, ‘News Focus’, ‘Letters’, ‘Books et al.’, ‘Random Samples’, ‘Science 
Scope’ and ‘Policy Forum’ for Science. It is in these sections where scientific 
developments are discussed in relation to major technical, economic, political and 
social issues. Most of the news sections are covered by Nature and Science in-house 
writers, while the correspondence and commentary sections are a space for the 
journals’ readers to express their own views on a given issue. Overall, the search 
covered 9 years of reporting from 1
st
 February 1997 to 30
th
 of October 2005. This is to 
identify overall trends and patterns of the scientific coverage of the public debate that 
occurred after the announcement of the birth of Dolly in February 1997 until the time 
of the conduction of the individual interviews with scientists. Having collected the 
articles a first ‘read through’ of the text was needed to deselect articles that came up 
containing the search words without however being relevant to SCNT technology. For 
 115 
instance there were articles referring to nuclear power or cell regulation that were 
irrelevant to CNR research. Articles containing the search word ‘stem cells’ without 
however referring to SCNT were likewise excluded. A second reading followed 
identifying articles discussing public perceptions, media coverage and the regulation 
of CNR. A decision was also made to retain those articles discussing public 
developments relevant to animal cloning not only as a way to further extend the 
corpus of data accounting for the maximum of possible varieties, but also because it 
was soon realised that relevant discussions and arguments unfolded in parallel. In the 
same frame of mind and chronologically matching the period of the interviews, the 
second step was performed resulting in the identification of an overall 461 articles 
having at least one reference to public perceptions and/or media coverage and/or 
public policy of SCNT research from February 1997 to October 2005 (226 Science 
articles and 235 Nature articles). 
 
 4.3.2 Methods of analysis  
As already stated, the analysis of the material is based on a typification logic. While 
classical content analysis is employed in order to document important information 
about the salience and the structure of the debate as covered by the two journals, 
argumentation analysis and metaphor analysis are performed so as to identify 
different types of metaphors and arguments used to anchor and objectify the public 
sphere. 
 
4.3.2.1 Content analysis  
Content analysis can be seen as situated at the crossroads of statistical formalism and 
qualitative analysis (Bauer, 2000). While providing a means for numerical 
descriptions of several features of the text corpus, at the same time, it invites the 
researcher to reflect upon ‘kinds’, ‘qualities’ and ‘distinctions’ in the text prior to 
quantification. According to Farr (1993), the domination of the individualistic 
tradition of social psychology resulted in socio-psychological research being confined 
to the laboratory and the consequent undervaluing of content analysis as a method of 
analysing socio-cognitive phenomena. Recently, and with the advent of social 
representations theory, importance has been reinstated in this form of analysis. 
In the present study content analysis of the articles is performed so as to document 
issues relating to: 1) basic information about the article (item number, name of 
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journal, date); 2) salience of the public sphere (size, journal section, news format, 
author,); 3) identification of the public sphere (public themes, focus, location and type 
of cloning); 4) arguing about the public sphere (claimant5, public arena claimed, 
location of public arena claimed). The use of metaphorical concepts is also 
documented (string code), while information regarding the metaphor user and the 
arena to which the metaphor applies are likewise coded. The coding frame underwent 
several transformations and was piloted before devising the one used on the full 
corpus (Appendix 5).  
 
4.3.2.2 Metaphor analysis 
Metaphors employed to describe public perceptions, media coverage and regulation of 
SCNT constitute the focus of analysis. The procedure is unfolded in two steps and it 
draws heavily from Liakopoulos (2000): 
1) Identification of metaphors 
  The basis for the identification of metaphors in the text lies in the definition of 
non-literal speech as a form of wording intended to mean something other than what 
is exactly said. However, analysis of relevant literature indicated that there are other 
tropes of non-literal speech, from which metaphor needs to be carefully distinguished. 
The purpose thus, is to provide definitions and examples of these related tropes in an 
effort to secure a reliable process of identification, after Liakopoulos (2000): 
 
Irony: an utterance used to express the very opposite of what is said. 
For example, to say ‘what lovely weather’ to refer to a dark and rainy 
day is ironic. The difference between metaphor and irony is the way 
non-literal meanings are used. Thus, although ‘what lovely weather’ 
expresses something else than what is said, it echoes a probable reality 
under other circumstances, something that cannot be said for metaphor. 
Hence, to say that somebody is a ‘lion’, or ‘regulation is battle’ can 
never assume a literal meaning. 
Hyperbole: an utterance that contains exaggeration beyond what is 
really possible. For example, to say ‘I told you a thousand times’ is a 
                                                 
5
  In cases where the claimant or the user of metaphor was a scientist, a string code 
documented his/her specialisation 
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hyperbole for it is impossible to believe that someone has repeated the 
same word a thousand times. 
Dead metaphor: figures of speech, which, although deriving from 
metaphorical concepts, have lost their value as metaphors. For 
example, ‘the law endangers current research’ is an instance of a dead 
metaphor. A law is not a living entity able to ‘endanger’ anything. 
Although originating from metaphorical concepts, it is not perceived as 
a metaphor for it is quite common to use active verbs in association 
with immaterial concepts. 
Simile: an utterance describing similarities between different entities. 
For example, to say that somebody ‘sits on his chair like a king on his 
throne’ is an instance of simile. Simile is different to metaphor for it 
describes literal similarity between two entities (in the example actual 
posture observed and that of a familiar photograph or a painting). 
Metaphors, on the other hand, offer similarities between concepts (a 
man and a lion). A useful way to distinguish simile from metaphors is 
the use of words such as ‘as’ or ‘like’ in expressions of the former. 
Metonymy: while metaphor is used so as to understand a concept in 
terms of another, metonymy uses one entity to stand for another. For 
example, to say ‘I bought a Picasso’ is to refer to the qualities of a 
painting by reference to the painter.  
 
At the completion of this step, and after having demarcated metaphor from 
other tropes of non-literal speech in the text analysed, a list of 269 metaphors, used to 
refer to the three arenas of public sphere, was produced (as has been already 
mentioned, metaphorical concepts were documented in the form of a string variable).   
2) Identification of superordinate categories 
Following the identification of metaphors, the next step is to detect similarities 
between the metaphors found so as to classify them under a common superordinate 
category. This provides a way of understanding and explaining the intrinsic 
associations that metaphors create. In this way, light is shed on the categorisation 
function of anchoring.  
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4.3.2.3Argumentation analysis 
The analysis of arguments was conducted by employing Toulmin’s theory of 
argumentation. As it has already been discussed in Chapter 1, Toulmin’s (1958) 
theory of argumentation is one of the most important in the tradition of informal logic 
for it is the only who has managed so far to offer a workable definition of the 
argument and its premises, providing a clear methodological approach for the analysis 
of everyday discourse (Brockriede & Ehninger, 1960; Liakopoulos, 2000). As such, it 
has been adopted in a variety of research projects, among which in studies for the 
analysis of science argumentation (Ball, 1994), the analysis of children’s 
argumentation (Bernardi & Antolini, 1996), of arguments in organisational settings 
(Putnam & Geist, 1985; Simosi, 1997), of media effects (Chambliss & Garner, 1996), 
and the analysis of argumentation in formal debates (Vári, 1991; Liakopoulos, 2000).  
In the present research, argumentation is explored in articles from scientific 
journals, which focus on public perceptions, media coverage and regulation of SCNT. 
The analysis follows a two step-procedure (for a more elaborate description of the 
procedure followed, please see Appendix 7): 
 
1) Identification of argumentation structure 
The first step employs the reconstruction of arguments as identified in the articles. 
That is, identify those elements of the argument that function as a claim, data, 
warrant, backing, or rebuttal, based on what is explicitly said. In doing so, a small 
summary of the main points of argumentation is produced enabling the identification 
of the argumentation structure. Many scholars employing Toulmin’s model have 
criticised him for failing to successfully demarcate backings from warrants and data 
from warrants making it difficult for the analyst to distinguish the role of relevant 
statements (Hample, 1992; van Eemeren et at., 1987). In order to clarify this point, 
and based on Toulmin’s notion of context-effects, other scholars have found it 
appropriate to contextualise their argumentation by devising their own definitions of 
the argument parts (Bernardi & Antolini, 1996; Simosi, 1997, Liakopoulos, 2000). 
This was found to be a helpful way in clearly identifying the structure of the 
arguments while increasing the reliability of the analysis. 
In the present research, argumentation develops in the context of a formalised 
debate in which participants offer clear and articulate backings for their claims about 
public perception, media coverage and the regulation of CNR technology. The 
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argumentative parts are defined as follows:  
 
Claim (So): The organising theme, the conclusion, the point of view that the claimant 
tries to make about people, media, regulation. This is the outcome of the argument. 
The purpose is to account for all the claims made in a given article concerning the 
three arenas of the public sphere. Some claims come as a form of evaluation of the 
public sphere; others stress a mode of relation with the public to be adopted, while 
others still, express the effect of public engagement with science on science. 
Examples of claims include:  
 
 ‘People do not understand reproductive cloning and what it really is.’ 
 
‘Scientists and those who are interested in the ethical consequences of advances in 
science must strive
 
to point public debate toward what is practical and possible as
 
well as what is plausibly moral.’ 
 
‘It is important that the current confusion about these issues does not lead to a  
ban on the production of certain types of human cells growing in Petri dishes.’ 
 
 
Data: An utterance which constitutes the evidence at the claimant’s disposal. 
It may refer to past events or current situations, actions or opinions. Examples of data 
are: 
 
‘Much confusion has arisen in the public, in that cloning seems to have become 
almost synonymous with somatic cell nuclear transfer.’ 
 
 ‘Some companies are touting the current feasibility and safety of cloning people, and 
are moving ahead with volunteers.’ 
 
‘Widely publicized examples of scientific dishonesty, like the Schön case, or 
unacceptable scientific practice, like the Lomborg affair or repeated unverified claims 
of human cloning, are not only misleading but seriously erode the public’s trust in 
science.’  
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Warrant (because): It is the operational name Toulmin gives to that part of an 
argument which authorises the mental ‘leap’ involved in advancing from data to 
claim. The distinction between data and warrants of a particular argument can only be 
achieved by examining how the particular claimant has chosen to use the information 
which s/he has included in her/his argument. If a statement is used as part of the 
definition of the situation at hand (presentation of current public concerns, media 
coverage, regulation, current science communication), the statement is considered to 
be part of the data of this particular argument.  On the contrary, if the claimant has 
used it as a means to support her/his main claim (i.e. evaluation or mode of action), 
then this statement has taken the role of the warrant in the particular argument. The 
purpose is to focus on the intention of the arguer, how she/he wanted to use this 
information. Examples of warrants are: 
 
‘Science-based regulatory agencies have learned that stakeholder consultation makes 
all the work going better.’ 
 
‘People have a right to know what they consume and have a right to choice.’ 
 
‘It takes a focused effort to explain to the average citizen that therapeutic cloning 
does not entail making a copy of another person and that what many find abhorrent 
(including ourselves) is reproductive cloning.’ 
 
Backing (since): An utterance which refers to an additional assumption, used as a 
means of further supporting the warrant in the argument. Backings could be claims of 
their own. They usually present deeper ideas and values about science, the public, 
media and regulation. Backings include statements such as:  
 
‘It is not the job of scientists to decide what research should follow, but it is the 
job of society to decide what scientists should be permitted to do.’ 
 
‘We do believe that accurate language will result in clearer debates and will not 
so routinely mislead the uninformed.’ 
 
‘As science encroaches more closely on heavily value-laden issues, members of 
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the public are claiming a stronger role in both regulation of science and the 
shaping of its research agenda.’ 
 
Rebuttal (unless): Rebuttals indicate conditions under which the general authority of 
the warrant is to be set aside. These are statements that ‘cancel out’ the argument and 
are stated explicitly by ‘unless’. For example: 
 
‘Unless they are devoted followers of a religion which has a very specific view on the 
matter.’   
Another hurdle associated with Toulmin’s model is the dilemma the analyst 
faces with the treatment of the implicit parts of the argument. Relevant work has 
shown that in everyday argumentation it is the warrant and, most frequently, the 
backing that is unexpressed (Simosi, 1997).  Scholars like Freeman (1991), alert the 
analyst to the dangers of imposing their own thoughts and values on the phenomenon 
of research by trying to fit Toulmin’s model on the research data. In this approach it is 
only what is explicitly stated that is taken as part of the argument. However, it is in 
the warrants and backings where, according to Toulmin, the deepest values and 
thoughts of a community are to be found. Social representations research has also 
argued for the need to account for the crucial role of empirical absence, often thought 
to reveal ‘taken for granted’ dimensions of the phenomenon under study (Gervais et 
al. 1999). Early on in the analysis of the data, I too was faced with this dilemma. In 
order to avoid a strongly subjective reading of the data, it was decided to follow a 
third less ‘rigid’ approach. The missing elements were inferred (I kept a list of all the 
‘missing’ statements) whenever they were safely deduced from the expressed 
elements (data or warrants). In cases where the content of the missing element was 
less obvious to identify, making the danger evident of imposing my thoughts and 
values, I refrained from this procedure.  
 The completion of this first step of the analysis concluded in the identification 
of a total of 410 arguments made about public perceptions, media coverage and the 
regulation of SCNT technology in the Nature and Science articles analysed. 
Information regarding the structure of each argument was also generated.  
 
2) Classification in argumentative types 
The last step involves the identification of different types of arguments based on the 
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claims and their supportive elements. The notion of type of argumentation originates 
from the fact that every debate is structured around some general points which guide 
and organise the thinking process (Liakopoulos, 2000). Each argument is grouped 
under its corresponding type.  
 The data from argumentation analysis were later integrated with those relating 
to the source of each argument and to the arena to which each argument was 
addressed, as coded in content analysis.  
 
 
4.3.2.4 Reliability of content and argumentation analysis of formal 
communication data 
Reliability estimates are one means researchers have at their disposal to assess the 
overall quality of the various measuring instruments employed in their studies. The 
core idea of reliability could be summed up by the word ‘consistency’. Across time 
researchers have conceptualised consistency in many forms depending on the question 
of interest. Thus, in some studies reliability measurements are employed to evaluate 
consistency across repeated testings, or to assess internal consistency of inventory 
items, or still in others to estimate the degree of agreement among different raters. It 
is in this latter context that the idea of reliability has been used here (Huck, 2000).  
Hence, a second coder was employed so as to estimate the degree of interrater 
consistency of the coding schemes used for both content and argumentation analysis. 
The second coder was an academic with experience in media studies. A careful 
procedure was followed in order to familiarise her with the rationale of the study as 
well as the coding frames adopted and their application in the analysis of the relevant 
data. Consequently, the second coder received information regarding the underlying 
principles of the study and its interest in providing a typification of elite media 
coverage of cloning related public developments by triangulating data concerning 
patterns of coverage, metaphors and arguments used. Extensive material was also 
provided in relation to SCNT research; its technicalities and different applications. 
The coder was also familiarised with Bauer and Gaskell’s (2002) proposed framework 
for conducting similar social research projects and the operationalisation of the public 
sphere as public perceptions, media coverage and regulation.  
With regard to the content analysis procedure, the second coder was given 
enough time to acquaint herself with the coding frame and its rational while any 
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difficulties met were thoroughly discussed. A basic set of instructions was provided to 
enhance the understanding of the coding frame devised and its use (see Appendix 13). 
Careful training in the logic of argumentation analysis also took place. At first, the 
coder was introduced to Toulmin’s proposed model for argumentation analysis and 
his respective definition of the argument’s parts. Considering the various difficulties 
met by researchers so far in the implementation of Toulmin’s approach, as 
aforementioned, and in order to better clarify the coding scheme adopted in the 
present study, the second coder was familiarised with the definition of argumentative 
premises, as described in the above section. Thus, the coder received clear 
information as to the way of identifying and differentiating between data, warrants, 
backing, claims and rebuttals in the context of the present research topic. Regarding 
cases in which specific parts of the argument were missing, the coder was asked to 
deduce them only when they could be easily inferred by what was explicitly stated in 
the text. Thus, a list of inferred items was produced. This was mainly done to enhance 
the next step of the analysis, which related to the identification of the overall type of 
the argument.  
Overall, inter-coder reliability of content and argumentation analysis of formal 
communication data was assessed on the basis of a sample of 10 per cent of the 
material coded (i.e. 46 articles). The criterion for the estimation of the inter-coder 
reliability adopted was that of percentage agreement. Percent agreement is one of the 
most popular coefficients used for the estimation of interrater reliability (Neuendorf, 
2002). Its conceptual formula could be represented as:  
PAο = A/n 
 
where PAο stands for the ‘proportion agreement observed’, A is the number of 
agreements between two coders and n is the total number of units coded by the two 
coders (ibid, p.149).  
For content analysis, the average reliability between the two coders measured 
as percentage agreement was 0.86, ranging from 0.61 to 0.99. The overall interrater 
reliability value for the identification of argument parts was estimated as 0.89 with 
individual part’s values fluctuating between 0.72 and 0.96.  Moreover, the percentage 
agreement in the coding of the ‘argumentation type’ was 0.86.  
The above results add force to the quality of the coding schemes and 
procedures adopted pointing to acceptable values of consistency among the coders. 
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Especially regarding argumentation analysis, this is in accordance with prior studies 
that have also implemented Toulmin’s model in their analysis of argumentative 
material (Liakopoulos, 2000; Simosi, 1997). Both scholars argue for the importance 
of introducing the second coder to a) the rational of the study, b) the phenomenon of 
interest, c) the definition of research concepts and d) the coding strategy followed. 
Appendix 14 provides clear and fuller information regarding the reliability measures 
of content and argumentation analysis of articles. 
 
4.4 Selection of interviewees 
From the beginning of its conception, the present thesis set to study one specific 
group of people, scientists involved in human SCNT research and their 
representations regarding the public sphere. Although highly selective, such a focus 
was thought to offer an opportunity to investigate the interplay between the scientific 
and the non-scientific in the context of a technoscience in the making. That stated, this 
conceptualisation does not mean to propose that experience in different scientific 
projects relates to different representations of the public sphere. This question and its 
answer exceed the purpose of the present thesis. Rather, this choice mainly reflects an 
attempt to investigate one group of scientists working in a controversial arena, while 
ensuing that the relevant data is contained at a manageable size. Taking into account 
the lacuna in relevant social representations research, such an attempt was considered 
topical. However, a crucial question soon arose: considering new social movements, 
pressure groups, advisory committees and all these different hybrids, where is one to 
draw the line before falling into the simplistic dichotomy of lay versus expert, which 
was the original intent of this investigation? (Burningham et. al, 2007; Irwin & 
Michael, 2003; Latour, 1993). Although such a distinction assisted in the further 
clarification of who constitutes an expert and who does not, nevertheless it could not 
be surpassed. Still, it was largely treated as unproblematic by the interviewees, as will 
be shown later. 
Who then is an ‘expert’? As aforementioned, the logic guiding qualitative 
research is not that of representativeness but of typification, that is, to identify the 
variations of the phenomenon under study. In this context, the task of the researcher is 
to maximise the possible varieties of the phenomenon investigated by maximising the 
criteria guiding the selection of her/his interviewees. While some observations 
regarding the criteria of selection were made a priori, they were continually updated 
 125 
throughout the study. In general, differences amongst subjects were thought to vary 
according to the degree of relevance to human SCNT research, the degree of 
experience in the field, the type of institution, and gender6. 
 A variety of scientists whose work is relevant to human CNR research and 
applications was identified, generally comprising three broad groups of people: 1) 
those directly involved in somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) research for the 
purposes of extracting human embryonic stem cells; 2) those engaged in human 
embryonic stem cell research by using other methods; and 3) those involved in animal 
SCNT research for the purposes of advancing the efficiency of the technique for both 
animal and human applications. It was hypothesised that these different ways of 
relating to CNR research were connected with different experiences of being under 
‘siege’ and possibly resulting in different perspectives of the relationship between 
science and the public sphere. During the course of the investigation, and following 
the logic of triangulation, it was decided to include a fourth group of scientists 
engaged in other projects unconnected to SCNT research. The decision was made so 
as to further enhance the interpretative power of the present research, for it was 
thought to assist in better understanding possible absences and presences in the 
discourse of the interest three groups.  
 Prior research has indicated that seniority, research institution, and gender are 
all factors that have a considerable impact in the way scientists think about science 
and its relation to public perceptions, media coverage and regulation. Thus, in a 
qualitative study by Waterton and her colleagues (2001), structural shifts in science 
identified by older and younger UK scientists were associated with different degrees 
of reflection between these two groups regarding uncertainty, responsibility, 
accountability and precaution. In a similar way, research conducted by MORI (2000) 
detected significant differences between senior and junior UK scientists regarding 
                                                 
6
  An additional criterion first considered was that of the participant’s role in 
science communication. It soon became apparent though that it was quite difficult to 
control for it, since some scientists had often several different kinds of relationships 
with people and/or media and/or regulation, while their participation in science 
communication seemed to be strongly determined by their respective working 
experience in the field. Thus it was thought to account for it with the criterion of 
seniority.   
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their participation and attitude to science communication activities. While the 
Waterton study (2001) identified no variations amongst UK scientists working in 
different institutional settings, it did detect differences between men and women 
scientists, with women adopting a more responsible position regarding science and its 
relevance to society. In an earlier survey, by Rabino (1994), with US scientists 
engaged in recombinant DNA research, differences were detected amongst 
researchers working in private industry, government research institutions and 
academe across a set of questions enquiring about the impact of public attention, 
political advocacy and litigation of their work. Overall, scientists in academe had a 
more favourable view of the impact of public engagement with science on their work.  
 While the above variables guided the selection of interviewees, various 
sources of information were considered in order to further familiarise myself with 
research groups and institutions in the U.K. Thus, an extensive Internet search was 
carried out in order to identify possible settings where relevant research was 
conducted (for example, the HFEA webpage provides a list of all the institutions 
currently holding a license to perform human embryonic stem cell research).  
Information gathered through out the analysis of Nature and Science contents proved 
most helpful. I also got in touch with a biologist working in the Sociology Department 
at the LSE to whom I am greatly indebted for granting me access to her rich stem cell 
archive and most importantly for our fruitful discussions.  
 A combination of ways was used in order to contact the interviewees. Initially, 
and with the help of my supervisor, I got in touch with a member of the HFEA. 
Through her acquaintances I was successfully secured access to two institutions 
engaged in human embryonic stem cell research. After that it was thanks to the 
participants’ enthusiasm that I accessed other academic institutions were similar work 
was being conducted. In other instances, interviews were arranged after public 
meetings, mostly organised by the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science or through e-mails and without the use of a liaison. All interviewees were 
approached applying the following two-step procedure. They first received an e-mail 
drawing their attention to the research and informing them about the research interest, 
the researcher, the procedure and issues of confidentiality (Appendix 8). After a week, 
the scientists were again approached. With the exception of a few cases, where the 
contacted people did not respond, most of the scientists made prompt replies either 
expressing their interest to participate or not. The most frequently met obstacle was 
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scientists’ heavy schedule, a factor also having important ramifications on the conduct 
and duration of the interviews.  Approximately, one in three people contacted agreed 
to collaborate.  
 While the majority of participants were receptive about the research, there was 
one case where my supervisor was asked to provide additional clarification about the 
research and myself. This was justified as part of the institution’s policy in hosting 
‘outsiders’ and it did add further breadth to my understanding of the modes of 
interaction with the public. 
Overall, 18 people were interviewed over a period of 9 months, from February 
to October 2002. Three of the participants were directly involved in SCNT research 
for the purposes of extracting human embryonic stem cells, seven were engaged in 
human embryonic stem cell research by using other methods, five participated in 
research groups with an interest in animal SCNT research, while three were biologists 
working in areas not relevant to SCNT and human embryonic stem cell research. In 
terms of working experience in the field, eleven of the interviewees were senior and 
seven were junior scientists (Ph.D. and postdoctoral students). Since at the time of the 
study most of the work in animal SCNT, human SCNT and human embryonic stem 
cell research was undertaken in academic research institutions, there is an 
overrepresentation of scientists working in the public sector. While some institutions 
held links to the commercial sector, by and large, research was supported by 
governmental funding through the research councils and the Wellcome Trust. Thus, 
fourteen of the interviewees worked in academic institutions, and the other four in 
government research institutions7. Regarding gender, eleven of the participants were 
male and seven were female. It is clear that authoritative claims over the 
representativeness of the sample cannot be made and relevant results are to be treated 
in this frame of mind. This does not, however, undermine its richness, further 
enhanced by the consideration of some additional, uncontrolled variables. Hence, 
eleven of the participants had one or more experiences in formal science 
communication activities, either in the form of talking to the press, on television or at 
discussions organised by relevant bodies. Notably, two of them are amongst the most 
                                                 
7
  I refrain from presenting a fuller and more detailed account of the relevant 
institutions for this is a small and easily identifiable community. Commitment to 
confidentiality as was assured to the interviewees remains my first priority.  
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recognised science-spokespersons in the U.K. Also, at the time of the interview two 
held links to regulatory authorities of SCNT research, being members of respective 
scientific advisory groups.  
 
4.4.1 Conducting interviews  
Most of the interviews were conducted in the interviewees’ office spaces provided by 
the institution they worked for (one was held in a hospital waiting room, one in a 
university cafeteria and one was conducted over the phone due to the interviewee’s 
tight schedule). The duration of the interviews varied between 10 and 77 minutes, 
depending on the interviewee’s time availability, with a mean of 45 minutes.  All 
interviews were conducted individually, with the exception of one where two 
interviewees participated in the conversation 8 and they were all organised according 
to a three-phase sequence: the initiation phase, the questioning phase, and closure. 
The purpose of the initiation phase was to introduce myself to the interviewee, 
describe the topic of my research, and to explain the principles of the conversation 
(i.e., the interviewee was invited to discuss about personal experiences and opinions 
regarding the public’s engagement with and understanding of somatic cell nuclear 
transfer research and its human applications). Opportunity was given to the 
interviewee to pose any preliminary questions, while permission was requested for the 
use of a tape recorder acting as an aid mémoire. Interviewees were also reassured 
about issues of confidentiality. In order to establish rapport and give the participant 
some time to become comfortable with the situation, the discussion started by inviting 
each interviewee to present her/his research interests and current working projects. 
Next, the interviewee was invited to recall any instance of public communication of 
her/his work. This was proved to be a useful and non-directive way of initiating the 
conversation around the topic of interest while enabling me to take notes and prepare 
for the questioning phase.  
During the next phase, and following the participant’s narration, I was able to 
explore in more depth specific themes occurring during the narration using the 
interviewee’s vocabulary and to expand the conversation by prompting descriptions, 
                                                 
8
  While the interview had already been scheduled with one of the participants, when I 
arrived at the interviewee’s workplace I was told that one of his junior colleagues ‘had 
offered to help me’ as well. He was invited by the interviewee to join the discussion.  
 129 
opinions and explanations about the ‘public’, the ‘media’ and the ‘regulatory 
authorities’. In each case, by following the flow of the conversation, I tried to avoid 
directing the interviewee, so as not to trigger rationalisations (‘this is very interesting’, 
‘earlier you said that… would you mind telling me a little bit more about that?’, ‘from 
what you say it seems that you think that…. Am I right?’ and ‘what do you think 
about …?’).  
In the last phase and while the conversation approached its closure I reminded 
the interviewees of a specific event (Switzerland’s latest referendum on stem cells, for 
it constituted a recent example of direct public participation in science policy) inviting 
their opinion about similar events. This primarily was done to bring to the surface any 
unexplored themes and/or to close the conversation. It soon proved to ignite fruitful 
discussions about the role of public opinion and its relation to formal decision-
making. The interviews were closed by enquiring about any last thoughts and 
comments. In most cases, the conversation was over as soon as the tape-recorder was 
switched off, due to the interviewees’ time constrains. In the cases were ‘small- talk’ 
did occur, it was later documented and used in the interpretation of the formal part of 
the interview.    
  The accumulation of data from the scientific journals before the conduction 
of the interviews assisted to familiarise me not only with the main themes and 
arguments relevant to the public perceptions, media coverage and regulation of human 
CNR technology but also with the language used by experts (for example, I tried 
avoiding the term ‘cloning’ by using the scientific equivalent ‘somatic cell nuclear 
transfer’ prompting expressions of satisfaction by the interviewees. This was also a 
point considered in the latter phases of interpretation). Generally, the interview topic 
guide (Appendix 9) served more as a reminder of a list of general areas to cover and 
less as a way of structuring the conversation. In many interviews the above sequence 
was deviated from for the purposes of the discussion. In some cases, the interviewee 
was in full command of the conversation by bringing up topics, offering explanations 
and justifications, in others I had to stimulate the conversation in a more direct way, 
while still in others the interviewee’s tight schedule enabled me to cover the main 
topics of interest in a less exhaustive manner.    
After the completion of the interview each participant was asked to fill in a 
form providing additional information about her/his current profession, total number 
of years of working experience, research interests, total number of years of science 
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communication experience, and age (Appendix 10). All this information was 
documented in a separate sheet for each interview together with some personal notes 
about the interview, mostly in the form of advice regarding the conduct of the 
interviews, interesting moments before or after the formal interview, and some 
preliminary observations about the interpretation of data (Appendix 11). 
My different roles as an LSE Ph.D. student, a non-scientist, a woman, a 
foreigner, and first and foremost a member of the public came to form a fascinating 
amalgam of reactions prompting questions about my background, my motives in 
doing this research, my personal thoughts and opinions about human SCNT research, 
its applications and its actors. While most of them originated from a genuine 
curiosity, I was challenged (on some occasions directly) for my social sciences 
background and my lack of any formal biology training. This interesting inter-play 
between being an observer and at the same time a participant, served in a dual way. 
Firstly, it further encouraged me to assume a disinterested research attitude, as 
specified by Bauer & Gaskell (1999), avoiding confrontation and taking a more 
passive stance; especially in cases where the interviewee persisted in finding out my 
thoughts on the ethics of human SCNT and the public debate. In such circumstances I 
replied that when doing research in social sciences one is obliged to be as less 
attached emotionally to her/his object of study as possible. Secondly, and in the 
interpretation phase, these moments of interaction proved to be a useful resource 
further illuminating my object of study. Overall, I was welcomed by the interviewees, 
most of whom were enthusiastic about my research, and while I did encounter some 
initial defensive manners, they were soon overcome in the course of the discussion. 
Some of the participants kept contact with me long after the completion of the 
interviews, not only enquiring about the progress of my research but also sending me 
papers of their work either to inform me about the latest developments or to ask me 
for a commentary. These expressions of trust and appreciation accompanied me all 
the way through this journey. Table 4.5 gives a general description of the people 
interviewed together with details regarding the location and the time of the interview. 
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Table 4.5 The interviewees: Who-where-when 
Interviewee Type of 
research 
Degree of 
experience 
Gender Institution Location  Date Duration 
minutes 
No1 Other Senior Male Academic Office 04/02/2005 77 min. 
No2 hES¹ Senior Male Academic Office 18/02/2005 70 min. 
No3 hES Junior Male Academic Office 18/02/2005 70 min. 
No4 aSCNT²  Senior Female Academic Hospital 
waiting 
room 
09/03/2005 50 min. 
No5 hES Senior Male Academic Office 14/03/2005 45 min. 
No6 hES Senior Male Academic Office 20/03/2005 50 min. 
No7 hSCNT³  Senior Male Academic Office 29/03/2005 40 min. 
No8 hES Senior Female Academic Phone 
interview 
30/03/2005 20 min. 
No9 aSCNT  Junior Female Governm. 
research 
institution 
Office 04/04/2005 20 min. 
No10 aSCNT  Junior Male Governm. 
research 
institution 
Office 04/04/2005 40 min. 
No11 aSCNT  Junior Female Governm. 
research 
institution 
Office 04/04/2005 33 min. 
No12 aSCNT  Junior Female Governm. 
research 
institution 
Office 04/04/2005 30 min. 
No13 hSCNT  Junior Female Academic Office 14/04/2005 50 min. 
No14 hES Senior Female Academic Office 19/04/2005 10 min. 
No15 hES Senior Male Academic Office 16/06/2005 56 min. 
No16 hSCNT  Senior Male Academic Office 16/06/2005 62 min. 
No17 Other Junior Male Academic Cafeteria 11/10/2005 59 min. 
No18 Other Senior Male Academic Office 25/10/2005 23 min. 
¹human embryonic stem cells 
²animal somatic cell nuclear transfer research 
³human somatic cell nuclear transfer research 
 
 
4.4.2 Analysis of interview data 
Metaphor and argumentation analysis were employed for the identification and 
analysis of metaphors and arguments used by the interviewees while discussing about 
the public sphere and SCNT. Once again, it is metaphors and arguments on public 
perceptions, media coverage and the regulation of CNR that are under analysis. While 
the procedure unfolded in the exact same way as for the analysis of metaphors and 
arguments in the scientific articles (that is, identification and classification), there 
were some differences, most notably in argumentation. Thus, from an analytical 
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perspective, it was less difficult to infer missing warrants and backings as most of 
them were spread out in the course of the discussion (for example, the same warrant 
could be used to support different claims). This is thought to relate to the fact that 
interviewees had enough time to spontaneously provide descriptions, explanations and 
justifications in the less formalised, more flexible setting of individual interviews (for 
an example of argumentation analysis of interview data please see Appendix 12). 
Overall the analysis concluded in the identification of 402 metaphors and 363 
arguments employed in the discussions with scientists. 
The same coder employed to assess the inter-coder reliability of the coding 
schemes adopted for the content and argumentation analysis of articles was also used 
to assess relevant interrater measures for the identification of the structure and the 
overall type of interviewees’ arguments. A similar procedure was also followed, 
assessed on a sample of 10 per cent of the overall coded material (i.e. 2 interviews). 
Once again, clear and thorough instructions were included (see Appendix 13). 
Percentage agreement of the overall reliability between coders for the identification of 
argument parts provided an estimated value of 0.79 (ranging from 0.61 to 0.95) while 
the value of inter-coder consistency for the identification of the argumentation type 
was 0.88 (see Appendix 14).  
To conclude, a summary presentation of the data analysed in both formal and 
informal settings of communication is given below. 
 
Table 4.6 Summary of research data 
Formal communication  Informal communication 
     Total No of articles: 461             Total No of interviews: 18 
            Nature articles: 235                    
           Science articles: 226 
Metaphor analysis                           Metaphor analysis 
Total No of metaphors: 269            Total No of metaphors: 402 
        Nature metaphors: 117   
       Science metaphors: 152    
           Argumentation analysis                  Argumentation analysis 
Total No of arguments: 410            Total No of arguments: 363 
        Nature arguments: 191   
       Science arguments: 219 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Jovchelovitch (1995) argues for the need to be explicit regarding methodological 
procedures not only as a way to meet the demands of scientific rigour but also as a 
means to circumvent any uncritical treatment of the assumptions they entail. With that 
in mind, and based on theoretical elaboration, I have sought to offer a detailed 
presentation of the data collected and the methods employed in their analysis. Thus, 
discourses on the three arenas of the public sphere are studied through the analysis of 
scientific journals in an attempt to shed light on the historical aspects of social 
representations, reflecting both the structure of the public debate and the main issues 
of concern at the collective level. Individual interviews with experts are thought to 
provide access to the ontogenetic process of social representations where collective 
meanings are transformed for the appropriation of individual identities. Overall, two 
modes, formal and informal settings of communication, and one medium, words, of 
social representations were studied. The triangulation of different methods of analysis 
was performed in such a manner so as to capture both structural aspects and essential 
elements of meaning of the phenomenon under study (Flick, 1992a).  
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Chapter 5 
 
The public sphere according to Nature and Science 
 
The first journals about science were published in the early nineteenth century in the 
spirit of ‘popularisation’ when the distinctions between popular practices of science, 
academic science and public perceptions of science were largely blurred. However, 
the gradual ‘professionalisation’ of scientific work and the resulting social division 
between scientists and non-scientists also brought about a distinction between popular 
and academic scientific journals (Bensaude-Vincent, 2001). While the scope of the 
former is to disseminate scientific facts to a non-specialist audience, processes like 
peer-review have contributed to the establishment of the role of the latter as a qualifier 
of distinction between ‘science’ and ‘pseudoscience’ further restricting its purposes to 
a small minority of experts. In the context of social representations theory and 
research, formal settings of communication are seen as an active forum of 
construction and communication of ideas and opinions regarding the main aspects of 
collective life in a given community. In this vein, the choice of scientific journals as a 
specific type of medium of representations is thought to provide access to highly 
specialised forums of discussion of the relationship between science and non-science. 
Whilst illuminating patterns of reporting, their analysis assists in identifying the 
intensity of coverage of non-scientific activities, the salience of ‘different public 
spheres’, the salience of different ‘public arenas’ and actors and the mapping of 
representations of public life contained therein. The coverage of almost 9 years of 
reporting (1997-2005) further brings forth the possibility for variations and shifts 
casting light to the historical aspects of representations. As already noted, media 
reports are treated in parallel to individual constructs of meaning, for they are seen as 
feeding one another. In this chapter I aim to present the results of the content analysis 
of Science and Nature and to account for the metaphors and arguments employed in 
the reporting of public developments relating to SCNT research. As this chapter 
ensues, the content of the news in both scientific journals investigated bears a clear 
connection to discussions with the individual scientists interviewed in this study. It 
should also be noted that an absence of any empirical consideration of the academic 
media by similar studies renders such an analysis topical.  
 
 
 135 
5.1 SCNT news coverage in Nature and Science 
Figure 5.1 shows the intensity of coverage of SCNT related public developments in 
the period analysed. From 1997 to 1998 there appears to be a growth in both Nature 
and Science articles covering initial public national and international reactions to the 
announcement of the creation of Dolly and the extraction of the first human 
embryonic stem cell lines.  
 
Figure 5.1  Intensity of articles in scientific journals, 1997-2005 
 
A decline in interest between 1999 and 2001, a time during which the U.K passed its 
first legislation banning reproductive cloning, is followed by a considerable peak in 
2002. This was a year of great interest both in terms of related research as well as 
regulatory developments. Thus, the U.S federal government was about to vote on a 
bill banning therapeutic cloning at the same time that in the U.K the Court of Appeal, 
overturning an earlier verdict, permitted the government to grant the first licenses for 
the creation of human embryonic stem cell lines while approving research into 
therapeutic cloning. In Asia, countries such as, Singapore were finalising their legal 
framework and in the UN opinions on how to approach CNR research differed 
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respectively. This was also the time when Antinori announced the pregnancy of one 
of his patients with a cloned human embryo and Chinese researchers claimed to have 
extracted embryonic stem cells from cloned embryos created by fusing human cells 
with rabbit eggs. In the period from 2003 to 2005 in most of the countries, and with 
the exception of the U.S and the difference between federally and privately funded 
research, relevant public debates had been settled. In the U.K, the first licenses to 
create human embryos by SCNT for research were granted and until the time of the 
completion of the present study South Korean researchers had claimed to have created 
the first human embryonic stem cell lines through SCNT
9
. However, this disparity 
between the US and the UK public interest in SCNT is thought to be reflected in the 
reporting of relevant articles by the two journals analysed. Thus, whereas attention of 
the UK based Nature in public developments around CNR technology progressively 
declines, the number of articles covering similar developments in the North American 
Science increases. 
To match changes and shifts in the public debate following the creation of 
Dolly, results of the analysis will be presented in a two-phase time frame permitting 
relevant comparisons. The years from 1997 to 2001 represent the opening of the 
international public debate on human and animal SCNT when the first intense 
discussions over the ethics and the regulation of related research occurred. The last 
four years of the period covered correspond to later phases when the clarification of 
legal frameworks in most countries marked an initial closure of pertinent disputes.  
 Thus, a comparison of the interest of the two journals in SCNT related public 
developments between the two chronological phases investigated reveals significant 
differences (see Appendix 15). Whereas 59% of the total corpus of articles analysed 
from the period 1997 to 2001 appeared in Nature, relevant Nature articles appearing 
in the later period of the debate decreased to a total of 41%. This again is thought to 
echo general trends of interest in CNR as they developed in their respective countries 
of publication over the time frame investigated.  
 
                                                 
9
    The scandal, that later followed, exceeded the time-frame of the present thesis. 
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5.2 Salience of the public sphere 
For each article, information was coded regarding its size, format, the section it 
appeared in, and its author. These are all variables thought to assist in the 
identification of the importance of a given issue reported in the media outlets. 
Although the format and structure of scientific journals is different in comparison to 
other mass media communication, since their primary scope is to publish the latest 
scientific findings, they can nevertheless expose styles of reporting and possible shifts 
across years. Table 5.1 gives a comparative view of reporting between the two 
chronological phases. Overall, there do not appear to be any significant differences 
(see Appendix15). With an average of 51 articles per year, public developments 
relevant to SCNT research received considerable attention. The majority of articles 
were of small size and tended to provide information about the latest main news in 
brief. Most of the stories were reported by in-house Nature and Science writers. 
University scientists represented the majority of ‘outside’ voices, contributing 
considerably to pertinent discussions, especially during the later phase of the coverage 
analysed. 
  
Table 5.1 Salience of the public sphere in scientific journals 1997-2005 (threshold 
for inclusion 5%) 
Phase¹                                             1997-2001    2001-2005 
Frequency (%)       50                       50 
Size (%)             Small               48                         Small                     57 
                                               Medium            37                        Medium                  33 
                                               Large                15                        Large                       10 
Section (%)                           News             79                         News                       74 
                                               Editorial            9                          Editorial                    9 
                                              Commentary      5                          Correspondence        8 
                                                                                                     Book reviews            6 
Format (%)                         Latest news       76                  Latest news             74 
                                              Commentary      21                        Commentary            21 
                                                                                                     Response                   5 
Author (%)                           In-house           81                         In-house                 80 
                                            University          9                        University                14 
¹ Percentage of corpus; total n = 461 
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5.3 Identifying ‘public developments’ 
Significant shifts in the public themes reported can be identified across the time 
period analysed, as shown in Table 5.2 (see Appendix 16). Changes appear to follow 
public developments as they occurred over the years. During the early phase of 
coverage, focus was placed on the initial science policy reactions and debates over the 
regulation of SCNT research. Attention was also given to issues of interest to public 
perceptions and mass media coverage with articles providing information and 
opinions of non-scientific views and treatment of human and animal CNR, most often 
within a pro-scientific frame. U.S, U.K and generally international developments 
monopolised reporting while other individual countries were less frequently 
mentioned.  
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Table 5.2 Public developments covered in scientific journals, 1997-2005 
(threshold for inclusion 5%) 
 
Phase                                        1997-2001       2002-2005 
 
Frequency (%)¹                              50                                              50 
 
Public Developments² (%)                                  
 
                                                Proposal/Draft        39                 Proposal/Draft      30 
                                                People                      13                  Science Policy       14 
                                                Other                        10                  ‘People’                 13 
                                                Public funding           9                   Public funding      10 
                                                Science Policy           8                   Public hearing        7 
                                                Media                        5                   Other                       7 
                                                                                                        Law                        6 
 Media                     5                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                                                              
Cloning  (%)                        Human                    82                 Human                     95 
                                              Animal                     18                 Animal                        5 
 
 
Human Cloning  (%)         Reproductive          52                  Therapeutic             60 
                                              Therapeutic             48                   Reproductive           40
                                     
 
Focus (%)                           Main                        52                   Reference                53 
                                            Reference                 48                    Main                        47 
 
Controversy (%)                 Imbalanced            61                    Imbalanced           62 
                                           Balanced                 39                    Balanced                 38 
 
Location  (%)                     US                           41                    US                            58                           
                                             UK                          16                    Asia                          11 
                        International           16                   International               8 
                                              Other Europe          13                   Other Europe              8 
                                              Asia                         13                   UK                             8         
                                                                    Other                          7                                                                                                   
 
¹ Percentage of corpus; total n = 461 
² Multiple codings (more than one variable may be coded per article) 
 
 
During the later phase, science policy issues remained of high news value 
prioritising the reporting of developments relevant to therapeutic cloning and stem 
cell research. A main focus on public matters was sustained with U.S activities, and 
the tension between federally funded and private research regulation, dominating 
discussions. Interest in the U.K seemed to drop following the clarification of the legal 
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framework and the permission to carry out human SCNT research, while importance 
was given to developments coming from the East and the rise of stem cell research 
and related policy there. Overall, the regular sections of the scientific journals, such 
as, ‘Policy forum’ for Science and ‘News’ for Nature point to the institutionalisation 
of science policy as a matter of routine coverage (Einsiedel & Coughlan, 1993).  
 
 
 
5.4 Metaphors in formal communication 
 
5.4.1 Metaphors  
In the context of discursive communication, the use of metaphors is thought to cast 
light on the symbolic and contextual resources interlocutors have at their disposal to 
familiarize new objects, ideas and beliefs. Classification of one thing in terms of 
something else is what metaphor does, permitting for the identification of anchors. In 
the context of formal communication, approximately 33% of the total number of 
articles discussing the public dimensions of SCNT technology contained 269 
metaphors, anchoring public perceptions, media coverage and the regulation of CNR. 
Metaphors were identified on the basis of certain criteria, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
that differentiated them from other linguistic tropes. Following, they were classified 
into superordinate categories according to conceptual similarities between target and 
source domain. Before presenting the underlying associations between the source 
concept and the public sphere for each superordinate category, it is essential to 
provide some basic information regarding the different actors identified as using 
metaphors, as well as the public arenas classified in this way. As presented in Table 
5.3, a large proportion of the metaphors identified were found to be employed by the 
in-house writers of the two scientific journals. Anchors by other actors are less often 
quoted with the exception of the metaphors used by representatives of the scientific 
community. With regard to the three arenas of the public sphere (regulation-popular 
media coverage-public perceptions) there is only a limited reference to metaphors 
utilised directly by representatives of national regulatory authorities in discussions 
relevant to developments in the regulation, media coverage and public perceptions of 
SCNT research. 
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Table 5.3 Users of metaphors in scientific journals, 1997- 2005 
Type of actor Representatives Number of 
Metaphors 
Total 
Interest Groups Pro-life antiabortion groups 
Church/ religious groups 
Anti-cloning groups 
1 
1 
3 
5 
 
In- House authors In-house writers 198 198 
Regulatory 
Authorities 
Upper House 
Lower House 
Research funding agency 
Specific member state/ country 
Ethics committee 
Scientific advisory group 
Univ. scient/ethics committee 
member 
Univ. scientist/ member of 
scientif. advisory group 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
9 
Scientific-
industrial complex 
Biotechnology company 
Biotechnology organisation 
University scientists 
Scientists in private lab 
Scientists in government 
institution 
Scientists in museum 
Scientific organisation 
Scientists in general 
1 
7 
28 
1 
 
1 
2 
7 
1 
 
48 
Other Other 9 9 
  Total 269 
 
Table 5.4 offers a schematic presentation of the public arenas classified by the 
identified metaphors. Categorisation processes by metaphor appear to be monopolised 
by an interest in national regulatory arenas. When metaphors are employed to refer to 
media or public perceptions of SCNT there seems to be a tendency for generalisation. 
Although classification of regulatory developments seems to be actor specific, 
categorising a number of different regulatory representatives, differentiations among 
representatives of media or people are almost absent. In contrast, most of the 
metaphors employed are used to associate relevant source domains to broad concepts 
of ‘media in general’, or ‘people in general’.  
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Table 5.4 Public arenas classified in scientific journals, 1997 - 2005 
Type of public 
arena 
Representatives Number of  
Metaphors 
Total 
Regulatory 
Authorities 
Upper House 
Lower House 
Legislature 
Government 
Health agency 
Research funding agency 
National patent office 
Specific member state/ 
  country 
Ethics committee 
Scientific advisory panel 
Policy makers (general) 
EU Commission 
EU Parliament 
EU Council 
UN Organisations 
64 
16 
33 
17 
5 
3 
2 
7 
 
21 
1 
6 
1 
8 
8 
14 
 
 
 
206 
Media Newspaper 
Radio programme 
Media (general) 
1 
1 
33 
35 
Public perceptions People, public (general) 25 25 
Not identified  3 3 
  Total 269 
 
Table 5.5 offers a comparative view of metaphor users, arenas anchored and 
locations of arenas across the two phases of reporting covered. Analysis indicates an 
equal distribution of relevant variables between the two periods regarding the users of 
metaphors (see Appendix 17). However, significant differences were detected in 
relation to the public arenas anchored and their respective locations. An initial effort 
to anchor relevant developments as they took place in all three arenas of the public 
sphere were followed by a strong preoccupation with the classification of regulatory 
developments in later years. Whereas in the first phase interest was placed in both U.S 
and other countries’ regulatory developments, later discussions and relevant 
metaphors employed focused mainly on the public debate still strong and on-going in 
North America.  
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Table 5.5 Metaphors employed in scientific journals, 1997-2005 (threshold for  
          inclusion: 5%) 
Phase          1997-2001                     2002-2005 
 
Frequency (%)¹   47                                               53 
 
Metaphor user (%)                     In- house            72                In- house               75 
 
                                                      Scientific                                  Scientific 
          Industrial                                  Industrial 
                                                      Complex              19                 Complex               17 
 
Public arena anchored² (%)        Regulatory                              Regulatory 
                                                      Authorities           72               Authorities         83 
                                                                                                        
                                                      Media                     18              ‘People’                8.5 
 
                                                      ‘People’                  10               Media                  8.5 
                                                                     
Location of arena³ (%)                US                         51              US                        72 
                                                      International           22              International         13 
                                                      UK                         17               UK                         5 
                                                      Other Europe           5               
                                                       Asia                        5                                                                                             
¹ Percentage of metaphors; total n = 269  
² Missing values excluded; total n = 266                                                          
³ Missing values excluded; total n = 244 
 
Following, each superordinate category of metaphor is described in terms of 
the underlying associations and images it creates, while some paradigmatic examples 
are offered. Overall, fourteen major superordinate categories were identified: War, 
Arts/Entertainment, Nature, Economy, Psychopathology, Journey, Sports, Cloning, 
Chemistry, Engineering, Religion, History, Container and Popular metaphors. The 
order in which they are presented does not denote their frequency, nor is it considered 
of vital importance, since a rare appearance today, might be a common occurrence 
tomorrow, provided there is fertile ground for its development (Liakopoulos, 2000). 
Rather, the main interest of the present research lies in the identification of the 
symbolic resources used to anchor the three arenas of the public sphere, namely 
public perceptions, media coverage and the regulation of SCNT research.  
 
 
 
 144 
5.4.2 Superordinate categories 
 
War 
Metaphors that fall under this category were largely identified in articles discussing 
research regulatory developments relevant to SCNT at both national and international 
levels. With ‘War’ constituting the source domain, the various metaphors in this 
category produce ominous images of the political arena. Science policy is portrayed 
as a ‘battle’ where different assemblies of interest groups, scientists and politicians 
‘clash’ in an attempt to legitimate their standings (anti or pro-SCNT) determining, 
thus, the legal future of SCNT research and its applications (permission or banning of 
certain applications). The structure of the metaphor can be presented as: (1) 
argumentation is war, (2) words are weapons, (3) interlocutors are enemies, and (4) 
there are winners and losers.  
 
‘The decision marks the latest stage in an intensive 9-year battle between industry, 
which foresees economic and health advantages to a uniform biopatent policy, and a 
coalition of consumer, environmental, and religious groups, which object to many 
biotech patents on safety or ethical grounds’ (Science, 5.12.1997) 
 
‘The battle lines are already drawn: Opposition Member of Parliament (MP) Liam 
Fox, a physician who serves as the Conservative Party's "shadow" health secretary, 
has come out against therapeutic cloning.’ (Science, 25.08.2000) 
 
‘In a warning shot in the battle on human cloning, a conservative Republican has 
introduced a bill banning federal payments….’ (Nature, 18.2.1999) 
 
Different ‘camps’ use different ‘strategies’ and ‘weapons’ to succeed. The 
ultimate goal is to win, and ‘allies’ seem to determine the outcome of the ‘battle’.   
 
‘Says Tipton: "We've dodged the first bullet."’ (Science, 20.02.1998)  
 
‘The comments drew darts from numerous scientists in the audience.’ (Science, 
23.06.2000) 
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‘Tackling the legal and ethical minefield associated with human embryonic stem-cell 
research…..’ (Nature, 8.9. 2005) 
 
‘…he and others suggest that the state would have sufficient ammunition to argue 
convincingly…’ (Nature, 15.1.1998) 
 
‘There is going to be a sort of guerrilla campaign now," says Nigel Cameron of the 
Council for Biotechnology Policy, a conservative think tank in Reston, Virginia.’ 
(Science, 21.6. 2002) 
 
‘The United States and its European allies are once again on a collision course over 
an international agreement.’ (Nature, 7.03.2002) 
 
‘Scientists have worked with advocates for patients…to fight attempts to outlaw 
therapeutic cloning.’ (Nature, 7.11.2002) 
 
‘Missouri scientists who favour human embryonic stem cell research found an 
unlikely political ally… to help kill a bill that would have outlawed somatic cell 
nuclear transfer…that decision made him a hero on the floor..’ (Science, 22.4.2005) 
 
As in any war there are those who lose and those who win. At times, science 
seems to be one of the ‘victims’.  
 
‘The American Society for Cell Biology dubbed it the "Friday Afternoon Massacre."’ 
(Science, 5.3. 2004) 
 
‘The result led both sides of the debate to claim victory, but it will probably not have 
a great impact on research.’ (Nature, 17.3.2005) 
 
‘Stanford University Nobelist Paul Berg warned that Americans' "health is being held 
hostage" by the anticloners.’ (Science, 15.3.2002) 
 
‘When Rivers proposed an amendment to restore the ban to one on the use of cloning 
for ‘creation of a human being’, it was soundly defeated.’ (Nature, 7.8.1997) 
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As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have pointed out, while allowing us to 
comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another, metaphor necessarily hides 
other aspects of it. That stated, the choice of ‘war’ as a concept with which to anchor 
the regulatory arena appears to hinder the consensual nature of public dialogue. 
Interlocutors are more preoccupied with domination rather than appreciating the 
cooperative aspects of public debates. Such a metaphor departs from the Habermasian 
(1999) notion of the public sphere, where agreement is reached on the basis of the 
‘goodness’ of an argument. Rather, conflict is pervasive in social and political life and 
inherent validity does not determine the power of the argument; it is the allies, the 
weapons and the strategies that do so.  
 
Art/Entertainment 
Metaphors relating the public sphere to the concept of arts and entertainment were 
also found in articles covering the latest developments in the regulation of human 
SCNT research. Largely following relevant discussions as they took place in various 
US deliberations at the federal level, public decision making is categorised as a public 
show to which people are protagonists in an attempt to entertain a certain audience. 
Such an anchoring of the public sphere downplays the importance of knowledge 
production and information circulation. Public debates are spectacles with a view to 
produce excitement and surprise. Some examples of relative metaphors include:  
 
‘And although the cast has changed, lawmakers seem to be replaying last year's 
drama, which ended in stalemate.’ (Science, 7.2. 2003) 
 
‘..when two important protagonists in the debate presented strongly conflicting views 
of appropriate rule of cloning.’  (Nature, 24.1.2002) 
 
‘Cloning ban waits in the wings’ (Science, 29.8.1997) 
 
Billig (1996) has pondered extensively on the dramaturgical metaphor and its 
use by social researchers’ theories to account for the public sphere. He notes the 
tendency of the metaphor to underline the notion of actors, roles and scripts. Social 
life is a staged drama, in which, actors enact their roles in the presence of an audience. 
One of the central features of metaphors in this category is that they emphasise the 
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smoothness of public debates. By pointing to social regularities and the coordination 
of script performances, they undermine the importance of conflict found in the 
previous superordinate category. The image of the public actor as a mere follower of 
pre-given rules seems to prevail. This leads to another interesting aspect of the 
metaphors, that of public performance. By familiarising the public sphere in terms of 
art and entertainment, a primacy is given to developments taking place on stage rather 
than backstage. However, as Billig (1996) argues, everything important happens 
backstage, for it is there that scripts and roles are produced. That stated, the 
employment of such metaphors seems to implicitly contrast public life to that of 
science. Public debates are ‘performed’ with a view to excite the audience. The force 
of the argument is to be found in its ability to produce sentiments and arouse feelings. 
Science on the other hand, is not about entertainment nor is it about feelings, but 
rather it is a realm where rigorous and objective processes take place for the 
elaboration of facts. Most evident of such a contrast is the use of relevant metaphors 
by scientists to refer to specific actors in the human SCNT debate and their 
engagement in public communication.  
After the announcement of Dolly’s creation, and throughout the period 
covered, particular scientists, frequently termed by the scientific press studied as 
‘cloners’, monopolised the human SCNT debate both at national, as well as, 
international levels. These include Zavos, Antinori, Seed, and a religious cult, 
Clonaid, all of whom had raised prospects of human reproductive cloning 
experimentation, even claiming success in the creation of human clones. However, 
and until the completion of the present study, all of them had failed to provide 
analogous scientific evidence in support of their alleged successes. It is in reference to 
their research and its media coverage that several metaphors in this category were 
detected. They were used in the context of discussions concerning: a) the scientific 
credentials of the above researchers and their work, b) the risks and ethical dilemmas 
relating to human reproduction and cloning, and c) the dangers posed by such claims 
on the regulation of human therapeutic cloning and stem cells research.  
 
‘The current media circus might be entertaining were it not for the potentially 
destructive consequences for nascent research in human reproduction and 
developmental biomedicine.’ (Science, 17.1. 2003) 
 
 148 
‘This time, it seems likely to have been a bizarre publicity stunt.’ (Nature, 16.1.2003)  
 
 A relevant metaphor was also detected in relation to another ‘actor’, Jeremy 
Rifkin, a well-known anti-biotechnology activist. In response to his accusations, 
expressed at a public forum in Switzerland, against several genetic engineering and 
SCNT researchers of having lost their objectivity at the expense of public good, due 
to their ties with the biotechnology industry, a Bern University biologist was reported 
as saying: 
 
"This is theater, not science." (Science, 23.6.2000) 
 
Such a choice of metaphors with which to anchor other actors in the debate, 
performs a dual role. At a first level, and by categorising them in the sphere of fantasy 
and entertainment, it permits the demarcation between reality and fiction, thus, 
perpetuating the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate scientists. It is the 
commitment to international standard rules of scientific conduct, including the 
provision of sufficient evidence in support of one’s claims and the reverence of 
ethical rules, that becomes a criterion for distinguishing between science and non-
science. Following that, and at a second level, such an anchoring assists in the 
restoration of the public image of the scientists as responsible and accountable to 
public disquiet regarding SCNT research. Driven by an interest in objective truth, and 
in contrast to those motivated by a need to manipulate the public sentiment, legitimate 
scientists emerge as the gatekeepers of ethical and safety standards, as the credited 
spokespeople of nature, as qualified public servants.  
 
Nature 
In the context of public developments, either in the national and international 
regulatory arenas or in the media coverage of SCNT research, a number of metaphors 
familiarising the public sphere to nature and natural phenomena were detected. 
However, how is one to understand nature? As Liakopoulos (2000) also discusses, the 
concept of nature is an arduous subject in itself. Moscovici’s (1977) tripartite 
typology (organic, mechanistic and cybernetic) of the different states of nature and its 
uses across centuries marks a series of changes in its relationship to society. At times, 
nature emerges as a superb entity (mother-nature) detached from any human activity, 
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at other times, nature appears as a resource for the betterment of human kind, while 
still at others, it emerges as its product. Any of the above accounts contains an 
implicit set of values and modes of interaction with nature, whereas all seem to 
prevail in one way or another in contemporary notions and understandings of nature 
(Gervais, 1997). Metaphors under this category seem to favour an almost super-
natural view of nature. The associated images they create, relate to natural phenomena 
such as rain, hurricanes and storms, where human rules do not apply. In this light, the 
public sphere is seen as an unpredictable almost supernatural realm. Public debates 
are natural phenomena beyond the control of the observer. Indeed, in cases where the 
metaphors were directly used by the in-house writers of the two journals studied, they 
could be read almost as weather reports, informing the interested reader, while 
guiding future actions in a prescriptive and cautioning manner.  
 
‘The global storm will continue to gather over human cloning and related stem cell 
research.’ (Science, 3.01.2003) 
 
‘The vote has precipitated a storm of protest.’ (Nature, 17.4.2003) 
 
‘There is also a concern that the tidal wave of the media coverage blurred the 
distinction between therapeutic- which many scientists support-and reproductive 
cloning.’ (Nature, 16.8.2001) 
 
‘The media snowball began rolling after NPR sent out press releases…’ (Science, 
16.1.1998) 
 
‘Indeed, Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), who strongly supports therapeutic cloning, 
further muddied the waters by predicting…’ (Science, 15.03.2002) 
 
The above metaphors illuminate the catastrophic and unpredictable aspects of 
nature. Their choice, out of a possible stock, needs to be accounted for within the 
context of their use and production. In this vein, they seem to favour an image of the 
public sphere as a hostile and capricious environment. Metaphors such as ‘storm’ 
contrast images of light and dark, hope and desperation. Implied also is the concept of 
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distortion. These menacing associations leave the future of SCNT technology vague 
and unclear. 
 
Economy 
The next category contains metaphors derived from the concept of economics. They 
were largely found in articles covering deliberations in the regulation of therapeutic 
cloning, in the form of national laws or international measures considered. Anchoring 
science in the world of business, relevant research emerges as a manufacturing 
product to be sold to customers. Its driving force is money and demand. It is promoted 
by advertising and scientists are portrayed as entrepreneurs trying to find a niche. As 
such, SCNT is associated to its profit-generating aspects, depicting it as a potential 
resource for development. In this light, the public sphere appears, either as a possible 
partner or a hurdle in the realisation of gain. By promoting CNR technology’s 
prospects for profit, science is detached from any moral or ethical code: science is 
only there to be sold.  
 
"It would make us the center of the world" for stem cell research.’ (Science, 
16.01.2004) 
 
‘Now it looks like the Senate may follow suit, thus robbing scientists of a chance to 
pursue a technology that some believe is vital to realize the promise of embryonic 
stem (ES) cell research.’ (Science, 10.08. 2001) 
 
‘..the world’s scientific superpower has so far failed to deliver a satisfactory contract 
between researchers and its citizens at large on this issue.’ (Nature, 23.07.1998) 
 
 
 
Psychopathology 
This set of metaphors was mainly identified in discussions about the birth of Dolly the 
sheep and its subsequent reception by the national and international media, regulators 
and the general public. The public sphere’s reaction to the idea of SCNT as solely a 
technique to produce humans, is undermined as having been reached under states of 
‘shock’ and not that it involved a careful consideration of its actual contribution to 
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scientific knowledge per se. Relevant metaphors were, also, reported in a generally 
alarming context over the potential influence of media and public concerns in the 
regulation of what is seen as useful applications of the technology. Overall, such 
categorisations seem to perform a contrast between science, as the realm of logic, and 
the public sphere, as the realm of emotions.  
 
‘The latest aftershock came on Sunday, 19 October, when the Sunday 
Times....…whether the technologies that have stirred public fears will ever become a 
reality is hard to say ’ (Science, 31.10.1997) 
 
‘And even though animal scientists have been cloning sheep and cattle from embryos 
for a decade, the media went wild over Dolly, the first animal ever cloned from an 
adult cell….But even as the media frenzy continues, researchers say it's still unclear 
how practical cloning of animals, let alone humans, will be.’ (Science, 7.03. 1997) 
 
‘Cloned sheep such as Dolly, who set off the cloning frenzy in 1997 (Science, 7 
March 1997, p. 1415), are impressive scientifically and hold the potential to become 
bioreactors that produce human proteins for medicine’ (Science, 18.08.2000) 
 
‘The announcement last year of the cloning of Dolly the lamb led to an international 
response unprecedented in medical ethics… The wrong issue for a moral panic. If 
there is an area of medical ethics in need of international regulation it is not cloning 
but xenotransplantation…’(Nature, 22.01.1998) 
 
The idea of the public sphere as the sphere of emotionality and abnormality is 
not new. Jovchelovitch (2007) astutely points to how from its birth, Social 
Psychology itself, associated the social with psychopathology, exemplified in the 
name of the first journal of the discipline Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 
From Le Bon to Freud, life in groups has been tied to images of irrationality and 
emotional uncontrollability. Here, metaphors categorise the public sphere as being in 
the reign of neurosis. Lacking the necessary mechanisms to cope with anxiety, people 
fall into states of ‘shock’ and ‘panic’. Thus, a picture of an unthinking, 
psychologically unstable society emerges. Underlying these images is the Cartesian 
dictum ‘I think therefore I am’. However, thought is disentangled from its social and 
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emotive context restricted only in mind and cognition. Thought is logos (λογική) and 
in order for a person to think s/he needs to disengage from the social and also from 
the self. This aspect of the metaphor has important ramifications for public decision-
making. Sanity and insanity become the criteria for participation: only those who can 
think logically are entitled to enter. Indeed, in an article discussing the repercussions 
of the media coverage of two non-reviewed and non-reproduced claims, of having 
created a kidney from a cloned cow embryo and of growing differentiated cells from 
adult stem cells, on the deliberations of a US Senate judiciary committee on SCNT 
research, concerns were raised over both the media’s responsibility in producing 
accurate reporting, as well as, the regulators ability to fully understand and distinguish 
legitimate from illegitimate science: 
 
‘cloning agenda ‘skewed’ by media frenzy...this raises the question, researchers say, 
of whether policy makers know-or want to know- the difference between a claimed 
result and a peer-reviewed scientific finding’ (Nature, 14.02.1997) 
 
Journey 
This next superordinate category of metaphors was detected in the context of articles 
covering regulatory debates over SCNT research in specific countries, as well as, 
international arenas. The associations created under this category classify political 
debates in the concept of journey. The structure of the argument could be identified 
as: (a) argument is a journey, (b) words are vehicles, (c) strategies of argumentation 
are paths, and (c) discussions have destinations. Here, metaphors emphasise the goal 
of the argument, the fact that it must have a beginning and proceed in a linear fashion 
towards an objective (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  
 
‘The [anticloning] regulatory train is coming down the rails…’ (Science 24.04. 
1998) 
 
‘So it would speed through the conference committee.’ (Nature, 9.05.2002) 
 
However, reaching a destination is not always characterised by smoothness. 
Arguments and debates can at times ‘arrive’ at ‘dead ends’ or ‘hit a speed bump’.  
 
 153 
‘Biomedical groups derail fast-track anticloning bill’ (Science, 20.02.1998) 
 
‘Australia's quest for national legislation regulating human embryonic stem cell 
research has hit another speed bump.’ (Science, 6.09.2002) 
 
Images are also created associating public modus operandi with traffic 
regulations.  
 
‘California flashes a green light.’ (Science, 27.9.2002) 
 
‘Parliament gives green light to stem-cell research.’ (Nature, 4.01. 2001) 
 
‘Singapore opens door to stem-cell research.’ (Nature, 9.9.2004) 
 
‘The Korean group…. has got the green light to resume its research.’ (Nature, 
21.01.2005) 
 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have demonstrated the propensity of such 
metaphors to distinguish between the form and the content of an argument. Thus, the 
path corresponds to the form of the argument and the ground covered to its content. In 
arguing, metaphors like ‘going in circles’ indicate that although there is a long path 
not much ground has been covered, signifying that the argument lacks content. By 
categorising public debates as journeys, a purposeful and goal-oriented conception of 
life is entailed (Lakoff, 1993). Things cannot go backwards but only forwards. Seen in 
the context of their use, at times, the metaphors seem to imply a progressive image of 
science. Thus, science is conceived as a moving object that goes forwards. Such a 
classification appears to be in line with most Western ways of thinking about the past. 
What distinguishes the ‘moderns’ from the ‘pre-moderns’ is the ‘invention of 
‘Science’ in Latour’s (1993) terms. In a world constituted on the basis of beliefs in 
progress and development, science seems to be a prerequisite for further 
advancement: 
 
‘Full speed ahead.’ (Science, 7.06.2002) 
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Sports 
The world of sports is the world of games. Games are played among groups of people 
or between individuals. Although fun can be part of the game, the use of sports 
metaphors in the context of political decision-making over human therapeutic SCNT 
technology appears to place more of an emphasis on the bipolar loss-win situation 
associated with sports. Thus, different teams or individuals (pro-therapeutic or anti-
therapeutic cloning groups) compete with each other for the acquisition of a trophy 
(permission or ban of relevant research). Such a categorisation of the public sphere 
throws light on its competitive nature: (a) public life is a game; (b) teams compete 
with each other; and (c) there are winners and losers. Some examples of relative 
metaphors under this category include:  
 
‘He should get credit for appointing a group that has wrestled honestly with the 
issue.’ (Science, 19.07.2002) 
 
‘In its 90-day analytical sprint…’ (Science, 13.06.1997) 
 
‘Back in the race…’ (Nature, 2.06.2005) 
 
‘New players, same debate in congress.’ (Science, 7.02.2003) 
 
‘...amid the media scrum that has surrounded her work...’ (Nature, 26.09.2002) 
 
Billig (1996) has commented on the masculine dimension of the metaphor. 
Traditionally, it is men who wrestle and box. Such a classification of politics as a 
‘men’s thing’ finds its genesis in the context of the Athenian polis, where the 
exclusion of women from public matters was part of the modus operandi, ensuring 
participation only to a privileged minority. Although partial, to fully appreciate the 
importance of the metaphor, Billig also discusses its associative image of the social 
actor. Thus, the social actor is pictured as a follower of a predetermined set of rules. It 
is the rules that render the game possible. Although points of views are pitted against 
each other with the purpose of wining, the rules always remain the same. People argue 
on subjects not on how to argue. According to Billig, such a conceptualisation of the 
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public sphere fails to capture the controversial nature of rules, for they too, under 
certain circumstances, can become the object of an argument. 
  
Cloning 
‘Arthur Caplan, a University of Pennsylvania bioethicist, referred to it as ‘a council 
of clones’…’ (Science, 19.07.2002) 
 
The above extract originates from an article published in a section of the latest news 
in Science in 2002. The article discusses the deliberations of President Bush’s council 
on bioethics. Commenting on the membership and staff of the council, the university 
bioethicist calls it a ‘council of clones’. This metaphor is of profound importance, for 
two reasons. Firstly, it is one of the few occasions where cloning itself becomes the 
paradigmatic source domain to understand public developments. Although the 
appearance of the metaphor is a unique instance, future research may reveal 
analogous classifications. Secondly, it seems to originate from popular understandings 
of cloning, where it has been conceptualised as a way of replicating identical copies 
of a certain prototype undermining individual differentiations. Such an understanding 
of cloning has repeatedly been refuted by scientists themselves, who argue that 
although cloning may in the future succeed in producing identical organisms, 
personalities are not determined solely on the basis of genes.  
  
Chemistry 
‘Created by a 1988 law aimed at making U.S. companies more competitive in global 
markets by funding innovative research with potentially high payoffs, ATP for the last 
decade has been a $1.5 billion political litmus test for whether the government should 
subsidize corporate research.’ (Science, 5.5.2000) 
 
The above metaphor has been used by a Science in-house writer to report, at the time, 
the latest developments over science funding schemes and SCNT research 
governmental grants in the United States. The concept of litmus, a chemical used to 
differentiate between acid and alkali, is used to make sense of regulatory 
developments. While employed to denote the intentions of the government, it is an 
instance of scientific resources utilised to render non-scientific activities familiar.  
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Engineering 
‘Scientists are still struggling over how best to make the distinction clear in the minds 
of the public and politicians between cloning to make babies (bad) and cloning for 
research and developing new treatments (good).’ (Science, 5.07.2002) 
 
Public understanding of SCNT research and its various applications has been at the 
centre of scientific interest ever since the birth of Dolly the sheep. A number of 
articles, as will also be discussed in a later section, covered international scientific 
meetings in which various researchers pondered on the necessity of clarity in terming 
the different applications of SCNT technology, as a sufficient enough reason in 
securing politicians’ and the general public’s support in therapeutic cloning and 
relevant stem cell research. The above metaphor was identified in reportage of a 
similar scientific meeting, where scientists considered the use of a number of possible 
terms with which to distinguish the various uses of SCNT. The article concluded in 
inviting its readers to send analogous propositions directly to the journal. Such a 
metaphor establishes the idea of a unified public mind, the disposition of which 
towards a specific object, and in this case SCNT research and its applications, is 
determined solely on the basis of naming. In light of public disquiet regarding SCNT, 
scientists are established as being a sort of engineer in the face of a technical hurdle 
that has to be fixed by the use of highly sophisticated gear. SCNT is pictured as an 
objectified fact, as a set of equations one needs to learn by heart to make sense of it. 
Moscovici (1984) traces such an understanding of perception in the Cartesian notion 
of an external objective world which humans are to make sense of through processes 
of replication. It is largely based on the image of the human mind as a machine or 
black box that has, for centuries, pervaded socio-psychological understandings of 
human perception. However, more recent relevant research has indicated that the 
understandings and attitudes towards a certain object are not solely determined on the 
basis of its name but rather through a complex and highly creative interplay between 
individual and collective memories, personal and social identities, emotions, values 
and beliefs, to name but a few.  
 
Religion 
‘Can a state on its financial uppers become a mecca for stem cell research?’ 
(Science, 16.01.2004) 
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The above metaphor, used in the context of a report about California’s regulation of 
stem cell research by a Science in-house writer, produces sacred images of science. 
Science is a religion; there are pilgrims and scientific ‘holy places’. Those who 
believe in science will be saved. Such a categorisation has been the subject of intense 
consideration by philosophers and sociologists of science. The secularisation of 
Christianity in the seventeenth century, largely a result of the emergence of the 
European nation-states, marked the descending of religion as the main repository for 
hopes of salvation in the Western world (Fuller, 2000). Based on historical and 
philosophical considerations of the role of systematic knowledge in society, Comte 
was the first to announce science as the new religion of the post-Christian world. He 
was convinced that the natural sciences could replace the institution of the Church as 
a source of authoritative knowledge and political power (ibid, 2000). The 
philosophical debate between science as a doctrine of belief, replacing religion, and 
science as the accumulation of objectivity through successive tests can be seen as an 
exemplification of this tension over the essence of science and its, if any, social 
functions. The associative images of this metaphor seem to favour a dogmatic 
understanding of science overcoming barriers between knowledge, belief, and 
ideology.  
 
History 
‘The Brownback bill ...will drive scientists to countries that are not going back into 
the Dark Ages.’ (Science, 15.03.2002) 
 
‘Politicians have been only ready to make populist condemnations of a practice that 
still remains many years from realisation…what appears at times to be virtually a 
witch-hunt…’ (Nature, 7.8.1997) 
 
‘Driven by ignorance, conservative thinking and fear of the unknown, our political 
leaders have undertaken to make laws that suppress this type of research… I believe 
our country risks being thrown into a dark age of medical research.’ (Nature, 
27.9.2001) 
 
In the above extracts, discussing national and international proposed bans regarding 
human therapeutic SCNT research, science policy is anchored in science’s historical 
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past. The choice of medieval metaphors arouses traumatic memories regarding the 
relationship between science and non-science and especially religion. These were the 
times when Giordano Bruno was burned for supporting the Copernican view of the 
solar system and Galileo was presented with the Inquisition’s torture instruments for 
popularising it (Gregory & Miller, 1998). This was also the world of myth and magic; 
the era of superstition, usually contrasted to the Enlightenment and the proliferation of 
the sciences. Metaphors in this category undermine the ability of the public sphere to 
disassociate from practices of the past constituting an alarm warning in order to avoid 
repeating past mistakes. Once more, the public realm emerges as a menacing place for 
science, where bias and errors reign.  
 
Container 
The following extracts formed part of articles covering the latest, at the time, 
scientific crises, like the BSE scandal, or announcements of the birth of human clones 
and their repercussions on both the public’s trust in SCNT and stem cells researchers 
in particular, as well as, people’s overall confidence in science per se. Accounting for 
science’s pervasive role in the lives of everyday people, and in contrast to past efforts 
that engaged the public solely through educational efforts, the following metaphors 
present a strategy of ‘opening up’. 
 
‘…and above all, be open and publish all advice…these admitted and awkward costs 
of wide and open consultation, and of open admission of uncertainty, are outweighed 
by their trust-promoting benefits.’ (Science, 11.05.2001) 
 
‘We need to engage the public in a more open and honest bidirectional dialogue… 
Science-based regulatory agencies have learned that stakeholder consultation makes 
all the work go better.’ (Science, 14.02.2003) 
 
‘Scientists, too, have a responsibility to open up.. their confidence that an informed 
public is a responsible public is welcome.’ (Nature, 23.10.1997)  
 
Originating from the experience of the human body as a container, bounded and set 
apart from the rest of the world by the surface of the human skin, the above metaphors 
perform analogous categorisations (Lakoff & Johsnon, 1980). Thus, science is 
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anchored as a physical being with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation. This 
is not, however, performed with a view to sustain demarcation but rather as a way to 
transcend existing boundaries and establish novel channels of communication and 
interaction. Such an anchoring permits the re-establishment of public trust in science, 
while sustaining future research. Hellström and Jacob (2000) comment on a recent 
shift from the ‘scientification’ of politics to ‘politicisation’ of science. Whereas in the 
past, scientific knowledge was considered an important resource for public policy, 
public funding of scientific research has placed the social and political utility of 
science under scrutiny. The idea that public spending on science has to be justified, 
entitles society to pose previously unasked questions, like ‘who is entitled to do what, 
to what ends, for whose benefit?’ and so on. As a result, scientists turn into politicians 
- public orators - seeking to refine their rhetorical strategies to ensure public 
legitimation for their actions.  
 
Popular metaphors 
The next and final superordinate category contains metaphors used mainly by anti-
cloning groups and the Church, linking regulatory developments and science to a 
moral and ethics code. The idea of classifying them under the name ‘popular’ is based 
on the findings of prior research by Liakopoulos (2000) on anchors of biotechnology 
in the British press from the 1970s to the 1990s. He identified a set of metaphors, used 
mainly by environmentalists to produce Evangelical images of doom and disaster, 
linking science to the concept of hubris. Scientists are depicted as cunning and 
arrogant creatures, exaggerating their abilities by comparing themselves to God. The 
divinity of human creation as a product of God’s wisdom prevails, where the foetus is 
a living organism and life is sacred; God will take revenge by destroying the sinners. 
Implied is the image of public regulation as a safeguard. Regulators are God’s angels 
with the duty to protect society from scientists’ moral degradation. 
 
‘Opponents in Britain and elsewhere in Europe have called the 19 December vote a 
step down a slippery slope toward human cloning.’ (Science, 5.01.2001) 
 
‘…it will produce “government-sanctioned ‘human fetus farms.’ (Science, 
9.01.2004) 
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‘I fear that if we proceed as we are doing, we will open the floodgates.’ (Science, 
5.01.2001) 
 
 
5.4.3. Classifying and naming about classifying and naming 
Like every newly introduced technology, SCNT research and its human reproductive 
and therapeutic prospects has been associated with both images of prosperity and 
doom, as identified by relevant public opinion and mass media coverage research 
(Durant et al., 1998). The analysis of articles in the two scientific journals reveals an 
interesting instance of another debate, as it took place within the confines of the 
academic media per se. In an attempt to control relevant classificatory processes of 
non-scientists to anchor and make sense of CNR technology, representatives of the 
scientific community were found to be engaged in an almost de-anchoring procedure. 
An integral feature of the procedure involved the choice of the ‘right’ terms and 
‘right’ names for the different human applications of the technology, as well as, the 
destruction of popular metaphors like ‘Brave New World’ and ‘scientists playing 
God’. Discussions over the production and choice of different alternatives with which 
to communicate their doings, point to efforts to de-contextualise human SCNT 
research from the moral and ethical frame in which it was received in the public 
realm, restricting it to technical matters where scientists appear as the sole experts. In 
this way, terms and names produced by rival groups, such as Pro-life and the Church, 
lose in validity and credibility for they are treated as stereotypical misunderstandings 
of scientific research. Some examples of such discussions include:  
 
‘I do not think that anyone has a license to play God.’ (Nature, 3.07.2003) 
 
‘The International Society for Stem cell research is asking its members to use the 
phrase ‘nuclear transfer’ instead of ‘therapeutic cloning’ in future papers and in 
communications with the public and press.’ (Nature, 1.07.2004) 
 
‘Researchers have stopped using the term "therapeutic cloning" to avoid being tarred 
by the widespread criticism of efforts to clone human beings. Instead, they call the 
creation of a cloned embryo solely for research purposes "somatic cell nuclear 
transfer"’ (Science, 15.02.2002) 
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5.4.4. Recapitulating the results of metaphor analysis 
The analysis of metaphors in the two scientific journals studied indicates the 
employment of an amalgam of symbolic resources with which to anchor the public 
perceptions, media coverage and regulation of SCNT technology. Overall, the public 
sphere is incorporated in a rich and highly diversified pre-established network of 14 
superordinate categories. By assigning a name, each category succeeds in categorising 
the public sphere in an already existing set of contents, accentuating some of its 
properties, while hiding others.  
 Thus, the use of ‘war’ and ‘sports’ metaphors in making sense of the 
deliberations between different interest groups, scientists and politicians in public 
decision-making processes over the legal status of the various applications of SCNT 
research, highlights the competitive nature of public life. At times, specific regulators, 
the media or people become the ‘enemy’, whereas at others, they prove to be an 
indispensable ‘ally’ in securing ‘wins’. In this light, action is coordinated towards the 
design of sophisticated strategies for the accumulation of supporters and like-minded 
‘players’ to ensure domination. As a result, other, more cooperative aspects of public 
life are largely left in the background.  
 Categories such as ‘Art/entertainment’, ‘Psychopathology’ and ‘Engineering’ 
seem to cast a set of distinct demarcations. More specifically, the use of ‘Art/ 
Entertainment’ metaphors with which to anchor regulatory arenas and the media 
coverage of other actors in the debate, though pointing to the consensual character of 
public decision-making, present a dual tension. On the one hand, the allocation of 
regulatory processes in the sphere of the arts and entertainment produces a stark 
contrast with the sphere of science. While the production of spectacles with the 
purpose of arousing the world becomes the scope of the former, the latter is 
differentiated as the sphere of objectivity and logos with the intention of explaining 
the world through the production of fact-making claims. On the other hand, these 
same metaphors are also employed to distinguish between real and fake scientists, 
restoring a responsible public image to science, while securing participation in the 
relevant debates to only a handful of legitimate researchers. The employment of 
‘Psychopathology’ metaphors with which to anchor public understanding, media 
coverage and regulation of SCNT technology is another instance of demarcation. The 
engagement of concepts of normality and mental health further accentuates the 
distinction between an emotional public sphere and a logical scientific realm, ensuring 
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decision-making status on the basis of sanity and insanity. Lastly, ‘Engineering’ 
metaphors produce a mechanistic understanding of human perception, treating any 
discrepancies between scientific knowledge and its non-scientific reception as calling 
for rectifying actions.   
 In contrast to the above, a blurring of the boundaries between the public 
sphere and science occurs with metaphors in the categories of ‘Container’, ‘Economy’ 
and ‘Religion’. Traditional demarcations are abandoned, assigning new meanings to 
both science and the public sphere. An opening up takes place, expanding existing 
channels of communication, while establishing novel roles and patterns of interaction 
in a more reflexive tone.   
Categories like ‘History’, ‘Chemistry’, ‘Popular metaphors’ and ‘Cloning’ 
constitute another pool of symbolic resources with which public perceptions, media 
coverage and regulation of SCNT research are anchored. They are but demonstrations 
of the way a group’s common stock of experiences and memory are stimulated to 
make sense of a novel debate. Thus, prior or more recent science related debates, as 
well as, expert forms of knowledge constitute an already familiar context with which 
to appreciate the current public interest in SCNT research. A certain continuation with 
the past is performed, sustaining group identities, while coordinating action.  
Lastly, while ‘Nature’ metaphors highlight the unpredictability of the 
regulatory arena, metaphors in the category of ‘Journey’ perform another 
classification, putting forward more cooperative and purposeful meanings of public 
decision-making. 
Statistical analysis regarding the identification of possible variations in the 
types of superordinate categories used between scientific journals, as well as, among 
different representatives of science did not reveal any significant differences
10
 (see 
Appendix17). However, an investigation on the distribution of the most frequently 
identified superordinate categories between 1997/2001 and 2002/2005 resulted in 
some interesting findings, as shown in Table 5.6.   
 
 
                                                 
10
 Associations between superordinate category/ phase, superordinate 
category/metaphor user and superordinate category/location of arena anchored could 
not be performed due to the small number of frequencies in the cells. 
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Table 5.6 Superordinate categories in scientific journals, 1997-2005 
                             (threshold for inclusion: 5%) 
 
Phase        1997-2001              2002-2005 
 
Frequency (%)¹                              48                                           52 
 
Superordinate category (%)       ‘War’                       48         ‘War’                      66 
                                                       ‘Psychopathology’   17         ‘Journey’                 11  
                                                       ‘Journey’                  17         ‘Nature’                    8 
                                                       ‘Nature’                    10         ‘Arts’                        8 
                                                       ‘Popular metaphors’  8         ‘Popular metaphors’ 7 
                
 
¹ Percentage of metaphors, total n = 230 
 
The employment of ‘Psychopathology’, evident only in the first phase covered 
points to the classification of the initial public, media and policy reactions in the 
realm of emotions. The image of the public sphere as being in the reign of pathology 
and uncontrollability, reveals an early need to identify who is eligible and who is not 
to enter and contribute to the public debate about CNR research. Overall, and largely 
referring to regulatory developments in the U.S (see Table 5.5), there is parity in the 
superordinate categories dominating scientific reporting across the years with images 
of competition coupled by associations, emphasising the consensual character of 
public life. 
 
 
5.5 Arguments in formal communication 
Billig (1996), drawing from the philosophy of sophists, conceptualises the argument 
as a thesis with the purpose of persuasion through criticism of a counter-position. 
Further extending on his view, in the context of the present phenomenon under study 
the choice of an argument about the public sphere is not only conceived as taking a 
stance in relation to it but also as a reproduction of ideas on how the interlocutor, that 
is the public sphere, is perceived to be. Claiming for the need to expand educational 
initiatives or for public accountability are not only two different persuasive ways to 
support one’s opinion but also illuminate two completely different objectifications of 
the public sphere. Thus, argumentation analysis is thought to provide access to 
objectification processes as they take place in a discursive context. Following 
Toulmin’s approach, mostly as a tool enhancing the identification of the argument and 
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its parts, the analysis proceeded in two steps: accounting for the structure of the 
argument and its content and overall argumentative type (see Chapter 4). From a total 
of 461 articles discussing public developments of CNR technology 224 were found to 
contain argumentative parts (110 Nature articles and 114 Science articles). The rest 
were articles mainly of an informative nature, containing news about the latest public 
developments. It should also be stated that each article might contain one or more 
arguments, reflecting the tendency of the scientific press to account for a number of 
different actors and their claims in the debate. Overall the analysis identified 410 
arguments discussing public perceptions, media coverage and the regulation of SCNT 
technology. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 contain information about the different claimants as 
well as the different public arenas for which arguments were expressed. Relative 
results indicate a bifurcation in terms of the voices reported in the scientific press. 
Arguments expressed by the scientific/industrial complex and various regulatory 
actors are overrepresented. In contrast, the argumentation of interest groups is less 
often reported, while there seems to be an overwhelming absence of public opinion 
(media coverage and public perceptions) and related views on public developments on 
CNR research. Taking into account the nature of the scientific press to cover the latest 
developments regarding scientific research and relevant social events as well as their 
character as a forum of further reflection upon them, it could be suggested that 
inclusion of certain points of view is indicative of their perceived legitimation. The 
tendency to confine discussions largely between regulatory and scientific experts 
reveals the propensity of scientific journals to prioritise elite forms of knowledge and 
opinion over others, the importance of which may be considered as less central.  
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Table 5.7 Claimants reported in scientific journals, 1997-2005 
Type of 
actor 
Representatives No of 
arguments 
Total 
Interest 
Groups 
Pro-life antiabortion groups 
Church/ religious groups 
Anti-cloning groups 
Environmental groups 
Patients groups 
Pro-cloning groups 
3 
7 
9 
2 
5 
3 
29 
Journalists In-house writers 59 59 
Regulatory 
Authorities 
Upper House 
Lower House 
Legislature 
Government 
Health agency 
Research funding agency 
Specific member state/ country 
Ethics committee 
Scientific advisory group 
Policy makers (general) 
EU Parliament 
UN Organisations 
Univ. scientist/ ethics committee 
member 
Univ. scientist/ member of scientific 
advisory group 
Government research institution-
ethics committee member 
9 
5 
3 
13 
1 
5 
30 
11 
5 
3 
3 
1 
15 
 
7 
 
 
3 
114 
Media Radio programme 
Media (general) 
1 
1 
2 
Scientists University scientists 
University scientist-scientific 
organisation member 
Scientists in hospital 
Scientists in private lab 
Scientists in government institution 
Scientists in government research  
institution/ scient. org. member 
Scientific organisation 
Scientists in general 
Biotechnology company 
Biotechnology organisation 
92 
 
2 
1 
2 
10 
 
1 
43 
11 
6 
16 
184 
Other Other 22 22 
  Total 410 
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Table 5.8 Public arenas argued for in scientific journals, 1997-2005 
Type of 
actor 
Representatives No of 
Arguments 
Total 
Regulatory 
Authorities 
Upper House 
Lower House 
Legislature 
Government 
Health agency 
Research funding agency 
National patent office 
Industry agency 
Specific member state/ country 
Ethics committee 
Scientific advisory group 
Policy makers (general) 
EU Parliament 
EU Council 
EU Patent office 
UN Organisations 
48 
24 
92 
28 
6 
7 
3 
2 
16 
40 
4 
20 
8 
6 
1 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
339 
Media Media (general) 
Newspapers 
11 
2 
13 
Public 
perceptions 
‘People’ 
People, public (general) 58 58 
  Total 410 
 
 
 
 Table 5.8 offers a schematic depiction of the various arenas constituting the 
focus of argumentation processes. It is apparent that regulatory developments, both at 
the national and international levels monopolise relevant discussions. As was the case 
in metaphor analysis, here too, it seems that although there appears to be a degree of 
differentiation among different regulatory arenas, overall, arguments about the media 
and public perceptions assume a more general standpoint. A comparative analysis 
between the two chronological phases presents an overwhelmingly similar picture in 
terms of frequency of arguments, claimants, and arenas claimed across the years (see 
Appendix 18). Once more, significant differences were detected regarding the 
salience of different national developments. Thus, an initial focus on the state of 
public policies across a variety of different locations was later restricted to regulatory 
activities in the U.S.  
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Table 5.9 Arguments developed in scientific journals, 1997-2005 (threshold for  
              inclusion 5%) 
 
Phase                   1997-2001                                      2002-2005 
 
Frequency (%)¹                               53                     47 
Claimant   (%)                  Scientific/                                     Scientific/ 
     Industrial                                     Industrial 
     Complex               45                    Complex           45 
 
 
     Regulatory                                    Regulatory 
     Authorities             28                   Authorities         28     
 
      In-house                13                 In-house               16 
 
      Interest                                         Interest 
      Groups                    8                   Groups                 6 
 
      Other²                      6                    Other                   5 
 
Public arena claimed (%)           Regulatory                                  Regulatory 
                                                      Authorities            83                  Authorities       83 
 
          ‘People’                  15                  ‘People’             13 
 
Location of claimed arena³ (%)      US                      52                  US                    61 
                                                           International       18                  International     20   
                                                           UK                      13                  Asia                    8 
                                                           Asia                     10                  
                                                          Other Europe          5 
 
¹ Percentage of arguments; total n = 410  
² ‘Other’ and ‘Media’ have been merged for the purposes of analysis 
³ Missing values excluded; total n = 374                                         
 
5.5.1 Structure of argumentation 
In only 35 out of the 410 arguments identified, data, warrants, backings and claims 
were directly expressed in the text. The most frequently missing premises were data 
and backings, while claims were openly reported in all of the cases. In an attempt to 
account for the missing elements, I tried to stay as close as possible to the text, 
deducing inferences on the basis of the reported parts. Given that warrants were 
directly reported in almost one third of the arguments, some of the missing backings 
were easily inferred (see Appendix 7). In cases where there was a danger of imposing 
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my own thoughts and values on the phenomenon of research attempting to account for 
Toulmin’s model, only evident premises were coded.  
According to Govier (1987) missing premises reveal either gaps in the 
deductive reasoning of the argument or universal truths in the particular context in 
which the argument takes place. It would be unrealistic to attempt such an assumption 
in the present context without risking misinterpretation, considering that most of the 
articles containing argumentative parts were of an informative nature, updating 
readers on the latest developments. While presenting news, reportage focused on 
covering the main points of view (claims) of associated actors in a rigorous and 
superficial manner. I would suggest that this is more indicative of the tendency of 
scientific reporting to provide a brief overview of relevant issues in a few paragraphs 
rather than being expressive of taken-for-granted information or any other dimension. 
It should also be noted that arguments expressing the author’s personal opinions in 
editorial and correspondence sections contained all the main argumentative parts. 
However, the absence of any rebuttals in the reported arguments could be seen as 
indicative of their authoritative nature. Table 5.10 gives an overview of the basic 
structure of the arguments analysed.  
 
Table 5.10 Expressed, inferred and missing premises of the 410 arguments 
identified 
 Data  Warrant Backing Claim Rebuttal 
Reported 96 163 47 410 0 
Inferred 12 5 124 0 0 
Missing 302 242 239 0 0 
 
 
5.5.2 Argumentative types 
Having selected all the relative arguments, an attempt was made to typify them 
according to their expressive meanings. Such a classification was also assisted by 
taking into account the overall context of their production, that is, each thesis was 
categorised by a consideration of its counter-thesis. This mode of proceeding resulted 
in the identification of two main types of argumentation: the technocratic (218 
arguments), and the strategic (149 arguments), shortly to be presented. That stated, 43 
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claims contained mainly in articles reporting news were unable to be categorised into 
argumentative types. These were mainly premises claiming lack of clarity in political 
decision-making. The fact that any supporting elements were missing made it difficult 
to assess the overall type of argumentation. A consideration of the context of their 
reporting and possible counter-argumentation also failed to draw any informative 
conclusions. Thus, and in order to do justice to the data, it was preferred to code them 
as ‘not identified’.  
 
5.5.2.1 Technocratic argumentation 
The term ‘technocratic’ has been used to capture the tendency of the arguments under 
this type to prioritise expertise over other forms of knowledge. More specifically, 
scientific knowledge as fact-based and public opinion as emotive and biased are 
demarcated. In this way, science policy is placed in the minds and hands of those who 
have access to ‘true’ facts. A one-linear model of communication between science 
and the public is assumed with people envisaged as the final receptors of a fait- 
accompli.  
 
Claims 
A large portion of the claims under this type of argumentation ponders on the effects 
that science policy has on SCNT research. In a rather alarmist tone, they point to the 
potential of regulation to put what is seen as important research (human therapeutic 
cloning and animal cloning) in jeopardy. In contrast, permissive regulatory 
developments are treated with enthusiasm.  
 
‘The bill would prohibit all researchers in public and private universities and in 
private companies from performing important research’ (Science, 14.03.1999) 
 
‘Outlawing research would set a dangerous precedent’ (Science, 20.02.1998) 
 
‘This bill will stop important research’ (Science, 22.10.2004) 
 
‘The bill proposes draconian measures that could deter legitimate research’ (Nature, 
3.07.1997) 
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‘Such restrictions send a strong signal to the next generation of researchers that 
unfettered and responsible scientific investigation is not welcome in the United States’ 
(Nature, 18.04.2002) 
 
‘The bill as passed could jeopardize broad classes of research such as the growth of 
lines of nerve, liver or kidney cells’ (Nature, 7.08.1997) 
 
‘I think it is a very reasonable bill’ (Science, 8.12.2000) 
 
‘The new law is very reassuring’ (Science, 19.03.2004) 
 
‘It is a huge step forward’ (Nature, 10.03.2005) 
 
 
Accounting for scientific research from an international perspective, other 
claims focus on issues of national competitiveness. Conclusions are drawn over the 
prospect of possible regulatory measures to constrain or reinforce research affecting 
national economies respectively.  
 
‘We are not in a leadership position’ (Nature, 15.01.98) 
 
‘The country is working hard to build up its biotechnology industry and it seems that 
the business will grow in the wake of this legislation’ (Nature, 9.09.2004) 
 
‘The bill would leave the US in a conservative position compared with countries such 
as Britain and South Korea’ (Nature, 2.06.2005) 
 
‘Talent and resources will flow to countries with the most permissive laws’ (Science, 
4.01.2002) 
 
 
‘Political decisions in the United States may carry real penalties for its own scientific 
enterprise’ (Science, 12.03. 2004) 
 
‘Governments around the world must invest significantly in the basic science’ 
(Science, 29.08.2002) 
 171 
Claims are also addressed to regulators proposing alternative SCNT policies. 
Invitations to national and international regulatory bodies are made pointing to the 
need for further reflection before the enactment of bans on relevant research.  
 
‘Deliberate and considerate reflection is needed’ (Nature, 15.01.1998) 
 
‘Ethical consideration is essential, but the character of ethical arguments, and how to 
respond to them, merits reflection’ (Nature, 24.01.2002) 
 
‘A federal ban at this time would be premature’ (Science, 14.03.2003) 
 
‘Human cloning should not be banned’ (Nature, 13.11.1997) 
 
‘Research cloning should not be banned’ (Science, 29.06.2001) 
 
‘Sensitive and flexible guidelines overseen by an interagency regulatory body, 
including the Food and Drug Administration, NIH, and representatives of the general 
public, would be better than legislation.’ (Science, 16.10.1998) 
 
The next set of claims entails a demarcation between scientific and public 
knowledge. The dissemination of scientific facts into the public realm produces 
misunderstandings and arouses negative feelings. Media coverage of science is also 
criticised for failing to objectively account for the facts. In this light, scientific 
expertise is called to remedy the wrongs and educate the ill informed over the ‘true’ 
state of affairs.  
 
‘The prohibition ignores a distinction obvious to most biologists, that between sexual 
and asexual reproduction’ (Science, 01.09.2000) 
 
‘This may be the lowest level of knowledge I've seen for a significant piece of 
legislation’ (Science, 10.08.2001) 
 
‘All of Dolly's other popularizers have misunderstood her importance’ (Science, 
25.02.2000) 
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‘Some of the common fears about cloning are little more than science fiction at 
present’ (Nature, 25.03.1999) 
 
‘Debates over the ethics of such approaches, as well as their potential scientific and 
clinical merit, should be separated from the fantasy currently occupying news 
reports’ (Science, 17.01.2003) 
 
‘Science and scientists would be better served by choosing other words to explain 
advances in developmental biotechnology to the public’ (Nature, 05.07.2001) 
 
‘Members of the public who would like to understand what the debate on human 
cloning is all about should read this book’ (Nature, 22.04.2004) 
 
‘Scientists and those who are interested in the ethical consequences of advances in 
science must strive
 
to point public debate toward what is practical and possible as
 
well as what is plausibly moral’ (Science, 28.11.1997) 
 
‘Federal departments and agencies concerned with science should cooperate in 
seeking out and supporting opportunities to provide
 
information and education to the 
public in the area of genetics
 
and about other developments in the biomedical 
sciences’ (Science, 11.07.1997) 
 
Data 
Data are utterances in the form of evidence that strengthen the claim by constituting a 
‘hard’ base on which conclusions are drawn. They are of an informative nature, 
referring to past or current events or to unproblematic statements. A large part of the 
utterances used to build a solid foundation to the claims made reference to 
developments in the regulatory arena. Some examples include:  
 
‘We believe the danger is very real that research with enormous potential benefits 
may be suppressed’ (Science, 30.05.1997) 
 
‘Public reaction to human cloning failures could hinder research in embryonic stem 
cells for the repair of organs and tissues’ (Science, 30.03.2001) 
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‘Congress is now pondering a bill that would ban research on human cloning, 
subjecting scientists to criminal as well as civil penalties’ (Science, 26.10.2002) 
 
‘Therapeutic cloning might become legal in Singapore’ (Nature, 27.06.2002) 
 
 
Other forms of data provided give information about public opinion in relation 
to SCNT research. The majority of them focus on the ethical concerns surrounding 
relevant research and they are employed in such a way so as to later point to their 
fallacies. The use of statements about public apathy or public misunderstandings as 
data is indicative of their treatment as inherent and permanent characteristics of public 
opinion formation.  
 
‘Apathy about science and technology seems especially rampant among my fellow 
Americans, among whom indifference toward scientific understanding is almost 
considered a badge of honor.’ (Science, 13.03.1998) 
 
‘The appearance of Dolly, the first cloned mammal made from DNA of an adult cell, 
set of a flurry of ethical concern about the pace with which cloning technology could 
be applied to human beings’ (Science, 10.12. 1999) 
 
‘I think people have a tendency to think that scientists in China just push research 
wherever they want it to go’ (Nature, 26.09. 2002) 
 
‘The page-one headlines heralding Dolly’s creation ignited worldwide concerns 
about the potential of this approach for cloning people’ (Science, 7.03.1997) 
 
‘SCNT has inappropriately been lumped into the general category of ‘cloning’ and so 
may be subject to regulation that is aimed mainly at preventing reproductive cloning’ 
(Nature, 24.04.2003) 
 
‘We must accept that democratic debate on cloning is bereft of any meaning’ (Nature, 
5. 07. 2001) 
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‘Enhanced polarization has emerged in the human cloning debate, encouraging a 
reflex response that demands sweeping bans rather than the determined reflection 
that the issue deserves’ (Nature, 15.01.1998) 
 
Evidence is also drawn from the present or past of relevant scientific research. 
References are made to activities by specific scientists, identified as ‘cloners’, in an 
attempt to assess the effects of their doings on public perceptions, media coverage and 
science policy. As would be later exemplified, these kinds of data are largely 
employed with the purpose of defining ‘real’ expertise.  
 
‘Twenty-five years ago, the discovery of techniques for cloning and manipulating 
DNA molecules (the use of recombinant DNA) presented comparable concerns, while 
promising to advance the life and biomedical sciences’ (Science, 16.10.1998) 
 
 
‘Stanford University last week announced the formation of a new, privately funded 
institute to marry research on stem cells and cancer in a search for new therapies’ 
(Science, 20.12.2002) 
 
 
‘Human cloners were invited to speak to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the 
U.S. Senate, and the media’ (Science, 17.01.2001) 
 
 
 
Warrants 
Warrants are explanatory statements in that they explain how things are. Their role is 
to enhance the legitimacy of the data in support of a claim. Warrants used in 
technocratic argumentation can be largely grouped into two broad categories. In the 
first set explanations are of a more internal nature in the sense that they are largely 
drawn from scientific expertise (assuming that the point of reference in technocratic 
argumentation is science). Thus, a majority of them originates from technical 
knowledge with regard to SCNT research. They are presented as ‘factual’ knowledge 
informing about the way things ‘work’ in CNR. Issues of financial growth are also 
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employed linking cloning research to the world of business. SCNT is a way of making 
money. Health and research benefits of associated research are another way of 
asserting the strength of relevant claims. Such explanations dissociate SCNT from the 
ethical and moral context in which it was received in the public realm. Even if there 
are fallacies they are quickly reduced to matters of risk and safety, implying the 
assumption that eventually they will be understood and accounted for by relevant 
scientific research. Examples of such internal explanations include:  
 
‘‘Nuclear transfer’… involves inserting a nucleus from one cell into an egg stripped 
of its own genetic material’ (Nature, 22.04.2004) 
 
‘In scientific parlance, cloning is a broadly used, shorthand term that refers to 
producing a copy of some biological entity--a gene, an organism, a cell--an objective 
that, in many cases, can be achieved by means other than the technique known as 
somatic cell nuclear transfer’ (Science, 15.02.2002) 
 
‘[Because of] current rates of interest’ (Nature, 9.6.2005) 
 
 
‘Research cloning is likely to give insights into the processes that underlie a host of 
debilitating diseases’ (Nature, 9.05.2002) 
 
‘The technique shows promise to overcome the anticipated problem of immune 
rejection in stem cell-based therapies to replace a patient's diseased or damaged 
tissue while offering an unprecedented opportunity to study genetic disorders as they 
unfold during cellular development’ (Science, 15.02.2002) 
 
‘From safety considerations alone, human reproductive cloning is unwarranted 
because animal cloning so far results in high rates of abortions and neonatal losses’ 
(Science, 17.01.2003) 
 
‘The success rate in animals is between 3% and 5%’ (Nature, 5 April 2001) 
 
External explanations refer to statements used to describe the modus operandi 
of public opinion formation and public policy. Technocratic argumentation prioritises 
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explanations of social influence over critical thinking. This is mainly exemplified by a 
tendency to account for public perceptions as mere reproductions of media opinion. 
Certain groups like the Church or the ‘cloners’ are also singled out as agents of public 
influence. People misunderstand because of what they read in the media, because of 
what the Church or the ‘cloners’ claim. In a sense, public opinion reflects the opinion 
of major actors in the debate. Such explanations direct any attempts to account for 
responsibility outside the scientific/industrial complex. Science policy is also 
described as operating under the principles of politicisation. Relevant regulation 
reflects political rather than rational motives.  
 
‘Antinori’s activities will generate public anxiety about cloning’ (Nature 11.04.2002) 
 
‘…after Seeds claims to the media declaring his intention to produce a human baby 
clone…’ (Science, 16. 01.1998) 
 
‘[because] the public is woefully ignorant about genetics’ (Science, 23.05.1997) 
 
‘...to avoid a public debate on the issue in the run-up to next year’s presidential 
elections...’ (Nature, 21.06.2001) 
 
‘It provides an avenue for politically based regulation of research’ (Nature, 
20.03.1997) 
 
‘Advocates of supernatural or spiritual agendas may be trying to railroad 
governments into banning biological research’ (Science, 30.05.1997) 
 
Backings 
According to Toulmin (1958) backings reveal wider beliefs and values shared in a 
large community. Relevant research has indicated that these premises are frequently 
alluded to or left to be assumed by the reader of the argument (Govier, 1987). 
Warrants referring to the economic and research benefits of cloning technology 
appear to imply two different sets of backings. The first set promotes sociobiological 
explanations of science, in the sense that scientific conduct is portrayed as an 
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inherently competitive activity. Different scientific groups compete amongst each 
other over the accumulation of knowledge and professional credibility.  
 
‘We need to conceal the birth of cloned animals until publication in scientific 
journals’ (Nature, 30.07.1998) 
 
The second set of inferred backings draws heavily from economics describing 
science within the context of a capitalist economy. Competition is also stressed here 
but this time involves different stakeholders. Another kind of backings not explicitly 
stated appears to be inferred in warrants discussing the health benefits of CNR 
research. These types of explanations seem to reveal the humanitarian nature of 
science per se. Inherent in them is the idea that an important function of science and 
scientific research is to promote general well being by offering solutions to problems 
devastating humanity.  
Still, others attempt to draw a demarcation between scientific conduct and 
politics revealing a growing unease about the increased politicisation of science. 
Beliefs in scientific freedom and its strictly factual nature are situated here. As was 
the case with warrants, technical knowledge is also employed as a further means to 
differentiate between what is seen as reality and as fantasy.  
 
‘There is a balance between the protection of human rights and scientific freedom’ 
(Nature, 7.08.1997) 
 
‘A federal ban would constitute an unprecedented intrusion of the U.S. government 
into the freedom of scientific inquiry in the United States’ (Science, 14.03.2003) 
  
‘The real cloning technology might only lead to the birth of a unique and 
unpredictable child who had the same DNA sequence as someone else’ (Nature, 
5.07.2001) 
 
‘Even Dolly is not an exact replica of the ewe used to clone her, because she did not 
develop in that ewe's uterus nor receive its genes in the cellular organelles called 
mitochondria’ (Science, 19.12.1997) 
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Normative statements were likewise used to base relevant claims. These were 
utterances referring mainly to ideas on how things should be, and taken together they 
constitute the majority of backings under technocratic argumentation. Overall, they 
assign primacy to expertise knowledge implying the meritocratic assumption that 
science communication and policy should be restricted to those with direct access to 
‘hard’ facts. ‘Right’ knowledge becomes the criterion for the exclusion and inclusion 
of different actors in associated debates. Those who act under the influence of 
emotions or any non-experts are to be prohibited from decision-making for rationality 
is the basis of ‘valid’ opinion. In the same light, specific scientists, namely the 
‘cloners’, are also excluded, for they do not appear to operate within the context of 
scientific rules and standards.  
 
‘Scientific knowledge is essential for all citizens to participate in a full and informed 
fashion in the
 
governance of our complex society’ (Science, 11.07.1997) 
 
‘I believe we will realize that the answers to many of the problems that still confront 
us will need to be solved by scientists and engineers who understand the complexities 
of the societal problems their work impacts’ (Science, 13.03.1998) 
 
‘There is a heavy responsibility [for accuracy] on those who frame the public debate’ 
(Nature, 28.01.1999) 
 
‘Legitimate scientists submit evidence, sufficiently substantial to withstand rigorous 
expert review, to be considered for publication in reputable journals’ (Science, 
17.01.2003) 
 
5.5.2.2 Strategic argumentation 
Several names were considered preceding the final choice of the term ‘strategic’, 
including ‘protective’, ‘social’ and ‘democratic’ argumentation. Although the term 
‘protective’ was thought to reflect some of the most basic features of this type of 
argumentation, it failed to capture the active role assigned to representatives of the 
public realm. The term ‘social’ was considered problematic for it implied yet again a 
‘science versus society’ explanation. Finally, an overview of relevant literature on 
political theory confirmed that the term ‘democracy’ has been used to refer to 
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different regulatory and policy practices across years and countries. Even technocracy 
has been associated with a specific type of democracy, further to be discussed in 
following chapters. The final choice of the term ‘strategic’ was thought to best reflect 
the participatory role assigned to members of the public sphere. In contrast to the 
previous type of argumentation, here people, the media and regulators are given 
voice; voice of a certain weight and status. Thus, instead of being treated as a bad 
caricature of scientific knowledge, public opinion is perceived in the wider context of 
its production. People and the media are portrayed as playing a central role in the 
legitimation of scientific practices, while decision-making is based on the idea of civil 
rights and their protection. Overall, argumentation proceeds in the wider background 
of ethics regarding not only SCNT research but that of science and humanity too.  
 
Claims 
All of the claims made and addressed to regulatory authorities originate from the idea 
of regulation as a gatekeeper of ethical and moral standards. Some of the most 
frequently expressed are calls made to either permit or ban relevant research. In a 
similar manner invitations are made to further reflect on matters at stake or to clarify 
relevant points. In what follows some examples of such claims are presented:  
 
‘We need to enact banning legislation’ (Nature, 15.01.1998) 
 
‘We should ban this technique from being applied on humans’ (Nature, 20.03.1997) 
 
‘This promising line of biomedical research should be permitted to continue, not 
banned by an act of Congress’ (Science, 27.06.2003) 
 
‘So, this is a decision no president should make alone’ (Science, 27.06.1997) 
 
‘We need to proceed carefully’ (Nature, 1.07.1999) 
 
‘An information protection law should be set up, with an authoritative body to oversee 
genetic and embryo research for at the moment the CST is too weak’ (Nature, 
1.04.1999) 
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A different set of claims argues for the effects of science policy on SCNT 
research. Although similar claims are also found in the technocratic type of 
argumentation, these seem to originate mainly from the idea of science as proceeding 
in the service of the greater public good.  
 
‘A sweeping cloning ban would have grave implications for future advances in 
medical research and human healing’ (Science, 10.08.2001) 
 
‘Health is being held hostage’ (Science, 15.03.2002) 
 
 
The last set of claims presented is only evident under this type of 
argumentation. They include conclusions regarding the inability of regulation to 
protect the rights of human life, as well as references to a more participatory model of 
communication with the wider public. As such, calls are addressed to the scientific 
community to engage in public discussion and dialogue, implying the assumption that 
public opinion is valid opinion.  
 
‘Issuing a patent that can be applied to create genetically engineered human embryos 
poses both ethical and legal problems’ (Science, 03.03.2000) 
 
‘The experiment might be used by countries to accelerate research’ (Nature, 
26.05.2005) 
 
‘We need to respect the public’s perspective and concerns even when we do not fully 
share them, and we need to develop a partnership that can respond to them’ (Science, 
14.02. 2003) 
 
‘We should integrate public concern into a viable science policy’ (Nature, 
16.10.1997) 
 
‘We should adopt a more inclusive approach that engages other communities 
assertively discussing the meaning and usefulness of our work. Let’s try diplomacy 
and discussion and see how that goes for a change’ (Science, 11.02.2005) 
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‘More can still be done to engage the public directly in regulating the impacts of 
modern science’ (Nature, 23.01.1997) 
 
‘The purpose is to create a dialog with the larger society’ (Science, 12.09.2003) 
 
 
Data 
Evidence in support of strategic claims is largely similar to those employed in 
technocratic argumentation. Thus, references to regulatory developments and to the 
benefits of SCNT research are also being made. Information about public ethical 
concerns over the use of CNR technology is coupled with the personal concerns of 
claimants in an attempt to account for their authenticity. Examples of scientific 
misconducts relating either to the communication style adopted or to the breaking of 
ethical codes are put forward as well.  
 
‘The president has announced his support for a bill sponsored by Senator Sam 
Brownback (R-KS)’ (Science, 10.05.2005) 
 
‘One country where human cloning is in principal legal is the US’ (Nature, 
23.07.1998) 
 
‘Cloning research for therapeutic purposes has potential to treat diseases’ (Science, 
29.07.1999) 
 
‘Some members of the public are finding certain lines of scientific research and their 
outcomes disquieting, like therapeutic or research cloning and stem cell research. 
Although many understand the benefits of the research they are also troubled about 
scientists working so close to what they see as the essence and origins of human life’ 
(Science, 11.02.2005) 
 
‘We would regard cloning a human being as an unethical and reprehensible act’ 
(Nature, 25.09.1997) 
 
‘Human cloning raises ethical and moral issues that go well beyond questions of 
safety.’ (Science, 4.12.1998) 
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‘The suggestion made by some that cloned human embryos will provide otherwise 
unobtainable cells for disease research misleads the public.’ (Nature, 22.05.2003) 
 
‘Widely publicized examples of scientific dishonesty like the Schön case, or 
unacceptable scientific practice, like the Lomborg affair or repeated unverified claims 
of human cloning.’ (Science, 14.02.2003) 
 
 
Warrants 
A large part of the explanatory statements offered to further support data in strategic 
argumentation reflect ethical worries and questions regarding SCNT research. 
Scientific practice is put under scrutiny. At the same time, warrants referring to the 
benefits of CNR are largely expressed in the context of public health and healing.  
 
‘The cloning of human beings is not socially acceptable’ (Nature, 3.07.1997) 
 
‘The fundamental genetic material in every person is the common heritage of 
humanity and shall not give rise to financial gains’ (Science, 21.11.1997) 
 
‘New technology is always followed by controversial issues, bringing forth new 
concerns requiring new solutions’ (Science, 27.04. 2001) 
 
‘This kind of research could have tremendous value for people’ (Nature, 20.03.1997) 
 
‘Therapeutic cloning’s objective is information that might be useful in developing 
therapies for genetic defects in brain chemistry’ (Science, 10.05.2002) 
 
The next set of warrants draws a completely different picture of public opinion and 
science policy compared to those used in technocratic types of arguing. Statements 
point to the importance of public representatives in the conduct of scientific practices. 
Here, people are given a role: they are stakeholders in the form of patients, funders, 
and voters; also they are a means in recognising scientific work. References to public 
trust and its importance in legitimasing relevant practices are also made. If the public 
loses trust in science, scientists lose their job.  
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 ‘Indeed, the one million Americans who suffer from Parkinson's disease would 
undoubtedly feel more affronted if these advances had not taken place’ (Science, 
16.04.2004) 
 
‘There is a need to protect the safety of patients and the public health’ (Nature, 
22.01.1998) 
 
‘This ban prevents taxpayer funding from bizarre experiments such as cloning’ 
(Nature, 12.11.1998) 
 
‘This is a necessary tension to ensure the long-term quality of the publicly funded 
research enterprise’ (Nature, 22.05.2003) 
 
‘Science-based regulatory agencies have learned that stakeholder consultation makes 
all the work going better’ (Science, 14.02. 2003) 
 
‘We find it is often the flaws that inspire non-science students to want to know more 
about the current scientific research, the future possibilities and the responsibilities 
that come with them’ (Nature, 16.09.2004) 
 
‘In highlighting the research, the press is responding to a sensitivity that its readers 
already have’ (Science, 31.10.1997) 
 
‘Public trust is crucial to science’ (Science, 15.11.2002) 
 
‘Because if we don’t handle this right the public will lose trust in science’ (Science, 
19.03.1999) 
 
‘Trust is created through a complex of social interactions’ (Nature, 16.10.1997) 
 
 
Backings 
Some of the supporting premises in strategic argumentation are left unexpressed. To a 
large extent these refer to backings articulating science’s humanitarian motives. 
Implied in the warrants used to exemplify the benefits of SCNT technology is the 
inherent view that scientists are acting in the service of the greater good. Another set 
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of backings points to the pragmatism of public opinion, while ethical considerations 
of the technology and of science in general, are also included. 
 
‘Ontological arguments do not distinguish between ordinary embryos and embryos 
that have been cloned’ (Nature, 05.02.1998) 
 
‘To assume that viewer’s don’t understand that movies distort science in the same 
way that they distort historical events is somewhat patronizing’ (Nature, 16.09.2004) 
 
 
Beliefs in protective democracy constitute the majority of backings in strategic 
argumentation. The idea that science policy serves with a view to protect individual 
rights and general standards is largely employed. Public accountability as an integral 
feature of scientific conduct is also taken into account, further enhancing the role of 
people as an important resource in the development of scientific research.  
 
 
‘As science encroaches more closely on heavily value-laden issues, members of the 
public are claiming a stronger role in both regulation of science and the shaping of 
its research agenda’ (Science, 11.02.2005) 
 
‘The centrality of science to modern life bestows an obligation on the scientific 
community to develop different and closer links with people’ (Science, 14.02.2003) 
 
‘The intent is not to limit commercial applications stemming from the Human Genome 
Project, but to ensure that knowledge about the genome remains in the public 
domain’ (Science, 21.11.1997) 
 
‘Our citizens will never forgive us’ (Science,25.07.1997) 
 
5.5.3 Recapitulating the results of argumentation analysis 
Analysis of the arguments employed in formal discussions about the public 
developments of SCNT technology has concluded in the identification of two main 
argumentative types. Technocratic argumentation could be largely characterised as the 
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rhetoric of logos. At the heart of argumentation lies a strong belief in the superiority 
of expert knowledge. A set of criteria is drawn, demarcating right from invalid 
opinion. Right opinion is characterised by the acquisition of technical knowledge and 
skills, rationality and objectivity. In contrast, emotionality and intellectual incapacity 
render non-technical opinions dubious. The rhetorical effect of such a means of 
argumentation is that of exclusion (reported also in studies by Michael & Birke, 
1994a; 1994b) where participation in decision-making about the future of CNR 
technology is restricted to a small minority of experts and all other actors are not 
permitted to enter the debate.  
Strategic argumentation seems to follow a different logic, that of ethos. 
Evident here are references to the moral obligations of science to society, the 
responsibility of policy to serve and protect citizens, as well as the identification of 
the validity of the ethical concerns characterising much of public reaction to SCNT 
technology. This type of argumentation, while informing the reader of the claimant’s 
character and moral credentials, opens up the debate to other, non-scientific parties. It 
is a rhetoric of inclusion, inviting the voices of stakeholders, such as patients, voters, 
interest groups and funders, to contribute to the debate alongside more 
technoscientific opinions.  
A comparative analysis between the two time frames covered, as well as 
between Science and Nature failed to reveal any significant shifts and alterations (see 
Appendix 18). However, considerable differentiations were detected regarding the 
argumentation type adopted by different claimants, as well as in relation to various 
countries.  
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                 Figure 5.2 Argumentation type by claimant 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 5.2, a large majority of the arguments employed by the 
scientific/industrial complex falls into the technocratic type. Such a rhetorical style 
permits scientists and industrialists to differentiate themselves from other claimants in 
the debate, assuming a superior status. By presenting themselves as the sole holders of 
true knowledge they succeed in undermining both public opinion and opposing views. 
This enables them to preserve a certain degree of freedom in their doings, while 
framing the debate around issues they can control. Overall, theirs could be 
characterised as a defensive strategy with the purpose of maintaining professional 
ideology and symbolic and technical resources. When strategic argumentation is 
employed it is mainly performed as a way to reconstruct the agents’ public image. 
Claims to public accountability and references to the moral obligation of science and 
regulation to protect individual rights and ethics codes permit scientists to build an 
alternative icon to the image of ‘mad scientists’, namely a ‘humanitarian’ one. Such a 
rhetorical style restores public trust in expert knowledge and its holders. 
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Along the same lines, regulators also make use of technocratic patterns of 
argumentation as a way to control and preserve their decision-making role, while 
ensuring national competitiveness on the international map of techno-scientific 
progress. The more frequent use of strategic argumentation comes mainly as a 
reflection of politicians’ needs to certify their support of their constituencies and their 
potential re-election. Interest groups’ argumentation develops overwhelmingly within 
a strategic frame. Aligning themselves to wider concerns and reservations, mainly 
regarding the potential applications of SCNT technology on humans, they succeed in 
identifying themselves as representatives of a significant part of public opinion. Such 
a rhetorical style legitimises their role and actions in the CNR debate, while ensuring 
their participation in those to come.  
Possible discrepancies between the argumentation types adopted by the 
different representatives of scientific institutions were also considered. The results are 
presented in Figure 5.3 and they appear to be in-line with the findings of previous 
research by Rabino (1994). Thus, scientists working in private laboratories and 
representatives of the biotechnology industry seem to rely largely on technocratic 
arguments, holding more degrading images of public actors compared to their 
academic fellows. Since most of the claimants come from the United States and 
taking into account the permissive regulatory framework in which private research 
operated in the period analysed, the need to address non-scientific matters seems less 
obvious. An analysis of the rhetoric style of natural and social scientists was also 
conducted, however, it did not reveal any considerable differentiations.  
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               Figure 5.3 Argumentation type by scientific institution 
 
 
Accounting for locations and the argumentative type employed in reference to 
different national and international public arenas, an interesting amalgam was 
detected, as shown in Figure 5.4. At a national level, the U.K stands out since the 
proportion of strategic argumentation far outweighs that of technocratic. This is 
thought to be in-line with recent shifts and discussions in the country regarding the 
wider relationship between science and non-science and more participatory models of 
decision-making, a point considered fully in the final chapter. In contrast, technocratic 
argumentation dominates claims relating to US public developments, reflecting the 
need of the scientific/industrial complex to preserve control in an unclear regulatory 
environment. Arguments referring to other locations present an almost dichotomised 
picture with technocratic and strategic argumentation used interchangeably.  
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    Figure 5.4 Argumentation type by location of public arena 
 
 
 
5.6 The public sphere in scientific journals 
The analysis of scientific journals regarding the coverage of the public developments 
of SCNT technology is thought to further enhance, both methodologically and 
interpretatively, the elaboration of the material collected from interviews with 
individual scientists. Thus, it proved to be a useful guide informing me about major 
research and public events as they occurred worldwide, while at the same time, 
assisting in the identification and crystallisation of relevant actors and experts. It also 
revealed the ‘news value’ of science policy and its institutionalisation in the scientific 
press in the form of regular spaces, as well as, the prioritisation of US developments 
regarding SCNT and stem cell technology. However, such an analysis is thought to 
illuminate emergent, circulating and communicated representations of the general 
relationship between science and non-science as covered in the field of formal 
communication. One can evidence not only how these wider representations are 
engaged but also how they are actually employed in the process of a specific type of 
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research in the making to legitimise itself as a Science; in Latour’s terms, as a reified 
form of knowledge. That stated, the coverage does not merely give an informative 
account of public perceptions, media coverage, and the regulation of CNR technology 
but by drawing from such diverse sources as technical knowledge, ideology and 
popular beliefs, it also puts forward specific theories and visions of democracy, public 
opinion, public dialogue, communication, even nature. The data discussed in the 
present chapter reveal a sort of tension in the network of metaphors and 
argumentations comprising the representational activity in formal settings of 
interaction. Figure 5.5 schematically captures such meanings. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Meanings of science and the public sphere in Nature and  
Science 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
On the one hand, there is a demarcation between science and non-science. 
Logic explains the scientific, while pathos the non-scientific. Such a disassociation 
permits the legitimation of scientific knowledge as superior. Disentangled from the 
irrationality of the social, science no longer faces the threat of being thus polluted. 
Science is about facts and scientists are the only credited spokespeople on nature. On 
the other hand, there is a degree of identification with the non-scientific where a more 
human picture of science prevails. Science is about people; it is a tool at their disposal 
in order for them to tackle dangers and problems that may be threatening the human 
race. What feeds science is the ethos of service to the wider good. Such a re-
association distinguishes between good and bad science, while it legitimises the 
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importance of the former by the preservation of investment in time, money and 
personnel.  
In an analysis of a variety of UK and US popular media outlets (including 
films, television dramas and drama-documentaries, as well as, the press) covering 
human SCNT research and its potential reproductive and therapeutic applications, 
Haran et al. (2008) reveal similar tendencies in relevant representations of public 
perceptions. On the one hand, and largely composed of a mixture of agential subjects, 
rational deliberators and advocates for cures and enhancement, the public emerges as 
a somewhat ‘unbiased’ subject, becoming the new arbiter of objectivity. They are the 
people in whose name cloning comes to be a scientific practice for future generations. 
On the other hand, there is the ‘bad’ public, harbouring irrational, science-fictional 
and misinformed understandings. These are the people that need to be approached and 
educated. And while participation in science policy is granted to the former, the latter 
are dismissed as ‘outsiders’. 
Public sphere meanings in Nature and Science are not treated as mere 
distributions or reflections of individual representations existing in isolation but rather 
as the ‘bubble’, according to Moscovici, of a certain elite community. At the same 
time as informing, they also transform, in this way creating a sense of belonging to a 
wider scientific community, whilst sustaining communication through the 
transgression of physical and time boundaries. The section that follows is thought to 
shed further light on the experience of being a scientist in such hotly debated research, 
allowing for the identification of the way individual researchers themselves play out 
the relationship with the non-scientific, nature and the self.  
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Chapter 6 
The public sphere according to stem cell researchers in informal 
communication 
 
Drawing from their own study on the social representations of biotechnology in 
different publics, Bauer and Gaskell (1999) offer a paradigm for research extending 
similar scholarship. Attempting to account for the complexities and richness of the 
different phenomena under study, they propose the elaboration of methodological 
pluralism. They discuss different modes and mediums of analysis covering 
behaviours, individual cognitions and different settings of communication by 
participant observation, individual and group interviews, and mass media 
documentation respectively. Triangulation then becomes a central objective for the 
social representations researcher, and as discussed in the methodology section of the 
present thesis, assists in capturing different aspects, elements, and processes of the 
object under study. Having presented metaphors and different types of argumentation 
in articles of two scientific journals discussing public developments on SCNT 
research, the purpose of this chapter is to present data from individual interviews with 
different experts in this technology. In their seminal paper, Bauer and Gaskell (1999) 
conceptualise individual interviews as a way of accessing social representations 
existing at the level of the person. While this remains undoubtedly true, I would also 
point to the communicative character of the interview situation, further elaborating on 
this in the final section of the present chapter. The interview situation is not only an 
instance of examination of thoughts as they exist in the mind of the individual but also 
a moment of informal communication between two people. As such, although 
retaining a disinterested attitude, in the sense that I tried to hold myself back from any 
immediate or direct intervention in the procedure other than that of nodding or further 
exploring a given statement, I could not help but notice those moments of genuine 
interest and curiosity by the interviewees expressed in enquiries about my motives in 
doing this research, my personal thoughts, my ethnicity, my religion and academic 
background. These moments further enlightened my understanding of the experience 
of working in a controversial field of research, while assisting in the interpretation of 
the data collected. In the following pages, I set to account for the metaphors and 
arguments employed by interviewees when discussing about public perceptions, mass 
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media coverage and the regulation of their doings. In the following chapter and 
coming from a more synthetic perspective the social representations of the public 
sphere among experts will be fully examined.  
 
6.1 Talking to scientists  
The period under study was an interesting time to talk to scientists about SCNT and 
its applications on human embryonic stem cell research. While the debate over the 
regulation of CNR was still unsettled in countries like the U.S, and although in others 
such as Germany and Switzerland this type of research was illegal, the U.K was 
amongst the first to grant licenses allowing it to proceed (August 2004). This was a 
time of reflection, both of individual as well as collective activities, by the wider 
scientific community. Thus, discussions over the sequence of events following the 
birth of Dolly were coupled with explanations, opinions and ideas over the status of 
public opinion, contemporary science policy, media effects and democracy, while 
accounting for one’s personal values and feelings regarding the ethical dimensions of 
the public debate. All the interviews started by prompting descriptions of the 
participant’s research and possible experiences in science communication practices. 
Most of them happily agreed to confide to me their thoughts and opinions about 
public perceptions, media coverage and the regulation of human SCNT research. My 
role was then mainly to listen and to invite further elaboration. It was left to the 
interviewee to raise the themes that she/he considered important for discussion. An 
interesting pattern soon emerged. Public perceptions and media coverage of their 
research was what mostly preoccupied the interviewees’ discussions. References to 
regulation were brief and overall positive, most of the times brought up at the end of 
the interview prompted by my questions. This absence in their discourses is thought to 
reflect an unproblematic, taken-for-granted trust in the perceived ability of the UK 
regulatory arena to frame relevant policies in a pro-scientific manner. It was this 
permissive context that motivated seven of the interviewees to abandon their home 
countries and settle in Britain. Some of them had been at the forefront of intense 
criticism by ethicists, Pro-life, religious groups, including media and policy 
representatives for crossing the boundaries between the ‘natural’ and the ‘unnatural’ 
as well as being criticized for destroying human life. The psychological bearing of 
such public unease was evident in their discourses. This unexpected condition 
permitted for the investigation of possible differences between UK and non-UK 
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scientists. An extensive account of the metaphors and the arguments employed 
follows. While typification is attempted, the chapter ends with a consideration of the 
variations as they were identified. In doing so, the presentation of the results of the 
discourse analysis in formal and informal communication settings is concluded, 
leading to the final part of the thesis, the synthesis.  
 
6.2 Metaphors and arguments of scientists 
6.2.1 Metaphors 
Relevant analysis of interview data identified 402 metaphors used by interviewees to 
categorise the public sphere, that is, public perceptions, media coverage and the 
regulation of human SCNT research. Identification of superordinate categories 
followed the same criteria applied in formal communication. Thus, metaphors were 
classified based on similarities between source domain and target domain, while 
taking into account the discursive context. Overall, 12 superordinate categories were 
identified: Conduit, Container, Economy, Engineering, Entertainment, Human Nature, 
Journey, Psychopathology, Parenthood, Popular metaphors, Statistics and War. Seven 
of the superordinate categories also appeared in relevant articles of Science and 
Nature, presenting a certain degree of parity with regard to categorisation. These are 
the categories of Container, Economy, Engineering, Entertainment, Journey, 
Psychopathology, Popular metaphors, and War. Following, a presentation of the main 
associations of each superordinate category will be given, including some examples of 
relevant metaphors. Again, the order of the presentation does not denote their 
frequency. The four categories specific to the context of informal communication will 
be described first, followed by the subsequent eight discussed in a more epigrammatic 
manner to avoid unnecessary repetition.  
 
Conduit metaphor 
Metaphors in this category involve the figurative assertion that language transfers 
human thoughts and feelings. More specifically, the structure of the metaphor could 
be roughly described as: (1) ideas or meanings are objects, (2) linguistic expressions 
constitute containers, and (3) communication is related to transportation (Wagner & 
Hayes, 2005).  
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‘…the idea that stem cell research is one thing and nuclear transfer is another aspect 
of that thing has not been put across.’ (Senior university stem biologist, male, 2) 
 
‘…the scientists can then sort of put forward to the public reasonably how maybe the 
benefits of what they do.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 5) 
 
‘I think they have been informed at a superficial level maybe, which is probably 
understandable because it is the easiest thing to get across.’ (Junior government 
research institution geneticist, female, 11) 
 
‘The BBC documentaries that they do, where they kind of set them in the future and 
things like that, they are quite clever but they get the message across.’ (Junior 
government research institution geneticist, female, 9) 
 
In this context the media becomes the vehicle for communicating messages 
and information to wider public realms. The idea of balance in the dissemination of 
information assumes great importance.  
 
‘It is important because it [the media] is a vehicle, it is an effective vehicle, arguably 
it is the vehicle to communicate to the public’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, 
male, 16) 
 
‘How else can you transfer information to the public without it being, in one 
channel?’ (Junior university geneticist, male, 17) 
 
‘I think if you have the public deciding you need to give them balanced information 
because often the information they get is from people who appear in the media and 
those people most of the time are not interested in presenting the scientific facts.’ 
(Senior, university embryologist, female, 8) 
 
‘But obviously people are interested to hear about it, people do not have necessarily 
all the background that is needed to understand that in detail but I think it can still be 
made accessible and simplified and that is important.’ (Junior government research 
institution geneticist, female, 11) 
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 According to Reddy (1979), the conduit metaphor is one of the most dominant 
used in the English language, comprising almost seventy per cent of the entire 
metalingual apparatus. It imposes the assumption of an external, intersubjective 
reality where thoughts are seen as ‘lamps’ or ‘tables’ (Reddy, 1979). Communication 
is treated as an automatic process of replication and no effort is required for it to be 
successful. Ideas and concepts are simply transferred from one person to the other. 
Even where there is an interruption in communication and an effort is needed to be 
made, the metaphor localises this expenditure almost entirely on the speaker or the 
writer (ibid, 1979). It is up to the speaker to put enough meaning in the words or to 
put the meaning in the right place. The role of the listener or the reader is trivialised. 
That is, the metaphor completely ignores the ability of the human mind to think, 
process, and reconstruct meanings in a creative and flexible manner. Instead, it 
encourages the idea that the more signals we create, the more ideas we ‘transfer’ and 
‘store’. 
 In the context of the present interview material, the metaphor invites the 
assumption of an outside, objective world to which scientists have the only access. It 
is their duty to ‘transfer’ relevant information to people and the popular media seem 
to play a key role. By focusing on the centrality of the speaker or writer, 
communication is placed in the hands of scientists. It is scientists who should control 
what is to be disseminated. According to Bucchi (2002), the idea that scientific 
concepts need to be transported from a specialist context to a popular one originates in 
the professional ideology of both scientists and scientific journalists. On the one hand, 
scientists can distance themselves from the process of communication and thus 
become free to criticise possible errors, while on the other hand, journalists legitimise 
their professional role as mediators. Such a categorisation enables scientists 
simultaneously not only to be in charge of information dissemination but also be the 
rectifiers of any possible wrong doings. 
  
Human Nature 
This next set of metaphors categorises public opinion formation in the domain of 
human nature, offering a biologistic explanation on the way public and media 
representations of SCNT are formed and transformed. Thus, people are organisms 
programmed by their very nature to function in certain, predictable ways. There is a 
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continuation between generations, and inheritance plays a crucial role in sustaining 
beliefs and values.  
 
‘…but the reason everything was stopped was on the basis of publicity and the kind of 
media nature, rather than a careful analytical overview of what happened.’ (Senior 
university stem cell biologist, male, 2) 
 
‘I think part of it though is just human nature. There is nothing new about the Dolly 
reaction and the cloning reaction, it has been seen before; heart transplants, that is 
exactly the same. Series of reactions, first of all sort of ‘gut’ reactions, ‘the yuk’ 
factor and of course nowadays is a routine  ’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, 
male, 15)  
 
‘I think minimally people should be relying on different sources for their information, 
they should not get all of their world perspective from Sky News. Ok…..I dare say 
perhaps a problem with humanity as a whole; we tend not to digest information and 
come up with, make up our own minds what we tend to do, and you are the sociologist 
not me, but I would say what we tend to do is inherit the vision of the world that our 
parents had; and never really do much to upgrade that in light of new experiences.’ 
(Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 16)  
 
‘I think it is part of our inheritance, about belief. You don’t want to change – once 
you’ve got a belief, you don’t want to change it too quickly.’ (Senior university 
embryologist, male, 18) 
   
 There is a dual importance in such a categorisation. On the one hand, it 
appears to produce an image of the social actor close to Durkheim’s (1898/1996) 
concepts of life in the collective. Memory and the past hold an authoritative status 
providing the basic means for explaining and understanding new concepts and 
phenomena. In this vein, resistance to novelty is what explains the world. On the other 
hand, it permits researchers to account for bias as inherent in human nature. People 
have a tendency to exaggerate leading to distortions and misconceptions; this 
inevitability legitimises the superiority of science and scientists’ logic and motives.  
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Parenthood 
In the next superordinate category, the concept of parenthood becomes the source 
domain explaining public and media perceptions of human SCNT research. (1) People 
are children, (2) Experts are adults, and (3) Knowledge is food. Some examples of 
relevant metaphors include:  
 
‘We should try to feed information to the public from a very young age – it has a 
huge impact, you know.’ (Junior university geneticist, male, 17) 
 
 ‘...they [journalists] swallow any ridiculous story without checking it.’ (Senior 
university geneticist, male, 1) 
 
 The concept of childhood as a developmental stage leading to adulthood has 
invited debates over the status of the child in relation to adults. For some, the idea of 
treating children in the same way as adults is unthinkable, whereas for others, it 
should be the norm (Lliaudet, 1998). The metaphors above support an understanding 
of children as uncritical, instinctively driven creatures. Children would swallow and 
eat anything to ease their hunger. Such a categorisation of public opinion produces a 
tension between the image of people as children and that of scientists as adults. In this 
light, the paternalistic attitude of scientists emerges as a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the survival of people in the grownups’ complex world.  
 
Statistics  
The use of concepts from the discipline of public opinion measuring, produces a 
statistical representation. Employed in their discussions are references to ‘population’, 
‘levels’, ‘peaks’ , ‘majority’ and ‘minority’; terms usually encountered in statistical 
reports about the public understanding of science. The image of public opinion 
promoted is that of an aggregation of individual points of views. Glynn et al. (1999), 
discuss this as the most common definition of public opinion in contemporary 
politics, which serves to justify the use of surveys and polls as a means to measure it. 
Such an assessment enables researchers to engage in complex causal analysis making 
general claims about the entire population. A mathematical and quantitative approach 
is assumed while it resonates with the structure of popular election, which is the basis 
for a democratic process.  
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‘…they [journalists] have an important role but I think they also contribute to what I 
have just described as these peaks and valleys of interest.’ (Senior university stem 
cell biologist, male, 16) 
 
‘…but their level of knowledge is nowhere near as good as we think it is as scientists 
and actually where it should be; I think it should be logarithmically better to what it 
is.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 5) 
 
‘I do not think that the public perception of the different issues here is, I think it is a 
very low level because of the way it has been portrayed…’ (Senior university stem 
cell biologist, male, 2) 
 
‘I think you have to have the support of the general population.’ (Senior university 
stem cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘…but there is a tendency on the part of, possibly a majority of the public, certainly a 
large minority…’ (Senior, university stem cell biologist, male, 15) 
 
‘But it has to be what is acceptable to the population.’ (Junior, research government 
institution geneticist, female, 12) 
 
Container 
This next set of metaphors presents an interesting amalgam of concepts like body, 
community, fence, building, and language with which to categorise the various 
relationships between science and the public sphere. Instead of treating them 
separately, it was best thought to group them under the superordinate category of 
‘container’ for the way they were used by the interviewees, as well as the associative 
images they produce present an ‘in-out’ orientation.  
Thus the use of certain physical metaphors creates the impression of a natural 
boundary performing a demarcation between the scientific and the public sphere. 
Some examples include: 
 
‘Maybe it is the scientists’ job; they should be getting out there...’ (Junior government 
research institution biologist, male, 10) 
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‘…so import the knowledge but make it convenient as well…’ (Junior government 
research institution geneticist, female, 11) 
 
‘…you do not want outside influences…’ (Junior government research institution 
geneticist, female, 11) 
 
Scientists are also pictured as a body of people working towards the realisation 
of common goals. These metaphors create a sense of belonging to a united 
community, which is assigned a strong, concordant identity.  
 
‘And again I think the scientific community; there are some really powerful 
spokespeople…’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘I socialise more with scientists than non-scientists to be honest…’ (Junior 
government research institution geneticist, female, 12) 
 
‘I do not want to say scientists, I don’t mean it on an individual basis, but I mean it as 
a body…’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 2) 
 
The demarcation between the scientific and the public world is further 
accentuated through the conceptualisation of a tension between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’ language. 
 
‘…it is the sort of grammar of science rather than the vocabulary of science; but as a 
scientist you get soaked in this grammar.’ (Senior university geneticist, male,1) 
 
Yet at the same time, and in accordance with the analysis of formal 
communication data, these same metaphors are also employed to transcend existing 
boundaries establishing new connections with the public sphere while securing 
legitimacy for individual actions.  
 
‘...we do not want them to think that we are doing something behind doors. So 
everything is open.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 7) 
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‘Our research is about being open and staying open.’ (Junior university stem cell 
biologist, female, 13) 
 
‘I am speaking from both sides of the fence…’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 
5) 
 
‘They [journalists] do not try to explain science in a lay language to the public.’ 
(Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 2) 
 
Economy 
Metaphors under this category present scientific research as a business opportunity 
de-contextualising it from any moral or ethical reference. An entrepreneur ethic 
prevails where it is all about money and client satisfaction. Competition amongst 
rivals invites for the identification of leaders and losers. Implied can also be found the 
assumption of knowledge as money. The more one knows, the richer she/he is.  
 
 ‘…sometimes it is business we are doing…’ (Junior university stem cell biologist, 
male, 4)  
 
 
‘…to try to find your niche somewhere were you can develop…’ (Senior university 
stem cell biologist, male, 2) 
 
‘…if people were not going to buy this particular treatment then there is no point in 
really going down that route.’ (Junior university stem cell biologist, female, 13) 
 
‘…so we are really, we are selling them the promise of this, and I firmly agree with 
that..’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘In general I would say that the public’s understanding of science is pretty poor.’ 
(Senior university embryologist, male, 18) 
 
‘It is becoming a political issue, it was a political issue in the American presidential 
race last autumn, when you look at what all of the States in America are doing in 
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terms of competing against one another to raise money…’ (Senior university stem 
cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘It is right, which has meant that the U.K is one of the leaders in this field and 
certainly the regulatory system in the U.K is admired all over the world and has been 
copied now by many other countries; we have the first National Stem Cell Bank and 
there are centres in Sweden, U.S, Singapore, China…’ (Senior university biologist, 
female, 4) 
 
Entertainment 
Associations of the public sphere to the realm of entertainment and spectacle are once 
again encountered, this time in the context of informal communication with experts.  
 
‘I get very frustrated watching TV science programmes, even the so-called good ones 
because it is all very theatrical, you know, great rising scheme of orchestras in the 
background when the guy makes a bold statement…’ (Senior university stem cell 
biologist, male, 15) 
 
‘It [Newspaper coverage] is about sexing it up!’(Senior university stem cell biologist, 
female, 14) 
 
‘You get sensationalism because actually science is very boring. So that probably 
promotes the cloning embryos bit. It is, as a phrase, because it captures the readers’ 
imagination…’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 2) 
 
Journey 
The superordinate category of journey is also identified in the metaphors anchoring 
the public sphere in the interviewees’ discussions. This purposeful and progressive 
image of science creates associations of promise over the future of humankind while 
portraying society as a follower.  
 
‘…trying to stop the progress of science is as if trying to stop a flood coming through 
a dike, it is going to come through; it is going up and all you can do is to try and 
slow it down a bit.’ (Senior university geneticist, male, 1) 
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‘People’s attitudes follow science.’ (Senior university geneticist, male, 1) 
 
‘You would have to be continually updated in those things, so it is behind, it is very 
difficult for the HFEA to probably see this…’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, 
male, 2) 
 
‘It has got no choice, science can only go forward, it cannot go backwards, you 
know, it has one gear which is forwards.’ (Senior university geneticist, male, 1) 
 
Engineering 
The associations created under this category classify the human mind within the 
concept of machinery. Human cognition is about replication, in the same way that 
computers work. Once more, scientists are portrayed as engineers fixing the damage.  
 
‘Genetics, it hits all the buttons which the public likes.’ (Senior university geneticist, 
male, 1) 
 
‘They may have heard the arguments a number of times but it does not always 
register in the right boxes.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 5) 
 
‘I suppose I am not really a big fan of social engineering. I think that all that you can 
do is provide the facts as dispassionately as possible and let people get on with it.’ 
(Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 15) 
 
Psychopathology 
The poles between normality and abnormality, health and illness, constitute the pool 
of metaphors to be found in this fifth category. Here, a demarcation is drawn between 
those who are entitled to enter the debate surrounding human SCNT and those who 
are not. Sanity and insanity become the criteria for participation. Scientists picture 
themselves as normal people, engaged in normal activities, while the doings of 
competing interest groups are demonised. The structure of the metaphor is as such: (1) 
there is health and illness in the world; (2) there are healthy people and ill people; and 
(3) science and scientists are healthy.  Examples here are: 
 
 204 
‘I think the media at the moment is really fixated on stem cells.’ (Senior university 
stem cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘…it is just like the headings and things they put in the newspapers, they are always 
there to shock rather than to give the facts.’ (Junior government research institution 
geneticist, female, 9) 
 
‘They [Zavos and Antinori] are just psychos really…’ (Junior government research 
institution geneticist, female, 12) 
 
An important element of these metaphors is the idea of stigma and the 
stigmatisation of science as rupturing ethical and moral norms. A type of rectification 
is performed by the interviewees to associate science to normality and identify 
scientists as a group of normal people.  
 
‘I think most scientists are normal people, they have their families and they like to 
work within a framework set up by the public; they do not like to be seen as doing 
unethical work.’ (Senior university embryologist, female, 8) 
 
‘I have a number of friends in the U.S who will not do human embryonic stem cell 
research even if they can, even if they have government money. They do not want this 
stigma that is associated with doing it in the U.S.’ (Senior university stem cell 
biologist, male, 6) 
 
War 
As has already been discussed in the presentation of formal communication data, the 
categorisation of public legitimation processes of scientists’ individual actions in the 
source domain of war promotes the image of a ‘battle’ among different interest 
groups. At times, certain arenas of the public sphere become the ‘enemy’. At others, 
though, they form an indispensable ally for securing wider support. 
 
‘…but you are fighting against a lot of images from movies and things, they work on 
their own and do what they want.’ (Junior government research institute geneticist, 
female, 12) 
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‘If you have an important law to debate coming up, your worst enemy is somebody 
just not voting or not turning up...so if you lose the public, you have lost it all, .’ 
(Senior university embryologist, male, 5) 
 
 ‘I am much more interested in defending why we use human embryos to create cells 
for therapy… I think the U.K is kind of unique, in a sense that we have the HFEA 
authority regulating embryo research for almost 15 years now and I think the 
government was very pressing to win, they decided to push ahead with this by 
basically putting stem cells onto their back and the HFEA an already existing 
regulatory body....’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘On the other hand, while you are doing this, for instance in Germany, you could be 
declared as a killer so it is a much nicer feeling when you know that you have 
somebody behind you, and that is the public. And that is the most important thing.’ 
(Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 7) 
 
Popular metaphors 
In private discussions, experts are also involved in a process of de-anchoring by trying 
to disassociate their doings from the dominant images of the ‘Brave New World’, 
‘Armies of Hitlers’, or the ‘Playing God’ metaphors, largely employed in public talks 
and debates about human SCNT research. In an attempt to nullify them, scientists are 
pointing to their fallacies. This de-classification process seems to contribute further to 
the establishment of images discussed above, like the ‘normality’ of scientists and the 
economic and progressive potential of science, as other, alternative ways to categorise 
human CNR technology.  
 
‘The American public does not have a clue as to what is going on and they think that 
the idea of cloning is to create Hitlers.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 
6) 
 
‘Because the media portray scientists as mad; that image can be negative and it is not 
true.’ (Senior university embryologist, female, 8) 
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‘So when people say ‘scientists play God’ – you see they’ve got it wrong. It is parents 
who play God.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 18) 
 
 
6.2.2 Arguments: Structure and argumentative types 
Analysis of argumentative parts proceeded in the same logic adopted for that in 
formal settings of communication. Thus, a first reading of each interview material was 
performed allowing for the identification of different arguments and their premises 
(Appendix 12). While accounting for the structure of each argument, and based on the 
overall context of the discussion and what was generally said, I also tried to account 
for missing premises. This was done mainly as a way to further illuminate the 
argument and its expressive meanings. Most of interviewees’ discourses were centred 
around basic claims and warrants with the intent of offering explanations on their 
stated thesis. Examples, in the form of data, were also given whereas backings were 
largely left unspoken. While trying to infer those missing backings, I soon realised 
that it was there that one could find all of those beliefs, norms and values taken for 
granted, which provide the backbone of the overall argument. It was this attempt, as 
well as a consideration of the arguments in the scientific journals that enabled me to 
finally group them all into argumentative types. Overall, 363 different arguments 
were detected. Table 6.1 offers a presentation of their structure. The authoritative 
nature of scientific argumentation is exemplified by the restricted use of rebuttals. 
Technocratic and strategic forms of argumentation were once again met, presenting a 
degree of continuation of discourses from the written to the spoken, from the informal 
to the formal and vice versa.  
 
 
Table 6.1 Expressed, inferred and missing elements of 363 arguments identified 
 Data  Warrant Backing Claim Rebuttal 
Expressed 210 340 189 358 2 
Inferred 0 17 157 4  
Missing 153 6 17 1  
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6.2.2.1 Technocratic argumentation 
As in scientific journals, technocratic argumentation comes as a reminder of the 
superiority of expert knowledge. A split between the commonsensical and the 
scientific is performed contrasting logic to emotionality and passions. Public 
perceptions are criticised for a lack in the understanding of human SCNT and its 
different applications, the media are accused of misreporting, while the bureaucratic 
nature of regulation is seen as a hurdle to the advancement of research. Following, a 
presentation of the main premises of this type of argumentation is given and for the 
most part, I leave it to the interviewees in their own words to express thoughts and 
opinions, further bringing life to the text. Of the 363 arguments, 281 were identified 
to fall into this type.  
 
Claims 
The conclusive parts of technocratic argumentation can be classified into three main 
types. The first set of claims gives emphasis to the propensity for the non-scientist to 
resort to stereotypical understandings of human CNR. Scientists question the ability 
of people to comprehend: (1) the technical procedure of human SCNT research; (2) 
the distinction between the different applications of SCNT research; (3) the 
distinction between science and ethics; (4) the distinction between ‘lies’ and ‘truth’; 
and (5) the scientists’ genuine interest in finding cures for diseases. Instead, the public 
sphere is the sphere of irrationality and exaggeration. Media accounts sensationalise 
and in so doing provide distorted representations of the technology. In the same 
context, scientific unease is detected, not only reflecting dissatisfaction regarding the 
political scrutiny of science at large but also its invasion in everyday scientific 
practices, in the form of paperwork.  
 
‘The basis of it is not understood; what is done to a cell it is not understood, or let’s 
say why it would be so difficult to clone humans it is not understood.’ (Junior 
Government research institution geneticist, female, 11) 
 
‘So, the concept of cloning, of reproductive cloning, was in people’s mind as a 
fanciful future science fiction thing, really very different from the reality and I think 
that was what made it different from most new scientific advances.’ (Senior university 
biologist, female, 4) 
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‘I think that most people think that we are just going to clone humans to make copies 
of each other rather than the actual stem cell advantage of cloning.’ (Junior 
government research institution geneticist, female, 9) 
 
‘I think it [media coverage] has been completely over the top.’ (Senior University 
stem cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘Yet when you listen to these programmes and you listen to, let’s say, stories about 
cloning, it always seems like it is so much closer like next year or something we will 
have a human clone that is born and I do not think that it is necessarily factual or 
realistic.’ (Junior government research institution geneticist, female, 11) 
 
‘So certainly almost in every story you read, if you are intimately involved in this 
work, are errors.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 15) 
 
‘We can persuade ourselves that we are being logical and objective but what all of 
these committees are doing is allowing science to step one step away rather than one 
step ahead.’ (Senior university biologist, male, 1) 
 
‘So why should you have to report differently, why should you have to report twice as 
frequently for stem cell, that is driven by all the wrong reasons?’ (Senior university 
stem cell biologist, male, 2) 
 
The second type of claims relates to a bifurcation in the discussions of 
scientists regarding the ‘goodies’ and the ‘baddies’. While overwhelmingly claiming 
the inability of the people to follow scientific knowledge, certain distinctions are 
drawn based largely on the continuum of UK-non-UK and expert-non-expert. 
Foreigners come in the form of the distant other, the alien, providing a useful 
benchmark for relevant comparisons. The UK public is viewed as more supportive of 
other publics giving a competitive advantage to national research. Generally, there is a 
celebration of British pragmatism, arousing feelings of national pride and hope over 
the future of their respective field. Similarly, scientific training renders specific media 
outlets, like popular science journalism, different from the masses. Those who know 
understand better.  
 209 
‘I think the support in this country has been fairly substantial.’ (Senior university 
stem cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘If you speak only about UK journalists they understand very well.’ (Senior university 
stem cell biologist, male, 7) 
 
‘I think people will turn to it for a number of applications.’ (Junior university 
geneticist, male, 17) 
 
‘I guess I do have a sense that people are more accepting of these technologies than 
they were when they first came into the public prominence.’ (Senior university stem 
cell researcher, male, 15) 
 
 
‘So we are very lucky and we are ahead, so we have a good vision.’ (Senior university 
stem cell biologist, female, 14) 
 
 
‘And it is in my mind much better to work in a country like the U.K or Canada, which 
is probably like the U.K kind of example, than work in a country like the U.S where 
the guidelines are much stricter and yet if you are in a private company you can do 
whatever you want.’ (Junior government research institution geneticist, female, 11) 
 
The final set of claims relates to the mode of relation with non-scientists. 
Some of the claims focus on the personal experiences of the interviewees and others 
are more normative in nature, suggestive of possible science communication 
strategies. On the one hand, a certain degree of alienation is sensed. In their accounts 
interviewees report dissociation from non-experts, unable to cope with questions and 
queries perceived to fall outside what they term as scientific and rational. 
Misunderstandings and prejudices are hard to overcome. If there is a need to 
communicate this should be done with caution and careful examination of the 
interlocutor’s motives. 
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‘So I think that is a problem and I think that is one reason why a lot of scientists 
either don’t want to or can’t get involved with public discussions of science. They find 
themselves being asked questions which are not scientific.’ (Senior university 
geneticist, male, 1) 
 
‘It probably makes scientists work more separately from the general public rather 
than trying to engage them’ (Junior government research institution biologist, male 
10) 
 
‘I don’t think I have much impact.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 18) 
 
‘There are now a couple of people whom I will not talk to at all.’ (Senior university 
stem cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘You have to be very careful about who you speak to and how you speak to them and 
how things get released, and why is someone asking the questions, what do they 
want?’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 2) 
 
 
On the other hand, scientists reflect on their activities to approach the lay 
public, the media and the regulators. Such a desire originates from a need to rectify 
mistakes and to set the ‘true’ state of affairs. Educating non-scientists is seen as one of 
their primary duties, for it is them and only them who have acquired the right 
knowledge. Such an overemphasis on expert knowledge turns the discussion into an 
identification of insiders and outsiders. Lacking the basic technical understanding of 
SCNT, non-scientists are excluded from direct decision-making. It is only those who 
are truly in-the-know that are to decide the future for any given technoscience. 
Furthermore, other competing voices, like the Church or Pro-life groups, are 
diminished to the level of being deviant as they produce unnecessary fear and tension.  
 
 ‘We spend a lot of time talking to the public. Tonight I am involved in a debate at the 
X. We give a large number of talks to charities. I speak at public events at the X; I 
have given public events up in X at C.’ (Senior university stem cell researcher, male, 
6) 
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 ‘Maybe the scientific community should also be aware of that and when they speak to 
people in the media to really try and make an effort, try and keep some control’ 
(Junior government research institution, female, 11) 
 
‘Well they [regulators] need to definitely be more involved with the scientists. They 
should really listen to what the scientists are saying.’ (Junior university geneticist, 
male, 17) 
 
‘I think the media should open up the stem cell technology area. Try to categorise 
each type of technology.’ (Junior university geneticist, male, 17) 
 
‘People may not necessarily agree with all aspects of the legislation governing 
reproductive technologies but the fact remains that it is preferable to a referendum.’ 
(Senior university stem cell researcher, male, 16) 
 
‘I just think it would be better to have people that you actually explain to them 
properly rather than trying to get across to the whole population and then let them 
decide.’ (Junior government research institution geneticist, female, 12) 
 
‘You can’t make scientific decisions based on popular prejudices. It does not work 
that way.’ (Senior university geneticist, male, 1) 
 
‘I think the public can be consulted or explained [to], but the public don’t decide what 
science should be done.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 18) 
 
‘…[religious groups] are probably never going to change their minds.’ (Senior 
university stem cell researcher, male, 15) 
 
 
Data 
Some of the evidence used to support the above claims is drawn from the common 
history of the scientific community. These are references made to prior debates about 
the interplay between ethics and science and to a large part they form individual 
memories of human embryo research, organ transplantation and animal 
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experimentation. Here, it is the past that explains the present, supporting the 
assumption that similar ethical issues have been dealt with before; that CNR adds 
nothing new, and as was the case in the past the use of SCNT as a source for human 
embryonic stem cells will become common practice.  
 
‘It is the same with IVF; IVF is always in the newspapers, no matter how you sort of 
see it; it is always there and has been between the years.’ (Senior university 
embryologist, male, 5) 
 
‘In a way, heart transplantation was similar’ (Senior university biologist, female, 4) 
 
‘I think that it will end up becoming like the animal testing and things like that and 
there would be protestors all outside. I can see it happening.’ (Junior government 
research institution geneticist, female, 9) 
 
‘One thing I always remember, [the] huge shock about telomeres about five years ago, 
where you could tell how old you were going to be when you died from telomeres; 
which you can’t. And that shock must have lasted about two weeks and then the public 
got bored and moved to something new.’ (Senior university biologist, male, 1) 
 
Other evidence originates from the interviewees’ concrete and personal 
experiences. Either drawn from formal settings of communication (public speeches, 
exhibitions, debate, TV programmes) or from more informal encounters (friends and 
family), they are used as a solid base to support one’s claims.  
 
‘Obviously I have seen some shows on TV that generally discuss technologies like this, 
like embryo technologies. So, I mean I guess that is the only experience I have.’ 
(Junior government research institution geneticist, female, 11) 
 
‘The other day in the pub we were talking about cloning and they were like ‘wow, 
wouldn’t it be great if you can do this SCNT and clone a whole football team!’  And 
then we would have the best football team in the world!’ (Junior government research 
institution geneticist, female, 9) 
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‘The one thing that is quite interesting is that we participated in this cloning show 
that was on the BBC.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘We published a paper last year and it had one of those press releases, so I worked on 
the press release with other people.’ (Junior government research institution, male, 
10) 
 
‘I remember when I was doing a talk in X, there were a couple of people in the 
audience that were quite happy to have clones of themselves that they can keep 
somewhere for spare parts.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 15) 
 
 
Still others are drawn from present and contemporary developments relevant 
to CNR research. These are examples that refer to specific actors, like foreigners and 
activities in non-UK countries or specific groups of scientists, like the ‘cloners’, also 
found in relevant argumentation in scientific journals. References are also made to the 
ethical concerns people have about the human applications of SCNT, while previous 
claims, usually regarding the public’s lack of understanding of the technology, appear 
once more to support proposed modes of communication.  
 
‘So when there was the big referendum in Switzerland, it was about transgenic 
animals, and my friend pointed out to me, that they won in the long-run.’ (Senior 
university embryologist, male, 18) 
 
‘If you crossed the Atlantic that would be a mega problem because they do not have 
regulations in that respect.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 7) 
 
‘Until a couple of years ago the other way to get on the news was to put out a press 
release; that is what all of these ‘cloning people’ did.’ (Senior university biologist, 
male, 1) 
 
‘I think you get quite a lot of strong views and they tend to be really quite predictable 
views ‘the embryo, you should not do research on the embryo and destroy it. How do 
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we know it is not a slippery slope argument?’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 
5) 
 
‘I think people worry about it being used in humans.’ (Junior government research 
institution geneticist, female, 12) 
 
‘Now the concern has always been with cloning and stem cells; that there might be 
some abuse that would then have such a negative effect on the whole field.’ (Senior 
university stem cell researcher, male, 16) 
 
 
‘People think this is routine. People think that the occasional wrong scientist makes 
the moral decisions in cloning.’ (Junior university stem cell researcher, male, 3) 
 
‘Using the word ‘cloning’ some people are thinking that we are cloning human 
beings. That is nonsense, we are trying to understand diseases and this is the message 
we want to pass to the public.’ (Senior stem cell researcher, male, 7) 
 
 
 
 
 
Warrants 
Explanations offered by the interviewees form a rich spectrum. Many of them derive 
from personal theories and ideas on the process of public opinion formation. By and 
large, common perceptions about SCNT technology and its applications are 
considered inauthentic. Lacking the ability to think critically, people rely on media 
reports and representations of the technology. Thus, media opinion becomes public 
opinion placing reproduction in a central position. Certain groups of people, such as 
the ‘cloners’ are also seen as contributing to misconceptions. As a result, the prospect 
of direct public involvement in decision-making processes is received with scepticism 
and unease. 
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‘Because the majority of the people who are familiar with the word ‘cloning’ watch 
bad movies from Hollywood; that is a stupidity.’ (Senior university stem cells 
biologist, male, 7) 
 
‘Medics will blindly go out and say stem cell therapy is round the corner; gene 
therapy was round the corner 20 years ago and it still is.’ (Senior university 
geneticist, male, 1) 
 
‘The public tends to believe what the media tells them.’ (Junior university stem cell 
biologist, male, 3) 
 
‘The only thing they do is to read an article or watch a TV programme and this is the 
way they form their opinions about cloning.’ (Senior university embryologist, female, 
8) 
 
‘I think that the coverage of the media is always difficult because that is all that the 
public knows. So, what they read in the news…’ (Junior government research 
institution geneticist, female, 9) 
 
‘I do not think they really worry about these things too much, it is just what they hear 
about in the media.’ (Junior government research institution geneticist, female, 12) 
 
‘…because referendums, elections  put a lot of power into the hands of people who do 
not have time to think about the issues and therefore are more likely to be swayed by 
the loudest voice, the flashiest logo or sales pitch.’ (Senior university stem cell 
researcher, male, 16) 
 
‘But I do have a concern, if you let the public decide on whether it’s right or wrong, 
you basically let the media decide what’s right or wrong. Because the media tells the 
public what is right and wrong, and by and large, the public will believe what the 
media says.’ (Junior university geneticist, male, 17) 
 
‘And I guess there is always going to be an irresponsible element of the press that are 
going to try to twist stories to their advantage.’ (Senior stem cell biologist, male, 15) 
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‘For a long time there were all of the Antinoris in this world and Zavos standing up 
and saying ‘we have done this and that.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 5) 
 
‘There have been reports of clones being around but nothing has been confirmed but 
that also put a lot of fear in people.’ (Junior university stem cell biologist, female, 12) 
 
Other explanations are derived from notions regarding the nature and the 
modus operandi of the public sphere. What explains public perceptions about CNR is 
emotionality. This undermines the validity of public opinion, which contrasted to 
scientific rigour and thoroughness, seems instinctive and irrational.  
 
 
‘I think people get very emotional about embryo research. ‘Is it a human?’; ‘are you 
hurting somebody?’; or ‘what is happening?’, and they are driven emotionally rather 
than, really, logically.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 5) 
 
‘It is probably easier to just sort of say ‘oh it sounds like a bad thing’ rather than 
think about it more. It is easier to say ‘no’ rather than think about it.’ (Junior 
government research institution biologist, male, 10) 
 
‘So I think quite often it would just be based on people’s instant reactions rather than 
any sort of thought process perhaps.’ (Junior university stem cell biologist, female, 
12) 
 
A degree of apathy and disinterest is also detected in the public realm. People 
do not care and even if they do so there is not enough time to think. The complexity 
of life is such that deprives them from engaging in any real consideration of the issues 
at stake. Religious beliefs present an additional hurdle extinguishing any possibilities 
to appreciate the true nature and use of SCNT research.  
 
‘I think that most people do not really like science at school; they are not very 
interested. The only thing that they have to do with science after they have left school 
is through the media’ (Junior government research institution geneticist, female, 9) 
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‘Some people also do not want to see the distinction. Some people are very, very 
strong-minded against it and no matter what we say they will still be against it.’ 
(Junior university stem cell biologist, female, 13) 
 
‘There are many other things in life; such as pay the mortgage, so, there are other 
things you have to think about in your life ...’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 
5) 
 
A vicious cycle then is detected. The unthinking people drive the unthinking 
media who drive the unthinking regulators and the other way around. Errors, scandals, 
lies and sensationalism acquire almost contagious properties. This way of politicising 
scientific research further alarms its representatives. Science is about facts, truth and 
hard thinking. 
 
‘You want to be distinctive; you want to be interesting to your reader; you want to be 
provocative to make your reader think; you want to engage the reader.’ (Senior 
university stem cell biologist, male, 2) 
 
‘…Because that is a more interesting story than just telling the truth…’ (Junior 
government research institution geneticist, female, 9) 
 
‘So that tells you something about the press; they are not often really interested in the 
story; they just want something either funny or catchy that they can interest their 
readers with.’ (Senior university stem cell researcher, male, 15) 
 
‘Everyone likes a good story, a good scandal, or something like that.’ (Junior 
university geneticist, male, 17) 
  
‘It is not slow because they take time to think about it; it is slow because they are just 
not processing those quickly enough.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 5) 
 
‘It certainly can be restrictive because you can only make amendments to the license 
once every 12 months, so if you ever wanted to do some other tiny project, then you 
can’t’ (Junior university stem cell biologist, female, 13) 
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‘I think again, there have been drivers there, that have been political and media 
driven and defensive for those reasons and not driven by science, [nor] proper 
regulation and safety and making sure things don’t profit. It has been driven mainly 
by the political aspects.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 2) 
 
‘If you talk about the regulators, they are somewhat controlled by the public anyway.’ 
(Junior university geneticist, male, 17) 
 
‘Stem cells and cloning seem to become more and more politicised all the time.’ 
(Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
However, it is not only because emotionality, irrationality and lack of critical 
thinking reign in the public realm. The complexity of CNR is such that only a true and 
genuine knower could ever appreciate its full potential. Drawing from a large pool of 
technical knowledge and expertise, interviewees emphasise the various benefits of the 
technology. Naming and the use of words such as cloning, appears once again as in 
the scientific journals, to account for the misconceptions. Trapped in the unfortunate 
associations that wording creates, people fail to distinguish between reality and 
fiction. 
 
‘… you need thousands of eggs and you need women that are going to be able,[and] 
who are going to be willing to carry these eggs and go through these pregnancies and 
have these children that would be abnormal or won’t be able to be born to be able to 
make that feasible.’ (Junior government research institution geneticist, female, 11) 
 
‘If you are talking about cloning you have never been asked ‘what is this problem 
with lack of imprinting, when you make a cloned embryo?’ (Senior university 
geneticist, male, 1) 
 
‘People understand that you cannot clone human beings but lots of different animals 
and species have been cloned and it is not simple; and they had to do lots of trials so 
you do oocytes and the chromatin; you grow it, fertilise it and implant it into the 
womb and you get a clone, no problem with that. For therapeutic cloning, which is a 
wrong name, all that happens is that instead of implanting you let it grow and take the 
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cells from the inner cell mass and this will be embryonic stem cells.’ (Senior 
university stem cell biologist, female, 14) 
 
‘You are taking a cell, you are taking a nucleus, manipulating cells in the nucleus, 
you are not cloning embryos in the same way as the image of cloning that there is a 
potential for life there.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 2) 
 
‘It’s quite complicated stuff, and you’re not just concerned with reproductive cloning, 
you’re also concerned with making stem cells.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 
18) 
 
‘…I think scientifically it is a fairly complex issue.’ (Senior university stem cell 
biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘The idea of nuclear transfer just conjures up the idea of cloning which is the creation 
of identical individual, identical things. It has nothing really to do with that in terms 
of its exploitation, potential therapeutic exploitation, drug screening exploitation.’ 
(Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 2) 
 
‘The fact that we are dealing with cells, the fact that we are very likely in the future to 
obtain enough from cloning that one day we can apply that knowledge to adult cells 
and change their fate without ever having to involve an egg makes people start to 
think about it.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 16) 
 
‘It is a valuable tool and people should not be scared of it. Once the technology is 
developed I am sure that everybody would want to use it anyway.’ (Junior government 
research institution geneticist, female, 9) 
 
‘A scientific journalist is generally quite well trained.’ (Senior university 
embryologist, male, 5) 
 
‘Because they [science journalists) understand the science and they’re good.’ (Senior 
university embryologist, male, 18) 
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Backings 
Three distinct kinds of backings were evident in technocratic argumentation. First are 
explanations about the nature of the public sphere. By resorting to biological 
conceptualisations of humane, the inevitability of public irrationality and naiveté is 
further enforced. Deficit understandings of the type ‘the more one knows about it, the 
more one loves it’ are evident here as well. Ideas are also presented about the 
operating principles of the media. Economic explanations and capitalistic motives are 
put forward. The media are there to make money and since scandals interest their 
audience, exaggeration becomes the norm.  
 
 ‘…what is unacceptable today will be acceptable tomorrow; [this] is a matter of 
simple human psychology.’ (Senior, university geneticist, male, 1) 
 
‘I think part of it though is just human nature.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, 
male, 15) 
 
‘It is inherent in human nature.’ (Senior, university embryologist, female, 8) 
 
‘…I think if you do not disclose what you are doing, people do not know what you are 
doing. Therefore, they are not as educated and probably they cannot make  their own 
opinions about  it and often they tend to perhaps go towards the more negative side as 
opposed to a positive just because of the fact that they do not know.’ (Junior 
university stem cell biologist, female, 13) 
 
 
‘…I think that people who have watched it and understand what is happening, think 
‘well, there is no problem with it’ (Junior government research institution geneticist, 
female, 9) 
 
‘There are clearly a lot of well informed, well-educated, thoughtful people who have 
spent a lot of time thinking about it and have come to the view that controlled 
applications of these technologies are in general a useful and appropriate thing.’ 
(Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 15) 
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‘They want to make money so they publish the stories that they know people will want 
to buy the paper to read. That is just the way it works.’ (Junior university stem cell 
biologist, female, 13) 
 
 
The second type of backings originates from interviewees’ inherent beliefs 
about the nature of scientific research per se. In contrast to popular notions, one of 
science’s main priorities is not to transgress ethical boundaries but to really improve 
human life. Scientists should be trusted, for their motives are humanitarian. 
References to scientific freedom are also made. Thus, a disassociation from any moral 
context is made. Science is about giving answers to questions regarding the natural 
phenomena around us, and the way they work; and as such it is neutral. The laws of 
the politic cannot be applied here. Scientists’ personal motives are also discussed. 
Excitement, professional recognition, and legitimation are all seen as irreducible parts 
of scientific conduct.  
 
‘I would like people to also understand that science is about excitement and 
discovery.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male 15) 
 
‘If there are samples that are going to be destroyed for other reasons, let us work with 
them, trust us that we will be responsible and there should not be any fear for the 
greater good.’ (Junior university stem cell biologist, female, 13) 
 
 ‘I want the debate in this country to be about science and less about politics.’ (Senior 
university stem cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘My line on that particular question is that science will tell you the facts but the facts 
are always neutral.’ (Senior university geneticist, male, 1) 
 
‘Common sense doesn’t suit science.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 18) 
 
‘...it is important for a researcher to have freedom and that a certain amount of trust 
is put into people’ (Junior university stem cell biologist, female, 13) 
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‘It is not practical to tell science where to go because you do not know where it is 
going to go.’ (Senior university geneticist, male, 1) 
 
Lastly, statements are made about the nature and the form of the preferred 
democratic model. These are expressed in a more normative style and they discuss the 
way things should work. Participation in public affairs comes with certain obligations. 
In order for someone to make a decision or publicly express an opinion, she/he first 
needs to know. ‘Right’ knowledge becomes the epitome of democratic judgment. In 
this vein, scientists are portrayed as prototypes of what determines a ‘good citizen’. 
Integral to their role is the dissemination of this knowledge and the education of the ill 
informed. The responsibility of the media, on the other hand, is to inform the citizens 
in a comprehensive and accurate way, enabling them to participate in the democratic 
process. 
 
‘I guess only scientists can really understand, or researchers in their field can really 
know the value of research.’ (Junior government research institution geneticist, 
female, 11) 
 
‘It is our duty to inform them and to give them the chance to see what we are doing; 
to explain to them what we are doing; to improve their knowledge or background; just 
to give the right information that we are not doing anything that is connected with 
creation; the creation of human beings, babies via cloning.’ (Senior university stem 
cell biologist, male, 7) 
 
‘It does not matter what most people think. There is actually another way of working 
out if it is right or wrong, quite often, I think based on good knowledge in the field’ 
(Junior government research institution biologist, male, 10) 
 
‘If you are to make a choice, you should really make an informed choice, otherwise 
it’s not really a good decision in the first place.’ (Junior university geneticist, male, 
17) 
 
‘I do not mind them saying ‘no’ to what we do as long as they understand what we 
are trying to do and get the pros and cons.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 5) 
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‘I think if you are doing science programmes on the BBC or any other network you 
have a certain responsibility to maintain truthfulness in what you report.’ (Junior 
government research institution geneticist, female, 11) 
 
‘I think accuracy is important in everything we do.’ (Senior university stem cell 
biologist, male, 2) 
 
 ‘They should serve a public good not a profitable remit.’ (Senior university stem cell 
biologist, male, 15) 
 
 
Rebuttals 
In only two instances was the force of the proposed conclusion conditioned by 
rebuttals. In both cases, they were used while claiming for the supportive attitude of a 
large part of the British public towards CNR and its application in the derivation of 
human embryonic stem cells. People appreciate SCNT for it has the potential to save 
lives. It is only pro-life and religious beliefs that deprive certain groups from a true 
understanding of what the technology has to offer.  
 
‘Unless they are devoted followers of a specific religion, which has a very peculiar 
view on the matter.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 16) 
 
‘So long as they are not pro-life people because then everything is sacred and every 
baby should be protected’ (Junior government research institution geneticist, female, 
12) 
 
 
6.2.2.2 Strategic argumentation 
Although to a large extent interviewees were found to argue within the context of the 
technocratic type, there were also moments of profound reflection on their work, their 
doings and its wider ramifications. It was at these moments that the degree of their 
humane sensitivity was able to freely unfold. This is not a discourse of demarcation 
but a blurring of the boundaries between the scientific and the non-scientific, the 
technical and the ethical, knowledge and its applications. A certain degree of power is 
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assigned to the public sphere; people are stakeholders, the media is a means of 
communication, and the regulators apart from being a safeguard, were at the same 
time, an important source of feedback with deep implications on the psychological 
well being of the individual researcher. Overall, 82 arguments were found to fall in 
this type of argumentation.  
 
Claims 
A more holistic and participatory account of public opinion and science policy is 
assumed. People are invited into discussions concerning SCNT research and its 
human applications. The role of the individual scientist is to ensure and preserve such 
participation. Public accountability and involvement constitute the necessary 
conditions for the overall progress of this type of research.  
 
‘If they decide to go and organise a referendum it is the decision that has been made 
and you follow it whether it has good or bad consequences on the research.’ (Junior 
university stem cell biologist, female, 13) 
 
‘I do not think that you can just ignore the public, and say ‘I do not really care about 
what they think, I am just going to pursue my research.’ (Senior university stem cell 
biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘There has to be a reflection of what society wants.’ (Junior government research 
institution geneticist, female, 12) 
 
‘We need people to sort of turn up and vote.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 
5) 
 
‘I think that people’s interest in these stories, in TV programmes, public debates or 
whatever might be going on, actually is a positive thing for a researcher.’ (Junior 
government research institution geneticist, female, 11) 
 
‘I think that TV programmes and the newspapers offer a greater opportunity to 
elaborate on your points.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 16) 
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 Authoritative claims about the inability of people to produce their own 
opinions give way to more constructive accounts underlying the multitude of reasons 
that determine individual attitudes. Moreover, regulation of SCNT technology is 
received with an overall tone of satisfaction. Careful evaluation and consideration of 
all the relevant scientific and ethical issues are seen as inevitable.  
 
‘What determines people’s beliefs about life, death, the afterlife and God is 
complicated.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 18) 
 
‘You know as well as I do that the public is a very mixed lot.’ (Senior university 
biologist, female, 4) 
 
‘I think the regulations in this country are very tight. I think they are appropriate for 
what we are doing.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘I agree with all of the regulation. It has to be strict.’ (Senior university embryologist, 
female, 8) 
 
‘I think the Human Fertilisation and Embryonic Authority have done extremely well.’ 
(Senior university embryologist, male, 18) 
 
‘We need to have a proper world-wide regulation on cloning.’ (Junior government 
research institution geneticist, female, 12) 
 
Data 
A large part of the evidence originates from a consideration of the ethical issues and 
concerns raised by the non-scientists. Their elaboration here, however, is performed 
so as to further establish their validity. Examples are also drawn from individual 
memories and experiences in science communication.  
 
‘They have concerns and again a lot of people think that this technology could then be 
transferred from animals to humans. I think that this is scary.’ (Junior university stem 
cell biologist, female, 13) 
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‘I think everyone is entitled to their individual, religious beliefs and therefore, some 
people would feel it is wrong. And that is good, I am happy with that.’ (Senior 
university stem cell researcher, male, 2) 
 
‘So, for example, with our ambitions to clone for stem cells or to derive new stem cell 
lines we did not just communicate this as a laboratory, we communicated it with the 
approval of our institution as reflected by ethics approval.’ (Senior university stem 
cell biologist, male, 16) 
 
‘On a personal level I have been quite heavily involved with how you try to 
communicate with the public on the value of, let’s say, therapeutic cloning and 
embryonic stem cell research in general.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 5) 
 
References are also made to current regulatory developments as they occur 
both nationally and abroad. Foreigners are once again used as a benchmark for 
comparison, implying the assumption that UK CNR research is more aligned to public 
concerns than in other countries, such as the U.S, where political indecision postpones 
the closure of eminent ethical dilemmas posed by SCNT.  
 
‘Of all the places in the world where you can do full reproductive cloning America is 
one of the few.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘The regulatory framework is different depending on where you go. And probably the 
strangest example is America, where my understanding is that if you have federal 
funding you are restricted to using a very few, very small number of pre-existing lines. 
However, if you are working with commercial funding there are no restrictions what 
so ever.’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 15) 
 
‘Certain types of cloning are already allowed.’ (Junior university geneticist, male, 17) 
 
 
Warrants 
Explanations give an emphasis on the perceived role of public perceptions, the media 
and the regulators in the development of a new scientific field of research. Public 
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voices are invested with power and prestige; they are the voters, the consumers, the 
funders and as such confidence in scientific activities is what drives research 
initiatives.  
 
‘If they do not like it they are quite happy to tell you about that. There are lots of 
mechanisms to do that.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 5) 
 
‘People’s interest in the field kind of gets translated into people like politicians who 
are responsible for allocating money to research. I think it encourages them to 
continue supporting research into embryo technologies or nuclear cloning 
technologies or understanding basically what underlines normal embryology so that 
we can understand why these techniques do not work and how to get them to work.’ 
(Junior government research institution geneticist, female, 11) 
 
‘If we want to keep money in science it is important to keep people trusting in 
scientists.’ (Junior government research institution biologist, male, 10) 
 
‘Most of us spend significant amounts of public money.’ (Senior university stem cell 
biologist, male, 15) 
 
‘People have a right to know what they consume and have a right to choice.’ (Junior 
university stem cell biologist, female, 13) 
 
‘There is no point developing therapies for treatment of cancer or diabetes or 
whatever if people are not going to want to receive the treatment.’ (Junior university 
stem cell biologist, female, 13) 
 
‘I think you really gain public confidence when you perceive and seem to be and 
actually are open and honest about what is going on.’ (Senior university 
embryologist, male, 5) 
 
‘If public opinion had been very much against stem cell research and cloning that 
would not have happened’ (Senior university biologist, female, 4) 
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A certain degree of identification with the non-scientists is also performed. 
This is either done explicitly or through the elaboration of the ethical problems of 
SCNT research. Here, scientists take on board public concerns further enriching them 
with their own personal values and opinions about CNR. 
 
‘If you want to do this kind of science you should know that it has very important 
ethical concerns’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 6) 
 
‘You do get these scientists who are just doing whatever they want.’ (Junior 
government research institution geneticist, female, 12) 
 
‘It is sensitive and we are dealing with human material; we are dealing with human 
life, early life form and you just cannot do anything about it.’ (Junior university stem 
cell biologist, female, 13) 
 
‘Cloning and safety is obviously one of those things. The problems of gene regulation 
in the cloned embryo make it extremely risky. The risk is so high that to do it on 
humans at the moment is unacceptable.’ (Senior university geneticist, male, 1) 
 
‘I am part of the X [regulation], I am a scientist and I am a member of the public.’ 
(Senior university embryologist, male, 5) 
 
Not only is the public sphere an important source to sustain overall scientific 
growth but also a means of personal recognition in the scientific community per se. 
Thus, explanations are offered pointing to the legitimating function of the media. It is 
through the media that co-workers and colleagues across the world come to identify 
their fellows, securing fame and acknowledgment. At the same time, the non-expert 
comes as a reassurance of personal choices and motives. Wider appreciation of one’s 
work is a source for establishing individual psychological well being and personal 
gratification.  
 
‘The media is show-casing your work and you are more recognised in the community; 
people know about your research. That is always a good thing and it could be a good 
thing financially as well.’ (Junior university stem cell biologist, female, 13) 
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‘Knowing that there is an interest or that there is somehow some kind of benefit to the 
research obviously motivates you as a researcher.’ (Junior government research 
institution geneticist, female, 11) 
 
‘I personally am much happier if I see the recognition that the public is on my side. If 
not, I have to think ‘the majority of the people do not agree with my science so maybe 
I am doing something wrong?’ (Senior university stem cell biologist, male, 7) 
 
‘You do not want to do something that you yourself think is wrong because you know 
other people would feel that it is wrong; it is about mental well being.’ (Junior 
government research institution geneticist, female, 12) 
 
 
Backings 
Personal values and beliefs regarding the role of the wider society to ensure and 
protect individual rights and moral standards constitute the majority of backings in 
strategic argumentation. Science is an inclusive system of debate, accounting for the 
range of opinions of a variety of different actors. This is largely based on the image of 
protective democracy, also encountered in the argumentation of scientific journals. 
Here, the scientists’ responsibility is to ensure the legality of their actions. The notion 
of the media as a conduit further enhances its important role for the legitimation of 
scientists’ work.  
 
‘I see science as an open system and debate.  I do not see it as ‘the scientists versus 
the public.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 5) 
 
‘It is not scientists’ job to decide what research to follow but it is the job of society to 
decide what scientists should be permitted to do.’ (Senior university embryologist, 
female, 8) 
 
‘I think the public has to feel that they have a voice in these things.’ (Junior 
government research institution geneticist, female, 12) 
 
‘I just believe it is a democracy.’ (Senior university embryologist, male, 5) 
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‘Part of doing the work is being able to communicate your results not only to other 
scientists but also to the public.’ (Senior, university stem cell biologist, male, 2) 
 
‘Media is the vehicle to communicate to the public.’ (Senior university stem cell 
biologist, male, 16) 
 
At the same time, a more economic and user-oriented image of science 
prevails. Here, interviewees speak the language of money, for science is about selling 
products. The more resources one engages, the more possibilities she/he has in 
sustaining financial and personal growth.  
 
‘In order to make sustained growth of any scientific discipline there needs to be 
consistent growth, you can’t do peaks and drops. So you need to carry everyone with 
you and one important part of that is carrying the government with you.’ (Senior 
university stem cell biologist, male, 16) 
 
‘Media coverage helps with funding and with letting the government know about our 
research, its benefits and the money we need. There is never enough money in 
science.’ (Junior university stem cell scientist, female, 13) 
 
 
6.2.3 Recapitulating the results of metaphor and argumentation analysis  
Private discussions with scientists provided a rich and fruitful amalgam of metaphors 
and arguments put forward about the public perceptions, media coverage, and 
regulation of human SCNT technology. A continuation of meanings, opinions and 
ideas is evident between formal and informal settings of communication. Thus, the 
same types of symbolic resources are once again mobilised, anchoring the public 
sphere into a final set of 12 categorisations. In doing so, light is shed on different 
properties of it, while others are left in the background.  
 Hence, categories like ‘Conduit’ and ‘Engineering’ prioritise a certain image 
of the world as objective, universal and untouched by human interaction. In this vein, 
scientific facts are somewhere ‘out there’ requiring transmission. Thus, a one-way 
communication with the public sphere is assumed. ‘Parenthood’ metaphors further 
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accentuate a more paternalistic attitude towards the public understanding of science 
securing control of dissemination in the hands of those who truly know.  
 The use of ‘Entertainment’ metaphors seems to perpetuate the distinction 
between the world of science and that of the public sphere, presenting a sort of parity 
with data derived from formal communication. And while certain metaphors in the 
categories of ‘Container’, ‘Psychopathology’ and ‘War’ are used to further promote 
such a dichotomy, at the same time they are also employed in an opposite manner, 
presenting a degree of identification with the non-scientist (‘normal’, ‘ally’) while 
establishing new and more participatory and engaging channels of communication 
and interaction, blurring the boundaries between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. 
‘Economy’ metaphors further contribute to such blending by prioritising a more 
entrepreneurial rapport with the public sphere.  
 Metaphors like that of ‘Human Nature’ and ‘Journey’ highlight pioneering and 
progressive conceptualisations of science while the category of ‘Statistics’ 
incorporates a more quantitative understanding of the public sphere, largely drawing 
from the concept of electorate. Lastly, and once more, the category of ‘Popular 
metaphors’ is incorporated in an effort to revisit past and present debates with the 
scope of offering alternative, largely rectifying explanations11.  
Argumentation too seems to unfold in a parallel way to that identified in the 
scientific journals. Thus, technocratic argumentation represents once again the voice 
of logos. Claiming for the incapacity of the non-scientist to apprehend the 
technicalities and different applications of human SCNT technology, a rhetoric of 
exclusion is performed. Rationality, objectivity, authenticity and intellectuality 
become the criteria for inclusion into the public debate. This, by and large, is a 
defensive way of argumentation. Scientists defend their professional autonomy and 
their doings by framing their discussions within a highly technical context. While 
enabling them to exclude opposing voices, it assists to preserve their control over 
knowledge. Control is exerted not only on the content of non-scientists 
representations of human CNR but also on their use. The demarcation between reality 
and fantasy empowers the superiority of scientific knowledge over other forms. The 
end result is a clear and well-demarcated boundary between science and non-science. 
                                                 
11
   Associations between the superordinate category and metaphor user could not be 
performed due to the small number of frequencies in the cells. 
 232 
The flow of communication adopted is one-way, from the scientific to the public 
sphere.  
Strategic argumentation is about aligning with the public. Either by 
acknowledging the ethical ramifications of their actions or by accounting for the 
different types of public participation and its contribution to their every day practices, 
a form of partnership is formed with the non-scientists. The boundaries between the 
scientific and the non-scientific become more permissible. As was the case in the 
scientific journals, this is the rhetoric of ethos. If in search of a motto, this could be: 
‘we are you’. Such a way of arguing while permitting the construction of a more 
humane image of the scientist, assists in the accumulation and expansion of symbolic 
and material resources for the advancement of SCNT research. This alignment with 
the public also trivialises other competing voices in the debate, like the Church, pro-
life groups or the ‘cloners’. 
 A statistical analysis of relevant data did not produce any significant 
differences between interviewees and types of argumentation used (see Appendix 19). 
It should be noted, however, that senior scientists were more likely to rely on their 
experiences in formal settings of communication with representatives of the public 
sphere. Junior scientists reported limited participation in formal science 
communication. This lack of involvement was largely based on the belief in the 
primacy of expert knowledge. Thus, it is the duty of the older scientists, those who 
know better, to disseminate their findings to a wider audience. Junior scientists were 
also more likely to refrain from giving immediate answers and explanations, referring 
to a lack of information or knowledge about public perceptions, media coverage and 
the regulation of human SCNT technology. This too was defended by personal 
references to their being subordinate. It is again the older scientists that have a better 
and deeper understanding of related issues. Although during the course of the 
discussion such reservations were soon overcome, they undeniably point to the 
commitment of the experts in the production of precise and well-verified claims.   
  A consideration of relevant research points to similar results. Thus, research 
conducted by MORI (2000) identified analogous discrepancies between senior and 
junior scientists. Opinions, ideas and consequent attitudes regarding public 
degradation and superficiality were also reported by the majority of PUS studies as 
presented in Chapter 2. Instances of boundary construction in rhetorical styles adopted 
are also discussed in studies under the auspices of the sociology of science. However, 
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despite the fact that prior research, by and large, has verified types of argumentation 
typical of the ‘technocratic’ kind reported here as well, there have been few occasions 
where the possibility of a different conceptualisation of the public sphere has been 
raised. Thus, only Michael and his colleagues in their studies on xenotransplantation 
observed a similar ‘we are different- we are the same’ tension in scientists’ 
conceptualisation of the public. More specifically, they attribute such a switch in the 
context of conversation, reporting how when moral and cultural criteria entered the 
discussion experts employed a ‘non-expert popular’ rhetoric aligning with the wider 
concerns regarding their research, as expressed by non-scientists (Brown and Michael, 
2001). A closer examination of the present data however, could not account for such 
an explanation. Indeed, the whole interview instance was a discussion of the main 
ethical and moral repercussions of SCNT research and its treatment by people, media 
and regulators in the UK, as well as, in other countries. Metaphors and arguments 
contrasting science and scientists to non-scientists were coupled with anchors and 
objectifications blurring those same borders, presenting, thus, an interesting and 
mixed amalgam. The fact that the analysis of the non-reactive formal communication 
data presents similar results calls for a consideration of different possible explanations 
far exceeding the confines of the interview situation. And while Brown and Michael 
(2001) discuss this as exemplary of the conscious efforts of scientists to present 
themselves as the representatives of the public, as protectors of civil rights, permitting 
them to marginalise the role and voices of animal rights activists, it does not exhaust 
all possible justifications. Therefore, I would argue that the employment of metaphors 
emphasising transparency and alignment (‘be open’, ‘stay open’, ‘normal’, ‘ally’) and 
arguments of the strategic type could also be attributed to the particular area of 
research studied, the time-frame adopted and its geographical focus. Hence, it should 
be noted that the U.K was the first to provide a clear and permissive regulatory 
framework on human SCNT and relevant embryonic stem cell research. At the time of 
the interviews, the public debate on CNR and related research had lost much of its 
intensity. This would have undoubtedly contributed to a sense of reassurance for the 
individual researcher. In addition, this seems to be in-line with the findings of the 
present study relating to the analysis of the two scientific journals (‘strategic 
argumentation’ was significantly more evident in the UK than in any other individual 
country reported), as well as prior research results by Waterton et al. (2001) whose 
findings showed that researchers involved in less controversial areas were found to be 
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more reflective of their doings. This does not mean to suggest that human SCNT 
research has ceased to arouse controversies; this is hardly the case. Rather, the present 
results may relate to a particular phase in the UK public debate, when discussions 
about the future of CNR had, to an extent, already been settled by the appropriate 
legal framework. The future possibility of applying this technique directly on human 
patients might well rekindle yet another heated discussion. Future research may 
account for such a hypothesis. However, I would also suggest that this identified 
tension in the metaphors and arguments typified in both formal and informal settings 
of communication is not just a matter of switch between different linguistic 
repertoires, as per Brown and Michael (2001), but evident of the complex and hybrid 
content of relevant social representations in relation to their functions as well as to 
their overall context of production. Indeed, social representations are always 
representations of something by someone in a particular place and time. Based on 
such a conceptualisation, a more synthetic account is proposed in the next chapter. 
Before such an attempt, however, one is obliged to reflect on the position of the self in 
relation to the non-scientific, the scientific, the other, the world, as presented in the 
interview data.  
 
 
6.3 The public sphere in informal communication 
Individual interviews provide access to the ontogenetic level of social representations. 
Not only are they a way of tapping into individual cognitions about a certain object of 
representation but they also inform about the way the individual thinks and acts in the 
wider world. The same kind of tension is evident in the metaphors and arguments 
employed in individual discussions with experts, as was the case with the articles in 
the scientific journals. Figure 6.1 attempts to provide a pictorial depiction of this. 
 
Figure 6.1 Meanings of the public sphere and the self 
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While thinking and talking about SCNT technology and its public dimensions 
conceptualisations of the self, democracy, science and non-science are also enacted. 
Thus, the image of science as an almost unnatural process reigns; it virtually being a 
sphere in which the Platonic ideal prevails, where ideas about the essence of nature 
and how things are, remain untouched by human intervention. It is this human agency 
that contaminates knowledge with passions and emotions. The public sphere becomes 
the place of irrationality, bias and error. If ideology is taken to denote a set of ideas, 
values and beliefs, which distort reality, then this is the realm of ideology. Underlying 
this, there is the assumption that scientific knowledge is to be accepted as the only 
truth in the world. Everything else is just story telling. However, how do scientists 
acquire authority as the sole representatives of nature? The answer to this question 
lies in the positioning of the other, and in this case the non-scientist. It is the non-
scientist that secures scientists almost super-natural properties. This is mainly 
performed through a process of disassociation of the self from the other. Contrasted to 
the unthinking other, scientists and their training in the laws of objectivity, 
intellectuality, and neutrality create an almost mythical identity - the scientific 
identity. Detached from the public sphere, the self becomes the only credited 
representative of true facts. A sense of belonging to a different community, that of the 
global scientific community is sustained. 
At the same time, however, it is the social that renders the scientific possible 
mainly through the allocation of material and symbolic resources. Thus, the public 
sphere is the ally, the stakeholder, the interested other. Internal laws do not suffice to 
explain science. While science’s job is to produce statements and facts about the way 
things work, the role of the non-scientist is to define the way these products are to be 
used. Science then becomes an enterprise and different outsiders become insiders at 
different times during the process of production. Once again, authority is granted to 
the self but now through identification with the other. ‘You are not me’ becomes ‘I 
am You’. Such a positioning of the self not only secures legitimation of individual 
actions but also a sense of personal morality and worth. The end result is a more 
humane identity, a sense of belonging to a wider community of different social actors 
bound together with the common project to better human life. 
During the interview process, I had the opportunity to fully experience this 
tension. The interlocutors transformed from individuals with authoritative, almost 
inhuman status, to people driven by personal motives and interests. Questions 
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examining my own understanding of the technicalities of SCNT (‘but you have a 
biology background, don’t you? Otherwise how could you do this work?’ as one of 
my interviewees told me) were coupled with enquiries about my personal views and 
ideas regarding the ethical standing of their doings (‘so, what do you think of what I 
do?’ as I was asked by another). I could see myself through their eyes being 
transformed, from an ignorant social scientist, an outsider, into an exotic foreigner, a 
potential buyer, patient, customer, promoter. In the course of the discussion, I 
received explanations of how things work to how things could work for me. While 
maintaining a disinterested attitude, it was precisely these moments that assisted in 
being able to listen more empathically. The chapter that follows brings us to the final 
part of the present thesis, which will give an account of the various meanings of the 
public sphere and science as observed in both the formal and informal settings of 
communication studied from a more synthetic view.  
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Chapter 7 
The public sphere among experts: Synthesis  
 
While the relationship between science and the public sphere has for a long time 
preoccupied numerous scholars as a philosophical quest, the present thesis has turned 
it into an empirical question for experts in one particular scientific area, that of SCNT 
research. Representation, that is, the process of making present what is absent through 
the use of symbols, became the focus of attention. However, instead of treating it as a 
form of empirical equation testing for possible discrepancies between the world ‘out 
there’ and the world ‘therein’, a more socio-psychological approach was assumed. 
Moscovici’s social representations set the basis for such an endeavor. As a theory, 
they point to the constituted and constitutive nature of knowledge. Thus, every 
representation of something is always a representation by someone in a specific place 
and time, inviting the individual researcher to approach her object of study from a 
disinterested attitude. As a phenomenon, they call for a mapping out, a typification of 
relevant contents as they are embedded in different modes and mediums, while 
linking them back to the people who hold them and the functions they possibly serve.  
The present study has been an exploration of the way UK stem cell scientists 
conceptualise the public sphere, that is, their representations of the public perceptions, 
media coverage and regulation of human SCNT research. Accounting for 
developments in relevant social representations research, the object of study has been 
approached in a triangulated manner. Thus, instead of focusing on meanings and 
contents existing solely at the individual level, an attempt was made to explore 
additional, more collective settings of communication. Therefore, data from 
individual interviews with stem cell scientists in the UK have been triangulated with 
relevant material from two scientific journals. This is because social representations 
are not reached in isolation but through a constant and complex process of 
communication and interaction with and between individuals. And while this being a 
theoretical imperative, a methodological necessity also formed part of such a choice. 
Hence, comparison between different types of data offers the possibility of further 
strengthening interpretation by detecting potential absences and presences.  
Relevant results, as presented in the previous two chapters, indicate a 
continuation between meanings existing at the collective and the individual levels. 
More specifically, the typification of metaphors and arguments with which to anchor 
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and objectify the public sphere in both formal and informal settings of communication 
present a degree of parity, revealing a similar tension across the representational fields 
studied. Below, this tension is revisited in light of Abric’s account. Core and 
peripheral elements of the representation are discussed in relation to its contents and 
functions. This is performed by a consideration of the overall context of its 
production, as per current discussions and trends, in the relationship between science 
and the public sphere.  
 
7.1 Representing the public sphere: contents, structure and functions 
The typification of the various meanings, that is, anchors and objectifications of the 
public sphere in both formal and informal settings of communication resulted in the 
the identification of an overall 18 superordinate categories of metaphors, as well as, 
two main types of argumentation. A consideration of their associations and contents 
presents a dual tension. On the one hand, a demarcation is performed between science 
and the public sphere. On the other hand, a form of blurring of those same boundaries 
is achieved. Indeed, a first glance at the data suggested a kind of Gordian knot (to 
quote Dr Bauer, my supervisor). Was I then to split the data in two, as another 
Alexandra, and discuss the workings of two distinct representations of the public 
sphere? Or were these different anchors and objectifications indicative of a more 
complex web? The answer was to be found in the data per se. Suggestive of the 
consensual, yet flexible nature of social representations, they were evidence of the 
composite structure of human thought. The same object can be perceived in different 
ways by the same individual at the same place and time; yet this diversity manages to 
work as a coherent whole. In search of illuminating this phenomenon further, I was 
introduced to the work of Abric (1993, 2001). It is through his structural 
understanding of social representations that I was permitted to fully appreciate and do 
justice to the dynamic and complex character of my data, while further assisting in the 
identification of the subjective, the intersubjective, and objective dimensions of 
representation (Jovchelovitch, 2007).  
Abric’s (1993, 2001) structural approach to the study of social representations 
comes as an extension of Moscovici’s seminal theory. Specifically, it propounds that 
every social representation is organised around a central core further enriched by 
peripheral elements. The core represents the rigid and stable part of the 
representation; it is about stability and homogeneity. It is through the core elements 
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that the past dictates the present. This is the historical and normative part of the 
representation. Peripheral elements are more flexible in nature, permitting for 
differentiations and changes between individuals. They are adaptive and absorbing of 
new information and events, capable of challenging the central core. One of their 
main functions, thus, is to protect core elements in the light of new and threatening 
developments. Below, a more structural consideration of the accumulated data is 
performed. Thus, central meanings and their functions are distinguished from more 
peripheral elements, while demonstrating their complex, smooth and simultaneous co-
existence under one hybrid representation in relation to its wider context of 
production. 
 Hence, Figure 7.1 offers a schematic presentation of the core elements of the 
representation as expressed by certain metaphors and the ‘technocratic’ type of 
arguments identified in the scientific media and in private discussions with individual 
scientists. 
 
Figure 7.1 Core elements of anchoring and objectifying the public sphere in 
discourse 
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Based on the above elements it is evident that at the centre of the representation lies 
the image of the unthinking public sphere. As also discussed by Moscovici (1984), 
the denial that the public realm thinks, assumes two different forms. Firstly, and 
largely adhering to Cartesian logic, the public mind is treated as a unified black box. 
Ideas are transmitted from an outside world and reproduced in the form of opinions, 
attitudes and so forth. No room for creativity is left; it is replication that reigns. This 
takes us to the second point where people are seen as being under the sway of the 
dominant ideologies of the media or other interest groups, such as the Church or pro-
life representatives. Through this denial of authenticity, originality and individuality, 
the public sphere emerges almost as a Lebonian crowd (2002). ‘Crowds are as 
incapable of willing as of thinking for any length of time’ (p. 12, ibid). Lost in the 
homogeneity of the crowd, the individual lacks critical judgment, once more proving 
our primitive inheritance. Suggestion and contagion restrict public life into impulses 
and exaggerated feelings. The irresistible force of illusions refutes any distinction 
between what is real and what is not. The laws of logic have no power over crowds; 
instead, it is appeals to their sentiment that impresses them. Public opinion then 
becomes the aggregated sum of individual and certain prestige opinions of the elite, 
i.e. the leaders. In terms of communication between public perceptions, the media and 
regulation, it is the media that play a central role, as shown in Figure 7.2. 
                                                        Media 
 
     Public perceptions                  Regulation 
Figure 7.2 The ‘satellite’ function of the media 
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Like a satellite, every piece of information is transmitted and disseminated through 
the media. This is how opinions are formed; this is how laws are decided.  
Contrasted to this social world, one finds the world of science. Beyond and 
above this is the realm of truth. Standing in isolation, science thinks hard. It is an 
esoteric sphere governed by internal rules and strict organisation. Objectivity and 
neutrality render scientific knowledge universal and ahistorical. Plato’s idea of an 
exoteric natural order whose structure the sciences aim to expose is of centrality here 
(Kitcher, 2001). Thus, the work of science is that of cosmology, the production of 
statements of how things really are and work. This is the apotheosis of human 
achievement. It is this apodictic nature that has managed to replace old prejudices and 
superstitions, ameliorating human life and sustaining progress. What is being 
performed here is rapture with our primitive past: ‘We are no longer the same, we are 
better’ (Latour, 1993).  
 Around this central nucleus more peripheral elements are to be found, as 
shown in Figure 7.3.  
 
Figure 7.3 Peripheral elements of anchoring and objectifying the public sphere 
in discourse 
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It does not matter that the public cannot think; what matters is what the public 
can do. The image is drawn of an active public. There is a blurring of the boundaries 
between citizen and consumer (Michael, 1998). The constitution of contemporary 
democracies is based on the ‘voting’ power of the citizen/customer, not only through 
the typical path of elections but also through their consumer choices and purchases. A 
different conceptualisation of science prevails. Science is a product for consumption; 
an enterprise with specific audiences and partners. Nature is not only something that 
exists out there awaiting discovery but also a valuable resource to master and to 
exploit. At the same time, people and their opinions are of psychological value for 
they guarantee personal choices and actions. Science then becomes politics by other 
means; an almost Machiavellian process incorporating more and more individuals and 
resources (Gaskell and Bauer, 2001). It is a user-oriented design, an opportunistic 
endeavor. Thus, people are to be persuaded, the media is to be used, and regulators 
are to be influenced. This is how science is made.   
But how is this hybridity to be accounted for? Although some considerations 
were proposed earlier (Chapters 5 & 6), one is also obliged to take into account the 
wider context of its production and current debates and trends in the relationship 
between science and non-science, for this hybridity seems to be expressive of those. 
Therefore, during the last two centuries, the institution of science has witnessed 
immense alterations. The increase in private and public capital funding scientific 
research has led to the incorporation of commercial and political interests into the 
scientific sphere. While debates among scientists lose their esoteric character, as they 
are performed more and more in the public eye, discussions over public participation 
in science become ever more topical. Referendums, citizen juries, advisory and ethics 
committees, public consultation strategies and the like blur, even the boundaries 
between expert and non-expert. As social researchers currently debate over the extent 
of the ‘participatory’ qualities and motives of these initiatives, they have undoubtedly 
contributed to an increased politicisation of science (Hellström and Jacob, 2000; 
Einsiedel and Kamara, 2007; Braun and Schultz, 2008). At the same time, different 
stakeholders come into existence, such as environmental groups, the Church, pro-life 
groups, consumer organisations, patients organisations and so on and so forth. As a 
result, a multitude of voices and interests become part of the game of science. The 
public image of science likewise has changed. Thus, nuclear technology, I/T, 
biotechnology, human SCNT, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), to name but 
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a few, have brought the ethical and risk ramifications of the sciences to the forefront. 
And while in the past, these effects had a more local nature, at present they have 
assumed global dimensions (Tenner, 1997). These changes have resulted in Touraine 
(1995) proclaiming what he sees as a crisis in progress. Humans have ceased to 
believe in the same force as they used to in the potential of science for salvation 
and/or emancipation from dangers and threats. It is, rather, taken as constitutive of 
those. Inglehart (1990) identifies shifts in the values of youth, moving away from 
materialism to more humane orientations, at the same time as the latest 
Eurobarometer studies (Gaskell et al, 2001b) identify a crisis of public confidence not 
only regarding the institution of science per se but also traditional regulatory and 
policy agents. Adding to that is the social research of science, both as a sanctifier and 
demystifier (Fuller, 2000). As stated earlier, Comte was the first to anoint the natural 
sciences the successors to the Roman Catholic Church. More recently, it was 
sociologists’ and social psychologists’ studies of crowds, public opinions, attitudes 
and public understandings of science that contributed vastly to a deficit 
conceptualisation of the public, while fuelling scientific primacy. However, work, 
mainly after the Second World War, reversed this process. Ethnographic and 
historical studies of the day-to-day operations of science and scientific discourses 
have ‘humanised’ the neutrality of the scientist (Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Gilbert 
and Mulkay 1984). Research like that of Wynne’s (1992a; 1996) has pointed to the 
authority of local knowledge, while work into social representations further 
establishes a more complex and less degrading image of the lay thinker. In one way or 
another, these shifts in the focus and interpretative accounts of social research have 
contributed to a demystification of scientific thought and practices bringing into 
question their prior superior status. Although brief and even laconic, the above 
account manages to capture the complex interplay between science and the public 
sphere. Indeed, this hybridity is expressive of this complex and blurred web but it also 
constitutes a functional response to it (Gervais and Jovchelovitch, 1998).  
Core elements comprise the part of the representation taken-for-granted, which 
are self-centered, solid and rigid resulting in the unification of individual differences. 
One finds here, the collective memory of a group of people operating in a consensual 
way. Any threat is assimilated into the common past, indicative of the resistant 
function of social representations. Control is exerted to the reality of today through 
that of yesterday. The ideological function of the representation is also illuminated 
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(Jovchelovitch, 2007). This is mainly exemplified by the demarcation of the scientific 
from the non-scientific. Neither are they merely different forms of knowing and 
being, but rather a certain hierarchy is presumed. Thus, an asymmetry is sustained, 
with scientific knowledge being superior to that of the non-scientific, which permits 
the assumption of an emancipated identity. Disassociated from the messiness of the 
commonsensical, the individual scientist emerges as the one and only credited 
spokesperson of nature. This disassociation, however, is also a continuous effort to 
distance from one’s own self, her/his social and individual values. It is in isolation, 
from both the other and the self, that one hears nature loud and clear (Latour, 1993). 
Simultaneously, this emancipation assists in the preservation of the epistemic division 
of labour and the perpetuation of the sense of belonging to a unified community, that 
of the scientific. At the same time, the universality and superiority of scientific 
knowledge allows its penetration into other knowledge systems (Jovchelovitch, 2007). 
As recognition of the other’s perspective is denied, the power of one knowledge 
system over others results in their displacement. Public dialogue, as a form of rational 
communication amongst individuals, is trivialised as superficial and shallow. Public 
dialogue, as a form of communication between the non-scientific and the scientific is 
dominated by authority and exclusion. Decision-making is secured in the hands of 
those who truly know. Participation in the agora is only permitted to a handful of 
skilled and wise experts, as was the case in the oldest form of democracy, the 
Athenian. This meritocratic vision of democracy leads to the adoption of a one-way 
communication with the public sphere. Thus, a paternalistic attitude prevails, 
coordinating action towards the dissemination of facts and education of those less 
equipped. Homogeneity, continuity and conformity are sustained in the group and in 
its relations with outsiders. Core elements are, thus, the basis of the ‘scientific 
institution’. Figure 7.4 attempts to capture the various central meanings, values, ideas 
and their functions in a visual manner.  
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While core elements keep the group together and united allowing for the defense of 
central values and beliefs, peripheral elements constitute the interface between 
concrete reality and the nucleus (Abric, 1993). Threats and dangers are 
accommodated in the form of referendums, public relations offices, marketing 
strategies, and the alteration of initial research agendas and individual choices to suit 
public concerns (for example through abandoning of human reproductive cloning or 
through immigrating to more permissive countries). Identification with the non-
scientific permits the assumption of a sublimated12 identity, carrying the goals of the 
collectivity (both scientific and public), and at the same instance, resists the image of 
the ‘outsider’, the person who pursues her/his own goals without accounting for 
collective desires and rights, as other interest groups (for example, the Church) 
attempt to assign to the individual scientist. By accounting for public participation in 
the form of citizen/consumer interests, peripheral elements activate and preserve 
dialogue with the public. There may be asymmetries but coexistence carries with it 
the potential for inclusion and hybridisation of different forms of knowing. Individual 
differences among scientists permit for the adoption of more or less participatory 
models of democracy. Overall, action is oriented towards the accumulation of 
material and symbolic resources to preserve and expand individual choices, bringing 
forth a more entrepreneurial attitude towards the public sphere. Thus, this part of the 
representation is more present and future oriented, dictated less by the past, while 
opening the possibility of revisiting common history in a different light 
(Jovchelovitch, 2007). Changes and alterations are permitted to occur at the same time 
as core elements are protected. This is mainly performed through the recognition of 
the public sphere as more a potential holder of rights and less of knowledge. It is not 
that lay knowledge is scientifically valid but because it has a political and strategic 
function that it should be accounted for. Figure 7.5 depicts the main peripheral 
constituents and their functions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
   The terms ‘emancipated’, ‘sublimated’ and ‘outsider’ have been borrowed from 
Moscovici’s (1987) discussion of the different identities of the individual actor.  
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7.2 Hybrid identities 
While Jovchelovitch (2007), drawing from Weber and Habermas, discusses the 
‘disenchantment’ and ‘linguistification of the lifeworld’ (p.95) as the drama of local 
communities to preserve their identities within the context of the increasingly open 
communicative patterns of contemporary societies and the penetration of scientific 
forms of knowledge, scientists themselves are experiencing a parallel process. Science 
is progressively losing its authoritative and unmistakable status. Instead of providing 
solutions it becomes itself a part of the problem, scrutinised by individual, economic, 
political, ethical and other interests. In the midst of these alterations, scientists find 
resonance in both memory and future. On the one hand, a strong demarcation from the 
public sphere preserves professional autonomy and ideology. On the other hand, it is 
through mixing and/or blurring these same boundaries that hope about the future of 
scientific enterprise is sustained. Being, itself becomes hybrid. From the isolated 
individual of the sanitised laboratory, scientists are at one and the same time, 
transformed into public orators, social engineers, salespeople, entrepreneurs and 
migrants, to name but a few. I do not mean to draw a romanticised picture. What I am 
truly interested in is presenting reality through the eyes and voices of the participants 
and the views presented in the scientific journals in this research. They are defensive, 
attacking, persuasive, and reflexive, in a nutshell: they are thinking and acting. What 
maintains this is their belief in the superiority of their knowledge, their personal 
interests and narcissism, as well as the dedication to their community, which partly 
due to their own doings and the increased specialisation of knowledge, partly due to 
more exoteric influences has become more and more fragmented (Waterton et al., 
2001). As social research tightens its links to intervention, it is important to avoid 
establishing a reverse deficit. It is not that scientists are naïve and misunderstand of 
the public sphere, as they accuse their fellow citizens of being, making it our job to 
rectify their biases (one needs also to question such motives); it is because they 
understand, live and interact in a complex and hybrid world that they appear to 
simultaneously be distant and close, inhuman and human. Thinking always takes 
place in a certain context. The illumination of this context, the interaction of different 
communities, both non-expert and expert, and their coexistence should take priority. 
While the present thesis lacks such a ‘microgenetic’ approach, future social 
representations research may well account and further elaborate such an agenda. 
Again, I do not mean to assume a relativistic stance. Indeed, there are errors and 
 249 
biases, power struggles and misdoings. As Jovchelovitch (2007) astutely points out, it 
is through communication and negotiation between different forms of knowing and 
knowers that what is right and wrong, ethical and unethical, true and false is 
established. Indeed this is not only the way different types of knowledge grow and 
develop but also how democracies live and breathe. The potential role of the 
individual social researcher in further promoting this exchange through her/his studies 
necessitates a degree of self-reflexivity and critique. It is with that in mind that I move 
to the last and concluding part of the present work.  
  
7.3 Researching the public sphere among experts 
In the remainder of this chapter, I wish to draw some concluding remarks regarding 
the reasons guiding the choice of the phenomenon under study and the rationale of the 
conduct and formulation of exegesis, as well as some notes regarding future work and 
research. This is done mainly through a need to locate and reflect on the many ways 
my own theoretical conceptualisations, methodological choices, and interpretations 
have influenced the research subject. To identify any possible gaps in my study does 
not pose a threat to my overall standing and argumentation but rather functions as a 
resourceful indicator enabling researchers to ponder, make their critique, and expand, 
for this is how theories and research are enriched and developed further.  
 
7.3.1 On genesis and context  
There is no parthenogenesis in research. On the contrary, tracing back her/his steps, 
the individual researcher rediscovers a plethora of people, ideas, theories and 
practices that have fertilised thoughts, interests and choices, which consequently were 
followed by framed research questions and paths. Thus, it was through the teaching 
and writings of George Gaskell and Martin Bauer that I was introduced to the concept 
of strategic technologies and to contemporary debates regarding biotechnological 
developments and their interface with larger social, economic, ethical, political and 
other issues. This is the way I also came to appreciate Latour’s work for its holistic 
and ‘realistic’, as he prefers to term it, approach to scientific conduct. Sandra 
Jovchelovitch and Marie-Claude Gervais expanded my understanding of the local, 
detraditionalised public spheres, agency and social representations. Knowledge is 
always historical, contextual, individual and social. This was also a time when 
national policies and strategies on the relationship between the scientific and the non-
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scientific were redefined in the light of new social research developments, scientific 
scandals and related public debates. It is this fruitful context that preceded and 
cultured interest in the present thesis.  
So, how is one to conceptualise different forms of knowledge like science and 
common sense? What is the relationship between the scientific and the non-scientific? 
These and other similar pertaining questions as well as proposed answers have, for a 
long time, occupied the pages of philosophy, sociology and social psychology of 
knowledge, to name but a few. Social representations theory and Moscovici’s own 
discussions of the consensual and the reified, lead to distinct conceptual and empirical 
paths, according to the way one chooses to interpret this proposed dichotomy. The 
aim of the present research was to substantiate the theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings of social representations in the study of the relationship between 
science and common sense. The ability of Moscovici’s theory to cast light on the 
subjective, the intersubjective and the objective elements of knowledge and 
representation permits one’s view and standing in the world to be investigated in 
relation to and communication with others. Abandoning biases and errors, one comes 
closer to capturing and appreciating the essence of living. However, a reconsideration 
of the non-scientific and the scientific was needed before undertaking such an 
endeavor. As a result, instead of treating this dichotomy as a fait-accompli, trying to 
explain the one in terms of the other, a different conceptualisation was adopted. How 
is this dichotomy reflected and used in the efforts of experts to communicate and 
legitimate their research? What representations of the relationship between the 
scientific and the non-scientific are enacted in this process? What kind of 
communication strategies and symbolic resources are employed on the way? This last 
point called for a consideration of discourse and its relation to rhetoric and persuasion. 
Prior work by Liakopoulos (2000) on metaphors and argumentation, and his proposed 
links with anchoring and objectification proved a useful and inspiring base calling for 
further development. It was Caroline Howarth who raised my attention to Billig and 
his discussions on the relation between argumentation, thinking and social 
representations. Billig does not produce an isolated view of the individual trapped in 
the seclusion of her/his thoughts, but like Moscovici, the individual is regarded as an 
active thinker in constant communication and exchange, whose choice of arguments 
reveals projections of the interlocutor, worldviews, beliefs and ideologies. While 
linking theory to methodology, such a consideration is also pivotal for the study of a 
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debate about controversial scientific research taking place in and between the ‘public’. 
Who, though, is the ‘public’? Bauer and Gaskell’s (2002) proposed model for the 
study of the relations between science, technology and the public, provided a 
resourceful framework for the identification and differentiation between actors, 
challengers, counter-challengers, the public sphere and their consequent role therein. 
Human SCNT research, as the first-global media story of biotechnology, was 
considered to be an interesting case through which to study the interface between the 
scientific and the public sphere, for it represented a strong example of the increasing 
interplay between ethics and science. And while prior research into public 
understanding of science sustains interest in the way lay publics receive and transform 
expert knowledge, the issue, here, was reversed. This was not only in tune to relevant 
calls from the social representations tradition (Foster, 2003) but also to a wider need 
in the midst of discussions regarding shifts in contemporary science policy, increased 
public participation, and the restoration of public trust in science. However, the 
present thesis bears no socio-therapeutic aspirations, in the sense of presenting 
conceptual errors and providing solutions for their neutralisation. Instead, it is born 
out of a conviction that any intervention and proposed change needs to account for the 
way different forms of knowledge, opinions, and ideas are formed, sustained, and 
function. This brief presentation of the conceptual groundings of the present thesis is 
believed to summarise its basic underpinnings and to provide a quick view of the 
spectrum of the different theories that have worked as a resource for its execution. At 
the same time, besides assisting in its elaboration, they have also influenced the way 
the research phenomenon was perceived and approached.  
 
7.3.2 On implementation and interpretation 
As a continuation of the above remarks, a more reflective account of the present work 
is discussed. Thus, and accounting for my social representations background, the 
representational field was approached in a more intuitive than pre-established way. 
That is, research questions and hypotheses remained in the background, largely fluid 
and of a more general nature, reworked in the light of new data and analysis. The 
public sphere and the adopted operational definition prioritised a specific 
understanding of it, what Braun and Schultz (2008) call the ‘general’ public. 
Demarcated from more interested and expert publics, like interest groups and 
organisations, this view of the public permits it to be understood as people, citizens, 
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lay media outlets and regulators. In a way, and for the purposes of analytical research, 
it perpetuates the differentiation between expert and non-expert. It is through this 
reading that articles in the scientific journals were analysed, interview questions were 
posed and experts were identified. This, and especially regarding the interview 
situation, does not mean that other themes raised by the interviewees were not 
explored. However, and taking into consideration the participants’ strict work 
schedule, available time was organised, albeit non-systematically and non-invasively, 
so as to secure the discussion of matters of interest.  
 Focus on metaphors and arguments, as a way of studying anchoring and 
objectification processes in discourse are another issue for discussion. This proposed 
distinction is more reflective of methodological and analytical purposes than 
conceptual, for the two processes are interlinked. Thus, there are elements of 
argument in every metaphor as metaphoricity may lie in every argument. While the 
choice of a specific argument with which to address and discuss the public sphere is 
thought to illuminate the process of objectification, certain premises of the argument, 
like data and warrants, have at times a classificatory role. Either as references to past 
scientific debates (‘it is like the embryo debate’) or to specific developments and 
actors (‘If you look at the United States…’), they perform an anchoring function 
linking memory, present, and future. That stated, it should also be noted that certain 
metaphors seem to have acquired an ontological status. This is mostly evident with 
regard to the superordinate categories of ‘engineering’ and ‘conduit’. The idea of 
public opinion as a unified mind, a black box in which to input crystallised 
information has been reproduced not only in the arguments studied but also in models 
and schemes of popularisation initiatives from both scientific, media and regulatory 
representatives for years. The whole establishment of the deficit approach in the 
public understanding of science has been largely based on such images. Another 
hypothesis can also be made about ‘psychopathology’, especially regarding the 
metaphor of ‘contagion’. Though not explicitly stated in the data analysed, 
‘contagion’ might have played a significant role in the quality and form of relations 
between the scientific and the public sphere. For example, how far does the metaphor 
underlie past (like the first attempts to set up the Royal Society, where membership 
was excluded to craftsmen and artisans (Kitcher, 2001), and more recent activities to 
institutionalise science in more self-inclusive contexts? And what do new 
developments, such as, public relations offices, the Internet and other contemporary 
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forms and forums of communication entail? Future research may well trace such 
steps.  
More to the point of the present study, and drawing from Gervais and 
colleagues (1999), an attempt was made to account for the missing parts of the 
arguments analysed, for ‘what is omitted is assumed to signify every bit as much as 
what is included’ (p. 421). Though a conscious effort was made to stay as close as 
possible to the given and from there infer the unsaid, it would be unrealistic to 
propose that full control was exerted on my personal unconscious understandings of 
the interview situation, the public sphere, and science itself. This preoccupation with 
discourse has also resulted in the exclusion of other possible modes and mediums of 
social representations. As prior research on social representations has indicated 
(Jodelet, 1993, Howarth, 1996), representations exist not only in language but also in 
practices and actions, visual images and non-linguistic sounds, for often it is in the 
unspoken that taken-for-granted elements assume existence.  
The focus of the research on human SCNT and the public debate that followed 
after the creation of Dolly the sheep, as well as its final results are by no means taken 
as representative of all the possible ways of conceptualising , making sense, thinking 
about, in one word representing, the public sphere in science. Nor is the partial sample 
of people interviewed representative of the whole of the research community 
performing work in SCNT and human embryonic stem cells. However, the metaphors 
and arguments analysed and the hybridity they suggest, are indicative of possible 
representations and ways of being and living in a small, restricted, almost artificial 
community whose operations regularly challenge widely shared definitions of life and 
death, the human and the non-human, the natural and the unnatural, the ethical and the 
immoral. As the present work comes to an end, I do not mean to have accounted for 
all possible exclusions and absences. After all, though disinterested as one may try to 
stand13, total escape from one’s own subjectivity can never be fully accomplished. 
Again, this is not a relativistic point but a rather realistic one.   
 
                                                 
13
   I could not help but notice here a certain degree of identification with my participants. Is 
not this same claim to a ‘disinterested attitude’ evident also in the experts’ attempts to silence personal 
thoughts, values, and ideas so as to listen to their phenomenon of study? And does not this same claim 
attempt to persuade colleagues and like-minded individuals of the objectivity of one’s own actions and 
findings?  
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7.3.3 The way ahead 
I wish to conclude with some somewhat sketchy and preliminary thoughts regarding 
social representations both as a theory of knowledge, as well as, a conceptual 
framework in the future study of the relationship between the public and the scientific 
spheres. 
 Social psychology’s lengthy domination by individualism and behaviourism 
deprived the study of representation from its human sources and its context of 
production, resulting in a radical dehumanisation of the subject representing 
(Jovchelovitch, 1997). Moscovici’s (1961/1976) initial work marked the beginning of 
a new era in social psychology’s understanding and study of knowledge. And while 
focus was initially placed on less expert types of knowledge and knowledge holders, 
new developments in social representations tradition, with most paradigmatic 
Jovchelovitch’s (ibid) latest work, point to a more symmetrical treatment of all forms 
and types of knowledge. Thus, all knowledge is made of representation calling for an 
illumination of the numerous and complex interrelations among the people who hold 
them (the ‘who’ of the representation), its contents (the ‘what’), its functions (‘how-
why-what for’) and its overall context. However, how far and with what kind of 
implications can such an account be applied to the understanding of scientific 
knowledge per se, that is, of its conditions of genesis and functions?  
 Indeed, Moscovici is not the only one arguing for a more historic, humane and 
creative treatment of representation. Latour and his ethnographic studies of scientific 
laboratories seem to draw analogous conclusions. Nevertheless, at first glance, one 
might well be alarmed by the stark difference between the concepts used by the two 
scholars. Latour’s work is full of references to action (‘name of action’, ‘programs of 
action’, ‘science in action’, ‘actants’, ‘event’, ‘practices’) whereas Moscovici seems 
to give primacy to cognition (‘thinking society’, ‘thinking world’, ‘thought about the 
world - thought in the world’). This may suffice to start a discussion over the 
epistemological differences of the two. However, seen in the context of their 
respective disciplines a different interpretation may be possible. More specifically, 
they are haunted by different ghosts, the former by the ghost of the ‘ahuman’ 
scientific world and the latter by the ghost of the ‘inhuman’ social world.  
Thus, Latour prefers to talk about action in an attempt to stay as close as 
possible to the everyday reality of the scientists, and to demonstrate the constructive 
character of their practices (Latour and Woolgar, 1986):  
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We should emphasise, therefore, that we do not deny that science is a highly 
creative activity. It is just that the precise nature of this creativity is widely 
misunderstood. Our use of creative does not refer to the special abilities of 
certain individuals to obtain greater access to a body of previously unrevealed 
truths; rather it reflects our premise that scientific activity is just one social 
arena in which knowledge is constructed (p. 31). 
 
On the other hand, Moscovici (1984), as has been aforementioned, talks about 
the thinking world in an attempt to overcome the notion of the ‘unthinking society’ 
and to demonstrate the rationality of the modern thinker: 
 
When asking the question: what is a thinking society? We refute at the same  
time the conception which, I believe, prevails in the human sciences, that is, 
 that a society does not think, or, if its does, that this is not an essential  
attribute (p. 15).  
 
Thus, they attack the notion of the ‘input-output’ situation that views 
representation as a mere reproduction of the world by accounting for knowledge in 
association with its conditions of production. Knowledge about something is always 
knowledge of someone in a specific place and time. That science is less about 
discovery and more about creativity and construction, in a similar manner society is 
more about shaping reality than replicating it. And while Moscovici’s discussion of 
‘anchoring’ and ‘objectification’ recuperates the links between the cognitive and the 
social, Latour proposes analogous associations by introducing the concept of 
‘circulating reference’ to account for the representational activities taking place in the 
genesis of scientific knowledge. More specifically, Latour demonstrates the way the 
past comes to form a part of the making sense of a new phenomenon establishing a 
continuation with prior scientific research and meanings through processes of 
classification and categorisation. It is through such developments that a pictorial 
dimension is given to the object represented, transforming it into a map, a diagram, an 
image in an article. Progressively, and in analogy to Moscovici’s objectification, what 
is lost in matter is gained in form. Thus, at the same time that a map is a thing made 
out of paper, it is also the thing in itself; “it does more than resemble. It takes the 
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place of the original situation” (Latour, 1999, p. 67). As Latour notes ‘ontology is 
granted to non-human entities’ (1999, p.287).  
Indeed, a number of interesting analogies are evident in the work of the two 
scholars. Though preliminary, and far exceeding the scopes of the present thesis, 
future work may well trace and make use of these links in a view to further promote 
and substantiate a more symmetrical account of all types of knowledge, bringing to 
the forth its subjective, objective, and intersubjective elements.  
 More to the point of the present research and regarding the study of the 
relationship between science and the public sphere, a series of propositions could well 
be developed paving the way for novel enquiries. Thus, the present study and its 
typification of the various meanings of the public sphere as they exist in both formal 
and informal settings of communication with experts, resulted in the identification of 
a rich representation. Core and peripheral elements bear witness to a tension between 
preservation and accommodation. As boundaries between outsiders and insiders are 
defined and redefined, opening possibilities for hybridisation in both knowing and 
being, old demarcations between mind and body, scientific and non-scientific, still 
hold. While some initial attempts have been made towards the explanation of such a 
complex and mixed representation, future research may well contribute to its further 
illumination. For example, do variations in spatial and/or time parameters result in the 
activation of different elements of the representation identified? Are specific elements 
more absent or present depending on the scientific research group studied or is this 
more of a universal nature? These and related questions could well be addressed in the 
future.  
  A more microgenetic perspective could also bring further breadth and life in 
social psychology’s understanding of relevant phenomena. Studies like, for example, 
that of Jodelet’s (1993) and Gervais’ (1997), have contributed greatly to this view, 
however, there is still much work to be done towards this realisation. An investigation 
of scientific organisational settings and rituals could well enrich such an attempt. How 
far is communication with the public sphere institutionalised in specific scientific 
establishments? What is the form of such institutionalisation and under what agenda 
does it operate? What types of ‘publics’ are preferred or represented? How do 
particular public or private research groups internalise, assimilate, and accommodate 
more external views on their everyday practices? What are these external views? 
What types of artifacts are engaged in the process? What kinds of functions do they 
 257 
perform? What and who is empowered? What and who is submerged? What lies in 
the least visible and most unspoken? What do all of these mean for the self?  
These and similar questions and their answers could further enrich our 
comprehension of social representations, as a way of thinking, being, and acting in a 
live, thinking, and active world. They could also promote a socio-psychological study 
of expert knowledge. This should not be taken as an attempt to use the social so as to 
account for the scientific, but as an opportunity for observing how different modalities 
of knowing come together and/or clash, how different knowledge holders meet others, 
as well as mapping possible forms and instances of self-evaluation and reflection in 
the process (Jovchelovitch, 2007). In this vein, the visions of socio-psychological 
theory and research are expanded. At the same time, they are made use of in the 
continuous effort to sustain communication, to promote different perspectives, and to 
enhance encounters and coexistences.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Cloning and its meanings 
 
Form of cloning      Definition Applications 
Cell cloning A group of genetically 
identical cells produced by 
mitotic division from an 
original cell. This is how 
replacement cells are 
produced in the body when 
the old ones wear out. 
 
A naturally occurring 
procedure practiced in 
biomedical research for over 
50 years 
DNA cloning A group of DNA molecules 
produced from an original 
length of DNA sequences 
produced by a bacterium or a 
virus using molecular 
biology techniques 
A naturally occurring 
procedure practiced in 
biomedical research for over 
20 years 
Cloning by asexual 
reproduction 
A group of genetically 
identical individuals 
descended from the same 
parent by asexual 
reproduction. Many plants 
show this by producing 
suckers, tubers or bulbs to 
colonise the area around the 
parent. 
 
A naturally occurring 
procedure that has been part 
of traditional agricultural 
schemes for centuries 
Cloning by embryo 
splitting 
The production of genetically 
identical animals by ‘embryo 
splitting’. This can occur 
naturally at the 2-cell stage to 
give identical twins.  
 
 
This procedure, occurring 
spontaneously in mammals, 
has mainly been used 
commercially in cattle 
industry for breeding 
purposes. Also useful in 
research settings for the 
production of animals for 
experiments 
Cloning by nuclear 
transfer or Cell Nuclear 
Replacement 
The creation of one or more 
genetically identical animals 
by transferring the nucleus of 
a body cell into an egg from 
which the nucleus has been 
removed.  
 
An artificial procedure with 
applications on both animals 
(transgenic technology) and 
humans (reproductive-
therapeutic cloning) 
(Based on: McLaren, 2002b, p. 175; Seidel, 2000) 
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Appendix 2 
 
From Weismann to Wilmut: A Brief History of Nuclear Transfer 
 
Vertebrate Cloning Timeline 
 
1885 Weismann proposes the theory that there is a loss of genetic  
information (genes) as cell specialize; this theory later proves to be 
incorrect. 
 
 
1914 Spemann performs first nuclear transfer with early newts embryonic  
nuclei. 
 
1938 Spemann publishes Embryonic Development and Induction, in which  
     he suggests a ‘fantastical’ future experiment: the cloning of an adult  
     animal 
 
1952 Briggs and King perform first nuclear transfer where early embryonic  
Rana frog nuclei are microinjected into enucleated eggs 
 
1958 Fischberg, Elsdale and Gurdon clone sexually mature Xenopus frogs  
using late embryonic nuclei 
 
1962 Gurdon uses differentiated donor nuclei to clone sexually mature  
Xenopus  frogs. 
 
1975 Bromhall performs mammalian nuclear transfer in rabbits, but clones  
                 do not develop past the embryonic stages. 
 
1979 Willadsen splits early sheep embryos and artificially produces  
           ‘identical’ (monozygotic) twins 
(continued….) 
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                                                                                                                    (continued…) 
 
1981 Ilmensee  and Hoppe claim to have cloned three adult mice by nuclear  
transfer, but their result has never been repeated 
        
1983         McGrath  and Solter perform mouse nuclear transfer, but only between  
  two zygotic cells, which are basically just fertilized eggs 
 
1986 Willadsen successfully clones sheep from embryonic (undifferentiated)  
cell nuclei. 
 
1993 Hall artificially clones humans via ‘embryo splitting’, but does not  
implant the embryos. 
 
1994 Campbell  and Wilmut clone sheep from differentiated cell nuclei  
  (announced in 1996) 
 
1996 Wilmut clones Dolly the sheep using adult cell nuclei (announced in  
  1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Based on Gurdon & Byrne 2002, p. 49) 
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Appendix 3 
 
Types of stem cells  
 
 
Type of stem cell Description 
Totipotent stem cells They can be defined in two ways, either as cells that are capable of 
producing an entire adult organism or as cells that can give rise to 
every cell line in the developing fetus. Based on the former 
definition they exist for a short period of embryonic development, 
probably up to the 2-4 cell stage in humans. In some cases, 
totipotent cells are equated with pluripotent cells which, however, 
cannot by themselves generate embryos 
Pluripotent stem cells They can differentiate into many types of cells and have the 
capacity to renew themselves indefinitely. These cells can be 
derived either from blastocyst-stage embryos or from fetal 
primordial germ cells (the region that is destined to develop into the 
sperm or eggs). In the former case, they are termed embryonic stem 
cells (ES cells), while in the latter they are called embryonic germ 
cells (EG cells) 
 
Multipotent cells They can be found in later stages of fetal development. They are 
capable of developing into a smaller range of cell types without 
being able to self-reniew endlessly 
Stem cells with more 
restricted potency 
These cells are able to differentiate into only one or a few types of 
specialized cells. Hematopoietic stem cells for example can only 
produce blood cells, skin stem cells only skin cells and so on. 
Recent studies have indicated that adult stem cells may have the 
ability to generate tissues of other sorts, as has been the case for 
example in adult mouse brains 
 
(Based on Royal Society, 2000; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2000; Clarke, et al., 
2000) 
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Appendix 4 
Possible uses of tissue derived from stem cells to treat disease 
 
 
 
CELL TYPE     TARGET DISEASE 
 
Neural (nerve) cells       Stroke, Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s  
                   Diseases, Spinal cord injury, multiple sclerosis 
 
Heart muscle cells       Heart attacks, Congestive heart failure 
 
Insulin producing cells      Diabetes 
 
Cartilage cells       Osteoarthritis 
 
Blood cells       Cancer, Immunodeficiencies, Inherited blood     
                                                    diseases, Leukaemia 
 
Liver cells        Hepatitis, Cirrhosis 
 
Skin cells        Burns, Wound healing 
 
Bone cells        Osteoporosis 
 
Retinal (eye) cells      Macular degeneration 
 
Skeletal muscle cells       Muscular dystrophy 
 
(Source: UK Department of Health 2000, p. 18) 
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Appendix 5 
Complete coding frame (version 7) 
 
Basic Information 
V1 Coder 
V2 Item Number 
V3 Scientific Journal Name 
 Science            1 
 Nature   2 
 
V4 Month [2 digits] 
V5 Day of Month [2 digits] 
V6 Year [4 digits] 
 
Attention structuring 
V7 Size of the article (small= less than 500, medium= less than 1000, large= 
anything above that) 
Small                  1 
 Medium                 2 
Large                  3 
 
V8 Journal Section 
News                   1 
 Editorial                  2 
Correspondence                 3 
Commentary                  4 
Book Reviews                             5 
 
V9 News Format 
Article with latest news/ developments               1 
Response, review of prior article                2 
Interview, mainly                  3 
Opinion piece, commentary                 4 
Other                    5 
 
Authorship 
V10Author 
Not applicable, unknown                  0 
In house-writer                   1 
Sent-in 
Scientists 
University                              2 
Private Laboratory                             3 
  Scientific organization                            4 
  Government research institution                           5 
Hospital                              6 
  Museum                              7 
  University scientist/ ethics committee member                         8 
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  University scientist/ scientific organisation member                         9 
  University scientist/ scientific advisory group                       10 
Private lab scientist- ethics committee member                       11 
  Private lab scientist- Scientific organisation member                      12 
  Private lab scientist- Scientific Advisory group member                 13 
Private lab scientist- Biotechnology organisation member           14 
  Government research inst. scientist- ethics committee member      15 
  Government research inst. scient.- scientific organisation member 16 
  Government research inst. scient.- scientific adv. group member    17 
  Hospital scientist- ethics committee member             18 
  Hospital scientist- scientific organisation group member           19 
  Hospital scientist- scientific advisory group member           20 
  Museum scientist- ethics committee member            21 
  Museum scientist- scientific organisation group member           22 
  Museum scientist- scientific advisory group member           23
    
  Public 
Government                            24 
Government agency 
Health                25 
    Industry               26 
    Research Funding              27 
   Ethics committee                                                28 
   Scientific Advisory Group              29 
   National Patent office               30 
 
  Economic 
   Biotechnology organisation (industry- private)            31 
 
  Other                   32
      
 
Identifying cloning 
V11  Type of cloning  
 Not applicable, not specified                    0 
 Human                      1 
 Animal                      2 
 Other                       3 
 
V12     Human cloning applications  
Not applicable, not mentioned                     0 
Cloning for the birth of genetically identical individuals                1 
Cloning for embryo as a source of stem cells/research                2 
Both the above                     3 
 
The public 
V13 ab Identifying the public  
Not applicable                        0 
Public communication of science                     1 
Public perceptions, people, society                     2 
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 Public opinion poll                       3 
Public Protest                        4 
Public forum, exhibition                      5 
Public consultation, public jury                     6 
 Media coverage (general)                      7
 TV coverage                        8 
Radio coverage                       9 
Newspaper, magazine                    10 
Internet                      11 
Legal regulation, law                     12 
Proposal, draft, bill, guidelines, recommendation, report                13 
 Legal ruling, court                     14 
Science Policy (general)                    15 
Public funding scheme                    16 
Patenting                       17 
Public hearing, briefing                    18 
Public investigation, inspection (regarding illegal actions)                 19 
 Other                       20 
 
V14 ab Focus of the story  
 V14a) Cloning 
 Not applicable                       0 
 Main cloning                        1 
  Other, cloning reference                      2 
 Other symbolic or rhetorical usage of cloning                   3 
 
V14b) (regarding nuclear transfer and embryo splitting) 
   Not applicable                                          0 
 Main Public                                   1 
 Other, public reference                                 2 
 
V15 Controversy  
V15  Public controversy 
Not applicable                       0 
  Balanced                       1
  Imbalanced                                  2 
 
 
V16     Location of the story  
Not applicable, not mentioned           0 
Australia             1 
Austria             2 
Belgium             3 
Brazil              4 
Canada              5 
China              6 
Cyprus              7 
Czech Republic             8 
Denmark             9 
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Estonia           10 
EU            11 
Finland         12 
France          13 
Germany         14 
Greece          15 
Hungary         16 
Ireland          17 
Israel          18 
Italy          19 
Japan          20 
Latvia          21 
Lithuania         22 
Luxembourg         23 
Malta          24 
The Netherlands        25 
New Zealand         26 
Norway         27 
Poland          28 
Portugal         29 
Russia          30 
Saudi Arabia         31 
Slovakia         32 
Slovenia          33 
Spain          34 
Sweden         35 
Switzerland         36 
United Kingdom        37 
United States         38 
Worldwide, ‘The world’       39 
Other Europe          40 
Other Latin America         41 
Other Asia          42 
Africa           43 
‘Europe’          44 
Third World          45 
UN           46 
 
 
Arguments and metaphors 
V17abcdef Claimant (who is arguing about public perceptions- media coverage- 
\regulation)  
Not applicable            0 
Public  
Upper House          1 
Lower House          2 
Legislature          3 
Government          4 
EU Commission         5 
EU Parliament         6 
 291 
EU Council          7 
  Government agencies 
Health, Environment        8 
   Research Funding        9 
Industry       10 
National Patent Office      11 
  European Patent Office      12 
Court         13 
Specific member state/country     14 
UN Organizations       15 
  Policy makers (general)      16 
Ethics Committee       17 
  Scientific Advisory Panel      18 
Media (general)       19 
Newspaper        20 
  TV programme       21 
Radio programme       22 
  People, public (general)      23 
Public opinion poll       24 
  Scientists 
University scientists/ research group     25 
Scientists/ research group in private lab    26 
Hospital research group      27 
Government institution research group    28 
Scientist/ Research Group in Museum    29 
    Joint ventures 
Interuniversity research group     30 
University-industry research group     31 
University-government institution research group   32 
University- Hospital research group     33 
University- Museum research group     34 
Inter-companies research group     35 
Industry- government institution     36 
Industry- Hospital research group     37 
Industry- Museum research group     38 
Inter- government institution research group               39 
  Government institution- Hospital research group   40 
  Government institution- Museum research group   41 
Inter- hospital research group      42 
Hospital- museum research group     43 
  Inter- museum research group     44 
University scientist-ethics committee member   45 
University scientist- Scientific organisation member   46 
University scientist- Scientific Advisory group member  47 
Private lab scientist- ethics committee member   48 
Private lab scientist- Scientific organisation member  49 
Private lab scientist- Scientific Advisory group member  50 
Private lab scientist- Biotechnology organisation member  51 
  Government research inst. scientist- ethics committee member        52 
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  Government research inst. scient.- scientific organisation member 53
  Government research inst. scient.- scientific adv. group member  54 
Hospital scientist- ethics committee member    55 
  Hospital scientist- scientific organisation group member  56 
  Hospital scientist- scientific advisory group member  57 
  Museum scientist- ethics committee member   58 
Museum scientist- scientific organisation group member  59 
Museum scientist- scientific advisory group member  60
  
Scientific organisation      61 
  Scientific community, scientists (general)    62 
 
 
Economic 
Biotechnology company      63 
Biotechnology organization (industry, private)   64 
  Patients groups       65 
Pro-life, anti-abortion organizations     66 
Religious groups, Church      67 
Environmental groups      68 
  ‘Anti-cloning groups’       69 
‘Pro- cloning groups’       70 
Author(s)                    71 
            Other                     72 
 
 
V18abcdef  (string variable) 
Area of research - Applicable only when the arguer is a scientist (relevant to 
V17, code for each actor) 
V19abcdef Type of argument 
 Not applicable         0 
Technocratic         1 
 Strategic         2 
 Other          3 
V20abcdef Public arena claimed (equivalent to V17) 
V21abcdef Location of public arena (equivalent to V16) 
V22abcdef Metaphor user (equivalent to V17) 
V23 abcdef Area of research - Applicable only when the metaphor user is a 
scientist (String, code for each actor) 
V24abcdef Metaphor (relevant to V22, string variable) 
V25abcdef Public arena to which the metaphor refers (equivalent to V17) 
V26abcdef Location of the arena to which the metaphor refers (equivalent to 
V16) 
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Appendix 6 
Basic frequencies of corpus variables of the public sphere in Nature and Science 
 
 
 Table 1. Number of articles discussing the public sphere in Nature and Science (V3) 
Scientific journal No of articles Percentage % 
Nature 235 51 
Science 226 49 
Total 461 100% 
 
 
Table 2. Number of articles discussing the public sphere by year (V6) 
Year No of articles Percentage % 
1997 45 10 
1998 65 14 
1999 35     7.5 
2000 36  8 
2001 48 10 
2002 82 18 
2003 44     9.5 
2004 54 12 
2005 52 11 
Total 461 100% 
 
 
Table 3. Number of articles discussing the public sphere by size (V7) 
Size of articles No of articles Percentage % 
Small 243 53 
Medium 161 35 
Large 57 12 
Total 461 100% 
 
 
Table 4. Number of articles discussing the public sphere by journal section (V8) 
Journal section No of articles Percentage % 
News 352 76 
Editorial 42  9 
Correspondence 28 6 
Commentary 20 4 
Book reviews 19 4 
Total 461 100% 
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Table 5. Number of articles discussing the public sphere by news format (V9) 
News format No of articles Percentage % 
Article with latest 
news/developments 
346 75 
Response/ review of prior article 17  4 
Opinion piece/commentasry 98 21 
Total 461 100% 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Percentage of authors of articles discussing the public sphere (V10) 
Type of author Percentage % 
Not applicable   1 
In-house journalist 80 
University research group 11  
Scientific organisation   0.5 
Government research institution   1 
Museum   0.2 
University/ethics committee member   1 
University/ scientific advisory group 
member 
  0.5 
Government   1 
Ethics committee group member   0.2 
Biotechnology organisation   0.2 
Hospital   0.2 
Other   3 
Total 100% 
 
 
 
Table 7. Percentage of types of cloning reported in articles discussing the public  
 sphere (V11) 
Type of cloning Percentage % 
Not applicable   6 
Human 83 
Animal 11 
Other   2 
Total 100% 
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Table 8. Percentage of types of human cloning reported in articles discussing the  
 public sphere (V12) 
Type of human cloning Percentage % 
Not applicable 30 
Human reproductive cloning 13 
Human therapeutic cloning 24 
Both 33 
Total 100% 
 
 
 
Table 9. Percentage of public developments reported in articles discussing the  
   public sphere¹ (V13ab) 
Type of public development Percentage % 
Not applicable 29.0 
Public communication of science   1.0 
Public perceptions 10.0 
Public opinion poll   1.5 
Public forum/exhibition   0.5 
Public consultation/jury   1.0 
Internet   0.1 
Media coverage   3.0 
TV coverage   1.5 
Newspaper   2.0 
Legal law/regulation   3.0 
Proposal/ draft 24.0   
Legal ruling   1.0 
Science policy   8.0 
Public funding scheme   7.0 
Patenting   2.0 
Public hearing   4.0 
Public investigation   0.3 
Radio coverage   0.2 
Other   0.1 
Total 100% 
¹ Combined multiple codings 
 
Table 10. Focus of the story of articles discussing the public sphere (V14b) 
Focus Percentage % 
Main public 49.6 
Other, public reference 50.3 
Total 100% 
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Table 11. Controversy in the story of articles discussing the public sphere (V15) 
Controversy Percentage % 
Not applicable 35.5 
Balanced 24.7 
Imbalanced 39.6 
Total 100% 
 
 
Table 12. Percentage of locations reported in articles discussing the public sphere 
(V16) 
Location Percentage % 
Not applicable   8.0 
Australia   2.0 
Brazil   0.4 
Canada   1.0 
China   1.0 
EU   4.0 
Europe   0.4 
France   2.0 
Germany   3.0 
Italy   2.0 
Japan   5.0 
Netherlands   1.0 
Norway   0.2 
Russia   1.0 
Spain   0.2 
Sweden   0.4 
Switzerland   0.4 
UK 11.0 
UN   5.0 
USA 45.0 
Other Europe   0.2 
Other Latin America   0.2  
Other Asia   5.0  
Worldwide/the world   2.0 
Total 100% 
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Table 13. Percentage of claimants reported in articles discussing the public sphere¹ 
(V17abcdef) 
Claimant Percentage % 
Not applicable 84.5 
Anti-cloning group   0.3 
Author   4.4 
Biotechnology company   0.2 
Biotechnology organisation   0.5 
Ethics committee   0.4 
EU Parliament   0.1 
Government   0.4 
Government research institution group   0.2 
Government research institution/ethics 
committee member 
  0.1 
Health agency   0.1 
Legislature   0.1 
Lower House   0.2 
Patients   0.2 
Policy makers (general)   0.1 
Pro-cloning group   0.1 
Religious group/church   0.2 
Research funding agency   0.2 
Scientific community/scientists (general)   0.4 
Scientific organisation   1.6 
Scientific advisory panel   0.2 
Specific member state/country   1.0 
University scientist/research group   2.3 
University scientist/ethics committee 
member 
  0.3 
University scientist/scientific 
organisation 
  0.1 
University scientist/ scientific advisory 
group  
  0.1 
Upper House   0.4 
Other   0.7 
Total  100% 
¹ Combined multiple codings 
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Table 14. Percentage of types of arguments reported in articles discussing the public  
     sphere¹ (V19abcdef) 
 
Type of argument Percentage % 
Not identified 87.0 
Technocratic    8.0 
Strategic   5.4 
Total 100% 
¹ Combined multiple codings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15. Percentage of public arenas claimed in articles discussing the public  
     sphere¹ (V20abcdef) 
Public arena claimed Percentage % 
Not applicable 84.5 
Ethics committee   1.5 
EU Council   0.2 
EU Parliament   0.3 
Government   1.0 
Health agency   0.1 
Industry agency   0.1 
Legislature   3.6 
Lower House   0.1 
Media (general)   0.4 
National patent office   0.1 
People/ public in general   2.2 
Research funding agency   0.3 
Scientific advisory group   0.1 
Specific member state/country   0.6 
UN organisation   1.3 
Upper House   2.0 
Total 100% 
¹ Combined multiple codings 
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Table 16. Location of public arenas claimed in articles discussing the public sphere¹ 
    (V21abcdef) 
Location of public arena claimed Percentage % 
Not applicable 86 
Australia   0.4 
China   0.1 
EU   0.6 
Germany   0.2 
Japan   0.8 
UK   1.2 
USA   8.0 
Worldwide/world   0.8 
Other Asia   0.4 
UN   1.3 
Total 100% 
¹ Combined multiple codings 
 
 
Table 17. Metaphor users in articles discussing the public sphere¹ (V22abcdef) 
Metaphor user Percentage % 
Not identified 90.0 
Anti-cloning group   0.3 
Author   8.5 
Scientific organisation   0.2 
University research group   0.4 
Other   0.1 
Total 100% 
¹ Combined multiple codings 
 
 
Table 18. Public arenas anchored in articles discussing the public sphere¹ (V25abcdef) 
Public arena anchored Percentage % 
Not applicable 90.0 
Ethics committee   0.8 
EU Council   0.3 
EU Parliament   0.3 
Government   0.6 
Health agency   0.1 
Legislature   1.3 
Lower House   0.6 
Media (general)   1.2 
People/ public (general)   1.0 
Policy makers (general)   0.2 
Research funding agency   0.1 
Specific member state/country   0.2 
UN organisation   0.5 
Upper House   2.3 
Total 100% 
¹ Combined multiple codings 
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Table 19. Location of public arenas anchored in articles discussing the public sphere¹ 
(V26abcdef) 
Location of public arena claimed Percentage % 
Not applicable 91.0 
Australia   0.2 
EU   0.6 
Japan   0.2 
Other Asia   0.1 
Switzerland   0.1 
UK   1.0 
UN   0.5 
USA   6.0 
Worldwide/the ‘world’   0.3 
Total 100% 
¹ Combined multiple codings 
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Appendix 7 
Argumentation analysis: an example  
 
 
Response Letter published in Science, Vol 297, Issue 5578, 51-52, 5 July 2002 
  
Response  
We thank Jones for the historical context. We can think of no one better to emulate 
than King, Briggs, and Gurdon, who have contributed so many elegant studies to 
modern embryology. "Nuclear transplantation" was a good term when they coined it, 
and it remains good. It is far more accurate than "therapeutic cloning" and much 
more easily pronounceable than "somatic cell nuclear transfer."  
Meyer has, unfortunately, missed the point of our Policy Forum. Human cells 
growing in a Petri dish are not equal to a human being. This is fact, not opinion. 
Cells in a Petri dish can't talk, think, move, love, laugh, or cry, to name a few of the 
numerous and obvious differences. Thousands of laboratories around the world 
already grow human cells (fibroblasts, lymphocytes, etc.) in Petri dishes. Each of 
these cells has the theoretical capacity to develop into a human being after 
experimental manipulation. The major medical goal of nuclear transplantation is to 
produce human cells growing in Petri dishes that can be used for regenerative 
medicine. The public needs to understand that there is a huge difference between such 
cells and an actual human being. It is important that the current confusion about 
these issues does not lead to a ban on the production of certain types of human cells 
growing in Petri dishes, precluding potential therapies for the millions of human 
beings who currently suffer from otherwise incurable diseases.  
 
 
 
 
Step 1: Identifying main points of argumentation 
 
Human cells growing in a Petri dish are not equal to a human being. This is fact, not 
opinion. Cells in a Petri dish can't talk, think, move, love, laugh, or cry, to name a few 
of the numerous and obvious differences. The major medical goal of nuclear 
transplantation is to produce human cells growing in Petri dishes that can be used for 
regenerative medicine. The public needs to understand that there is a huge difference 
between such cells and an actual human being. It is important that the current 
confusion about these issues does not lead to a ban on the production of certain types 
of human cells growing in Petri dishes, precluding potential therapies for the millions 
of human beings who currently suffer from otherwise incurable diseases. 
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Step 2: Identifying the structure and type of argumentation 
 
Data: The public needs to understand that there is a huge difference between cells in a 
Petri dish and an actual human being 
 
Warrant: Cells in a Petri dish can’t talk, think, move, laugh or cry 
 
Backing: Potential therapies for the millions of human beings who currently suffer 
from otherwise incurable diseases could come from cell in a Petri dish 
Claim: It is important that the current confusion about these issues does not lead to a 
ban on the production of certain types of human cells growing in Petri dishes 
 
Type of argumentation: Technocratic 
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Appendix 8 
Contact e-mail: Example 
 
 
 
Dear Dr  , 
 
     There have been a number of studies focusing on the public understanding and 
conceptualisation of somatic cell nuclear transfer technology, however there is a lack 
of information with regard to the way scientists have experienced public engagement 
with and understanding of this technology. I was wondering if you or any of your 
colleagues have some time available to talk to me about this issue. 
      I am fully aware of your busy schedule and of other similar demands made on you 
by the social science community and I apologize in advance if this message puts an 
additional pressure on you. However, I would be grateful if you agreed to take part in 
this research, for it is one of the few instances in which scientists are given the 
opportunity to talk about their work and interests. 
 
  
I will e-mail you again so as to discuss the details of a possible meeting. 
 
Thanking you in advance for your assistance I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
Alexandra Kolka 
PhD student in Social Psychology 
Institute of Social Psychology 
London School of Economics 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/socialPsychology/whosWho/researchStudents.htm 
 
 
 
P.S. Additional information about the research project 
 
My name is Alexandra Kolka and I am currently conducting my PhD research project 
at the Institute of Social Psychology, London School of Economics. The project 
involves the study of scientists working in areas relevant to somatic cell nuclear 
transfer technology and it focuses on the scientific point of view on the public reaction 
to the human applications of the technique (otherwise known as human reproductive 
cloning and human therapeutic cloning). The project is funded by the LSE Research 
Studentships Award (2004-2005) and supervised by Dr Martin Bauer 
(m.bauer@lse.ac.uk). An integral part of the project employs the conduction of 
individual interviews with scientists licensed by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority to work with human embryonic stem cells. The interview will 
be conducted at a place and date of your preference and any information that could 
reveal your identity and the institution you are working for will be regarded as strictly 
confidential and will not be disclosed.  
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Appendix 9   
Interview Topic Guide 
 
 
 
Initiation phase 
Introducing the researcher, explaining confidentiality, expressing gratitude, presenting 
the principles of the interview, granting permission for the use of a tape recorder, 
allowing preliminary questions to be asked, listening, and preparing for the 
questioning phase. 
 
Themes to be discussed 
1. Interviewee’s research interest 
2. Interviewee’s personal experience with science communication 
 
 
 
 
Questioning phase 
Exploring themes in the narration, prompting descriptions, examples, explanations 
and justifications 
 
Themes to be discussed 
1. Public perceptions of human cloning research and applications 
2. Media coverage of human cloning research and applications 
3. Regulation of human cloning research 
 
 
 
 
Closure 
Summarizing the discussion, enquiring about uncovered issues, expressing gratitude 
1. The Switzerland scenario 
2. Final thoughts and comments 
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Appendix 10 
Additional information sheet 
 
 
 
 
About you! 
 
The following information about you is necessary for further statistical analysis and 
will be treated with confidentiality: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Current profession: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working in this profession since: 
 
 
 
 
 
Research interests:  
 
 
 
 
Participation in science communication activities since  
 
 
 
 
Age:  
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Contextual information about the interview and the interviewee 
Appendix 11 
Documentation sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date of the interview:                         ……………….…………………………….. 
 
Place of the interview:                        ……………….…………………………….. 
 
Duration of the interview:                   ……………….…………………………….. 
 
Gender:                                                ……………….…………………………….. 
 
Age:                                                      …………………………………………….. 
 
Profession:                                            …………………………………………….. 
 
Working in this profession since:         …………………………………………….. 
 
Research interests:                                …………………………………………….. 
 
Peculiarities of the interview:        
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
(Based on Flick, 2000, pg. 84) 
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Appendix 12 
Argumentation analysis: example of interview data 
 
 
Extract from interview #5 with a senior university embryologist 
 
(I= Interviewer, P= Participant) 
 
- I: So, would you like to tell me a little bit more about your research, the kind 
of research you are involved in? 
- P: The research we actually do is, we have set up a system where you can 
donate embryos for stem cell research. And we are doing two things: one is 
deriving embryonic stem cell lines and secondly looking at the epigenetic 
profile of the inner cell, and the development of the epigenetic pattern, as the 
development of the embryo takes place. In addition to that, we have applied to 
a funding, although we have not been qualified yet, to set up a good 
manufacturing and practicing laboratory for IVF, so that you can produce high 
quality embryos that you can then use for stem cell research for treatment; at 
the moment it is only research. So, that is really our primary focus. But I am 
also a member of the X [regulatory body], so we have quite a lot of 
discussions about nuclear transfer. 
- I: I see, can you tell me a little bit more about these meetings and the chances 
you get to communicate your research to a wider audience? 
- P: On a personal level I have been quite heavily involved with how you try to 
communicate with the public on the value of, let’s say, therapeutic cloning and 
embryonic stem cell research in general. I think you have to strike the balance 
between being secretive and trying to sort of pretend you know everything and 
the public knows nothing and trying to protect the information you already 
have, because a lot of it is confidential, a lot of it is quite preliminary, to then 
give the public confidence. And I think you really gain public confidence 
when you perceive and seem to be and actually are open and honest about 
what is going on. And there is a lot of debate, so for example, in the U.K they 
were quite lucky because there was a lot of debate about animal research for 
many, many years but certainly it was solidified in 1991 with the HFE Act. 
And that really set strong the concept of embryo research; once you have got 
that then the issue of stem cells came there was further debate but it was on a 
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platform that was actually quite strong. And the U.K took a different concept, 
you could do nuclear transfer, but there was a lot of debate about how to do 
that, not to do reproductive cloning, what the advantages and disadvantages 
are and there was a host select committee etc., etc. I think once you got a lot of 
debate around what is happening and it is an informed debate rather than an 
emotional the scientists can then sort of put forward to the public reasonably 
how may be the benefits of what they do. Of course, they do not know that for 
certain but they know to a large degree. So, that strikes me as the best model. I 
think if you use a model of ‘well scientists know best, go away’, it is suicide, 
and if you use that model you just stop putting anything in the public. I think 
that is also a problem because you are not using any informed decisions. 
- I: So what about your experience, have you ever participated in a debate where 
SCNT was discussed? 
- P: Yes, I have. I think you get quite a lot of strong views and they tend to be 
really quite predictable views, you know, ‘the embryo, you should not do 
research on the embryo and destroy it, how do we know it is not a slippery 
slope argument?’, and there are lots of ways of dealing with this. I think once 
you can portray those to the people 85% of the people will understand that, 
15% percent no matter what you do they never going to change their mind 
and, you know, all you have got to do to those people is actually be prepared 
to debate it; you cannot hide, you have to go over there and say: ‘no I disagree 
with that, that is not right’, you know? But not from an emotional point of 
view, because this is the way it is. 
- I: So, what do you mean by this emotional point of view? 
- P: I think for the emotional point of view, I think people get very emotional 
about embryo research. ‘Is it a human?’, ‘are you hurting somebody?’, or 
‘what is happening?’ and they are driven emotionally rather than really 
logically. Once you start to explain to them what goes on and the loss of the 
human embryos etc., etc., then they start to get a grip of actually ‘I thought 
every embryo was a human’. Even if you get that stage you can start to then 
properly inform them of what really is going on and how it happens and then 
they see people who are involved in research and they discuss with them and 
they become a lot more open and you know, it is less instinctive, less 
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emotional, it is much more, they say things like ‘I did not know that, now I 
understand why you are trying to do so and so’. I think that is a positive thing. 
- I: And you think this is the same with SCNT research? 
- P: I think so, at least in my limited experience. There is still confusion as to 
move away from the term ‘cloning’, for example, but there is still confusion 
about nuclear transfer and how that will go forward. There, for a long time 
there were a lot of, you know, all of the Antinoris in this world and Zavos 
standing up and saying we have done this and that. And that tends not to help 
at all. I think we have put quite a strong campaign to assure that that is not 
really at all; but mind you, a few months ago we had the first license for stem 
cells for nuclear transfer and, you know, the technology is there it is just a case 
of using it, and how  that  can be done. And a true license is now in the U.K 
with X, but basically they have done that. You know, that is a very positive 
thing; it has opened up the debate, there is some information on the website 
for people. I think it has generally been handled very well.  
- I: I see. So you are saying that although the actions of specific scientists like 
Antinori and Zavos had to do a little bit with an initial confusion.. 
- P: Yes, I mean, they were trying, they were just PR idiots as far as I am  
 concerned and they know nothing of what is going on. Now, that does not stop  
 them from being front page in the newspapers, because the newspapers they  
 just want a headline. But what you have to do with those, you have to sort of  
 face that issue head on and say: ‘ they have claimed ‘x, y’ and ‘z, x, y’ and ‘z’  
 is not true. And you just go over scientific opinion to sort of put that forward.  
 And then, in most cases, the editors of the newspapers have been basically  
 informed and, you know, these are disreputable people, this is not the way to  
 do it. Yet, if this is to happen you will know about it and it will be done in this  
 way and we will tell you as soon as this is done, it will be done in some stage.  
 So, I think that strikes me as a positive way to deal with this and then you can  
 write articles in the paper that are more balanced rather than ‘clones on the  
 horizon’. 
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Step 1: Identifying main points of argumentation 
 
On a personal level I have been quite heavily involved with how you try to 
communicate with the public on the value of, let’s say, therapeutic cloning and 
embryonic stem cell research in general. I think you have to strike the balance 
between being secretive and trying to sort of pretend you know everything and the 
public knows nothing. And I think you really gain public confidence when you 
perceive and seem to be and actually are open and honest about what is going on. And 
there is a lot of debate; so, for example, in the UK there was a lot of debate about 
animal research for many, many years but certainly it was solidified in 1991 with the 
HFE Act. I think once you got a lot of debate around what is happening and it is an 
informed debate rather than an emotional the scientists can then sort of put forward to 
the public reasonably how the benefits of what they do may be. I think if you use a 
model of ‘well, scientists know best, go away’, it is suicide, and if you use that model 
you just stop putting anything in the public. I think that is also a problem because you 
are not using any informed decisions. I think you get quite a lot of strong views and 
they tend to be really quite predictable views ‘the embryo, you should not do research 
on the embryo and destroy it, how do we know it is not a slippery slope argument’, 
and there are lots of ways of dealing with this. I think once you can portray those to 
the people 85% of the people will understand that, 15% percent no matter what you 
do they never going to change their mind and all you have got to do to those people is 
actually be prepared to debate it, you cannot hide, you have to go over there and say:  
‘no I disagree with that. It is not right’. I think people get very emotional about 
embryo research and they are driven emotionally rather than really logically. Once 
you start to explain to them what goes on and the loss of the human embryos then 
they start to get a grip of it. There is still confusion about nuclear transfer and how 
that will go forward. For a long time there were all of the Antinoris in this world and 
Zavos standing up and saying we have done this and that. And that tends not to help at 
all. I think we have put quite a strong campaign to assure that that is not really at all. 
They were just PR idiots as far as I am concerned and they know nothing of what is 
going on. Now, that does not stop it from being front page in the newspapers, because 
the newspapers they just want a headline. What you have to do with those, you have 
to sort of face that issue head on and say they have claimed ‘x, y’ and ‘z, x, y’ and ‘z’ 
is not true. And you just go over scientific opinion to sort of put that forward. So, I 
 311 
think that strikes me as a positive way to deal with this and then you can write articles 
in the paper that are more balanced rather than ‘clones on the horizon’. 
 
 
Step 2: Identifying the structure and type of argumentation 
 
1
st
 argument 
 
Data: On a personal level I have been quite heavily involved with how you try to 
communicate with the public on the value of, let’s say, therapeutic cloning and 
embryonic stem cell research in general. 
 
Warrant: I think you really gain public confidence when you perceive and seem to be 
and actually are open and honest about what is going on. 
 
Claim: I think you have to strike the balance between being secretive and trying to 
sort of pretend you know everything and the public knows nothing. 
 
Implied backing: (since we need the public’s confidence in order to proceed with our 
research) 
 
Type of argumentation: Strategic 
 
 
2
nd
 argument 
 
Data: In the UK there was a lot of debate about animal research for many, many years 
but certainly it was solidified in 1991 with the HFE Act. 
 
Warrant: We need an informed debate rather than an emotional one. 
 
Backing: (Since) we should be using informed decisions. 
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Claim: The scientists can then put forward to the public reasonably how the benefits 
of what they do may be. 
 
Type of argumentation: Technocratic 
 
 
3d argument 
 
Data: There are quite a lot of strong views and they tend to be really quite predictable.  
 
Warrant: I think people get very emotional about embryo research and they are driven 
emotionally rather than really logically. 
 
Backing: Once you start to explain to them what goes on and the loss of the human 
embryos then they start to get a grip of it. 
 
Claim: You have to go over there and say: ‘no I disagree with that. It is not right’. 
 
Type of argumentation: Technocratic 
 
 
4
th
 argument 
 
Data: There is still confusion about nuclear transfer and how that will go forward 
 
Warrant: For a long time there were all of the Antinoris in this world and Zavos 
standing up and saying we have done this and that. 
 
Baking: As far as I am concerned they know nothing of what is going on. 
 
Claim: I think we have to put quite a strong campaign to assure that that is not really 
at all. 
 
Type of argumentation: Technocratic 
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5
th
 argument 
 
Data: Antinori and Zavos are front page in the newspapers. 
 
Warrant: The newspapers just want a headline. 
 
Backing: They should be writing articles in the paper that are more balanced rather 
than ‘clones on the horizon’. 
 
Claim: What you have to do with those, you have to sort of face that issue head on 
and say they have claimed ‘x, y’ and ‘z, x, y’ and ‘z’ is not true. You just go over 
scientific opinion to sort of put that forward.  
 
Type of argumentation: Technocratic 
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Appendix 13- Instructions for coding 
 
Content analysis: Instructions to coders 
 
1. The coding frame 
The coding frame is roughly divided into four sections. Thus, each article is coded in 
such a way so as to document issues relating to 1) basic information about the article 
(item number, name of journal, date), 2) salience of the public sphere (size, journal 
section, news format, author,), 3) identification of the public sphere (public themes, 
focus, location and type of cloning), 4) arguing about the public sphere (claimant
14
, 
public arena claimed, location of public arena claimed). According to syntactical 
procedures, the use of metaphorical concepts are documented (string code) while 
information regarding the metaphor user and the arena to which the metaphor applies 
are coded as well. The purpose of the coding frame is to identify the way   public 
developments regarding human and animal cloning (public perceptions, media 
coverage and regulation) are reported.  
 
2. Before coding 
In order for the coder to fully appreciate the rationale of the coding frame it is pivotal 
to read the attached files named ‘the rationale’, ‘on cloning’ and ‘on the public 
sphere’. The files provide information about the rationale of the overall research, the 
type of cloning that is of interest to the present study (that is somatic cell nuclear 
transfer (SCNT) for human and non human applications) as well as a workable 
definition of the ‘public sphere’ (that is, public perceptions, media coverage, 
regulation of SCNT).  Please do not start coding unless you have read and fully 
understood those files.  
 
3. Coding 
In what follows basic instructions are provided for each variable: 
 
v1: Just write your name in the coding sheet 
                                                 
14
 In cases where the claimant or the user of metaphor was a scientist, a string code documents his/her 
specialisation 
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v2: Each article has been assigned a code. The code is provided both on the copy of 
the article as well as in the list of articles given (file: ‘List of Titles of 46 articles to be 
coded’) 
v3: Identification of the journal in which the article has been published. Two are the 
scientific journals under analysis: Nature and Science. Please code accordingly 
v4-v6: Date information 
v7: The size of the article is coded. If the article is less than 500 words, then code as 
‘small’, if less than 1000 code as ‘medium’, anything above that is coded as ‘large’ 
v8: In which section is the article appearing? In Science the following sections are 
coded as ‘news’: News, News of the week, News focus, ScienceScope, Random 
samples, News and Comment. Sections like Policy forum, Breakthrough of the year, 
Science’s compass and Pathways of discovery are coded as ‘commentary’. Letters is 
coded as ‘correspondence’ 
In Nature sections like Brief, News feature and News in brief are coded as ‘news’. 
Correspondence is coded as ‘correspondence’. The sections Millenium Essay and 
Words are coded as ‘commentary’.  
v9: The article is coded according to the content and the way of reporting  
V10: If the article has been written by more than one author then you code for the one 
reported first. Note than in Science the sections Random Samples’ and ScienceScope 
are always coded as written by ‘in-house authors’.  
 
List of names of Science authors coded as ‘in-house’:  
Philip Abelson, Joseph Alper, Tim Appenzeller, Palava Bagla, Michael Balter, 
Marcia Barinaga, Floyd Bloom, Monica Bradford, John Brauman, Anne Brinlmann, 
Kathryn Brown,  Gilbert J. Chin, Adrian Cho, Barry Cipra, Daniel Clery, Jon Cohen, 
Elizabeth Culotta, David Ehrenstein, Martin Enserink, Linda Felaco, Dan Ferber, 
Richard Gallagher, Candace Gallery, Joshua Gewolb, Ann Gibbons, Christine 
Gilbert, James Glanz, Trisha Gura,  Michael Hagmann, Brooks Hanson, Jeffrey 
Hearn, Pamela Hines, Belinda Holden, Constance Holden, Stella Hurtley, Barbara 
Jasny, Patricia Kahn, Jocelyn Kaiser, Katrina Kelner, Donald Kennedy,  Richard 
Kerr, David Kestenbaum, Paula Kiberstis, Cherlene King, Robert Koenig, Carolyn 
Kyle, Steven Lapham, Andrew Lawler, Josh Lipicky, Diane Long, John 
MacFarlane, Charles Mann, Eliot Marshall, Jean Marx, Dawn McCoy, Jefrey 
Mervis, Linda Miller,  Anne Simon Moffat, Patricia Moore, Virginia Morell, Oliver 
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Morton,  Colin Norman, Dennis Normile, Elizabeth Pennisi, Richard Peters, John 
Pickrell, Beverly Purnell, Bryan Ray, Leslie Roberts, Wade Roush, Linda Rowan, 
Ellis Rubinstein,  Charles Seife, Robert Service, Robert Sikorski, Stephen Simpson, 
Orla Smith, Richard Stone, Phillip Szuromi, Gary Taubes, Julia Uppenbrink, 
Gretchen Vogel, David Voss, Ingrid Wickelgren, Nigel Williams, Anita Wynn, Ding 
Yimin 
 
List of names of Nature authors coded as ‘in-house’: 
Alison Abbott, Sara Abdulla, David Adam, Peter Aldhous, Laura Bonetta, Xavier 
Bosch, Geoff Brumfiel, Declan Butler, Erika Check, Harriet Coles, David Cyranosky, 
Rex Dalton, Carina Dennis, David Dickson, Olivier de Gandt, Natalie DeWitt, Jim 
Giles, Jenny Hogan, K.S. Jayaraman, Jonathan Knight, Sally Lehrman, Carl 
Levith, Natasha Loder, Heather Maccabe, Colin Macilwain, Ehsan Massod, Nicola 
Nosengo, Helen Pearson, Kendall Powell, Asako Saegusa, Quirin Schiermeier, Paul 
Smaglik, David Swinbank, Robert Triendl, Meredith Wadman 
 
List of institutions coded as ‘University’: Monash Institute for Reproduction and 
Development 
 
List of institutions coded as ‘Private Laboratory’: Carnegie Institution of 
Washington, Donald Danforth Plant Science Center, Institute for Genomic Research, 
USA;  
 
List of institutions coded as ‘Scientific organisation’: The Scripps Research Institute 
The Skaggs Institute for Chemical Biology 
 
List of institutions coded as ‘Government research institution’: Banbury Centre, 
John Innes Centre, Institut Cochin de Genetique Moleculaire, Max Planck Institut 
(Germany), Pacific Centre for Ethics and Applied Biology, Pangea Systems Inc., 
1999 National Human Genome Center, Shanghai, China; Salk Institute for Biological 
Studies, Salk Institute, La Jolla;  
 
List of institutions coded as ‘Hospital’: Clinical Trial Service Unit., MacCallum 
Cancer Institute 
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v11: Each article could be referring to more than one type of cloning. For example, if 
an article is discussing about both the human and animal applications of cloning then 
you code according to the main focus. There are times where general, non-specified, 
references to cloning are made; then you code as ‘not specified’. If other than human 
or animal uses of cloning are reported then you code for ‘other’.  
v12:  Only to be used for human applications of cloning! If an article does not 
discuss the human applications of cloning then you code as ‘not mentioned’. Again, in 
some other cases a general reference to human cloning may be made. If you are not 
100% sure which type of human cloning it is meant then code as ‘not mentioned’. If 
the article discusses human cloning as a form of human replication then you code as 
‘1’. If the article makes reference to the therapeutic applications of human cloning and 
stem cells research then you code as ‘2’. If the article discusses both then you code 
accordingly. 
v13ab: The purpose of this variable is to identify the different ways and types in 
which the three main arenas of the public sphere that are of interest (public 
perceptions, media coverage, regulation) are reported in the scientific press. Again 
more than one reference may be made. Our interest lies at the top two references. 
After you have read the article you then need to identify which are the main public 
references and then you code them according to the order of their appearance in the 
text. You may have noticed that law is coded separately from proposal, bill and the 
rest. The purpose here is to demarcate between science policy in the making (= in this 
case reference is usually made to proposal, bill, draft, guidelines, recommendation, 
report) and science policy as a fait accompli (law). Also public perceptions (usually 
referred to generally as people, society, the public) is to be treated separately from 
public opinion poll (when direct reference is made to the results of a study). Caution: 
the variable refers only to public developments relevant to cloning. If an article is also 
discussing the public developments of another type of research, for example nuclear 
power or stem cell research with no direct relevance to cloning, then you ignore that. 
Again, we are interested only in those developments in public perceptions, media 
coverage and regulation that relate to cloning.  
v14ab: The variable identifies the focus of the story. Again v14b measures only those 
public developments that refer to cloning.  
v15: if a public controversy regarding cloning is reported then code if it is a balanced 
reporting or not. A report is considered balanced when the author does not directly 
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position himself/herself and/or all the relevant rival points and voices are given equal 
attention.  
v16: Identification of the location. If more than one location is discussed in relation to 
public developments of cloning then you code based on the main location. 
 
 
Arguments and metaphors (v17abcdef- v26abcdef) 
The last set of codes identifies arguments and metaphors used when discussing the 
public perceptions, media coverage and regulation of cloning. The codes are 
interrelated. That means that v17a is relevant to v18a and v19a and v20a and v21a and 
so on and so forth. Before coding for this last part you first need to proceed with the 
argumentation analysis. Please see the instructions included in the folder 
‘Argumentation analysis of articles’.  
 
v17abcdef: The purpose of this code is to identify the person that is making an 
argument about the public perceptions, and/or, the media coverage, and/or the 
regulation of cloning. Up to 6 different claimants could be coded. Again they are 
coded based on the order they are reported in the article. Sometimes the same person, 
either the author, or someone reported in the text might make more than one 
argument. Two or more different arguments may be made about i.e. public 
perceptions or the same argument may refer to both i.e. public perceptions, media 
coverage or still two or more different arguments may be made about i.e. the public 
perceptions and regulation. You code separately for each argument. The following 
steps might be of help: 
 
1. Read through the article identifying those sections of it that contain 
argumentative material relevant to the public perception and/or media 
coverage, and/or regulation of cloning.  
2. Perform argumentation analysis- here you basically need to identify the 
structure of the argument (claim- data- warrant- backing-rebuttal). This will 
help you to identify the exact number of arguments reported in the article. In 
the case of commentary sections where the purpose of the article is to provide 
the author’s opinion about a development try to identify the number and the 
structure of the arguments made by the author. If in the process of his/her 
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argumentation the author is making reference to somebody else’s argument, 
either in an attempt to destroy or line himself/ herself with that way of 
thinking, there is no need to account for that person’s argument separately. 
Most of the times, that ‘somebody else’s argument’ is part of the author’s 
main arguments and is usually accounted for as ‘data’. In other cases, mostly 
regarding articles that report the latest news, reference is only made to 
different claims made from different claimants without including the reasons 
why those people are arguing in such a way. Again, you code separately for 
each claimant.  
3. Identify the claimants and code accordingly 
 
An example: An article reporting the latest regulatory developments regarding 
human cloning in the US, includes 3 different arguments. The first argument is 
made by a stem cells university scientist and discusses his ideas about an ethics 
committee’s proposal regarding human cloning. The second argument is made by 
a member of a scientific organisation and is addressed to the government’s plans 
about cloning whereas the same person makes also an argument about the US 
public and its understanding of cloning. After performing argumentation analysis 
you have managed to identify the structure of the first argument, warrant and 
claim. Only the claims of the second and the third argument have been reported. 
You make separate notes for each argument. Then you return to the coding frame 
and code as follows: 
 
v17a: University scientist (25) 
v18a: Stem cell scientist 
v19a: You code for the type of the argument the scientist made, let’s say ‘strategic’ 
(2) 
v20a: Ethics committee (17) 
v21a: United States (38) 
 
Then you code for v17b 
v17a: Scientific organisation (61) 
v18b: Not relevant 
v19b: Let’s say ‘technocratic’(1) 
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v20b: Government (4) 
v21b: United States (38) 
 
Then you code for 17c 
v17c: Scientific organisation (61) 
v18c: Not relevant 
v19c: Let’s say ‘technocratic’ (1) 
v20c: People (23) 
v21c: United States (38) 
 
Some titles of Upper Houses: 
 Senate 
 House of Lords 
 Legislative Council 
 Bundesrat- Germnay 
 Council of States- Switzerland 
 Eerste Kamer- Netherlands 
 Federation Council- Russia 
 House of Councillors- Japan 
 National Council- Slovenia 
 Rajya Sabha- India 
 
 
 
Some titles of Lower Houses: 
 
 House of Representatives 
 Chamber of Deputies 
 House of Commons 
 National Assembly 
 House of Assembly 
 Chamber of representatives- Uruguay, Columbia, Belarus 
 Congress of Deputies- Spain 
 Dail- Ireland 
 Duma- Russia 
 House of Keys- Isle of Man 
 Lok Sabha- India 
 Sejm- Poland 
 Tweede Kamer- Netherlands 
 National Council- Switzerland, Austria 
 
 
Some titles of National Legislatures: 
 
 Parliament 
 321 
 Congress 
 Diet 
 National Assembly 
 Althing- Iceland 
 Bundestag- Germany 
 Cortes Generales- Spain 
 Eduskunta or Riksdag- Finland 
 Federal Assembly- Russia, Austria, Switzerland 
 Folketing- Denmark 
 Knesset- Israel 
 Legislative Yuan- Republic of China-Taiwan 
 Oireachtas- Republic of Ireland 
 Riksdag- Sweden 
 Sejm- Poland, Lithuania, Latvia 
 State Assembly- Estonia 
 Staten- Generaal- Netherlands 
 Storting- Norway 
 Tynwald- Isle of Man 
 
 
v18abcdef: This code is relevant to v17abcdef and it is a string code. It is only to be 
used when the claimant is a scientist and direct information is given about his/her area 
of research i.e. ‘sociologist’ or ‘molecular biologist’ 
v19abcdef: The variable tries to provide a typification of the argument, that is a 
general sense that captures the essence, the main idea of the argument. If unable to 
specify the type of the argument then code as ‘not identified’.  
 
 
Definition of ‘technocratic’ type of arguments 
The term ‘technocratic’ has been used to capture the tendency of the arguments under 
this type to prioritize expertise over other forms of knowledge. More specifically, a 
demarcation is performed between scientific knowledge as factual based and public 
opinion as emotive and biased. In this way, science policy is placed in the minds and 
hands of those who have access to ‘true’ facts. A one-linear model of communication 
between science and the public is assumed with people envisaged as the final 
receptors of a fait- accompli. Media reports of cloning are degraded as sensational or 
lacking objectivity. Science policy is either treated with scepticism or enthusiasm. 
Promotion of scientific knowledge and the wellbeing of the scientific community is 
the common basis for all the above. 
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Definition of ‘strategic’ type of arguments 
The term ‘strategic’ reflects the participatory role assigned to members of the public 
sphere. In contrast to the previous type of argumentation, here people, the media and 
regulators are given voice, voice of a certain weight and status. Thus, instead of being 
treated as a bad caricature of scientific knowledge, public opinion is perceived in the 
wider context of its production. People and media are portrayed as playing a central 
role in the legitimation of scientific practices while decision making is based on the 
idea of civil rights and their protection. Overall argumentation proceeds in the wider 
background of ethics regarding not only cloning research but that of science and 
humanity.  
 
v20abcdef: To which arena of the public sphere is the argument addressed? To code 
use the values in v17abcdef 
v21abcdef: Code the location of the public arena claimed about. You code separately 
for each argument. Use the values in v16. 
v22abcdef: There might be more than one metaphor user in an article or the same 
person may use two or more different metaphors. Code for each metaphor separately. 
Again you follow the same logic as shown in the example regarding arguments. 
Codes v22a-v23a-v24a-v25a-v26a are interrelated. The same holds for the rest. To 
code use the values of v17abcdef 
v23abcdef: Applicable only when the metaphor user is a scientist. If reported directly 
write down his/her area of research 
v24abcdef: Write down the full metaphor. The basis for the identification of 
metaphors in the text lies in the definition of non-literal speech as a form of wording 
intended to mean something other than what is exactly said. However, analysis of 
relevant literature indicated that there are other tropes of non-literal speech, from 
which metaphor needs to be carefully distinguished. Examples of non-literal tropes 
that are not metaphors: 
1. Irony: An utterance used to express the very opposite of what it is said. For 
example, to say ‘what lovely weather’ to refer to a dark and rainy day is 
ironic.   
2. Hyperbole: an utterance that contains exaggeration beyond what is really 
possible. For example to say ‘I told you a thousand times’ 
 323 
3. Dead metaphor: figures of speech which, although deriving from 
metaphorical concepts, have lost their value as metaphors. For example, ‘the 
law endangers current research’ is an instance of a dead metaphor. A law is 
not a living entity able to ‘endanger’ something. Although originating from 
metaphorical concepts, it is not perceived as a metaphor for it is quite common 
to use active verbs in association with immaterial concepts. 
4. Simile: an utterance describing similarities between different entities. For 
example to say that somebody ‘sits on his chair like a king on his throne’ is an 
instance of simile. A useful way to distinguish simile from metaphors is the 
use of words such as ‘as’ or ‘like’ in expressions of the former. 
 
V25abcdef: To which public arena is the metaphor addressed? Code based on the 
values of v17abcdef 
V26abcdef: Code for the location of the public arena for which the metaphor has been 
used. Use the values of v16 
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Argumentation analysis: Instructions to coders 
Basic steps to follow when conducting argumentation analysis of articles: 
1) Read through the article and try to identify whether anyone makes any 
argument either about public perceptions and/or media coverage and/or 
regulation of cloning. In some cases it helps to paraphrase the argumentative 
material (see example provided in Appendix 7).  
2) Try to identify the structure of argumentation, that is what is the main claim 
the person is making and how he/she supports it and keep a record of every 
argument, as shown in the example. In some cases you will find just the claim 
reported whereas in other cases other premises would be directly given in the 
text. Yet again, in other cases you might be able to deduce those parts of the 
argument that are missing by inferring them from what is explicitly stated. Just 
make a list of them. This will help you in the next step which involves the 
identification of the overall argumentative type.  
3) Try to identify the type of argumentation. Is it a ‘technocratic’ or a ‘strategic’ 
argument. If not sure just write down ‘not identified’.  
4) Return to the coding sheet (content analysis) and code all the relevant 
information. 
 
 
Basic steps to follow when conducting argumentation analysis of interviews 
 
1) Read the whole interview 2 or 3 times before you start coding it. 
2) While in step 1 you can identify which parts of the interview refer to public 
perceptions and which to media coverage and regulation (you can highlight 
that). 
3) Start by reading those parts of the interview where public perceptions are 
discussed. 
4) The questions posed to the interviewee will help you identify the major 
arguments. Usually an answer is given in one or two paragraphs. 
5) In those paragraphs you may identify one or more arguments and their 
constitutive elements (Data- Warrant- Backing- Claim). 
6) When you are confused, try to paraphrase what the interviewee is saying. In 
the process of paraphrasing try to keep as close to the original as possible (see 
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Appendix 12). In cases where a premise is missing try to deduce it by inferring 
from what is explicitly stated. Make a list of the inferred premises. This is 
mainly done to assist the identification of the argumentative type. 
7) Important questions to ask when identifying the argumentative parts: 
a) Claim: What is the main point of argument? What is the conclusion? 
b) Data: Where is this information drawn from? What evidence does the  
interviewee have in her-his disposal? 
c) Warrant: Why is the interviewee claiming x or y? How does he get 
there? 
d) Backing: On what basis is this explanation founded? What is the 
‘bigger picture?’  
     8)     Identify the overall type of the argument. Is it a ‘technocratic’ or a ‘strategic’  
  argument?  Do the same thing separately for media coverage and regulation. 
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Appendix 14- Reliability Test 
 
Table 1. Intercoder reliability of content analysis of articles (percentage agreement 
between two coders) 
Variable   Name         Percentage agreement 
V7    Size                              0.87 
V8    Section                                                              0.91 
V9    Format                                                               0.82 
V10          Author                                                               0.78 
V11    Type of cloning                                                 0.85 
V12    Human cloning application                               0.70 
V13ab     Public development                                           0.61 
V14ab    Focus        0.66 
V15    Controversy                                                       0.63 
V16         Location                                                             0.90 
V17abcdef   Claimant                                                            0.99 
V18abcdef   Area of research                                                0.99 
V19abcdef   Type of argument                                              0.99 
V20abcdef   Arena claimed                                                   0.99 
V21abcdef   Location of arena claimed                                 0.99 
V22abcdef   Metaphor user                                                    0.91 
V23abcdef   Area of research                                                 0.98 
V24abcdef   Metaphor                                                            0.92 
V25abcdef   Arena anchored                                                  0.91 
V26abcdef   Location of arena anchored      0.90 
 
Mean                                                                                                                 0.86 
Median                                                                                                              0.85 
 
 
Table 2. Results of inter-coder reliability of argumentation analysis of articles¹ 
ARGUMENT PARTS 
 
CODER A Data        Warrant Backing Claim    Total   Percentage 
            Agreement 
 
CODER B 
 
Data  9                  2                0                    0            11         0.86 
 
Warrant             1          8                0                     0             9         0.80 
 
Backing             0                 1                4                     1             6         0.72 
 
Claim                0                 0                 1                    28           29        0.96 
                         
                        10                11               5                     29           55        0.89 
 
                         
Percentage agreement in ‘argumentation type’¹: 0.86 
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Table 3. Results of inter-coder reliability of argumentation analysis of interviews¹ 
 
ARGUMENT PARTS 
 
CODER A Data        Warrant Backing Claim    Total   Percentage 
            Agreement 
 
CODER B 
 
Data 23                  7                    4                 0            34        0.73 
 
Warrant 4                 30                    3                 0            37        0.76 
 
Backing             0                   5                   11                1            17        0.61 
 
Claim                2                   0                      1              42            45        0.95 
                        
                        29                 42                    19             43           133       0.79 
 
 
 
Percentage agreement in ‘argumentation type’¹: 0.88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¹Percentage agreement is extracted by the formula: number of agreement in the codes 
over (number of agreement in the codes plus number of disagreement in the codes by 
coder ‘a’ plus number of disagreement in the codes by coder ‘b’) 
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Appendix 15 
 
 Salience of the public sphere in scientific coverage of SCNT research 
 
1997-2005 
 
 
Journal * Year Crosstabulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           Pearson χ² (1, N= 461) = 10.349, p =0.001 
 
 
 
 
 Size * Year Crosstabulation 
Size * Year Crosstabulation 
Count    
  Year 
  Early phase Later phase Total 
Size Small 
48% 57% 
 
53% 
 
Medium 37% 33% 35% 
Large 15% 10% 12% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
   Pearson χ² (2, N= 461) = 5.427, p =0.066 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal * Phase Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Phase 
Total   Early phase Later phase 
Journal Science 42% 58% 49% 
Nature 59% 41% 51% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
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Section * Year Crosstabulation 
Section * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
  Early phase Later phase Total 
Section News 79% 74% 77% 
Editorial 9% 9% 9% 
Correspondence 4% 8% 6% 
Commentary 5% 3% 4% 
Book reviews 3% 6% 4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
         Pearson χ² (4, N= 461) = 8.113, p =0.088 
 
 
 
 
Format * Year Crosstabulation 
Format * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
  Early phase Later phase Total 
Format Article with latest 
news/development 
76% 74% 75% 
Response, review of prior 
article 
2% 5% 4% 
Opinion piece, commentary 21% 21% 21% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
              Pearson χ² (2, N= 461) = 2.909, p =0.233 
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Author * Year Crosstabulation 
 
(An exact significance test was selected for Pearson’s chi-square, due to small 
numbers of count in the cells) 
 
Author * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
  Early phase Later phase Total 
Author In-house 81% 80% 80% 
University research group 9% 14% 12% 
Scientific organisation 0.9% 0%       0.4% 
Government research 
institution 
2% 0.9% 1.5% 
Museum 0.4% 0% 0.2% 
University/ ethics committee 
member 
0.9% 0.9%        0.9% 
University/ scientific advisory 
group 
0% 0.9% 0.4% 
Government 2% 0% 1% 
Ethics committee group 0.4% 0% 0.2% 
Biotechnology organisation 0% 0.4% 0.2% 
Other 4% 2.5% 3% 
Hospital 0% 0.5% 0.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
   Pearson χ² (11, N= 458) = 16.458, p =0.06 
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Appendix 16 
Identifying public developments 
 
Public developments * Year Crosstabulation 
Public developments * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Phase 
Total   Early phase Later phase 
Public developments Public perceptions 13% 13% 13% 
Public opinion poll 2% 2% 2% 
Media coverage 5% 5% 5% 
TV coverage 4% 2% 3% 
Newspaper 4% 4% 4% 
Legal law 2% 6% 4% 
Proposal/ draft 39% 30% 34% 
Science policy 8% 14% 11% 
Public funding 9% 10% 9% 
Public hearing 4% 7% 6% 
Other 10% 7% 9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
          Pearson χ² (10, N= 658) = 27.355, p =0.02 
 
 
 
Type of cloning * Year Crosstabulation 
Cloning * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
  Early phase Later phase Total 
Cloning Human 82% 95% 89% 
Animal 18% 5% 11% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
                         Pearson χ² (1, N= 434) = 17.918, p =0.000 
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Human cloning type * Year Crosstabulation 
Human cloning * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
  Early phase Later phase Total 
Hcloning Human reproductive 52% 40% 45% 
Human therapeutic 48% 60% 55% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
      Pearson χ² (1, N= 480) = 7.202, p =0.007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Focus of the article * Year Crosstabulation 
Focus of the story-public * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
  Early phase Later phase Total 
Focus of the story-public Main public 52% 47% 50% 
Other, public reference 48% 53% 50% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Pearson χ² (1, N= 461) = 1.354, p = 0.245 
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Controversy * Year Crosstabulation 
Public controversy * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
  Early phase Later phase Total 
Public controversy 
Balanced         39% 38%     37.5% 
Imbalanced 61% 62%     61.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 Pearson χ² (1, N= 297) = 0.103, p = 0.748 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 Location of the story * Year Crosstabulation 
Location * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
Total   Early phase Later phase 
Location UK 16% 8% 12% 
US 41% 58% 50% 
Other Europe 13% 8% 10% 
International 16% 8% 12% 
Asia 13% 11% 12% 
Other 1% 7% 4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
                   Pearson χ² (5, N= 425) = 26.951, p =0.000 
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Appendix 17 - Metaphor analysis 
 
Metaphor user * Year Crosstabulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pearson χ² (4, N= 269) = 0.988, p = 0.912 
 
 
 
 
 
Public arena anchored * Year Crosstabulation 
 
Public arena anchored * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
Total   Early Phase Later Phase 
 
Regulation 72% 83% 77% 
Media 18% 8.5% 13% 
Public perceptions 10% 8.5% 10% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Pearson χ² (2, N= 266) = 6.052, p =0.048 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Metaphor user * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
Total   Early Phase Later Phase 
metaphor user Regulators 3% 4% 3% 
Scientific-industrial complex 19% 17% 18% 
Interest groups 2% 1% 2% 
In-house writers 72% 75% 74% 
Other 4% 3% 3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
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Location of public arena anchored * Year Crosstabulation 
(An exact significance test was selected for Pearson’s chi-square, due to small 
numbers of count in the cells) 
Location of public arena * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
Total   Early phase Later Phase 
Location of public arena UK 17% 5% 11% 
US 51% 72% 62% 
Other Europe 5% 2% 3% 
International 22% 13% 17% 
Asia 5% 3% 4% 
Latin America 0% 1% 0% 
Australia 0% 4% 3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Pearson χ² (6, N= 244) = 22.946, p =0.000 
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Superordinate category * Year Crosstabulation 
(N= 269) 
Superordinate category * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
Total   Early phase Later Phase 
Superordinate category War 41% 56% 49% 
Arts/Entertainment 3% 7% 5% 
Nature 9% 7% 8% 
Economy 3% 1% 2% 
Psychopathology 14% 3% 9% 
Journey 14% 10% 12% 
Sports 4% 4% 4% 
Cloning 0% 1% 0.5% 
Religion 0% 1% 0.5% 
History 2% 1% 1% 
Engineering 0% 1% 0.5% 
Chemistry 1% 0% 0.5% 
Popular metaphors 8% 7% 7% 
 
Container 2% 2% 2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
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Superordinate category * Year Crosstabulation 
(Threshold for inclusion 5% for N= 269) 
 
(An exact significance test was selected for Pearson’s chi-square, due to small 
numbers of count in the cells) 
Superordinate category * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
Total   Early phase Later Phase 
Superordinate category War 48% 66% 57% 
Arts/Entertainment 0% 8% 8% 
Nature 10% 8% 8% 
Psychopathology 17% 0% 8% 
Journey 17% 11% 14% 
Popular metaphors 8% 7% 7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Pearson χ² (5, N= 230) = 33.819, p =0.000  
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Superordinate category * Metaphor user Crosstabulation 
 
 
 
 
Superordinate category * metaphor user Crosstabulation 
Count        
  metaphor user 
Total 
  
Regulators 
Scientific-industrial 
complex Interest groups In-house Other 
Superordinate  
category 
War 3 16 0 108 5 132 
Arts/Entertainment 0 5 0 9 0 14 
Nature 0 5 0 17 1 23 
Economy 1 1 0 5 0 7 
Psychopathology 1 4 1 17 0 23 
Journey 1 4 0 26 1 32 
Sports 0 0 0 9 1 10 
Cloning 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Religion 0 0 0 1 0 1 
History 1 0 0 1 1 3 
Engineering 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Chemistry 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Popular metaphors 2 11 4 0 0 17 
Country 0 1 0 5 0 6 
Total 9 48 5 201 9 272 
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Superordinate category * Journal Crosstabulation 
(An exact significance test was selected for Pearson’s chi-square, due to small 
numbers of count in the cells) 
Superordinate category * Journal Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Journal 
Total   Science Nature 
Superordinate category War 47% 51% 49% 
Arts/Entertainment 6% 4% 5% 
Nature 7% 9% 8% 
Economy 3% 2% 3% 
Psychopathology 8% 9% 8% 
Journey 11% 13% 12% 
Sports 3% 4% 4% 
Cloning 1% 0% 0.5% 
Religion 1% 0% 0.5% 
History 1% 2% 1% 
Engineering 1% 1% 1% 
Chemistry 1% 0% 0.5% 
Popular metaphors 8% 3% 6% 
Country 2% 2% 2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
           Pearson χ² (13, N= 269) = 7.129, p =0.950 
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Superordinate category * Scientists Crosstabulation 
(An exact significance test was selected for Pearson’s chi-square, due to small 
numbers of count in the cells) 
Superordinate * Scientists Crosstabulation 
Count      
  Scientists 
Total 
  
Public institution Private institution 
Scientific 
community/orga
nisations 
Superordinate War 29% 33% 50% 33% 
Arts 10% 11% 12.5% 11% 
Nature 16% 0% 0% 11% 
Economy 3% 0% 0% 2% 
Psychopathology 10% 0% 12.5% 8% 
Journey 6% 11% 12.5% 8% 
Cloning 3% 0% 0% 2% 
Popular metaphors 23% 45% 0% 23% 
Container 0% 0% 12.5% 2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Pearson χ² (16, N= 48) = 14.752, p =0.595 
 
 
 
 
 
 341 
 
Superordinate category * Scientists Crosstabulation 
Superordinate category * Scientists  Crosstabulation 
Count    
  Scientists  
Total   Natural scientists Social scientists 
super War 20% 0% 16% 
Arts 13% 0% 11% 
Nature 13% 25% 16% 
Psychopathology 7% 0% 5% 
Journey 20% 25% 21% 
Cloning 0% 25% 5% 
Popular metaphors 27% 25% 26% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
    
                Pearson χ² (6, N= 19) = 5.663, p =0.637 
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Superordinate category * Location of public arena anchored Crosstabulation 
Superordinate category * Location Crosstabulation 
Count          
  Location 
Total   UK US Other Europe International Asia Latin America Australia 
Superordin. War 11 85 3 23 1 1 4 128 
Arts/Entertainment 1 7 1 1 0 0 0 10 
Nature 1 11 0 4 2 0 1 19 
Economy 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Psychopathology 3 10 2 4 0 0 0 19 
Journey 5 10 1 5 6 0 3 30 
Sports 1 6 0 1 1 0 0 9 
Cloning 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Religion 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
History 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Engineering 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Chemistry 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Popular metaphors 3 8 0 3 0 0 0 14 
Country 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Total 26 152 8 42 10 1 8 247 
(Missing values were excluded) 
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Appendix 18 - Argumentation analysis 
 
 
Claimant * Year Crosstabulation 
Claimant * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
Total   Early phase Later phase 
Claimant Regulatory Authorities 28% 28% 28% 
Scientific/industrial complex 45% 45% 45% 
Interest groups 8% 6% 7% 
In-house 13% 16% 14% 
Other 6% 5% 6% 
Total 100%        100% 100% 
           Pearson χ² (4, N= 410) = 1.998, p =0.736 
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                        Public arena claimed * Year Crosstabulation 
Arena Claimed * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
Total   Early phase Later phase 
Claimed Regulatory authorities 83% 83% 83% 
Media 2% 4% 3% 
Public perceptions 15% 13% 14% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
               Pearson χ² (2, N= 410) = 1.472, p =0.479 
 
 
Location of arena claimed * Year Crosstabulation 
 
(An exact significance test was selected for Pearson’s chi-square, due to small 
numbers of count in the cells) 
Location * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
Total   Early phase Later phase 
Location UK 13% 2% 8% 
US 52% 61% 56% 
Other Europe 5% 4% 4% 
International 18% 20% 19% 
Asia 10% 8% 9.5% 
Latin America 0% 0.5% 0% 
Australia 2% 3.5% 3% 
Other 0% 1% 0.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
                    Pearson χ² (7, N= 374) = 20.483, p =0.002 
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Argumentation type * Year Crosstabulation 
Type of argumentation * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
  Early phase Later phase Total 
Type of argumentation Technocratic 54% 53% 53% 
Strategic 40% 33% 36% 
Not identified 6% 14% 11% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
 
 
Argumentation type * Year Crosstabulation 
Argumentation type * Year Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Year 
Total   Early Phase Later Phase 
Argumentation type Technocratic 58% 61% 60% 
Strategic 42% 39% 40% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
             Pearson χ² (1, N= 367) = 0.526, p =0.468 
 
 
 
Journal * Argumentation type  Crosstabulation 
Journal * Type of argumentation Crosstabulation 
Count      
  Type of argumentation 
  Technocratic Strategic Not identified Total 
Journal Science 52% 50% 75% 53% 
Nature 48% 50% 25% 47% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Journal * Argumentation type Crosstabulation 
Journal * Technocratic/ Strategic Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Type 
  Technocratic Strategic Total 
Journal Science 52% 50% 51% 
Nature 48% 50% 49% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
                          Pearson χ² (1, N= 367) = 0.167, p =0.683 
 
 
 
Claimant *Argumentation type Crosstabulation 
Claimant * Type of argumentation Crosstabulation 
Count      
  Type of argumentation 
Total   Technocratic Strategic Not identified 
Claimant Regulatory Authorities 15% 43% 39.5% 28% 
Scientific/industrial complex 56% 29% 39.5% 45% 
Interest groups 2% 15% 7% 7% 
In-house 22% 6% 7% 14% 
Other 5% 7% 7% 6% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Claimant *Argumentation type Crosstabulation 
Claimant * Technocratic/strategic Crosstabulation 
   Type 
Total 
   Technocratic 
argumentation 
Strategic 
argumentation 
Claimant Regulatory Authorities Count 33 64 97 
Expected Count 57.6 39.4 97.0 
% within Claimant 34.0% 66.0% 100.0% 
% within Type 15.1% 43.0% 26.4% 
Scientific/Industrial complex Count 123 44 167 
Expected Count 99.2 67.8 167.0 
% within Claimant 73.7% 26.3% 100.0% 
% within Type 56.4% 29.5% 45.5% 
Interest groups Count 4 22 26 
Expected Count 15.4 10.6 26.0 
% within Claimant 15.4% 84.6% 100.0% 
% within Type 1.8% 14.8% 7.1% 
In-house Count 47 9 56 
Expected Count 33.3 22.7 56.0 
% within Claimant 83.9% 16.1% 100.0% 
% within Type 21.6% 6.0% 15.3% 
Other Count 11 10 21 
Expected Count 12.5 8.5 21.0 
% within Claimant 52.4% 47.6% 100.0% 
% within Type 5.0% 6.7% 5.7% 
Total Count 218 149 367 
Expected Count 218.0 149.0 367.0 
% within Claimant 59.4% 40.6% 100.0% 
% within Type 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Pearson χ² (4, N= 367) = 75.261, p =0.000 
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Scientists * Argumentation type Crosstabulation 
Institution * Argumentation type Crosstabulation 
   Argumentation type 
Total    Technocratic Strategic 
Institution Public Institution Count 67 25 92 
Expected Count 67.8 24.2 92.0 
% within Institution 72.8% 27.2% 100.0% 
% within Argumentation type 54.5% 56.8% 55.1% 
% of Total 40.1% 15.0% 55.1% 
Private Institution Count 21 1 22 
Expected Count 16.2 5.8 22.0 
% within Institution 95.5% 4.5% 100.0% 
% within Argumentation type 17.1% 2.3% 13.2% 
% of Total 12.6% .6% 13.2% 
Scientific 
community/organisations 
Count 35 18 53 
Expected Count 39.0 14.0 53.0 
% within Institution 66.0% 34.0% 100.0% 
% within Argumentation type 28.5% 40.9% 31.7% 
% of Total 21.0% 10.8% 31.7% 
Total Count 123 44 167 
Expected Count 123.0 44.0 167.0 
% within Institution 73.7% 26.3% 100.0% 
% within Argumentation type 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 73.7% 26.3% 100.0% 
Pearson χ² (2, N=167) = 7.005, p =0.030 
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Scientists * Argumentation type Crosstabulation 
scientists * type of argumentation Crosstabulation 
Count     
  type of argumentation 
Total 
  Technocratic 
argumentation 
Strategic 
argumentation 
scientists Natural scientist 65% 44% 58% 
Social Scientist 35% 56% 42% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
    Pearson χ² (1, N= 73) = 2.851, p =0.091 
 
 
Location of arena claimed * Argumentation type Crosstabulation 
 
(An exact significance test was selected for Pearson’s chi-square, due to small 
numbers of count in the cells) 
Location claimed * Argumentation type Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Argumentation type 
  Technocratic Strategic Total 
Location claimed UK 4% 16% 9% 
US 64% 49% 58% 
Other Europe 5% 2% 3% 
International 12% 21% 16% 
Asia 19 
10% 
15 
11% 
34 
10% 
Latin America 0.5% 0% 0% 
Australia 3.5% 1% 3% 
Other 1% 0% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
               Pearson χ² (7, N= 332) = 25.709, p =0.000 (Missing values were excluded) 
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Appendix 19- Argumentation analysis 
 
 
Types of argumentation * Seniority Crosstabulation 
Argumentation type * Seniority Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Seniority 
Total   Senior Junior 
Argumentation type Technocratic 76% 79% 77% 
Strategic 24% 21% 23% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
                 Pearson χ² (1, N= 363) = 0.349, p =0.555 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of argumentation * Gender Crosstabulation 
 Argumentation type * Gender Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Gender 
Total   Male Female 
Type Technocratic 79% 74% 77% 
Strategic 21% 26% 23% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
                     Pearson χ² (1, N= 363) = 0.953, p =0.329 
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Type of argumentation *Institution Crosstabulation 
Argumentation type * Research institution Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Research institution 
Total 
  
Academic 
institution 
Government 
research 
Institution 
Argumentation type Technocratic 77% 80% 77% 
Strategic 23% 20% 23% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
           Pearson χ² (1, N= 363) = 0.540, p =0.462 
 
 
 
 
Type of argumentation * Specialisation Crosstabulation 
Argumentation type * Specialisation Crosstabulation 
Count       
  Specialisation 
Total   Human SCNT Animal SCNT hES research other 
Argumentation type Technocratic 66% 76% 80% 83% 77% 
Strategic 34% 24% 20% 17% 23% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Pearson χ² (3, N= 363) = 6.796, p =0.079 
 
 
 
Type of argumentation * Nationality Crosstabulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
                   Pearson χ² (1, N= 363) = 1.603, p =0.205 
 
 
Argumentation type * Nationality Crosstabulation 
Count     
  Nationality 
Total   UK Foreigner 
Argumentation type Technocratic 80% 74% 77% 
Strategic 20% 26% 23% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
